The study of cartels is important to economists as well as business historians, but, on the whole, there has been little cross cultivation between the two academic fields. This article examines cartel theory developed by economists in the context of the historical case of international aluminum cartels in existence before 1940. By analyzing three basic theoretical questions—when cartels appear, when they break down, and when they are successful—in light of the empirical evidence of the aluminum industry, the article argues that economics and history, although they have very different approaches, can profit from using each other's methods when studying cartels.

This article argues that entrepreneurs, not governments or markets, shaped globalization during the early nineteenth century. The article concentrates on the trading and financial activities of London merchant bankers, and in particular on the different diversification strategies they followed. Although most London merchant bankers remained cautious and did not diversify their operations either geographically or in the products they traded during this period, Huth & Co. established an impressive global network of trade and lending, dealing with over six thousand correspondents worldwide in a wide range of products. This firm shaped globalization well before the transport and communication revolution of the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

I examine the factors underpinning the British radio-equipment sector's particularly poor interwar productivity performance relative to the United States. Differences in socio-legal environments were crucial in allowing key players in the British industry to derive higher monopoly rents than their American counterparts. Higher British rents in turn, had the unintended outcome of stimulating innovation around restrictive patents, initiating a path-dependent process of technical change in favor of expensive multifunctional valves. These valves both raised direct production costs and prevented British firms from following the American path of broadening the radio market beyond the household's prime receiver.

Economic and geographic centralization are typically seen as critical components of the industrialization of food during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The development of the fresh- and processed-tomato industries during this period offers an important counterexample to this dominant narrative. Between the late nineteenth century and World War II, the most salient characteristic of both fresh- and processed-tomato production was economic and geographic decentralization. This article argues that the emergence of sites of tomato production and processing in virtually every region of the country played a vital role in fulfilling the long-standing quest for year-round access to both fresh and processed tomatoes.

Lax regulation enabled trust companies to take excessive risks, according to previous studies of the Panic of 1907, leading to a loss of confidence and massive runs. These studies have, however, given relatively little attention to the historical development of trust companies. This article argues that a more historical perspective can lead to a better understanding of the institutional framework and the actions of trust companies. Depositors did not lose confidence because of inadequate regulation; depositors lost confidence in specific trust companies because of false rumors, and diversity among trust companies hindered cooperation to halt the Panic.

Rarely does a relatively unknown professor of economics publish a book that sells more than 200,000 copies in a few months. When critics accuse the same economist of being normative, political, of manipulating data, of misunderstanding basic economic theory, and of wanting to impoverish everyone, surely it must be because he is on to something. Other commentators, perhaps a bit prematurely, are claiming that his book is the economics book that will define twenty-first-century debate.