In the present essay I intend to approach the racial problems of today's world, or more particularly the problem of the Negro and of his integration in multiracial societies, from the point of view of the Jungian concept of Persona.

I will, of necessity, limit iny study to one national case only, that of Brazil. The use of Brazil as a particular instance for study can be easily justified. Brazil is probably the most complex multiracial society in the world and one that boasts the least tensions among communities of different stock, religion or cultural background. In 8.5 million sq. km., over one hundred and twenty million people are living who speak the same language, both in the literal and the figurative sense. We believe we have been somehow more successful than the Americans in emphasizing the element of fraternity that is so fundamental to the democratic way of life. My thesis is that we have achieved such a result thanks to a very peculiar working of the archetype of the Persona. This article will try to adumbrate the construction of what one may call a collective Persona, a fa¸ade, a pattern of national behaviour which tries to overcome the problem by simply overlooking the fact that genetic differences of colour, shape and mind exist.

Mythologies generally devote much attention to the birth of heroes and gods whose coming into the world is described as particular. Our first examples come from Greek mythology.

The Furies, goddesses of vengeance, were born of the blood of Uranus who had been castrated by his son Cronos. Athena sprang, completely armed, from the head of Zeus which Prometheus had struck with an axe, an act sometimes attributed to Hephaistos. The Centaurs came from a union of Ixion with a cloud to which Zeus had given the appearance of Hera with whom he was in love. Adonis came into the world from a myrrh tree (Smyrna in Greek ) which opened magically to give him birth. Ten years earlier a woman named Smyrna (myrrh) had committed incest with her father, Theios, without his realizing it; when he discovered the fact, he changed her into the tree known by that name. Bacchus was drawn out, a six months old fetus, from the body of his mother by Zeus. The body was lying in coals lit by the lightning and thunder accompanying the god's chariot as he came to visit Semele. Terrified at the sound of nature's fury, she had died of shock. Zeus sewed the fetus in his thigh and, when the time came, gave birth to Dionysius.

At the moment of its decline, we clearly see that painting in oils developed an original poetics, and one that was all of a piece, throughout a renascent and modern West. From its birth and during a development lasting half a millennium we see it— in Florence, Bruges, Venice, Rome, Toledo, Nuremberg, Amsterdam and Paris—attentive to the sources of signification: languages, rites, myths, theater, tools, techniques and sciences and the urban context that wove them all together. In each case, for one or the other of them, it brought a new relationship to the way of life and then left them to their social order of assimilation, keeping the initial contact for those who would be interested. It studded the West with centers of production that carried the practice and knowledge of art to their limits; engaged with the collective imagination, it punctuated history with decisive works, in which the desire to paint takes action and explains it. Marked by an impatience for change, oil painting revealed itself in a rapport with creativity akin to the other works of civilization. It is at the level of the bases of invention of the imaginary—which are in any expression the most profound structures—that the unfolding of oil painting is tightly bound. The establishment of modern national languages, the orderly rise, around a syntax and because of architecture, sculpture, music, song, tragedy, the systematic construction of scientific and technical expression, arose and grew quickly in importance in Western Europe during the same centuries as painting and with reciprocal correspondence. Dürer “who was the first to publish a treatise in which is collected all knowledge having to do with the expression of forms… wrote in his native tongue and in so doing was revealed as the creator of technical and scientific German.”

In economic theory it is circumstances that dictate fashion. During the last quarter of the century, years marked by an unprecedented escalation of material production, economists of all persuasions, neoclassicals or Marxists, accorded an important place to theories of growth. Economic reductionism being fundamental, development was likened to growth, which tends to take pars pro toto and to ignore the difference between a necessary condition and a sufficient one. Suddenly economic theory, to which mechanical formalization would confer the appearance of an almost scientific rigour, became a powerful argument for the ideology of growth.

In the following essay we shall try to show how a society uses the notion of “Foreigner,” how the image which it creates of something extraneous to it is only secondarily a means of conceiving the world, a would-be scientific approach to big problems, but is essentially an ideology for its own internal use and forms an integral part of a political play which takes place within the society itself. We thought that the example of ancient Greece, and particularly of Athens, might present a particularly interesting field for analysis, since for two centuries it had the problem of the Persian Empire's vicinity—a problem which the Greek thinkers and politicians never stopped studying, each following his own point of view; the variations of which seem to us extremely instructive.

“There is, in addition, a second reason for doubting that scientists reject paradigms because confronted with anomalies or counterinstances. In developing it my argument will itself foreshadow another of this essay's main theses. The reasons for doubt sketched above were purely factual; they were, that is, themselves counterinstances to a prevalent epistemological theory. As such, if my present point is correct, they can at best help to create a crisis or, more accurately, to reinforce one that is already very much in existence. By themselves they cannot and will not falsify that philosophical theory, for its defenders will do what we have already seen scientists doing when confronted by anomaly. They will devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict. Many of the relevant modifications and qualifications are, in fact, already in the literature. If, therefore, these epistemological counterinstances are to constitute more than a minor irritant, that will be because they help to permit the emergence of a new and different analysis of science within which they are no longer a source of trouble. Furthermore, if a typical pattern, which we shall later observe in scientific revolutions, is applicable here, these anomalies will then no longer seem to be simply facts. From within a new theory of scientific knowledge, they may instead seem very much like tautologies, statements of situations that could not conceivably have been otherwise.”