4 - The Military in Philippine Politics

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Until the imposition of martial law in the Philippines in September 1972, the principles of civilian control and supremacy of civilian authority over the military governed the relationship between the civilian government and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). As a consequence of the strategy used against the agrarian-based Huk insurgency during the late 1940s to the early 1950s, the role of the military in society slowly expanded beyond the original triad of external defence, internal security, and peace and order to include socio-economic functions. However, the constitutional and institutional framework, including civilian oversight over the military, and a body of civil and political rights that ensured democratic governance, including regular elections, continued to define civil-military relations and the role of the military in Philippine politics.

This changed with Martial Law. The legislature was disbanded, civil and political freedoms were suspended, political parties were outlawed, newspapers and other media outlets were controlled, the private property of Marcos’ political opponents was sequestered on the pretext of their outstanding loans from government financial institutions, and the military became a partner of martial law and authoritarian rule. This partnership lasted some fourteen years, and in its wake left civil-military relations in disarray. More disastrously for democracy, it created in the AFP members an “interventionist” tendency.

This chapter focuses on the military in Philippine politics, particularly the implications of martial law for the country's military, civil-military relations, and democratic governance in general. It attempts to explain the emergence of an “interventionist” role for the military by documenting:

1. • the military's role expansion without civilian oversight institutions and a democratic political system;

2. • the role the AFP played in the 1986 and 2001 political successions and in providing political stability and regime survival in the 1980s and at present;

3. • the military's role in countering communist insurgency and Moro separatism; and

4. • the absence of good governance which helped shape its “interventionist” role.