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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 March 2011
India's recent abstention on both the U.S.Soviet sponsored Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, “commended” by the U. N. General Assembly, and the Security Council's resolution offering “guarantees” to signatory non-nuclear weapons nations was prompted as much by domestic as by international considerations. Probably for the first time since India's independence, a major foreign policy position of the Indian government has been influenced by opposition parties, especially the Socialists. Heretofore, Indian foreign policy was almost exclusively the preserve of the governing Congress Party and within it of the Prime Minister and a few political and civil service confidants. This monopoly was increasingly challenged within both Congress and the Parliament, beginning with opposition to Nehru's position on the Hungarian revolt of 1956, and continuing through Prime Minister Shastris' Tashkent agreement of 1965. But it was the results of the Fourth General elections of 1967, and the rise of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty issue, that gave all opposition parties a more influential role in the formation of foreign policy. Among the most persistent, vocal, and influential critics against Indian support for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty have been the Praja Socialist (PSP) and Samyukta Socialist (SSP) parties who receive powerful support fromthe Jan Sangh, from Independents, and from within the Congress Party itself. Right Communists and Swatantra, on the other hand, favor the treaty.
1 Emphasis mine. Quoted in Jha, P. K., “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” AlCC Economic Review, Vol. XIX, No. 7, (October 15, 1967), 11.Google Scholar
2 U. N. Monthly Chronicle, Vol. X, No. 5 (May, 1968), 36–37.Google Scholar
3 Hindusthan Standard, July 8, 1967, p. 3. Plutonium is essential for the production of nuclear weapons.
4 Van Cleave, William R. and Rood, Harold R., “A Technological Comparison of Two Potential Nuclear Powers: India and Japan,” Asian Survey, Vol. VI, No. 7 (July, 1967), 487.Google Scholar
5 Indian Recorder and Digest, Vol. XIII, No. 10 (October, 1967), 4.Google Scholar
6 Van Cleave and Rood.
7 Hindusthan Standard, July 8, 1967, p. 3.
8 Barnds, William J., “India in Transition-Friends and Neighbors,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. XLVI, No. 3 (April, 1968), 556Google Scholar. Actual cost is a matter of dispute. The late Dr. H. L. Bhabha, first head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, estimated cost at Rs. 10 crores for 50 atom bombs and Rs. 15 crores for 50 two-megaton hydrogen bombs, or approximately $12 and $18 million respectively, exclusive of delivery systems. These projections were challenged by Prime Ministers Shastri and Gandhi as gross underestimates, based on what it cost nuclear powers to produce them. Other Indian estimates agree, citing figures of Rs. 500 crores annually to make the bomb and delivery system. See Goray, N. G. and Dwivedy, Surendranath, Why Praja Socialist? Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1967) p. 16Google Scholar; Indian Recorder and Digest, Vol. XIII, No. 10 (September, 1967), 2Google Scholar, and A; Noorani, G., “India's Quest for a Nuclear Guarantee,” Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 7 (July, 1967), 498–501.Google Scholar
9 India has bi-lateral agreements with France, the U. S., and the Soviet Union for experiments. Until now, India has used the Nike-Apache, Judy Dart, and Centaur rockets. The latter will be manufactured at Thumba. Asian Recorder, Vol. XIV, No. 9 (February 26-March 3, 1968), 8199.Google Scholar
10 Indian Recorder and Digest (September, 1967) p. 2.
11 Van Cleave and Rood.
12 Hindu Weekly Review, June 10, 1968, pp. 3 and 7. Relevance of this activization of the Indian Ocean area to the treaty and nuclear weapons issues began when India's Defense Minister told the Rajya Sabha, the upper house of Parliament, on August 16, 1967 that China was likely to acquire an operational short range ballistic missile “soon” and was developing a medium range one. This was in response to a clamor from all parties demanding an assurance against a surprise nuclear attack because of reports the Chinese planned to test fire an MRB with a nuclear warhead across India into the Indian Ocean. This unconfirmed, and apparently unfulfilled prediction, emanated from the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun in August 1967. It prophesized the missile shot would be fired before the end of October 1967 across India into the Indian Ocean from a new test site in Southeast China near the Indian border manned by several hundred Chinese nuclear scientists and engineers deployed there. Japanese sources also said China had already developed an operational MRBM with an effective range of 1700 kilometres, adequate to threaten India's vital areas. A few months earlier, Dr. S. Bhagantab, Scientific Adviser, Ministry of Defence, said the Chinese had the capacity to design a multi-megaton thermonuclear device for delivery by aircraft, could develop the same level warhead for an ICBM by 1970, and have an operational ICBM capacity by 1970–71 or 1972. He also indicated the Chinese were interested in submarines equipped with long range missiles. See Indian Recorder and Digest (September, 1967), p. 5; Hindusthan Standard, April 10, 1967, p. 9.
Recently, debates raged in Parliament over Indian press reports of secret agreements between Britain and the U. S. concerning the former's alleged purchase of one hundred islands of Seychelles group in the Indian Ocean for development of joint Anglo-U. S. bases. Both nations denied contemplating a military use, insisting the islands will be used for communication and staging facilities for seagoing vessels crossing the Indian Ocean to the Far East. Premier Kosygin's recent visit to India was alleged to be concerned with this development and sparked new rumors that the Soviet Union had been offered naval facilities on Indian islands. Under questioning by Socialist leader George Fernandes (SSP), the Defense Minister Swaran Singh denied the report or even a “Soviet presence” in the Indian Ocean, elaborating that there was neither an understanding nor anything under consideration “by way of giving any facility to any foreign Navy in the Indian ports or on the India coast.” He charged the reports were circulated by “certain interested countries and certain interested individuals abroad” without identifying them. See The Hindu Weekly Review, May 20, 1968; p. 16; Hindusthan Standard, April 13, 1968, p. 1.
It is in the light of these events that Prime Minister Gandhi's highly successful unprecedented tour of Southeast Asian countries in May-June must be viewed, her significant comments that Asian nations must give up reliance on outside powers as Asians will fill the “vacuum” left by British withdrawal through bilateral and regional arrangements rather than military alliances, and that even if China attacks, India will not accept help because such powers might decide to stay on. By her emphasis on a new regional cooperation with Southeast Asia, she won a public comment from the Malaysian Premier that they look to India for leadership and the startling admission by Australia that though it supported the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the U. N. it may not sign it because of Mrs. Gandhi's influence. See Hindu Weekly Review, June 10, 1968, pp. 3 and 7; The Statesman Weekly, June 1, 1968, p. 6. Japan is being similarly influenced against signing the treaty. Los Angeles Times, June 23, 1968.
13 Four years after the General Assembly passed a resolution requesting the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to draft such a treaty and the same year China exploded her first nuclear bomb. New York Times, June 11, 1968, pp. 1 and 3; Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, 370th Meeting. February 27, 1968. Final Verbatim Record. ENDC/PV. 370, p. 5.
14 In the Political Committee, the vote was 92 For, 4 Against, and 22 Abstentions and in the General Assembly 95 For, 4 Against, and 21 Abstentions. New York. Times, June 11 and 13, 1968, pp. 1 and 18.
15 Noorani, A. G., “India's Quest For A Nuclear Guarantee,” Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 7 (July 1967). 490–501CrossRefGoogle Scholar
16 Such as UN inability to settle the Kashmir question to India's liking, the Arab-Israeli dispute, or the Vietnam war, lack of Soviet support against China during the 1962 invasion and of American support against Pakistan in the 1965 war, and the feeling that even when such support is forthcoming, as in Vietnam, it is too destructive and dangerous to national independence. There is also resentment against U. S. and Soviet economic and military pressure to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
17 For a good summary and interpretation of the election see Palmer, Norman, “India Fourth General Election,” Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 5 (May, 1967), 275–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
18 It was reported that all MP's except Minoo Masani of the Swatantra Party spoke against signing the treaty. Hindusthan Standard, April 13, 1968.
19 For the source of their differences see Leadership and Political Institutions in India, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 188–210Google Scholar. The socialist movement split in 1955, reunited in 1964, split again in 1965, and continuing efforts towards re-unification are being made since the 1967 elections. But foreign and defense policies are not the source of their contention.
20 Though many Communists were individually members of the Congress before their expulsion in 1945, all Socialists were members of both organizations, enjoying a special relationship with the Congress as a Party that the Communist Party never had.
21 This is not to suggest that the only or even primary reason persons leave or join Congress is for program, policy, or ideological reasons. Many other factors enter in such as personal, group, or caste advancement, etc. … But the communalism of the Jan Sangh, the conservatism of Swatantra, the democratic socialism of the PSP and SSP, and the communism of the two Communist parties, and regionalism of the DMK or Shiv Sena, exist both within and without the Congress and cannot be ginored or underestimated.
22 When Socialists left the Congress in 1948, they lost approximately 2,000 members to that organization, half of which were in U. P. alone and included their provincial secretary, Mohanlal Gautam, who later became a Congress State Minister, and Hariharnath Shastri, President of INTUC. When Asoka Mehta led a mass defection back to Congress in 1964, it cost the PSP alone at least 17,700 members from eleven states including 60 legislators of whom 6 were MP's. Besides Asoka Mehta, the losses included the Socialists top legislative leader in U. P. Shiban Lai Saxena and M. Gurupadswamy of Mysore. Later in 1964, the PSP lost 2000 members to Congress in Saurashtra and 3,000 in Gujerat. This year they lost their top U. P. leader again with the departure of Triloki Singh and a reported 200 members to the Congress. There have also been losses from the Lohia Socialist Party and SSP. Over the twenty year period since 1948, the Socialists have lost additional thousands to Congress on a local basis. They have also gained from Congress defections, though nowhere near in numbers or importance of leaders except with the KMPP merger in 1952.
23 Of course there are some exceptions where ex-socialists have changed their views or nurse personal grievances. But it is the personal observation of this author based on a long standing study of Indian socialists and recent field research in India, that the generalization is true in the main. Outstanding examples of ex-Socialists in high Congress positions are Asoka Mehta, a founder leader in the socialist movement in 1934, and former National Chairman and Secretary of the PSP, recently Minister of Planning and of Oil; M. Gurupadswamy, former socialist MP, now Minister of State; and Sadiq Ali, now General Secretary of the A.I.C.C., former Jt. Secretary of the PSP.
24 For example, Acharya J. B. Kripalani, MP former National Chairman and founder leader of the PSP and Ganga Sharan Sinha, MP, founder member of the CSP and former National Chairman of the PSP.
25 General Secretary's Report, Eighth National Conference, December 26–28, 1965, (Bombay: Praja Socialist Party, 1965), pp. 45–46.
26 A Socialist Alternative. PSP Election Manifesto 1967. Praja Socialist Party, 1967, pp. 14–15.
27 Why Praja Socialist? (Popular Prakashan, 1967) pp. 14–15Google Scholar. This represents the PSP's official position as explained jointly by its National Chairman and chief parliamentary spokesman.
28 Ibid, p. 17. Also repeated to the author in an interview with Nath Pai, deputy leader of the PSP in the Lok Sabha, who added for emphasis: “I don't know how we will do it now [build nuclear weapons], but we will!” Pai is simply reiterating a strongly felt official party position.
29 Dr. Bhabha's broadcast nine days after the first Chinese nuclear explosion in October 1964, saying the only defense against a nuclear attack or the threat of one is a nuclear capability, started agitation for nuclear weapons development. The new Chairman, Dr. Vikram A. Sarabhai, is against making nuclear weapons, because it would involve a total commitment of national resources. See Noorani, pp. 490–91.
30 Janata Vol. XXII, No. 19 (May 28, 1967) 1.
31 Ibid.
32 Goray and Dwivedy, pp. 18–19.
33 Hindusthan Standard, July I, 1967.
34 Noorani, p. 497.
35 Hindusthan Standard (July 8, 1967), p. 3.
36 Statement of Principles, Programme & Political Line, Samyukta Socialist Party, 1966, p. 33; Why Samyukta Socialist? (Popular Prakashan, 1967) pp. 52–54.Google Scholar
37 Indian Recorder and Digest, Vol. 13, No. 6 (June, 1967), 9.
38 Janata, Vol. XXII, No. 16 (May 7, 1967), 3.
39 Janata, Vol. XXII, No. 19 (May 28, 1967), 6.
40 Emphasis mine. Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, 379th Meeting, March 14, 1968, ENDC/PV.379 pp. 9–10. See also his long speech before the same body in February ENDC/PV. 370, pp. 5–14 and before the U. N. General Assembly on May 14, 1968 in India News, Vol. VII, No. 10, (May 24, 1968) 1 and 5.
41 See series begun in The Statesman Weekly, June I, 1968.
42 Hindusthan Standard, July 8, 1968, p. 2 and The Overseas Hindustan Times, June 15, 1968, p. 9.