This article demonstrates the usefulness of the notion of embeddedness to the historical study of Italian industrial districts of small firms and of local economic change more generally. The development of gold jewelry production in two Italian towns, Valenza Po and Arezzo, shows that vertical disintegration was enabled by the creation of networks of heterogeneous social relations. In both towns, social and political ties led to the creation of institutions of collective governance, which in turn produced a workable level of trust between economic actors. The production of trust, however, never ceased to be a contentious process, endowed with multiple and often contradictory meanings embedded in specific networks and contexts, ranging from collective projects of modernization in Valenza Po to the cementing of a secretive informal economy in Arezzo. The embeddedness approach to economic action is superior both to the communitarian arguments of much of the literature on the Italian industrial districts and to transaction-cost theories, which tend to view institutions in instrumental and functionalist ways.

Crucial to the success of China’s transition to the market economy is the central government’s capacity for institutional innovation. Since 1997, Chinese politicians have sought to transform the governance of state-owned industries from decentralized administrator control to centralized corporate shareholder control. This essay examines the ideological, political, and institutional components of the central state’s strategy of “disembeddedness” that aimed to disrupt preexisting social norms and exchange relations of the planned economy. However, this authoritarian approach to organizational change has generated sociopolitical contentions and unintended economic outcomes that point to alternative conceptions of authority and exchange relations at industrial and firm levels. Focusing on the recent restructuring of the oil and petrochemical sectors into national oil corporations, I provide evidence of how certain types of informal social dynamics have shaped and constrained the implementation of asset control strategies and industrial policies favored by the state, with direct implications for the proper functioning of new market institutions.

This article argues that the embeddedness of Chinese enterprises in Singapore society explains the limited success of the nationalist movement in Singapore. To respond to the economic crisis in the 1930s, Chinese business elites employed nationalist rhetoric to appeal to their compatriots in the British colony to support Chinese “national products.” With dual allegiance to both British rule and Chinese national identity, Chinese business nationalists took a transnational approach. Because Chinese business communities in Singapore were organized along subethnic lines, Chinese transnationalism failed to surmount these social divisions.

In Japanese society the pinnacle of economic and political power resides in Tokyo conglomerates and elite ministries: the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Finance. Until now, the story of this power arrangement has been told from the perspective of national bureaucrats and big business executives. The image projected to the outside world has been of cooperative, trust-based relational contracting with big business at the top “taking care” of its suppliers and subsidiaries below. The story from the bottom, however, is one of technology expropriation (of patentable technology) and monopsony squeeze (unilateral cost-down demands, for example). Firms unwilling to toe the line have been wholly excluded from access to the benefits reserved for those at the top of the pyramid, where one finds lucrative main bank financing, government support, and copious technological information.

This article offers a historical narrative of the political struggle by independent-minded entrepreneurs in postwar Japan. Central to the struggle has been the challenge of building broad-based coalitions to avoid becoming embedded in these hierarchies while at the same time trying to obtain alternative sources of finance and technological know-how. The most successful example of such efforts is the Association of Small and Medium Size Enterprise Entrepreneurs (SME Doyukai). The SME Doyukai has somehow managed to remain completely independent from the state, while most other small business associations have not. This independence has not been free, and the association has gone through a number of institutional dilemmas as a result. We analyze these dilemmas over time and offer comparative lessons.