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Politics Disavowed Remarks On the Status of Politics in the Philosophy of Descartes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 April 2024

Jean-Pierre Cavaillé
Jean-Pierre Cavaillé*
Affiliation:
European University, Florence; École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris

Extract

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Only rarely does Descartes deal with specifically political questions, and then when he does so, it is only by denial, to justify his refusal to “become involved” in politics. All the texts show that this attitude of rejecting politics is not dictated primarily by prudence, the rule in this century of intolerance, but by a concern for philosophical consistency. This denial, as we will be attempting to establish, seems conditioned by fundamental options of Cartesian philosophy. For the moment we will only examine the theoretical effects of this refusal to write about politics other than by denial; such effects seem to us to consist in the exclusion of politics outside the realm of knowledge and its problematic inclusion into that of morality. And although it has been possible to speak of a “political Descartes”, it is completely against his stated intentions. This Descartes would be political in spite of himself. In fact, such an approach can only consist in a political interpretation of this denial, in a political reading of the texts that reject, or more often pass over in silence, politics as such. Although a reading of this kind can be at best a hazardous one, we will not attempt to challenge its legitimacy, for it is certainly possible to affirm that the work of Descartes is ridden and wrought by the question of politics (just as all philosophical thought, in one way or another, must of necessity confront political reality), but it is not without importance to begin by noting that it is never touched upon other than indirectly, obliquely, through the use of theoretical devices whose finality is not political.

Type
Research Article
Information
Diogenes , Volume 35 , Issue 138 , June 1987 , pp. 118 - 138
Copyright
Copyright © 1987 Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie / International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP)

References

1 Discours de la méthode (Oeuvres complètes, Adam et Tannery, t. VI, p. 15); "And if I thought that there was the slightest thing in this writing through which I could be suspected of such folly (namely of planning a political reform), I would be very sorry to allow it to be published". To Elisabeth, May 1646 (Oeuvres, Ferdinand Alquié, t. III, p. 653): "… I have always been so removed from the control of affairs that I would not be less impertinent than that philosopher who wanted to teach the duty of a captain in the presence of Hanibal, if I undertook to write here the maxims that should be observed in civil life". To Elisabeth, Sept. 1646 (FA III 670): "…I would deserve to be mocked if I thought I was able to teach something to Your Highness in this matter".

2 Antonio Negri, Descartes Politico, o della ragionevole ideologia, Milan, Feltrinelli, 1970.

3 The ideas of Descartes have given place recently to a variety of political analyses. Remaining only in the French-language sector, we can cite the work of P. Guenancia, Descartes et l'ordre politique (P.U.F. 1983), in which Descartes appears in some respects as a precursor of human rights. Cf. for example p. 228: "Make no mistake, the idea of equality that almost all modem political theories presuppose is not the one that, issued from rationalism and principally from Cartesianism, will serve to elaborate protocols for the defence of individual and universal rights against the attacks of political powers". In a similar vein, F. Georges ("La Confirmation de l'esprit", article published in La Liberté de l'esprit, Oct. 1984, Balland, p. 46) writes: "The institution tells me what exists outside myself, it teaches me what must be known in this respect. It answers with the truth, it guarantees the adaequatio rei et intellectus … it reposes on the expropriation of the cogito ". A completely opposite opinion is found in B. Pélégrin (in Figures du Baroque, Colloque de Cerisy, P.U.F. 1983, n. 21) who, attacking the "rage" and the "ravages of Cartesianism", fumes as vehemently as he is superficial against the "arbitrary norm, of a fearsome good faith, which doubts everything except itself (Reason is me, therefore I am correct), elevated to a principle of government by a centralizing and absolutist power jealous of its prerogatives and that continues to control mentalities".

4 To Elisabeth, 6 Oct. 1645 (FA III 619): "I admit that it is difficult to measure exactly to what point reason orders that we interest ourselves in the public". Likewise, 15 Sept. 1645 (FA III 607): "… if a man is worth more, by himself, than all the rest of his city, he would have no reason to want to lose himself in order to save it".

5 AT VI 11-15.

6 Ibid. 11.

7 Ibid. 11-12.

8 Ibid. 12.

9 Cf. E. Gilson, Notes et commentaires au Discours de la méthode, Vrin, 1967, p. 167. On this passage from DM, cf. also Guenancia, op. cit., p. 44-48.

10 On the general characteristics of political utopia, see G. Lapouge, Utopie et Civilisation, Weber, Paris, 1973.

11 AT VI 14-15.

12 AT VI 13: "It is true that we cannot see why we should tear down all the houses of a city for the sole purpose of redoing them in another manner"; p. 14: "… they (the imperfections of the "political structures") are almost always more bearable than their change would be…".

13 Cf. Lapouge, op. cit.

14 To Elisabeth, 4 Aug. 1645, FA III 587-588.

15 Cf. the project for a universal language of 1629 (20 Nov., FA I) that Descartes made depend on the appearance of true philosophy, and he esteemed possible, but improbable. This project, as soon as it had been announced, was rejected by Cartesian prudence and common sense as utopian: "It would be necessary that every one live in an Earthly Paradise, which is only true in novels". But it is also supposed here, with the denial of utopia, that the universal adoption of true philosophy would not fail to transform the world of mankind into a paradise, into a Garden of Eden, like that language, inspired from universal mathematics. The ideal society for science, the utopia of realized science, is the utopia of a society without politics. On the languages of utopia, cf. A. Pons, Critique, no. 387-388, Aug-Sept. 1979.

16 DM AT 15.

17 To borrow the title of the very beautiful book by F. Alquié, La Découverte métaphysique de l'homme chez Descartes, P.U.F. 1966.

18 DM AT 4; Recherche de la vérité, FA II 1139.

19 FA II 1106.

20 Principes de la philosophie, I art. 60, FA III 128.

21 The modem subject breaks its relationship with nature and with others with the same movement; Aristotelian definitions of man as "rational" animal and political being (zoon politikon) are abandoned. Metaphysically separating thinking from the body means detaching the individual from his socio-political environment, especially since it is true that it is primarily through my body that others are consubstantially present to me.

22 To Elisabeth, Sept. 1646, FA III 670.

23 This metaphor of the theatre of the world (Préambules Fa I 45, DM AT VI 28; Passions de l'âme, art. 147), a common idea of baroque and classical culture, for Descartes presumes a negative conception of politics. In the world of men I am an actor in a theatre. Social relationships, far from being essential for the metaphysical subject, are exterior to him and derive from fiction, just like the playing of actors on a stage. Subjectivity assists the spectacle of the world and participates in it, but without ever appearing unmasked. And could it, since it is part of its nature to be separate from each and every one, withdrawn into its pure interiority? In article 206 of Passions de l'âme, Descartes advises following the "false opinions of people" with regard to "the exterior of our actions". Politics is the domain of the exteriority of actions, the domain of external actions: that of theatrality. Exteriority emanates from moral interiority (it is an effect of the free determination of the reasonable individual), but to a great extent it escapes him in that the other remains fundamentally different. In the theatre the liberty of the thinking subject is manifested, but its effects remain foreign, strange. My acts, in reality, become other, they become what others make of them, they become the acts of others, they no longer belong to me, they enter into history. (I enter into history at most as a character). Politics is the theatre of morality, but in the Cartesian perspective, this is not at all the same as defining politics as the place in which morality is realized and accomplished, but the place in which it will be lost, or where it becomes unreal, or where it becomes an appearance among appearances instead of an ontological affirmation of liberty.

24 Full title of Discourse on Method.

25 Cf. To Elisabeth, May 1646 (FA III 654): "… it is better to base oneself on experience than on reason, since we rarely have to deal with perfectly reasonable persons." Cf. also DM 14.

26 DM 14.

27 DM 25.

28 DM 26: "… let us consider all the goods that are outside of us as likewise being beyond our power…" Cf. N. Grimaldi, L'Expérience de la pensée dans la philosophie de Descartes. Vrin, 1978, p. 204-211: "L'exercice de cette troisième règle consiste donc à opposer un refus infini qui nous est refusé".

29 It is in this way that Descartes does not hesitate to declare somewhat abruptly to Christina of Sweden, 20 Nov. 1647 (FA III 747): "But I am assured that Your Majesty is more concerned with your virtue than with your crown; I shall hardly fear at this point to say that it does seem that there is anything but this virtue that is rightfully to be praised."

30 In sum the prince, in any case Machiavelli's, is to be "pitied", as Descartes writes to Elisabeth (Oct.-Nov. 1646) after she herself had admitted that she preferred "the condition of the poorest peasant in Holland" to that of the prince or his ministers. But both recognize that all princes are led to act more or less in the manner that Machiavelli counsels. This means recognizing the divorce of morality from politics, and the prince ultimately appears as the one whose political role poses an obstacle to moral serenity.

31 As N. O'Keohane says so well (Philosophy and the State in France, Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 203), for Descartes, "politics is the business of sovereigns, not private individuals". On this point the thinking of Descartes coincides with that of absolutism, and with what Louis XIV would understand by the "profession of being king" (cf. his Mémoires pour l'instruction du Dauphin).

32 Letter to Chanut, ambassador of France in Sweden (FA III 749): "… it is only allowed for sovereigns, or for those authorized by them, to become involved in regulating the customs of others". It can be noted that Descartes thus esteems that religious institutions, at least of their own initiative, should not intervene in the moral education of the people. And this laicization of morality is completely in agreement with the spirit of Cartesian philosophy. But that such a task should rightfully fall only to sovereigns, thus to the political power, seems to contradict the properly Cartesian idea of moral autonomy and to overturn the subordinate relation that makes politics depend on morality. It is no doubt necessary to distinguish, as Descartes does not do in this text, between the manners of morality, the customs of a given community and the ethical requirements of individuals (their moral reason). The normative power of the sovereign would concern only the first of these, and the philosopher, who deals with morality in the strict sense, would in no way compete with the prince. But reading these lines, it seems above all that Cartesian morality, even though virtually democratic (since it is up to each one to overcome his autonomy), remains an aristocratic morality. Only great persons are truly capable of generosity, and it is up to the political authority to give other men, who obey customs without transcending them morally, proper rules of conduct.

33 He makes but few remarks on the De Cive of Hobbes (in P*, 1643? FA III 61). However, he devotes a long letter to Machiavelli's Prince (To Elisabeth, 16 Sept. 1646, FA III 665-671). He returns briefly to Machiavelli in a later letter in which he mentions his reading of the Discorsi (To Elisabeth, Oct. Nov. 1646 FA III 680-681).

34 Respectively, in P* (see preceding note) and to Elisabeth (FA III 669, quotation from Ch. 15 of The Prince).

35 Machiavelli repeats this constantly; cf. for example The Prince, ch. XVII: men "are ungrateful, changing, secretive… men are evil."

36 Discorsi, L I ch. III.

37 This is the "natural inclination that men have to harm one another" (De Cive, 1 st section).

38 In P*, FA III 61.

39 To use one of the key concepts of Machiavelli's political anthropology, cf. Ch. XV of The Prince.

40 FA III 667: Descartes is referring to the Machiavellian precept (Ch XVIII of The Prince) and uses it himself, even though limiting its application only to enemies. "One should also distinguish between subjects, friends or allies and enemies. For, with regard to the latter, one has permission to do just about anything…"

41 The Prince, ch. XVIII: "It is not necessary for a prince to have every good quality … but … he must appear to have them."

42 FA III 666.

43 In his letter, he defines such a man of good in this way (p. 669). "He is the one who does everything that true reason dictates…" True reason here has the specifically moral meaning that Descartes gave it at this time. Cf. To Elisabeth, 1 Sept. 1645 (FA III p. 602): "The true office of reason is to examine the proper value of goods whose acquisition seems to depend in some manner on our conduct." On the various definitions of reason in Descartes, cf. Alquié, op. cit., p. 326-329.

44 PA art. 161.

45 Ibid., art. 153.

46 Ibid.

47 Second letter (FA III 681). From this point of view, the Machiavellian "virtuoso" can seem to be the antithesis of the generous Cartesian. In the context of the morality of Descartes, he is the man with unlimited pride, pride being the vice and passion of those whose self-esteem is fed by their insatiable desire to enjoy goods, the possession of which could not depend on their will alone. The proud are "those who try to humiliate others and who are slaves to their desires … with their souls constantly agitated by hatred, envy, jealousy and anger." (PA art. 157). And this analysis of pride applies, it seems to us, to the Machiavellian virtuoso, such as he appears in the light of the criticism that Descartes makes of The Prince. The low regard for others, the supposition of their being evil, leads quite naturally to political cynicism and to tyranny.

48 FA III 666.

49 FA III 668.

50 Cf. H. Gouhier, Le nouvel humanisme selon Descartes et la politique (in Cristianesimo e Ragion di Stato: Atti del Secondo Congresso Internazionale di Studi Umanistici. Fratelli Bocca. Rome-Milan 1953). "Le principe moral est mis en échec par une nécessité de fait". (p. 84).

51 DM AT VI 13-14; To Elisabeth, May 1646, FA III 653; also Sept. 1646, FA III 670.

52 Cf. N. O'Keohane, op. cit., Ch. 8: "Orthodox Absolutist Theory and the Métier du Roi".

53 It goes without saying that such separation and such confiscation of politics is a property of absolutist doctrines.

54 FA III 669.

55 FA III 668.

56 To Elisabeth, 6 Oct. 1645, FA III 612.

57 To Elisabeth, Sept. 1646, FA III 666.

58 Cf. P. Mesnard, Barbosa Homen et la conception baroque de la raison d'État (in Cristianesimo e Ragion di Stato, op. cit.).

59 Cf. H. Gouhier, La Pensée religieuse de Descartes, Vrin 1979, in particular p. 217 sq. Cf. also J. R. Armogathe, Theologia Cartesiana (Nijhoff, The Hague, 1977), and J.L. Marion, La Théologie blanche de Descartes (P.U.F., 1981).

60 Doctrine of the creation of eternal truths, cf. Letters, spring 1630, FA III 254-269.