International Criminal Law [ICL] contains a number of general principles, which form the foundations of and conditions for holding individuals criminally responsible for crimes under international law (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression), and other crimes against the peace and security of mankind. Most general principles of ICL have been adequately implemented in the current (second) edition of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan. This paper assesses the quality of and identifies the lacunae in the implementation of Kazakhstan’s Criminal Code, with a view to suggesting further improvements to this Code.

While there have been various studies on international law in domestic courts, the case of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China [HKSAR], which celebrated its twentieth anniversary in 2017, presents unique questions. Under the principle of “One Country, Two Systems”, while the HKSAR maintains a distinct common-law system and a separate judicial regime, foreign affairs remain the responsibilities of the Central People’s Government of China. The handling of international law issues in cases before HKSAR courts would require consideration of the constitutional relation between the national (central) authorities of China and the local authorities in the HKSAR, and between the main legal system of China and the local HKSAR common-law system, in the light of the experiences of handling relevant cases in the past twenty years.

The historic Award in the South China Sea Arbitration gave much-needed clarity to many of the complex legal issues lying at the heart of the Philippines-China maritime dispute. Often overlooked, however, is the procedural significance of the case. This Comment submits that the South China Sea Arbitration represents a shift towards the use of judicial fact-finding initiatives as a means to overcome the adjudicatory challenges inherent to highly technical and scientific cases where one Party fails or refuses to participate. Even more striking, the Tribunal’s independently acquired facts appear to be the basis for the majority of its conclusions in the Award. This Comment highlights the appropriateness and practicality of the Tribunal’s actions in view of its extraordinary obligation under Article 9 of Annex VII of the UNCLOS to “satisfy itself” that the Philippines’ claims are “well-founded in fact and law”.

There has been a recent proliferation of scholarship on the development, identification, and determination of customary international law [CIL]. Much of this has focused on explication of the theoretical and practical problems inherent in the modern use of CIL as a source of international law. However, there are influential voices who argue that CIL nevertheless continues to play a necessary role in the international legal system, and that many of the problems that have been identified are exaggerated. This paper maintains that the problems which have been identified in the processes of identification and determination of CIL are of such a serious and institutionalized nature as to produce a presumptive distrust of any statement about what is or is not CIL. It argues that the process of identifying and authoritatively determining CIL must evolve to more objectively evidence the positive assent of states to the making of customary rules.

I argue that contextually reading two disputes involving Siam—Cheek v. Siam (1898) and the Temple of Preah Vihear (1962)—proves that both private law and public international law are structurally rigged against ex-semi-colonial nations. Nineteenth-century Siam was a political ferment known variously as a semi-colonial, semi-peripheral, non-colonial, or uncolonized polity. Siam bargained under imperial shadows her political independence by the tactical grants of concession contracts, as well as by negotiating treaties with competing European powers. In the post-colonial Temple of Preah Vihear case, colonial stationery—maps, photographs, and communiqués—as well as imperial customs offered evidentiary support to Cambodia, an ex-colonial state, against Thailand. In the early twentieth century, while authors picked Cheek v. Siam as a precedent for the law of international claims, textbooks offer the Temple of Preah Vihear case as a precedent on the form of treaties and estoppel. Conclusively, these two cases allow us to locate, if not exorcise, the ghosts of empires in Asian legal history, exposing, at the same time, Judge Koo’s Orientalization of customary international law.

This paper examines the UN Security Council’s [UNSC] response to the environmental impact of the 1990–91 Gulf War and its relevance to ongoing debates on environmental protection during armed conflict. With Resolution 687/91, the UNSC referred to “environmental damage and depletion of natural resources” in the context of war reparations, and established the UN Compensation Commission [UNCC] to process environmental claims. Whilst this is often hailed as a success story, this paper raises questions about certain dimensions of the UNCC: the choice of the applicable law; the decision-making process, particularly in relation to causation and remedies; and its punitive/biased nature. It argues that the successful outcome of the environmental compensation regime cannot be separated from the UNCC’s exceptional application of international legal norms. By drawing attention to this “logic of exception”, I suggest that alternative responses, more attentive to the dynamics of contemporary conflicts and their multiple environmental impacts, should be imagined.

Given the global contestation against BITs and ISDS, the outcome of the Philip Morris v. Uruguay case upholding Uruguay’s right to regulate for public health is important for the international investment law community. However, it is not just the outcome of a case but also the quality of legal reasoning that is significant in building the legitimacy of the ISDS system. This paper focuses on the reasoning adopted by the tribunal in deciding whether Uruguay’s regulatory measures resulted in the expropriation of Philip Morris’s investment. The paper critiques the tribunal’s use of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to invoke the police powers rule in interpreting the expropriation provision of the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT. The tribunal’s reasoning was internally inconsistent and based on abuse of arbitral precedents. Clarity in legal reasoning by ISDS tribunals is imperative to boost the legitimacy of the ISDS system for all stakeholders.

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank [AIIB] is the world’s newest multilateral development bank [MDB] and already one of Asia’s largest international organizations by membership. This paper will compare the institutional structure of the AIIB with that of the Asian Development Bank [ADB] to identify areas in which the AIIB has innovated as a matter of international institutional law. In reviewing the constituent documents, bylaws, and operational policies of the two banks, the paper will juxtapose the AIIB and ADB’s approaches to membership, project finance, voting, and governance. It will identify not only innovations, but also the likely implications, positive and negative, thereof. Finally, it will assess the degree to which these innovations may impact the AIIB’s ability to partner with existing MDBs. In particular, the AIIB’s approach to project finance and governance mark a significant break from the status quo, while in other areas it has remained conservative.