I argue that in order to solve the main difficulties confronted by the classical versions of the causal theory of action, it is necessary not just to make room for intentions, considered as irreducible to complexes of beliefs and desires, but also to distinguish among several types of intentions. I present a three-tiered theory of intentions that distinguishes among future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions, and motor intentions. I characterize each kind of intention in terms of its functions, its type of content, its dynamics, and the rationality and time constraints that bear on it. I then try to show how the difficulties encountered by the causal theory can be solved within this new framework.

Throughout the 1920s Heidegger's answer to the question of how to conceive of the phenomenon as a phenomenon has been the “formal indication,” that is a non-subsuming, non-generalizing type of discourse. Through a detailed interpretation of the sporadic explanations he gives on the matter, I try to point out some of the inconsistencies in his conception, and then work them out. I try to show in particular how Heidegger's emphasis on the method of phenomenology, which expresses his unrelenting desire to let the phenomenon be seen in itself, led him to overlook the essential role of language in phenomenological analysis.