The paper examines certain legal changes in eighteenth-century Connecticut, primarily in the area of debt litigation, and links them with economic development and with changes in the nature and meaning of community. The legal changes proceeded in the direction of greater rationality as expanding economic activity disrupted the multiplex ties that had once characterized communities and paired people instead in single-interest relationships. Max Weber's concept of rationality provides a theoretical base for the historical study of legal change.

The results of a survey of public attitudes about appropriate length of prison sentences for convicted offenders are reported. Two main questions are addressed: 1) degree of consensus within the population about appropriate sentences for different offenses and 2) the relationship between the desired sentences expressed by the public and the actual time served by offenders in prison. The analysis suggests considerable agreement across various demographic groups on the relative severity of sentences to be imposed for different offenses, but disagreement over the absolute magnitude of these sentences. These results suggest the feasibility of generating consensus on a proportional, just deserts sentencing schedule, but difficulty in establishing the “constant of proportionality.” The sentences desired by the public are found to be consistently more severe than sentences actually imposed, suggesting the need for greater public awareness of current imprisonment practices so that expectations of the determinate sentencing schedules will be realistic and consistent with limited prison capacity.

Disillusionment with the therapeutic ideal has led to the current movement to reduce the jurisdiction of juvenile courts to cases in which they can exercise a crime-prevention function and to emphasize a fair, adversarial court procedure including representation by a lawyer. Two North Carolina juvenile courts were studied in 1975-1976 to determine their degree of concern about rehabilitation, crime prevention, and adversarial procedure. These courts showed a trend toward reducing their intake of cases with a less serious prior record and current offense and becoming more punitive with regard to the remaining cases. The dominant factors associated with disposition—particularly with the decision to commit the child to training school—were prior court record and seriousness of current offense. Other factors found to be of some importance were the child's family structure, support by the family as shown by court attendance, and whether the complainant in the case was a parent or probation officer. Race, family income, and the sex of the child had little or no effect on decisions to commit. Differences in individual judges' commitment rates were explained largely by differences in the cases they handled. Being held in detention before the court hearing made commitment more likely. The type of counsel a child had—private, individually assigned, or specialized Juvenile Defender—made no difference in whether he was adjudicated delinquent or committed. In fact, children represented by counsel were somewhat more likely to be committed than those without counsel. This and other findings of the study suggest that the participation of lawyers in juvenile court may be largely a formality, a token compliance with due process requirements rather than an integral part of court fact-finding.

Congress and the Supreme Court have had many intense conflicts over the years. This paper examines that relationship in an effort to determine whether the Court's role is essentially that of legitimator or disturber of the political universe. Drawing upon the analysis of Dahl as critiqued by Funston, Adamany, and Casper, the relationship is tested using a much broader data base than was used by the previous studies. Based upon this analysis, the Court is characterized as a legitimator but also as a significant wielder of power (contrary to Dahl's earlier assertions).

The jury has been widely credited with contributing to the best elements of the American judicial system. Utilizing computerized case histories of 29,000 felony defendants in an urban trial court, this article examines an important aspect of the jury process—judicial sentencing following jury trials. The data show that the sentencing cost of pursuing constitutionally guaranteed jury trial rights is high: jury defendants are punished with substantially greater harshness than are plea and bench convictees in essentially similar criminal cases. Regardless of sentencing philosophy, virtually every judge who sentenced jury, bench, and plea defendants sentenced jury defendants far more harshly and sent them to jail more frequently. Stiffer penalties for jury defendants appears to be the operational, though unstated, judicial policy, exercised out of the apparent administrative interest in reducing the number of lengthy jury trials.

In recent years there has been substantial concern over the issue of whether the judiciary is a representative institution. Most research on the matter suggests that judges are to some degree sensitive to public opinion, but confusion exists over the process through which the public affects the courts. This research is designed to reduce the level of confusion.

Taking advantage of the quasi-experimental research design afforded by the “circuit” system of court organization used by the Iowa trial courts, this research investigates the “sharing” model of representation. In order to insure against spurious results, controls are introduced for three types of influences on sentencing decisions: defendant and case attributes, judge attributes and role orientations, and local system practices. Analysis of a path model consisting of measures of sentencing behavior, seriousness of crime in the local jurisdiction, and perceptions of crime seriousness reveals that one-sixth of the variance in sentences can be explained. However, substantial variation across judges in responsiveness to local norms is also discovered.

Further investigation of these data was undertaken to determine the factors that account for variation in the strength of environmental linkages. The analysis suggests that judges with greater contact with their constituencies, who have experienced electoral defeat, and who assume a “delegate” role orientation, are far more influenced by environmental factors.

The article concludes with some observations on how the process of recruitment and early career patterns affect representation.

This article reviews arguments about limitations on judicial competence or capacity, focusing on the need to go beyond such arguments to understand courts and their problems. Theoretical limitations on the competence and capacity of courts are compared with the record of judicial performance. The study examines performance in three areas in which courts are most likely to be thought ineffective: (1) cases involving unrepresented defendants, such as debtors or tenants; (2) disputes among persons with intimate or ongoing relationships; (3) extended impact cases. It is shown that courts adapt to changing circumstances and perform quite well, even with these difficult types of cases. Reforms are still needed, but rather than focusing narrowly on the courts, they should be directed at a wider range of social goals, such as strengthening family and community institutions which have been diminished by increasing urbanization and industrialization.