Recently, for many health economics researchers, empirical estimation of the monetary valuation of a quality-adjusted life year (QALY) has become an important endeavour. Different philosophical and practical approaches to this have emerged. On the one hand, there is a view that, with health-care budgets set centrally, decision-making bodies within the system can iterate, from observation of a series of previous decisions, towards the value of a QALY, thus searching for such a value. Alternatively, and more consistent with the approach taken in other public sectors, individual members of the public are surveyed with the aim of directly eliciting a preference-based – also known as a willingness-to-pay-based (WTP-based) – value of a QALY. While the former is based on supply-side factors and the latter on demand, both in fact suffer from informational deficiencies. Sole reliance on either would necessitate an acceptance or accommodation of chronic inefficiencies in health-care resource allocation. On the basis of this observation, this paper makes the case that in order to approach optimal decision making in health-care provision, a framework incorporating and thus, to a degree, reconciling these two approaches is to be preferred.

The inclusion of both monetary and non-monetary indirect benefits in economic evaluations of public health programmes and services can have significant distributive effects between patient groups. As a result, some patients may be advantaged and others disadvantaged for reasons not directly related to health outcomes or (direct) treatment costs. In pluralistic democracies, there is a case for consulting the community on the fairness of policies that have such distributive implications. This paper reports the results of two pilot studies aimed at uncovering the preferences of the Australian public for the inclusion of indirect benefits in the evaluation of services for its national health scheme, Medicare. The initial survey found some support for taking account of non-monetary indirect benefits – for example, the social contribution made by parents of young children and carers of elderly relatives. By contrast, there was little support for giving high taxpayers priority access to general Medicare services, to life-saving organ transplants, or to very costly drugs, despite the indirect social benefits of doing so. However, such support increased significantly in the follow-up study when the outcomes were characterised as certain, identifiable and health related, and the opportunity costs of failing to take account of indirect benefits were made very clear. The follow-up survey provided evidence of public scepticism about the willingness or ability of government to use additional tax receipts for socially beneficial purposes, and/or a preference for programmes and services that focus on health rather than welfare more generally.

Recommendations issued by agencies undertaking appraisals of health technologies at the national level may impact upon the availability of certain treatments and services in some publicly funded health systems, and, as such, have regularly been subject to challenge, including by way of litigation. In addition to expertise in the evaluation of evidence, fairness of procedures has been identified as a necessary component of a claim to legitimacy in such circumstances. This article analyses the assessment of courts in three jurisdictions of the fairness of decision-making by such agencies and evaluates the judicial reading of procedural justice developed in this particular context against the conditions of ‘accountability for reasonableness’.

Smoking cost the National Health Service (NHS) in England in 1996 an estimated £1.4–£1.7 billion. In 1998, in Smoking Kills, the Government outlined an action plan for reducing smoking prevalence. This paper estimates 2006 costs and the impact of declining prevalence. Estimates are derived from costs, service use, and attributable proportions based on current and ex-smokers’ prevalence and relative risk compared with never-smokers. Comparable 1996 costs were estimated by substituting 1996 prevalence. Smoking-attributable hospital admissions cost the NHS an estimated £1 billion in 2006, outpatient attendances cost £190 million, general practitioner (GP) consultations £530 million, practice nurse consultations £50 million and GP prescriptions £900 million; £2.7 billion in total. This represents 5% of adult hospital admission costs, 4% outpatients, 11% GP and 8% practice nurse consultations and 12% of prescription costs. Smoking accounted for 24% of respiratory disease hospital admission costs and 16% of cancer and cardiovascular disease costs (people aged ⩾35 years). The 2006 cost is estimated to be 13% lower than if smoking had remained at 1996 levels. Smoking represents a substantial cost throughout the NHS. Significant savings are associated with a reduction in prevalence, but much of this stems from an earlier phase of the smoking epidemic. Securing future such savings requires further policies to reduce smoking prevalence.

Funding contingent upon evidence development (FED) has recently been the subject of some considerable debate in the literature but relatively little has been made of its economic impact. We argue that FED has the potential to shorten the lag between innovation and access but may also (i) crowd-out more valuable interventions in situations in which there is a fixed dedicated budget; or (ii) lead to a de facto increase in the funding threshold and increased expenditure growth in situations in which the programme budget is open-ended. Although FED would typically entail periodic review of provisional or interim listings, it may prove difficult to withdraw funding even at cost/QALY ratios well in excess of current listing thresholds. Further consideration of the design and implementation of FED processes is therefore required to ensure that its introduction yields net benefits over existing processes.

In many poor countries, over 80% of the population have experienced corrupt practices in the health sector. In rich countries, corruption takes other forms such as overbilling. The causal link between low levels of the quality of government (QoG) and population health can be either direct or indirect. Using cross-sectional data from more than 120 countries, our findings are that more of a QoG variable is positively associated with higher levels of life expectancy, lower levels of mortality rates for children and mothers, higher levels of healthy life expectancies and higher levels of subjective health feelings. In contrast to the strong relationships between the QoG variables and the health indicators, the relationship between the health-spending measures and population health are rather weak most of the time and occasionally non-existent. Moreover, for private health spending as well as for private share of total health spending, the relation to good health is close to zero or slightly negative. The policy recommendation coming out of our study to improve health levels around the world, in rich countries as well as in poor countries, is to improve the QoG and to finance health care with public, not private, money.

In 2007, a new wave of local reforms involving choice for the population and privatisation of providers was initiated in Swedish primary care. Important objectives behind reforms were to strengthen the role of primary care and to improve performance in terms of access and responsiveness. The purpose of this article was to compare the characteristics of the new models and to discuss changes in financial incentives for providers and challenges regarding governance from the part of county councils. A majority of the models being introduced across the 21 county councils can best be described as innovative combinations between a comprehensive responsibility for providers and significant degrees of freedom regarding choice for the population. Key financial characteristics of fixed payment and comprehensive financial responsibility for providers may create financial incentives to under-provide care. Informed choices by the population, in combination with reasonably low barriers for providers to enter the primary care market, should theoretically counterbalance such incentives. To facilitate such competition is indeed a challenge, not only because of difficulties in implementing informed choices but also because the new models favour large and/or horizontally integrated providers. To prevent monopolistic behaviour, county councils may have to accept more competition as well as more governance over clinical practice than initially intended.