A rediscovery of the long-forgotten republican version of liberal political theory has arresting implications for the theory and practice of international relations. Republican liberalism has a theory of security that is superior to realism, because it addresses not only threats of war from other states but also the threat of despotism at home. In this view, a Hobson's choice between anarchy and hierarchy is not necessary because an intermediary structure, here dubbed “negarchy,” is also available. The American Union from 1787 until 1861 is a historical example. This Philadelphian system was not a real state since, for example, the union did not enjoy a monopoly of legitimate violence. Yet neither was it a state system, since the American states lacked sufficient autonomy. While it shared some features with the Westphalian system such as balance of power, it differed fundamentally. Its origins owed something to particular conditions of time and place, and the American Civil War ended this system. Yet close analysis indicates that it may have surprising relevance for the future of contemporary issues such as the European Union and nuclear governance.

Is there escape from a self-help system? Realists say no. They assume states are egoistic actors in anarchy; this means states must either look out for themselves or risk destruction: structure generates a self-help system. Constructivists think escape is possible. Because identities are made, not given, we should not make a priori assumptions of state egoism: process generates self-help. Process could also generate an other-help security system. This article introduces a third approach that uses social identity theory to argue that interstate relations are inherently competitive. Thus, for cognitive and motivated—rather than structural or social—reasons, competition, which can be coercive or cooperative, characterizes international politics.

Theories of integration fail to explain the stop-and-go nature of European integration. This failures stems from their one-sided attention to either the member states or the institutions of the European Union (EU). The process of integration is best described as one of action and reaction, involving the institutions of the EU, member states, and interest groups. Governments respond to European integration in one policy area by intervening more in adjacent areas, thus inducing policy competition between national states. When their rivalry becomes counterproductive, member states will be motivated to take new steps toward further integration. This interpretation explains the stop-and-go rhythm of European integration and results in a new theoretical framework termed ‘dialectical functionalism.’

The United States resisted restrictionist immigration legislation in the late twentieth century, providing an anomaly for those who would expect restrictionism in times of economic recession. According to some expectations, labor unions would be part of a coalition that in such times would restrict migration to reduce job competition. This reasoning draws on a state-centric approach and assumes that effective barriers to entrance exist. If one alternatively assumes that states cannot fully regulate the socioeconomic forces driving migration flows, then one may expect labor unions to abandon their supposed preference for restrictionism and instead organize immigrant workers. In that case, unions would prefer migration law that accommodates the transnational migrants' interests. The data provide some support for this argument. The perspective of complex interdependence, which emphasizes transnational relations and the blurring of foreign and domestic politics, can enhance understanding of immigration policymaking.

After the economic crisis of the early 1980s, developing countries adopted new policies regarding intellectual property protection only as a result of a coercive U.S. strategy, consistent with a neorealist explanation based on power. Targeted countries have complied only on paper, not in practice, however. In contrast, hegemonic powers have not employed overt coercion in the area of antitrust policy, consistent with interpretivist neoliberalism, which emphasizes learning and voluntarism. A nuanced analysis of power and ideas is necessary to account for the differences between the cases. The different mechanisms through which the new policies have been adopted suggest different prospects for these new policies.

Analysts of international politics can measure and explain the effect of international environmental institutions on the behavior of states and other actors and on the natural environment in three steps. First, we measure the outcome to be explained in terms of goal attainment, defined as the difference, over time or across cases, between actor behavior or the state of the natural environment on dimensions identified by institutional goals and certain end points determined by institutional goals. Second, we assess the effect of an institution in terms of the extent to which the existence or operation of the institution contributes, ceteris paribus, to variation in goal attainment. We transform these two variables into a score of institutional effectiveness to indicate the degree to which institutions contribute to the resolution of the environmental problems that motivate their establishment. Third, we analyze the relationship between institutional effectiveness and specific dimensions of institutional design—such as decision-making rules, membership and access conditions, and the compliance system.