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A clash of Umwelts: Anthropomorphism in behavioral neuroscience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2019

Alex Gomez-Marin Open the ORCID record for Alex Gomez-Marin [Opens in a new window]
Alex Gomez-Marin*
Affiliation:
Behavior of Organisms Laboratory, Instituto de Neurociencias (CSIC-UMH), 03550San Juan Alicante, Spainagomezmarin@gmail.comhttps://behavior-of-organisms.org/
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Abstract

Brains enjoy a bodily life. Therefore animals are subjects with a point of view. Yet, coding betrays an anthropomorphic bias: we can, therefore they must. Here I propose a reformulation of Brette's question that emphasizes organismic perception, cautioning for misinterpretations based on external ideal-observer accounts. Theoretical ethology allows computational neuroscience to understand brains from the perspective of their owners.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e229
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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