Galen's Technê iatrikê (Tegni, for short) was translated into Hebrew three times. The first two translations were executed in the Midi, around the year 1199: once from Constantine the African's Latin version, by an anonymous physician who used the pseudonym “Doeg the Edomite”; and a second time from Arabic, by Samuel Ibn Tibbon in Béziers, using as his Vorlage Ḥunayn Ibn Isḥāq's Arabic version (al-Ṣināʿa al-saġīra), accompanied by ʿAlī Ibn Riḍwān's commentary. (Samuel Ibn Tibbon's authorship of this translation has been called into doubt, but is reestablished in a paper by Gad Freudenthal in this issue of ASP.) A third translation, again from Latin and including Ibn Riḍwān's commentary, was done by Hillel ben Samuel in Rome, in the late thirteenth century, but is not considered in this paper.

We present the Tegni and discuss its history. We then ask why this work was translated into Hebrew twice, at precisely the same time and area. We show that both translators responded to the need of Jewish physicians who read only Hebrew. Doeg's translation was part of his vast project of making the greater part of the Salernitan corpus available in Hebrew. Samuel Ibn Tibbon translated the Tegni with Ibn Riḍwān's commentary both because he was responding to a social need and because he was in the process of switching his profession from physician to translator of philosophic works. Galen's medico-philosophic text was a perfect fit for his intellectual evolution from a philosophically minded physician to a philosopher-scientist.

We attempt to grasp the mathematics behind the planetary theories of the Syrian astronomer Ibn al-Šāṭir (1304–1375) in his treatise Nihāyat al-Sūl. Following the astronomers of the Marāgha school, by composing circular movements with constant angular velocity, Ibn al-Šāṭir attains two goals. He eliminates the need of excentrics and equant points in astronomy; but he also describes longitudes and latitudes with a unique method, with no more orbs than what is strictly necessary for the longitudes. A better understanding of rotation as a spatial transformation enables this ultimate economy of thought. In our commentary, we take Venus as an example offering an interesting problem about the latitudes. This is an opportunity to give a critical edition of the chapter of the Nihāyat al-Sūl dedicated to the latitudes of Mercury and Venus.

Samuel Ibn Tibbon (d. c. 1231) is best known as the translator of Maimonides's Guide of the Perplexed and as the author of the bold and ambitious cosmogonic work of Avicennian inspiration Ma'amar Yiqqawu ha-mayim (A treatise on ‘Let the water gather’; 1231). His authorship (in 1199) of the Arabic-into-Hebrew translation of Galen's Tegni with Ibn Riḍwān's commentary, known as al-Ṣināʿa al-ṣaġīra (= Small Art), is attested by the colophons of two manuscripts, but has recently been denied. The question is not unimportant, because if Ibn Tibbon indeed is the author of this translation then, as Steinschneider observed, ʿAlī Ibn Riḍwān's commentary is the first Arabic-into-Hebrew translation of a work by a Muslim writer. In this article I invalidate the arguments against Ibn Tibbon's authorship of the translation and, on the contrary, I positively show that a systematic consideration of the evidence unambiguously confirms it. The inquiry is notably based on probes into the evolution of Ibn Tibbon's philosophical vocabulary, whose results, it is hoped, will be useful beyond the immediate aim that has triggered them. This article accompanies Gad Freudenthal and Resianne Fontaine, “Philosophy and medicine in Jewish Provence, Anno 1199: Samuel Ibn Tibbon and Doeg the Edomite translating Galen's Tegni,” published in this issue of ASP, 26 (2016), pp. 1–26.

This article explores the reception of Avicenna's theories of motion in the sixth/twelfth century. Avicenna had devised innovative ways of understanding motion in response to various challenges and conditions that the preceding philosophical tradition and his own internal critique had posed. Motion for him was either the state of being between two termini or the traversal of an interval, where the former of these was the extramentally real type and the latter a product of the imagination. In the sixth/twelfth century, the implicit critique of some leading scholars led to the adoption of the thesis in some circles that motion by traversal is extramentally real. This position was accepted as viable both by those who endorsed the atomic and the continuous theory of bodies.

In this paper, I raise the following problem: what propositions have an import in Avicenna's modal logic? Which ones do not? Starting from the assumption that the singular and quantified propositions have an import if they require the existence of their subject's referent(s) to be true, I first discuss the import of the absolute propositions then I analyze the import of the modal propositions by considering Avicenna's definitions and the relations between these propositions. This leads to the following results: Avicenna's general opinion is that the affirmatives, be they assertoric or modal, have an import while the negatives do not. The possible affirmative propositions are given an import both in the externalist and the internalist post-Avicennan readings, provided that the subject is not impossible. However, the theory is not always clear, for the propositions containing ‘sometimes not’ are given an import, together with the negative necessaries containing ‘as long as it is P’, despite their negative character; the necessary affirmative propositions containing ‘as long as it is P’ are given an import, although they do not require it. In addition, Avicenna's analysis of the special assertorics E and O (containing the internal conditions ‘at some times but not always’) and their contradictories is erroneous, which does not help determine their import. But when correctly analyzed, these special E and O do not have an import, while their contradictories – I and A special assertorics respectively – have an import.

Man's individual responsibility is a very central notion in Muslim theology. Rational foundations for moral responsibility presuppose, however, that man has in some way control over his actions. It was therefore of central concern to theologians to formulate theories of action that were coherent enough to account for human self-determination. This article examines al-Bāqillānī's reflections on human acts and attempts to contextualise his thought within the discussions of his time. I will briefly review the Muʿtazilites’ theory of freedom of action, against which the Ašʿarite school developed its own position. I will then outline the fundamentals of the opposing standpoint adopted by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ašʿarī, who proposed to base human self-determination on voluntariness. Finally, I will discuss how al-Bāqillānī drew on and further developed al-Ašʿarī's ideas. Based on the extant volumes of al-Bāqillānī's Hidāyat al-mustaršidīn, I argue that he attempts to coherently organise the school's understanding of the famous theory of “acquisition” (kasb) by affirming two fundamental principles: a) that human acts are created by God and b) that there is nevertheless a real correlation between man and his “acquired” acts.

The purpose of this paper is to present a comprehensive and systematic study of Avicenna's account of animal self-awareness and cognition. In the first part, I explain how, for Avicenna, in contrast to human self-awareness, animal self-awareness is taken to be indirect, mixed-up (makhlūṭ), and an intermittent awareness. In his view, animal self-awareness is provided by the faculty of estimation (wahm); hence, in the second part, I explore the cognitive role of the faculty of estimation in animals, and how that relates to self-awareness. The faculty of estimation, according to Avicenna, serves to distinguish one's body and its parts from external objects, and plays a role in connecting the self to its perceptual activities. It follows that animal self-awareness, unlike human self-awareness, is essentially connected to the body. In the third part of the paper, I show that, while Avicenna denies animals awareness of their self-awareness, he explicitly affirms that animals can grasp their individual identity, but, unlike humans, do so incidentally, as part of their perceptual awareness.

In this paper, I propose to expose the logical structure al-Bāqillānī's argument for the existence of God and argue that it presents a distinctive type of argument that cannot be classified under the classical types of ontological, cosmological, and design arguments. The peculiarity of al-Bāqillānī's argument is related to the concept of God it presupposes. Developing Herbert Davidson's insights regarding this argument and criticizing Majid Fakhry's interpretation of it, I aim to clarify this concept of God by the concept of agency. In a nutshell, I argue that al-Bāqillānī presents a distinctive type of argument for the existence of God, which I propose calling the “cosmological argument from agency.” I consider it cosmological because it is an inference from the universe to the existence of God. Nonetheless, it is different from the classical versions of the cosmological argument for that the concept of agency and the idea of a personal deity play a central role in this argument.

Is it possible to invent a science that sets the rules for an ethical, logical and effective debate? Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (died in the first half of the 14th century), a logician and Ḥanafī jurist thought it possible. He undertook the task of developing a general theory of scientific discussion that had a tremendous success and impact on Muslim scholarship. Ādāb al-baḥth wa-al-munāẓara, as he called it, is a set of ethical and logical principles, taken from Aristotelian logic and Islamic law. His major treatise Risālat Ādāb al-baḥth, initiated a new discipline in which dozens of treatises, commentaries and glosses were written. In my contribution, I will shed light on this neglected science, describe its structure, expose its functions and highlight its significance for the development of debates and intellectual dialogues in the later medieval Islam.

This study examines a number of different answers to the question: where does Avicenna demonstrate the existence of God within the Metaphysics of the Healing? Many interpreters have contended that there is an argument for God's existence in Metaphysics of the Healing I.6–7. In this study I show that such views are incorrect and that the only argument for God's existence in the Metaphysics of the Healing is found in VIII.1–3. My own interpretation relies upon a careful consideration of the scientific order and first principles of the Metaphysics of the Healing, paying attention to Avicenna's own explicit statements concerning the goals and intentions of different books and chapters, and a close analysis of the structure of the different arguments found in the relevant texts of the Metaphysics of the Healing. I conclude that Avicenna's explicit goal in I.6–7 is to establish the properties that belong to necessary existence and possible existence, which consists, not in a demonstration of God's existence, but in a dialectical treatment of the first principles of metaphysics.

This article examines the textual alteration strategy carried out by Dominicus Gundissalinus in his original works. One of the most striking examples of this approach can be detected in the large quotation of Ibn Sīnā's Metaphysica I, 6–7 in Gundissalinus’ cosmological treatise De processione mundi, in which the Spanish philosopher variously modifies the text he translated a few years before. After a short presentation of Gundissalinus’ double role as translator and philosopher, the study moves on to the analysis of Ibn Sīnā's doctrine of necessary and possible being, and the five demonstrations of the unrelated uniqueness of necessary being offered by Ibn Sīnā. These arguments are directly quoted by Gundissalinus: nevertheless, the author modifies the text in many passages, here examined through the analysis of some representative excerpts. The results of this enquiry suggest that Gundissalinus is following an effective alteration strategy, envisaging at least two main purposes: the clarification of Ibn Sīnā's line of reasoning, and the doctrinal assimilation of Metaphysica's theories in his original philosophical system. In appendix to this article the whole text of the two versions of Metaphysica I, 6–7 is presented.

Professor Steven Harvey has honored us with a 28-page critique of our 2012 paper, “Avicenna among medieval Jews.” In our opinion, his text is wanting in both form and substance.

While Averroes’ work is often considered to represent the culmination of the method of Aristotelian demonstration in Arabic philosophy, a short passage of his Long Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics Γ.2 emphasizes the prominence of dialectic and calls for a re-examination of dialectic and demonstration in Averroes’ philosophical works. In this passage Averroes describes dialectic as an acceptable form of philosophy and the dialectician as a kind of scientist. In putting dialectic and demonstration on an equal, or nearly equal footing, Averroes seems to go against his own account of the dialectical and demonstrative classes of people in the Decisive Treatise. Moreover, this interpretation of Metaphysics Γ.2 also contradicts Averroes’ explanation of the same passage in the Middle Commentary on the Metaphysics as well as Aristotle's own description of dialectic throughout the Metaphysics. That is, in the Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, Averroes departs from his earlier views, and describes dialectic as a necessary part of metaphysics, even though the centrality of dialectic argumentation could call into question the entire project of metaphysics and consequently of the sciences whose demonstrations rely on metaphysical ground, i.e., all sciences. Averroes does not emphasize this view, but its presence is nevertheless unambiguous.