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Cultural evolution need not imply group selection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 March 2016

Dorsa Amir ,
Matthew R. Jordan  and
David G. Rand
Dorsa Amir
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511. dorsa.amir@yale.eduhttp://www.dorsaamir.com
Matthew R. Jordan
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511. matthew.jordan@yale.edudavid.rand@yale.eduhttp://www.daverand.org/http://psychology.yale.edu/people/matthew-jordan
David G. Rand
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511. matthew.jordan@yale.edudavid.rand@yale.eduhttp://www.daverand.org/http://psychology.yale.edu/people/matthew-jordan
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Abstract

Richerson et al. make a compelling case for cultural evolution. In focusing on cultural group selection, however, they neglect important individual-level accounts of cultural evolution. While scientific discourse typically links cultural evolution to group selection and genetic evolution to individual selection, this association is due to historical accident only. We thus call for more consideration of individual-level cultural evolution.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 39 , 2016 , e32
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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