Throughout the Spanish–American wars of independence Britain's policy was to observe a strict neutrality between Spain and the colonial revolutionaries. This did not reflect an indifferent detachment or a commitment to even-handed justice, but was rather dictated by the pursuit of Britain's own interests, which necessitated the maintenance of good relations both with Spain and with Spanish America. During the period of the Peninsular War of 1808–14 Spain was a vital ally against Napoleon, and after the war was over she remained an important element in the European collective security system that Lord Castlereagh, the British Foreign Secretary, constructed to prevent the re-emergence of French dominance. Accordingly Britain refused requests from the revolutionary regimes in South America to recognise their independence or to help them to defend it against the mother country. At the same time Britain declined to assist her Spanish ally in recovering control over the rebellious territories, as she had no desire to imperil the important commerical links she was developing with the emergent states of Spanish America. Both parties continued to try to enlist British assistance, and both of them at times complained of breaches of neutrality by British officials. But for several years Britain walked her tightrope very successfully.

There is currently a renewed interest in the relationship between economic fluctations and strike movements which refers back to an article by Eric Hobsbawm1 and an even earlier polemical piece by Leon Trotsky.2 This article offers a contribution to the growing literature, focusing, unlike most other studies, on a Third.World country. It also reflects the increasing influence of social history in Latin American research on the making of the working class.

By 1930 there were £435.1 million of British capital invested in Argentina, 62.3% of which was located in railway companies whose securities duly yielded reasonable annual profits. However, the onset of the Great Depression and the successful 1930 revolution brought this state of affairs to a standstill. Moreover, both events inaugurated years of growing difficulties for the British-owned railways and the British government, for whom these public utilities gradually turned into economic hostages and a potential source of conflict in Anglo-Argentine relations. On the one hand, the railways were slowly squeezed between rising operating costs and regulated tariffs while their net receipts dwindled becausé of the crisis. Furthermore, the companies began to experience the following: growing hostility from a local public opinion who resented their foreign ownership; the adverse effects of the Argentine nationalistic economic policies; and had to find suitable new courses of action to deal with government officials who were not wholly sympathetic to their interests. On the other hand, although Whitehall could not fail to consider that to some extent the railways were the backbone of Britain's economic stronghold in the Argentine, they also had other substantial trading, financial and shipping interests at stake in this highly profitable market. Therefore, the British government began to weigh carefully the role of these public utilities in British policy towards Argentina; the real prospects of a clash with Argentina if the railways' finances deteriorated too much and the Foreign Office intervened on their behalf; and whether their aspirations should be considered on the same standing as other British concerns in the Argentine.

For approximately the last two-and-a-half decades it has been a stated goal of both Honduran and U.S. policy to improve the welfare of the Honduran people, both directly through the provision of services and indirectly through the promotion of economic development. The need is great; Honduras has the lowest per capita GNP in Central America ($660 in 1984) and the highest population growth rate (3.4%). It also has the second highest percentage of its population living in rural areas (61%). Consequently, rural development has been a primary concern of development programs.

This paper examines the sensitivity of current account balances to several important variables. Variables are classified as external and domestic. External variables are those over which Central American countries have little or no control. In this study external variables are real interest rates in world capital markets, the terms of trade, and growth in the developed countries. Low real interest rates, improved terms of trade and rapid growth in the developed countries would be expected to improve current account balances. Domestic variables include budget deficits and real exchange rates. These are factors over which Central American countries do have control. Budget deficits and appreciations of real exchange rates can be expected to cause deteriorations in current account balances.

On 11 January 1986, the Sandinista government announced the modification of the 1981 Agrarian Reform Law. The new law institutionalizes significant changes in Sandinista agrarian policy which have yet to be analyzed. The changes introduced suggest that the Nicaraguan agrarian reform was reaching its limits during 1985, after successfully distributing 2,523,388 manzanas of land to 83,322 families. Further, six years into the institutionalization of the Nicaraguan revolution the balance of forces which had emerged required a re-evaluation of policies designed to achieve one of the central goals of the revolution – to radically change the socio-economic conditions of the Nicaraguan peasantry through the implementation of an agrarian reform.

A number of interpretations have recently emerged which attempt to explain the nature and sociopolitical implications of Roman Catholic base Christian communities (CEBs) in Brazil. Most studies have tended to describe these small, informal lay groups as a predominantly lower-class phenomenon which is facilitating the self-liberation of the poor from the weight of centuries-old political and economic oppression.