It is now over twenty-one years since a group of scholastic adventurers meeting in New Orleans established the American Political Science Association, and started the organization upon its uncertain course. Looking back over the days that intervene between our infancy and this, the attainment of our twenty-first meeting, one may trace the lines of advance in our undertaking. As one of the charter members I may be permitted the liberty of reviewing briefly some of the more significant fields in this development.

One of the most striking advances in research during the last twenty-one years has been that centering around the problem of the modern city. Research centers, some of them within and some of them without university walls, have sprung up all over the country, and municipal research workers have contributed materially to the intelligent analysis of urban phenomena and to the direction of the growth of our municipalities. In no field has there been more scientific and practical political research than here. Goodnow was most conspicuous in this field in the earlier days and Munro in the later.

The study of political parties has been rescued from neglect and has been made an integral part of instruction and the object of many specific studies, notably those of Holcombe, Rice, and Gosnell. Along with parties, public opinion has been made an object of more intensive inquiry, as in the suggestive studies of Lippman and Allport.

To students of international relations it has become almost a commonplace that among the most significant and permanent results of the World War has been the changed international status of the republics of Latin America. As a result of the war and post-war developments in these states, the traditional New World isolation in South America, as well as in North America, is a thing of the past. To our leading sister republics is no longer applicable the half-contemptuous phrase, current in the far-off days before 1914, that Latin America stands on the margin of international life. The new place in the comity of nations won by a number of these states is evidenced—to take one of the most obvious examples—by the raising of the legations of certain non-American powers to the rank of embassies, either during or immediately after the war. In the case of Brazil, for instance, where prior to 1914 only the United States maintained an ambassador, at the present time Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Portugal, and Japan maintain diplomatic representatives of this rank.

Yet all things considered one of the most fruitful developments in the domain of international relations has been the share taken by our southern neighbors in the work of the League of Nations. All of the Latin American republics which severed relations with Germany or declared war against that country were entitled to participate in the Peace Conference. As a consequence, eleven of these states affixed their signatures to the Treaty of Versailles, an action subsequently ratified in all cases except Ecuador.

Among the men who have profoundly affected the development of mankind and have given their best energies to the promotion of toleration, reason, and justice, Voltaire stands without a peer. Gifted as he so evidently was by nature for intellectual leadership and literary supremacy in France and in Europe, he was never content with these honors alone. His prolonged activity was to mean more to the world than an author's gift of over half a hundred volumes, filled with flashing wit and sparkling with the brightness and charm of a brilliant writer. Upon everything in France Voltaire fastened his keen gaze, and with rare insight and remarkable discrimination he analyzed the situation, devoting his life to an attempt to win recognition of the essential and pressing need of his program of reform.

He had read the history of all nations and of all times, and had studied politics and literature, philosophy and science. He did not always go to the heights and depths of things unknown; he may even at times have been superficial. But with versatility far surpassing that of most mortals, with an adroitness in expression and thought, with flexibility in manner, he used his knowledge and pressed his cause, so that willing homage was paid to his gifts and genius by the man of moderate intelligence, by the philosopher, by the humble citizen, and by the sovereign. Yet, appreciated as Voltaire was by those who realized the importance of his endeavors, he had to submit to indignities from those who could have given him the most assistance.

Perhaps no convention of our day is more acceptable to both the political scientist and the man on the street than the employment of the simple-majority device to determine the will of a group. Even the ponderous German scholar Otto von Gierke is drawn to the facetious conclusion that it is only in the institution of matrimony that the majority principle cannot be used. Exceptions, of course, exist. Examples familiar to students of American government include the two-thirds and three-fourths majorities of the federal amending process, the two-thirds vote of the United States Senate in the approval of treaties, and like majorities in the overriding of presidential and gubernatorial vetoes. But these exceptions do not invalidate the commonly accepted “naturalness” of decisions according to simple majority. The theory has probably been expressed best by Grotius: “It is unnatural,” he says, “that the majority should submit to the minority—hence the majority naturally counts as the whole, if no compacts or positive law prescribe a different form of procedure.”

Although it now finds almost universal acceptance, the practice of reaching decisions by counting heads has not always prevailed, and even where employed its use has been limited and contingent. Speaking historically, the modern dogma of majority rule is a comparatively recent development, although it is probably an outgrowth of the various theories of majority rule of days gone.

The decisions arising under the commerce clause of the Constitution during the 1924 term of the Supreme Court did not involve any striking extension of national authority in that field. There was no case approaching in significance the Recapture Clause Case decided in the previous term. However, the reinforcement of a familiar principle through a striking application of it, or the lucid and pungent expression of an old doctrine, lends some significance to several cases which otherwise have no far-reaching importance.

In the case of Brooks v. United States the court sustained the constitutionality of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act of 1919. The act subjected to heavy penalties any one who transported or caused to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce any motor vehicle, knowing it to have been stolen, and any one who, with the same guilty knowledge, “shall receive, conceal, store, barter, sell, or dispose of any motor vehicle, moving as, or which is a part of, or which constitutes interstate or foreign commerce.” It is certainly no surprise to learn from the opinion of Chief Justice Taft that the power to regulate commerce which is broad enough to enable Congress to bar from interstate transportation lottery tickets, diseased cattle, adulterated food, prize-fight films, and the like, and to penalize the interstate transportation of women for immoral purposes, is a power which can likewise be used to punish those who abuse the privileges of interstate and foreign commerce by using them in the furtherance of larceny or the disposal of stolen goods.

For six years Canada has suffered from a peculiar interaction of economic and political fatalities; and the indeterminate outcome of the general election of October 29, 1925, did little, if anything, toward straightening out the confused situation. First of all may be noted the way in which this situation developed; then some attempt may be made at an analysis of the setback which Premier King's government sustained at the polls.

In the fall of 1925 a unique electoral experiment was carried out in the Irish Free State. Nineteen senators were elected according to a system which presents a peculiar combination of electoral features. The aim of the framers of the Free State constitution was to provide a second chamber composed of men of experience and recognized ability. To this end they devised the following system: (1) the entire nation was to serve as a single electoral constituency; (2) the nomination of the candidates was left to Parliament; (3) the franchise was limited to citizens over thirty years of age; (4) the Hare system (single transferable vote) of proportional representation was to be used for the marking and counting of the ballots; (5) the senators were to be elected for twelve-year terms; and (6) onefourth of the senators were to be elected at each triennial election.

The constitution adopted by the constituent assembly at Tirana on March 3, 1925, is the third organic law of the country to appear in the last twelve years. The first was the organic statute issued at Valona on April 10, 1914, by the International Commission of Control in Albania. By the terms of this instrument the new state was constituted a hereditary monarchy under the protection of Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. The next act organizing the state was the provisional constitution adopted by Albanian leaders at Lushnia in January, 1920, and amended in 1922.