DIFFICULT questions of medical ethics are often made more complex in the real world by the intrusion of private law considerations. The end of life choices of a mentally competent but terminally ill patient may be influenced by the consequences for the financial well being of surviving dependants. In particular, attention is likely to be given to the effect on any life insurance cover in place. For many this will represent the greatest financial asset contingent on death. There has been considerable debate as to the proper response of public law to these issues, in both the criminal and regulatory fields. However, the prosecutorial, judicial and jury discretions that bound these rules limit their impact in practice. By contrast, the private law principles that govern the distribution of assets on death have been largely overlooked. This article redresses that imbalance.

OVER the past few years, an important legal debate has been raging, the full effects of which many lawyers have not yet felt. I am referring to the taxonomy debate and, specifically, the attempts by the late Professor Peter Birks and (the mainly academic) supporters and advocates of his and similar views to impose a coherent and logical taxonomy upon private (common) law. Much more attention should be paid to sound taxonomy, it is argued. This “great project” has been little noticed outside the backwater of the law in which it began, namely the law of restitution (or “unjust enrichment” as the theorists here under consideration would prefer).

IN 2000 the Employment Directive was enacted by the European Community, creating a framework for combating discrimination in employment on grounds not previously covered by Community law, namely religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. To a large extent the definitions of discrimination are uniform in relation to the different grounds of discrimination. In accordance with the Directive, new Regulations have been introduced in the UK prohibiting discrimination on grounds of religion or belief (the Religion and Belief Regulations) and sexual orientation, and amendments have been made to some aspects of the law governing discrimination on grounds of race, sex and disability. Age discrimination is subject to regulations which came into force in October 2006. One common aspect of these new laws and amendments is that the concept of harassment is specifically defined, instead of being viewed as a form as discrimination.

ONE of the most difficult questions facing English courts as they develop the common law right to privacy recognised by the House of Lords in Campbell v. MGN Ltd. is whether and, if so, when a person might have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a public place. Should an individual have a cause of action if she is photographed as she leaves her mother’s funeral or as he receives medical attention after an accident? Or should there be an absolute rule which says that there is no privacy in a public space? Recent decisions in England and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) suggest that it is no longer an answer (if it ever was) simply to say that the disclosure concerned something which took place in public. A more difficult question therefore remains: if the existence of a privacy interest does not depend on the nature of the space in which claimants find themselves, how do we determine whether a person does have a legitimate privacy interest?