Among archaeologists concerned with the study of cultural regularities in the evolution of the early civilizations, few general hypotheses have stirred such controversy as that which postulates a causal link between the phenomenon of irrigation agriculture and the origins of the state. Adumbrated initially by Karl Wittfogel in the 1920s and stated by him most completely in Oriental Despotism (1957), the hydraulic theory has been subject to much discussion and to varying fates in recent literature and research history. Although Wittfogel's original formulation was based chiefly on Old World data, the theory has had major impact on research and interpretation in the New. The first large-scale use of the approach in American archaeology followed World War II, when the Institute of Andean Research sponsored the Viru Valley Project in North Coastal Peru (Bennett, 1948; Willey, 1953). In recent years American archaeology has become concerned with questions of process beyond the limits of simple historical reconstruction (Binford and Binford, 1968). Concepts derived from systems theory (Flannery, 1968a; Hole and Heizer, 1969) are increasingly invoked to explain the cause-and-effect feedback mechanisms involved in the evolution of culture. Concomitantly, a virtual explosion of data has occurred concerning the chronology, size, and sociological and demographic matrix of New World irrigation systems. Thus, both investigative techniques and theoretical frameworks have undergone considerable recent modification and the body of relevant data is large and growing. While some might consider the hydraulic agriculture hypothesis a dead issue, such is not the case. Changes in the total conceptual context of any theory, and new evidence both pro and con, necessitate reevaluation of the theory.

This essay discusses aspects of contemporary cuban politics and economics, up to but not including the 1969-1970 sugar harvest effort, from the point of view of a theory of sectoral clashes presented by Markos Mamalakis. The essay will focus on those hypotheses, derived from Mamalakis' previous work, which attempt to explain social and political conflict and policy making.

Mamalakis defines a clash or collision of sectors as the aggressive and administered struggle for privileges and advantages among an economy's sectors. The clash is administered or manipulated because the transfer of resources from one sector to another is brought about through governmental economic policy; it is aggressive because the transfer of resources goes beyond voluntary saving or nondiscriminatory fiscal policies to such an extent that the government is willing to risk the decay of one economic sector in order to promote another.

According to the theory of sectoral clashes and coalitions, the sectoral element plays a unique role in affecting, on the one hand, the interrelationships between the economic processes of income creation, distribution, and allocation and, on the other hand, the interrelationships between economic, social, political, and institutional processes that make for change and progress. The objective of this essay is to extend the previous formulation of the theory of sectoral clashes and coalitions along two lines: first, by presenting statistical information from all of Latin America which prima facie supports the theory's basic premises; second, by defining and expanding these premises and the basic framework in an effort to obtain a clearer vision of the theory and its links to economic, political, and social reality. Although most criticisms of the theory find a specific answer and most of the suggestions for improvement are followed, this article is more than a rebuttal. In response to the urgent need for its further development, cited by all commentators and those who have applied and tested the theory in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, and Peru, this essay seeks to open new ground and explore new dimensions.