6 - The Regulatory Policy Network in Vietnam

Summary

Like other scholars I assumed that regulation, policymaking and implementation are the exclusive power of the Vietnamese Communist party-state. However, talking about the Vietnamese state as a monolith does not reflect reality: the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) often finds itself in a wide gulf between ideology on the one hand and reality, as experienced by the people, on the other (Koh 2001, p. 535). This chronic problem of “unimplementability” (Fforde 1986) can be traced back to various historical sources including how the Vietnamese nation-state came into being after the struggle against colonial powers and the still local forces within the country (cf. Elliot 1988; Vasavakul 1995; Kerkvliet 1995). Furthermore, market-like institutions and relationships in Vietnam evolved informally within the framework of a command economy since the late 1970s. The decision-making process and the relationship with the private sector has thus often remained informal (Painter 2005a, p. 268) (see also chapter 3, 4 and 5).

During the transition process a variety of private actors has — more often informally than formally — entered the scene of social policy. As a consequence, the state lags behind in defining its own role in this new public-private welfare mix. Rules and regulations seem to inevitably show inconsistencies and ambiguities. New laws contradict existing ones or are formulated vaguely. As the communication between the different actors (public and private; global, national and local) lacks clarity, masses of “delusional policies” exist on paper. They have little or no positive impact or any realistic chance of becoming competitive because they are unfunded, not feasible, or simply wrongheaded (Harvard Vietnam Program 2008, p. 53). The problem is both a lack of “political will — and to some extent capacity — to coordinate, implement and enforce them” (Transparency International 2006, p. 14).

The rationale of the national top-down implementation model is thus quite unrealistic in a setting of strong provinces as well as fiscal and administrative decentralization. Complex relationships are fostered due to the fact that officials often hold positions in different horizontal and vertical spheres, where a head of the provincial People's Committee can simultaneously be a member of the National Assembly and a member of a ministry.