Foreword

Summary

In 2004 and 2005, the Philippines' gross domestic product grew by 6 and 5.1 per cent, respectively. In the Southeast Asian context, this growth rate places the country behind Singapore and Vietnam, but it compares fairly well with those of Indonesia, Thailand and even Malaysia. Because of this, international credit rating agencies have been upgrading their ratings for the Philippines. Government figures show that, under the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the Philippine economy grew by an average of 4.4 per cent a year, faster than in the three previous presidencies.

Yet, the question in many people's minds is this: why does the Philippines continue to be outside the “radar screens” of most international investors, including those from Singapore and other capital-exporting ASEAN countries? Why has the percentage of the country's population living below the poverty line remained stuck at 30 per cent (in 2003), which, in ASEAN, puts the Philippines in the same league as Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar and worse off than Vietnam (19.5 per cent in 2004)? In spite of the steady macroeconomic growth, why do so many Filipinos have to leave their homeland and their families to seek jobs? If economic growth brings stability and contentment, why do the Philippines' two insurgencies — the communist and the Muslim — so stubbornly persist? Why do Philippine politics appear so volatile? Why do elements of organized religion and the military find it necessary to intervene in the political process?

Is it just a matter of the normal time lag between a macroeconomic surge and its trickle-down effect? Is it a question of unjustified impressions purveyed by media free from undemocratic constraints? Is the problem the country's rapid population growth? Is it the consequence of political decisions? Is it a matter of political will or political institutions? On the other hand, are there niches of progress that are not obvious to many?