One of the most important native industries in New Spain, allowed to flourish because of its rational necessity, and given exemptions from restrictive mercantile prohibitions was the obraje, or colonial textile factory. This institution had its origins in the tribute and labor policies of the quasi-feudal economic system imposed by the Spaniard in the decades after the conquests in the Caribbean and on the American mainland. For almost three hundred years clerics and humanitarians protested, viceroys raged, monarchs threatened, a plethora of regulations was issued, inspections were conducted, trials held, fines levied, obrajes were closed, and yet the obraje as an institution survived, and the inhuman conditions of the worker remained unchanged. While the Mexican encomienda system was being shorn of its abuses and gradually deemphasized by the crown, and while the repartimiento system of forced labor for wages was subordinated to a policy of conservation of human resources in the face of a shortage of Indian labor, the Mexican colony was becoming each decade more dependent on the locally-produced textiles, especially the commercial, non-luxury fabrics in everyday use. These were produced in the obrajes.

The American republics, for the sake of their own reputation and credit—if not for other humanitarian and altruistic considerations —“ought to intervene indirectly in the internal dissensions of the continent. Such intervention might consist, at the least, in the denial of recognition to de facto governments springing from revolution against the constitutional order.” Carlos Tobar, ex-foreign minister of Ecuador and the author of these views, thus expressed his concern over the problem of political instability in early twentieth-century Latin America. Constant revolutions and civil warfare he considered the curse of the region and the principal barrier to economic and social progress. His remedy was to put the combined diplomatic weight of all American nations against revolutionary governments, believing that such intervention would remove new, unconstitutional governments from power, and that, eventually, dissatisfied political factions in Latin America would give up their customary resort to violence. This pre-Wilsonian doctrine of legitimacy—known as the Tobar Doctrine—elicited little favorable response from Latin America’s leaders, already wary of any precept which could be used as justification for foreign interference in internal matters. Because Tobar’s anti-revolutionary entreaty ran directly counter to Latin American thought, it appeared headed for oblivion, except for a desperate situation in Central America in the first years of the twentieth century.

The Primary purpose for the creation of the Pan American Federation of Labor was to foster the development of trade-unionism in Latin America. But from its inception at Laredo in 1918 until 1927, when the fifth and last congress was held, autonomous trade-unionism became a secondary endeavor. Uppermost for Samuel Gompers and his associates in the AFL was the effort to deal with problems largely political in character.

One of the key policies guiding the regime of General Porfirio Díaz during its rule over an underdeveloped Mexico between 1877 and 1911 was to invite foreign participation in Mexico’s economic activities. At that very moment in history a rapidly industrializing Germany was anxious to find new economic opportunities in less advanced nations. German private entrepreneurs in Mexico could easily exploit both of these trends. A study of their fortunes suggests that commercial and industrial representatives of an economically advanced nation can earn the respect and personal friendship of citizens of a less developed country. This relationship was readily manifested because the Mexicans did not fear or resent German entrepreneurs since the German influence was large and tactful enough to be useful but small enough not to constitute a menace. There was no great possibility of a large influx of Germans into Mexico, because, by contrast to the opportunities enjoyed by German businessmen, Mexico’s latifundia system continued to limit German participation in Mexican agriculture to a few plantation owners. German professional people and workers avoided Mexico because of the depressed conditions that faced members of their calling there. Cautious German investors, afraid that Mexico’s political and economic stability might not last, limited themselves to extending occasional loans to the Mexican Government or to investments in Mexican private enterprises in conjunction with other foreigners, especially Americans.

Guadalupe Victoria, first president of Mexico (1824–1829), in many respects deserved the title Benemérito given him on numerous occasions by the writers of his time. He was honest, a sincere patriot, dedicated to the well being of his people. He died poor and in debt, a rare fate for Mexican presidents. He was the only president to complete his term of office in the first twenty-five years of Mexican history.