The U.S. is no longer providing leadership in trade policy. In recent years, we have seen a sharp turn toward a rapid proliferation of bilateral preferential trade agreements, accords that are likely to undermine the World Trade Organization (WTO). By pursuing a strategy of ‘competitive liberalization’ both on a sectoral basis under the Bill Clinton administration, and then a policy of seeking bilateral arrangements under the George W. Bush administration, this article argues that American administrations have undermined the coalition for free trade in the United States. Consequently, protectionist industries including textiles, steel, and agriculture have made further liberalization more difficult and thus the prospects for promoting continued trade liberalization have grown dimmer.

Although the global economy has flourished in the current global economic governance regime, the foundations of this order are starting to crumble. Both in trade and in finance, the existing institutions are under severe stress. In trade, more and more countries undermine the WTO by implementing preferential trade agreements. In finance, the IMF has been weak for most of this decade, although it experienced a revival in the current crisis. First and foremost, this weakness of the institutions of global economic governance is the result of policies implemented by the transatlantic powers. Both the European Union and the United States are actively pursuing policies that weaken the existing institutions. In trade, there is a large gap between the official rhetoric, which highlights the importance of the multilateral regime, and the trade policy practice, which is weakening the WTO. In finance, the transatlantic powers have until very recently blocked any progress in the IMF with regard to lending policies. In addition, the EU continues to defend its unjustified overrepresentation in the IMF's governance structures. The article suggests that one of the key explanations for this development is the weak support for globalization in most OECD-countries. Confronted with no enthusiasm for globalization in their domestic constituencies, policy makers in Europe and the United States are increasingly opting for policies that will, over time, erode the existing regimes of global economic governance.

Reform of the multilateral trade regime is not simply a second order problem within a wider economic crisis. The completion of the Doha Round may be a second order question but the global trade regime faces a series of broader systemic challenges beyond the completion of the current negotiations. This paper identifies five challenges: (i) a marked reduction in popular support for open markets in major OECD countries; (ii) the stalling of a transition from one global economic equilibrium to another; (iii) a lack of clarity and agreement on the agenda and objectives for the WTO as we move deeper into the 21st century; (iv) the demand for fairness and justice in the governance of the WTO'the ‘legitimacy’ question and (v) the rise of regional preferentialism as a challenge to multilateralism. Failure to address these challenges will represent not only a fundamental question for the future of the WTO as the guarantor of the norms and rules of the global trade regime specifically, but also the ability to establish greater coherence in global economic governance overall when its need is arguably greater than at any time since the depression years of the 20th century inter-war period.

This paper discusses the pros and cons of a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA) in comparison with an informal trade-facilitating marketplace between Europe and the US. It finds considerably more cons, especially since TAFTA would be expected to produce larger, more detrimental discriminatory effects on dynamic non-member economies, mainly in Asia but also in food-exporting regions as well. Efficiency-enhancing effects are argued to be achievable under a marketplace concept which does not separate insiders from outsiders. It is also shown that in foreign direct investment (FDI) and FDI-related service trade, TAFTA seems redundant as in recent years bilateral capital and trade flows have proven to be buoyant without preferential treatment.

Over the last 60 years, the multilateral management of trade through the GATT and subsequently through the WTO has been led by the United States and Europe. Since the turn of the new millennium, however, developing countries have increasingly used their leverage to insist that talks on agriculture receive priority attention, deny the inclusion of investment and competition policy on the negotiating agenda, and block agreement on negotiating modalities for agriculture and non-agricultural market access (NAMA). Cooperation between the United States and the European Union is still essential, but no longer sufficient, for successful multilateral negotiations. Specifically, the “BRICKs” (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Korea) are likely to be pivotal in directing the course and contributing to the success or failure of the WTO.

Drawing upon a comprehensive database of contemporary protectionism, this paper offers an initial assessment of the extent to which our understanding of protectionism may have to evolve. While some long-standing features of protectionism appear to have endured (such as the distribution of discriminatory measures across economic sectors), specific corporate needs arising from the global financial crisis and particular national attributes are more likely to have influenced the choice of beggar-thy-neighbor policy instruments than binding trade rules and other international accords.