Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 December 2015
The American republics, for the sake of their own reputation and credit—if not for other humanitarian and altruistic considerations —“ought to intervene indirectly in the internal dissensions of the continent. Such intervention might consist, at the least, in the denial of recognition to de facto governments springing from revolution against the constitutional order.” Carlos Tobar, ex-foreign minister of Ecuador and the author of these views, thus expressed his concern over the problem of political instability in early twentieth-century Latin America. Constant revolutions and civil warfare he considered the curse of the region and the principal barrier to economic and social progress. His remedy was to put the combined diplomatic weight of all American nations against revolutionary governments, believing that such intervention would remove new, unconstitutional governments from power, and that, eventually, dissatisfied political factions in Latin America would give up their customary resort to violence. This pre-Wilsonian doctrine of legitimacy—known as the Tobar Doctrine—elicited little favorable response from Latin America’s leaders, already wary of any precept which could be used as justification for foreign interference in internal matters. Because Tobar’s anti-revolutionary entreaty ran directly counter to Latin American thought, it appeared headed for oblivion, except for a desperate situation in Central America in the first years of the twentieth century.
1 Quoted in García, Leónidas, “La doctrina Tobar,” Revista de la Sociedad “Jurídico-Literaria” (Quito), I, n.s. (January-February, 1913), 28.Google Scholar
2 Ibid., 31; see also, Rivas, Carlos J. Arangua, La intervención: Doctrinas de Monroe, Drago y Tobar (Santiago de Chile, 1924), 225–30 Google Scholar; Anderson, Luís, “El gobierno de facto,” Revista de Derecho Internacional (Havana), VII (June, 1925), 332–34 Google Scholar; and Larnaude, F., “Les Gouvernements de Fait,” Révue General de Droit International Public (Paris), XXVIII (1921), 498–99.Google Scholar
3 There are many able studies of the relations between the United States and the nations of the Caribbean area in the first two decades of the twentieth century. For example: Callcott, Wilfrid H., Caribbean Policy of the United States (Baltimore, 1942)Google Scholar; Hill, Howard C., Roosevelt and the Caribbean (Chicago, 1927)Google Scholar; Jones, Chester Lloyd, Caribbean since 1900 (New York, 1936)Google Scholar; Munro, Dana G., Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900–1921 (Princeton, 1964)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Perkins, Dexter, United States and the Caribbean (Cambridge, Mass., 1947)Google Scholar. None of these, however, deals adequately with Central America or the recognition question. For Mexican interests in Central America to 1910 see Villegas, Daniel Cosío, Historia moderna de México: El porfiriato. La vida política exterior: Parte primera (Mexico City, 1960)Google Scholar; and Mendieta, Salvador, Alrededor del problema unionista centroamericana (2 vols.; Barcelona, n. d.), 42–44.Google Scholar
4 Papers Relating to the foreign Relations of the United States, 1907, II, 637–39 (hereinafter cited as Foreign Relations). For a chronology of the events leading up to the Washington Conference, see Osegueda, Raúl, Operación centroamérica (Mexico City, 1957), 40–41 Google Scholar. The Mexican view of day-to-day developments in Central America in 1906–1907 is available in the diary of the Mexican minister to Central America, Federico Gamboa. Gamboa, , Mi diario (2 vols., second series; Mexico City, 1934–1938), I, 167–261.Google Scholar
5 The work of the conference is ably summarized in Scott, James Brown, “The Central American Peace Conference of 1907,” American Journal of International Law, II (January, 1908), 121–27 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Official copies of the various agreements are found in Documentos relativos á la conferencia de paz centroamericana … de 1901 (San Salvador, 1908); and in Foreign Relations, 1907, II, 645–722.
6 Ibid., II, 696.
7 Brown, Philip Marshall, “The Recognition of New Governments,” American Journal of International Law, XXVI (April, 1932), 337 Google Scholar; see also Fenwick, Charles G., International Law (3rd ed.; New York, 1948), 158–68 Google Scholar; Oppenheim, L.F.L., International Law: A Treatise, ed. by Lauterpacht, H. (2 vols.; 8th ed.; New York, 1955), I, 131–32Google Scholar; Chen, Ti-Chiang, International Law of Recognition: With Special Reference to Practice in Great Britain and the United States (London, 1951), 119–21 Google Scholar; Hackworth, Green H., Digest of International Law (8 vols.; Washington, 1940), I, 175–76Google Scholar; and Goebel, Julius, Recognition Policy of the United States (New York, 1915), 177 ff.Google Scholar
8 Jessup, Philip C., Elihu Root (2 vols.; New York, 1938), 511 Google Scholar. See also the official report of the Honduran delegation in Gaceta oficial (Tegucigalpa), April 10, 1908.
9 Foreign Relations, 1907, II, 665–80.
10 Cosío Villegas, Historia moderna, V, 670–78.
11 Policarpo Bonilla, Honduran delegate to the Conference of 1907, later declared that the Central Americans had been left “in absolute freedom to do as they thought best.” Bonilla, , Wilson Doctrine: How the Speech of President Wilson at Mobile, Ala., Has Been Interpreted by the Latin-American Countries (New York, 1914), 19 Google Scholar. An excellent example of Central American enthusiasm for Tobar is the anonymous article, “Los tratados de Washington,” Centro-América, I (January, 1909), 12–15.
12 Anderson, , “El gobierno de facto” Revista de Derecho Internacional, VII (June, 1925), 334 Google Scholar. Anderson headed the Costa Rican delegation at the 1907 conference. See also, Wright, Theodore Jr., “Free Elections in the Latin American Policy of the United States,” Political Science Quarterly, LXXIV (March, 1959), 89–112 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mendieta, Alrededor del problema unionista, 47–50.
13 Philander C. Knox to Felipe Rodríguez (Nicaraguan chargé d’affaires in Washington), December 1, 1909, Foreign Relations, 1909, 455–57. See also Taft’s message to Congress, December 7, 1909, ibid., xviii.
14 Cosío Villegas, Historia moderna, V, 726.
15 William H. Taft to Juan J. Estrada, January 1, 1911, Foreign Relations, 1911, 648. For details on the revolution against Zelaya, see Denny, Harold N., Dollars for Bullets: The Story of American Rule in Nicaragua (New York, 1929), 63–94 Google Scholar; Cox, Isaac Joslin, Nicaragua and the United States, 1909–1921 (Boston, 1927), 707–710 Google Scholar; Saenz, Vicente, Norteamericanización de Centro América (San José, 1925), 48–65 Google Scholar; and Munro, Dana G., Five Republics of Central America (New York, 1918), 227–36 Google Scholar. Zelaya’s, own version is in his La revolución de Nicaragua y los Estados Unidos (Madrid, 1910)Google Scholar, passim.
16 Cosío Villegas, Historia moderna, V, 714–32.
17 Little scholarly research has been done on such commonplace, yet complex events as Central American rebellions. The story of this one can be pieced together in such accounts as Deutsch, Hermann B., The Incredible Yanqui: The Career of Lee Christmas (New York, 1931), 102–169 Google Scholar; Baker, Ernest H., “United Fruit II: The Conquest of Honduras,” Fortune, VII (March, 1933), 31–33 Google Scholar; Dávila, Miguel R., Mensaje dirigido al soberano congreso nacional … de 1911 (Tegucigalpa, 1911), 8–9 Google Scholar. Paredes, Lucas, Liberalismo y nacionalismo: Transfuguismo político (Tegucigalpa, 1963)Google Scholar, passim.; Otero, Luís Marinas, Honduras (Madrid, 1963), 374 Google Scholar; Sanso, Aro, Policarpo Bonilla: Algunos apuntes biográficos (Mexico City, 1936), 389–93 Google Scholar; and Ramos, Miguel A., Divulgaciones militares (Tegucigalpa, 1929), 205 Google Scholar. Ramos provides a chronological listing of military disturbances in Honduras up to 1925.
18 Foreign Relations, 1911, 291–94.
19 Mariñas Otero, Honduras, 373–75.
20 Ibid., 379–80; Ramos, Divulgaciones militares, 205; Bográn, Francisco, Mensaje, 1920 (Tegucigalpa, 1920), 11.Google Scholar
21 Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby to Minister in Guatemala, June 21, 1920, Foreign Relations, 1920, III, 754. For the fall of Estrada Cabrera, see Ospina, Carlos Wyld, El autócrata: ensayo político-social (Guatemala City, 1929), 187–267 Google Scholar; Jones, Chester Lloyd, Guatemala: Past and Present (Minneapolis, 1940), 65–69.Google Scholar
22 Costa Rican writers, drawn by this unusual experience with rebellion and military government, have given considerable attention to the Tinoco episode. See, for example, Oreamuno, José Rafael, comp., La caída del gobierno constitucional en Costa Rica: el golpe de estado del 27 de enero de 1917 (New York, 1919)Google Scholar; Volio, Jorge, El año funesto y la traición del 21 de enero de 1917 (Panama City, 1918)Google Scholar; Flores, Alfredo González, El petróleo y la política en Costa Rica (San José, 1920)Google Scholar; Tinoco, Federico, Páginas de ayer (Paris, 1928)Google Scholar; Alfaro, Carlos Monge, Historia de Costa Rica (11th ed.; San José, 1962), 255–82 Google Scholar. The two best general accounts of the Tinoco imbroglio in English are Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy, 426–48; and Buell, Raymond Leslie, “The United States and Central American Stability,” Foreign Policy Reports, VII (July 8, 1931), 177–84.Google Scholar
23 Secretary of State Robert Lansing to United States minister in Costa Rica, February 9, 1917, Foreign Relations, 1917, 307. John Foster Dulles, who was sent by Lansing on a secret, fact-finding mission to Costa Rica, reported that the country had accepted Tinoco, and he therefore recommended recognition. Wilson rejected the advice. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy, 433; Dulles, , “Conceptions and Misconceptions Regarding Intervention,” Annals of the American Academy, CXLIV (July, 1929), 103.Google Scholar
24 Wilson, Woodrow to Lansing, , February 7, 1917, in Lansing Papers, 1914–1920 (2 vols.; Washington, 1940), II, 518Google Scholar; Lansing, Robert, War Memoirs (New York, 1935), 309.Google Scholar
25 Rica, Costa, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria, 1917 (San José, 1918), v-viGoogle Scholar; R. Fernández Guardia to Lansing, April 9, 1917, Foreign Relations, 1917, 322; Carlos Lara, Costa Rican foreign minister, to Honduran foreign minister, July 17, 1917, in Valladares, Paulino, Movimiento unionista: iniciativa del Señor Presidente Doctor Francisco Bertrand (Tegucigalpa, 1917), 1–3.Google Scholar
26 Lansing to Wilson, August 16, 1919, Foreign Relations, 1919, 852.
27 Lansing to Central American legations, September 21, 1917, ibid., 1917, 343. An explanation of Honduras’ position is in Bertrand, Francisco, Mensaje dirigido al congreso nacional … de 1918 (Tegucigalpa, 1918), 7–8.Google Scholar
28 Lansing to United States minister to Honduras, November 4, 1917, Foreign Relations, 1917, 270; Acting Secretary of State Phillips to United States minister to Nicaragua, June 4, 1918, ibid., 1918, 265. Carlos José Gutiérrez maintains that these official admonitions had no effect and that Nicaragua continued to encourage resistance to Tinoco, . “Neutralidad e intervención,” Revista de la Universidad de Costa Rica, XIV (November, 1956), 30–31.Google Scholar
29 Tinoco, Páginas de ayer, 71–72; Loria, Rafael Obregón, Conflictos militares y políticos de Costa Rica (San José, 1951), 94–102 Google Scholar. Ramón Zelaya, a political prisoner of the Tinoco régime, has an excellent account of the last days of the collapsing government. Una prisión honrosa (San José, 1919), 175–95.
30 The policy of the United States in regard to the succession in Costa Rica was inflexible. Lansing advised the United States consul in San José: “You may make it public that the Government of the United States will not recognize Juan Bautista Quirós as present president. The governmental power should be deposited in the hands of Francisco Aguilar Barquero. …” Lansing to Benjamin Chase, August 30, 1919, Foreign Relations, 1919, 857.
31 Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby to Chase, August 2, 1920, ibid., 1920, I, 834.
32 Conference on Central American Affairs (Washington, 1923), 288–89. In addition to the General Treaty the delegates signed many other conventions and agreements pertaining to exchange of persons, tariff revision, and the like. A convenient summary of the conference is Scott, James Brown, “The Central American Peace Conference,” American Journal of International Law, XVII (April, 1923), 313–19.Google Scholar
33 Hughes to Franklin Morales, Minister to Honduras, June 30, 1923, Foreign Relations, 1923, II, 432–34; see also Hughes, Charles Evans, “Observations on the Monroe Doctrine,” American Journal of International Law, XVII (October, 1923), 611–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
34 Vicente Sáenz, a Costa Rican journalist who conducted a vigorous campaign against ratification of the Treaty of 1923, called the earlier treaty “a peace convention among five sister nations,” and the later one “a pact of protection signed by five governments under the shadow of the White House.” Sáenz, Norteamericanización de Centro América, 29.
35 Ibid., 29–79; Sáenz, Vicente, Rompiendo cadenas: las del imperialismo en Centro América y en otras repúblicas del continente (2nd ed.; Mexico City, 1951), 43–45, 215Google Scholar; Rica, Costa, Exteriores, Ministerio de Relaciones, Memoria, 1924 (San José, 1925), 130 Google Scholar; Gay-Calbó, Enrique, La América indefensa (Havana, 1925), 62–70 Google Scholar. For a brief account of the confused situation in Honduras with respect to the treaty, see Honduras, , Exteriores, Ministerio de Relaciones, Memoria, 1922–1923 (Tegucigalpa, 1924), 5–6.Google Scholar
36 There is practically no scholarly analysis of this critical period in the history of Honduras. The best account in English is Hackett, Charles W., “The Background of the Revolution in Honduras,” Review of Reviews, LXIX (April, 1924), 390–96 Google Scholar. An excellent study of United States support of free elections in Honduras, without benefit of Honduran sources, is Wright, Theodore P. Jr., “Honduras: A Case Study of United States Support of Free Elections in Central America,” Hispanic American Historical Review, XL (May, 1960), 212–23 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Some useful, personal accounts by Hondurans are as follows: Ramos, Divulgaciones militares, 205–206; Sanso, Policarpo Bonilla, 447–65, 536–42; and Paredes, Liberalismo y nacionalismo, 227–30, 234–39, 276–81.
37 Hughes to Morales, December 21, 1923, Foreign Relations, 1923, II, 449.
38 Welles to Hughes, April 19, 1924, ibid., 1924, II, 309; Costa Rica, Ministerio de Exteriores, Relaciones, Memoria, 1924, 97–98.Google Scholar
39 The principal effect of all this was to delay the ascent of General Carías Andino to the presidency; in 1932 he won the presidential elections and ruled as a dictator until 1949.
40 Uclés, Alberto, et al., Informe de la delegación de Honduras a la Conferencia Centroamericana celebrada en Washington (Tegucigalpa, 1923), 4–5 Google Scholar; Sáenz, Rompiendo cadenas, 169–71.
41 Charles C. Eberhardt, Minister to Nicaragua, to Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, October 25, 1925, Foreign Relations, 1925, II, 631; Honduras, Ministerio de Exteriores, Relaciones, Memoria, 1925–1926 (Tegucigalpa, 1926), 8 Google Scholar. See also Woolsey, Lester H., “The Non-Recognition of the Chamorro Government in Nicaragua,” American Journal of International Law, XX (July, 1926), 543–49 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Stimson, Henry L., American Policy in Nicaragua (New York, 1927), 23.Google Scholar
42 Sáenz, Norteamerìcanización de Centro America, 221–39; Cox, Nicaragua and the United States, 780–81.
43 State Department press release, Foreign Relations, 1926, II, 809; Honduras, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria, 1925–1926, 12.
44 New York Times, November 27, 1928.
45 Ibid., January 2, 1929.
46 Dana G. Munro, a State Department official in the early 1920’s, has written an able defense of the Treaty of 1923: “The Basis of American Intervention in the Caribbean,” Current History, XVII (September, 1927), 857–61. Few specialists in international law have endorsed non-recognition doctrines. For a rare defense of the Tobar idea by an international lawyer, see Fenwick, Charles G., “The Recognition of New Governments Instituted by Force,” American Journal of International Law, XXXVIII (July, 1944), 448–52 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. That the Central American governments were willing officially to continue the experiment is demonstrated by an agreement, signed in May, 1927, by all five republics, to hold consultations before any new government in Central America was recognized. Honduras, , Exteriores, Ministerio de Relaciones, Memoria, 1926–1927 (Tegucigalpa, 1927), 5.Google Scholar
47 Stimson himself, soon to be called upon to enforce the Treaty of 1923, saw little of merit in the non-recognition policy. From his mission in Nicaragua as special representative of the United States in 1927 he reported to President Calvin Coolidge as follows:
Owing to government controlled elections the only way to accomplish change in party control of Government is by revolution or coup d’etat. By forbidding the latter, [the] Washington conferences have strongly tended to make existing party control permanent, and the United States as strongest sponsor of said conferences becomes [the] target of hatred of [the] opposition. In dealing with the Central American situation, those conferences have thus treated the symptom and not the disease.
Quoted in Newmann, William L. Jr., Recognition of Governments in the Americas (Washington, 1947), 23 Google Scholar. In his book Stimson was only slightly less critical. See Stimson, American Policy in Nicaragua, 18. Among other critics are to be counted the following: Anderson, Chandler P., “Our Policy of Non-Recognition in Central America,” American Journal of International Law, XXV (April, 1931), 298–301 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Edwin M. Borchard, “The Unrecognized Government in American Courts,” ibid., XXVI (April, 1932), 261–71; Philip Marshall Brown, “The Recognition of New Governments Instituted by Force,” ibid., XXXVIII (July, 1944), 449; Philip C. Jessup, “The Estrada Doctrine,” ibid., XXV (October, 1931), 721; Rippy, J. Fred, “The ‘Right of Revolution’ in Latin America,” Current History, XXXIV (April, 1931), 12–16 Google Scholar; Buell, Raymond Leslie, “The United States and Central American Revolutions,” Foreign Policy Reports, VII (July 8, 1931), 193 Google Scholar; Dennis, Lawrence, “Revolution, Recognition and Intervention,” Foreign Affairs, IX (January, 1931), 204–221 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cox, Nicaragua and the United States, 767–69; Rafael de Nogales y Méndez, Looting of Nicaragua (New York, 1928), 287 Google Scholar; Sáenz, Norte americanización de Centro América, 29–79; Ribas, Mario, “A Central American Indictment of the United States,” Current History, XXVI (September, 1927), 919–24.Google Scholar
48 Stimson, supHenry L., “The United States and the Other American Republics,” [an address delivered before the Council on Foreign Relations, February 6, 1931] Foreign Affairs, IX (April, 1931—special supplement), vii-x.Google Scholar
49 Conde, Alexander De, Herbert Hoover’s Latin-American Policy (Stanford, 1951), 52–65, 79–89.Google Scholar
50 Luís Cardoza y Aragón, Guatemala: las líneas de su mano (Mexico City, 1955), 240 Google Scholar; Sáenz, Rompiendo cadenas, 216; Krehm, William, Democracia y tiranías en el Caribe (Mexico City, 1949), 74–75.Google Scholar
51 Orellana’s cousin, General José M. Orellana, had led the rebellion against Manuel Estrada Cabrera in 1920 and had been recognized immediately by the United States. Jones, Guatemala, 70.
52 Stimson to Sheldon Whitehouse, Minister to Guatemala, December 29, 1930, Foreign Relations, 1930, III, 190.
53 ibid., 396–401.
54 This effort by the United States in behalf of legality did not strengthen constitutional, representative government in Guatemala. In the elections that followed only one candidate, Jorge Ubico, organized and conducted a campaign. After winning an overwhelming victory at the polls, he abrogated the constitution and ruled as a dictator until he was overthrown in 1944.
55 Mestas, Alberto de, El Salvador, país de lagos y volcanes (Madrid, 1950), 492–94.Google Scholar
56 Charles B. Curtis, Minister to El Salvador, to Stimson, December 9, 1931, Foreign Relations, 1931, II, 175.
57 Curtis to Stimson, December 4, 1931, December 8, 1931, ibid., 175, 190–92.
58 Jefferson Caffrey to Stimson, December 22, 1931, ibid., II, 206.
59 Stimson to Curtis, December 29, 1931, ibid., 209–210.
60 New York Times, February 19, 1932; a sensationalist account of the January uprising is Méndez, Joaquín, Los sucesos comunistas en El Salvador (San Salvador, 1932).Google Scholar
61 Sáenz, Rompiendo cadenas, 219. Sáenz paid a brief visit to El Salvador in January, 1933.
62 McCafferty, W.J., chargé d’affaires in El Salvador, to Stimson, June 10, 1932, Foreign Relations, 1932, V, 602.Google Scholar
63 Dispatches from United States legations in Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, ibid., 605–608.
64 Ibid., 611–12.
65 Woolsey, , “The Recognition of the Government of El Salvador,” American Journal of International Law, XXVIII (April, 1934), 326.Google Scholar
66 Rica, Costa, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Documentación relativa a los tratados centroamericanos firmados en Guatemala el 12 de abril de 1934 (San José, 1934), 3–46.Google Scholar