Judges communicate outside of the courtroom on a regular basis. They give speeches at universities and to societies; appear before select committees; write for a range of publications; and engage in both media and outreach activities. Existing literature has charted the value and perils of such extrajudicial communication. This paper contributes an explanation of what motivates judges towards such communication, and what shapes their discourse. The work draws on 13 semi-structured interviews with senior serving and recently retired judges, along with an extensive range of examples of judicial speech beyond the bench. It argues that extrajudicial communication is shaped by a shared conception amongst the judicial community of what is appropriate. This conception of propriety is principally motivated by a communal pursuit of sustaining public confidence in the judicial office. The conception also informs the limits of appropriate discourse and establishes the ramifications for breach.

All aspects of law possess scaler elements, but critiques from the ‘politics of scale’, a concept well established in political geography, remain rare in legal analysis. Brexit, especially as regards Northern Ireland, provides a key opportunity to consider scaler analysis both in a descriptive and theoretical sense. Scale deepens our understanding of how law co-constitutes multiple scales but also highlights where a flat understanding of law tied to vertical jurisdictional frames foils attempts to garner a full understanding of its operation. Northern Ireland, a legal and political space that from one perspective lends itself to an apparently clear-cut vertical description of legal scales, actually presents a rich space where networked, rhetorical and nodular scales and structures continuously (re)contest scaled solutions. The Brexit outcome of what used to be known as the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland and is now known as the Windsor Framework – and specifically how the Framework is intended to operate in practice – provides an opportunity to not only understand Northern Ireland within a scale and law frame, but also to highlight the shortcomings of law's traditional scaler approach and what lessons may be learned when analysing or engaging with the intersection of law and politics in similar future situations.

This paper examines the interaction between ‘radical’ constitutional change, in the form of political devolution, and property systems in the UK, from the perspective of those at the margins of those systems. The paper adopts a property ‘from below’ approach and critically applies the theoretical framework developed by AJ van der Walt in Property in the Margins. In that book, van der Walt outlined how property systems frequently operate to resist democratic and constitutional change and transformation through the functioning of the property paradigm, which refers to a set of doctrinal, rhetorical, and logical assumptions and beliefs about the relative value and power of discrete property interests in law and in society. Building on van der Walt's work, this paper takes eviction, which represents the landlord's apex right, as a case study and considers how qualifications of that right have been reformed by the Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scotland) Act 2016. It is argued that while the strength of the property paradigm is apparent in both English and Scottish property systems, Living Rent, a national tenants’ union in Scotland, have organised tenants to effectively contest and, in some respects, displace the logic of the property paradigm during the reform process.

The aim of this paper is to inform a sociological jurisprudence of the implied duty in the contract of employment of mutual trust and confidence. Present analyses of the emerging term have been doctrinal in nature. Such scholarship contributes a normative internal perspective to what can be understood as the jurisprudential project of guarding and maintaining law as a practice of regulation. This paper seeks to generate knowledge that will allow for an extension of the jurisprudential analysis to take into account how mutual trust and confidence may manifest in contemporary conditions of work. This is achieved by, first, presenting original sociological data of the employment relation in a work context likely to demonstrate practices that resonate with features of mutual trust and confidence – that of early-stage digital technology startups – and, secondly, contrasting this empirical account with doctrinal conceptions of the term. Findings unsettle the dominant jurisprudential account of mutual trust and confidence as positively contributing to the social goal of labour law as operating to counter the power of capital.

The UK enacted its first legal measure to address gender pay inequity, the Equal Pay Act 1970, more than 50 years ago. Yet, in 2021, the gender pay gap (GPG) still stood at 15.4%. Departing from the remedial and individual approach that characterises equal pay legislation, the 2017 Gender Pay Gap Information Regulations (the Regulations) require private and voluntary sector organisations with 250+ employees to annually publish pay data broken down by gender. The long-term aspiration of the Regulations is to contribute to closing the GPG within a generation. It is also hoped that they will encourage the public disclosure of pay data and changes in workplace policies to reduce organisational GPGs (immediate aims) and improve employers’ accountability (underlying aim). This paper considers whether the Regulations have what it takes to meet those immediate and underlying aims. Our assessment framework is built on the premise that for public disclosure to be useful and for employers to tackle the causes of the GPG, the information reported must be of sufficient quality, meaningful and relevant. The paper draws on both doctrinal analysis and empirical data reported by FTSE 100 Index companies to assess the Regulations and determine whether they hold the potential to meet those aims.

This is the first academic paper to consider the role that parliamentarians play in access to justice. Under austerity, England and Wales has seen cuts to legal aid and local authority budgets that have impacted the ability of people to get help for legal problems in social welfare law from the advice sector. Members of the UK Parliament and Members of the Senedd Cymru are increasingly being called upon by their constituents to fill the resultant gap in advice. This paper draws on interviews with parliamentarians that draw out the nature of the role they are now playing in access to justice across three key areas of civil justice: welfare benefits; housing; and immigration. The growth of parliamentarians as figures in access to justice has thus far been largely neglected but is crucial to grasp, as the implications for the future of access to justice are massive. The paper calls for more research to better understand the phenomenon but urges caution that elected representatives should not be considered as an adequate substitute for a properly functioning, adequately funded advice sector.

This paper considers whether UK corporate insolvency law and the UK Insolvency Act 1986 have extra-territorial effect post-Brexit, and whether – and to what extent – it is for the courts or the legislature to extend any extra-territorial effect. It does not deal with ‘inward recognition’, ie the recognition of foreign judgments and orders in the UK.

Brexit has left something of a vacuum and provisions which might otherwise have applied extra-territorially, at least within the EU, may now have been deprived completely of extra-territorial effect. But all is not lost and Brexit here presents opportunities. There is room for clarifying that particular provisions which might otherwise have discriminated between EU application and application vis-à-vis the rest of the world can now be given a uniform global interpretation. Courts should, however, proceed incrementally in extending the extra-territorial scope of UK corporate insolvency law.

A bolder reform would be to enact legislation that specifies the exact extent to which the UK Insolvency Act applies extra-territorially. Legislation obviously depends on parliamentary time and requires detailed drafting but also provides the opportunity for the UK to showcase that it remains at the forefront of international insolvency developments.

Questions of statutory interpretation form a significant portion of administrative law cases. Accordingly, judicial methodology in this area requires careful consideration by public law commentators. The core aim of this paper is to question the general orthodoxy that statutory interpretation is invariably a question for judges. In recent times, one prominent argument has been that between jurists arguing that interpretation should be the realisation of Parliament's intention (‘intentionalist’), and those who prefer the closely related but subtly distinct focus on its objective purpose (‘purposivist’). I contend that this argument, framed as a question over the inter-institutional relationship between Parliament and the courts, focuses on how interpretation is carried out without considering who is best placed to do the interpreting. Given, as I demonstrate with a series of case studies, that in hard cases the distinction between interpretation and discretion/policymaking can become obscure to the point of nullity, the debate fails to consider institutional arguments for judicial deference on questions of law. Moreover, and counterintuitively, the arguments of the intentionalists/purposivists can be used to bolster an argument for deference. My conclusion adopts a wider lens, setting out a broader constitutional argument for, and addressing objections against, cautious and context-sensitive deference.

Judicial institutions have become the standard solution to umpire multilevel polities across much of the European continent. However, such arrangement is not free from complexities. This paper analyses the problems associated with the construction of legitimacy regarding constitutional courts in European multilevel democracies. In these polities, constitutional courts tend to rely on three different forms of legitimacy, which are embedded into their institutional design: democratic, multilevel; and technocratic. However, these forms of legitimacy are in tension, often undermining one another when combined. Furthermore, this tension is exploited by political actors to attack the courts, resulting in reputational costs for these institutions.

The National Security Act 2023 replaces the Official Secrets Acts 1911, 1920 and 1939, updating, rationalising, and expanding the various offences which they contained and introducing new rules aimed at the same broad end of countering the threat posed to the UK by the efforts of hostile states and their proxies. It therefore represents a legislative confirmation of the ongoing pivot back to ‘state threats’ rather than terrorism as the focus of the national security enterprise in the UK, though now informed by the experience of counter-terrorism law since 2000. This paper assesses the main changes made by the 2023 Act, including in the context of threats to the democratic process, actual and potential, which have been identified in recent years. The argument offered is that the focus of the 2023 Act – encompassing threats to democracy only where they rise to the level of threats to national security – is undermined by the absence of a more thoroughgoing project to protect the democratic process more generally against foreign interference.

Drawing on a dataset of 263 contempt of court decisions, this paper examines a widespread but under-interrogated phenomenon: imprisonment for breach of injunctions. Across a wide range of contexts – from cases involving anti-social behaviour, protest, Gypsy and Traveller communities – courts across the country are using their civil contempt of court powers to imprison individuals for breaching injunctions. As the first research to date that explicitly examines this issue, the paper falls into four parts. First, it introduces the powers to make an injunction; in section 2 the courts’ powers on committal are outlined. Section 3 introduces the dataset on which this paper is based. Finally, section 4 explores the geographical distribution of cases, sentencing decisions, and the representation of defendants in these proceedings. We identify significant disparities in the application and enforcement of injunctions, raising critical questions about legal practices, fairness and equality. We advocate for ongoing academic research in this area.

This paper discusses the accountability gap problem posed by artificial intelligence. After sketching out the accountability gap problem we turn to ancient Roman law and scrutinise how slave-run businesses dealt with the accountability gap through an indirect agency of slaves. Our analysis shows that Roman law developed a heterogeneous framework in which multiple legal remedies coexist to accommodate the various competing interests of owners and contracting third parties. Moreover, Roman law shows that addressing the various emerging interests had been a continuous and gradual process of allocating risks among different stakeholders. The paper concludes that these two findings are key for contemporary discussions on how to regulate artificial intelligence.

The merits and means of accommodating non-binary populations into UK law is becoming an increasingly important issue for policymakers, judges, scholars and legal professionals. Following Elan-Cane's Supreme Court challenge to binary passport sex markers in 2021, the UK Government face another challenge this year concerning non-binary recognition on birth certificates. While an additional third sex option is perhaps the most well-known reform option for the current binary system, other options have been suggested, including additional multiple sex options and/or removing sex from the birth certificate. While scholars and policymakers debate the merits of these, little is known about non-binary people's own preferences towards these options. This paper therefore presents original empirical data on non-binary attitudes towards these options, demonstrating the various perceived opportunities and drawbacks of each, and reflecting on the possible consequences of reform.

The past decade has seen a marked shift in the regulatory landscape of UK higher education. Institutions are increasingly assuming responsibility for preventing campus sexual misconduct, and are responding to its occurrence through – amongst other things – codes of (mis)conduct, consent and/or active bystander training, and improved safety and security measures. They are also required to support victim-survivors in continuing with their education, and to implement fair and robust procedures through which complaints of sexual misconduct are investigated, with sanctions available that respond proportionately to the seriousness of the behaviour and its harms. This paper examines the challenges and prospects for the success of university disciplinary processes for sexual misconduct. It focuses in particular on how to balance the potentially conflicting rights to privacy held by reporting and responding parties within proceedings, while respecting parties’ rights to equality of access to education, protection from degrading treatment, due process, and the interests of the wider campus community. More specifically, we explore three key moments where private data is engaged: (1) in the fact and details of the complaint itself; (2) in information about the parties or circumstances of the complaint that arise during the process of an investigation and/or resultant university disciplinary process; and (3) in the retention and disclosure (to reporting parties or the university community) of information regarding the outcomes of, and sanctions applied as part of, a disciplinary process. We consider whether current data protection processes – and their interpretation – are compatible with trauma-informed practice and a wider commitment to safety, equality and dignity, and reflect on the ramifications for all parties where that balance between rights or interests is not struck.

The usage of delegated legislation as a means of governance deserves significant attention, in view of the enormous impact that it is capable of having on the lives of citizens. While reforms to the process of parliamentary scrutiny are an important means of minimising the inappropriate usage of delegated legislation, this paper explores the possibility of drawing more fruitfully upon judicial review as an additional control mechanism. It undertakes a theoretical analysis of what makes delegated legislation distinct from primary legislation and other types of executive action for the purposes of judicial review, with a view towards identifying the proper normative orientation of judicial review of delegated legislation – upholding the moral requirements of delegation relationships and safeguarding democratic accountability and the rule of law. It then argues that existing grounds of review applied towards delegated legislation go some way towards but are inadequately directed at this normative orientation. Drawing inspiration from Irish and US jurisprudence, the paper critically evaluates several possible means of filling this doctrinal space, and concludes that the non-delegation doctrine and a rule of law-based ground of judicial review directed at exercises of delegated law-making power can supplement the law of judicial review of delegated legislation.

The paper reports the findings of over a decade of pioneering, award-winning fieldwork which has explored how workplace experience, if embedded successfully in different stages of legal education, can accelerate the ‘speed to capability’ and skills development of early career lawyers. The benefits from initial experiments of graduate-level work placements carried out by the authors since 2008 are presented. The paper then explores the findings from almost 10 years of creating year-long work placements for law undergraduates, assessing student skill growth, and the impact of the work placements on degree results and employment outcomes, before and during the Covid-19 pandemic.

This paper considers the relationship between litigants in person (LiPs) and conspiracy theories and seeks to answer two questions: how, and why, do some LiPs come to be conspiracy theorists? The majority of LiPs, of course, do not become conspiracy-minded. There is also no evidence that LiPs are more likely than anyone else in legal proceedings to be conspiracists, only, perhaps, that it is more obvious when they are. But there continue to be individuals who have conspiracist explanations for difficulties or failures they experience throughout legal proceedings. And while it is widely held that some LiPs hold eccentric beliefs about the law, there has been little attempt to understand how and why LiPs may come to acquire or articulate these beliefs. This is presumably because it has not been considered important to interrogate the views of people already often assumed to be ‘difficult’ or eccentric. This paper contends, however, that trying to understand how and why these conspiracist beliefs are acquired matters very much. This is because conspiracy theories can give us a critical insight into how negative experiences of litigation can result in a loss of faith or trust in legal institutions.

The interpretation of administrative policies is of great importance in contemporary public law. The correct approach to policy interpretation has, however, been subject to insufficient academic scrutiny. The effect of policies is to provide guidance: not only to decision-makers, but also to stakeholders in the decision. Obvious stakeholders include the applicant or the individual who is the subject of the administrative decision, but the scope of potential legitimate stakeholders may go far beyond this. In matters of general interest, the broader public may be guided by policy (for instance, whether to object to a proposal during a consultation exercise, or on what basis to object). When considering how policy should be interpreted, the court should have regard to the extent of the appropriate audience of the policy, specifically considering how the least expert reader of the policy would interpret it. This ‘least expert reader principle’ will assist in answering difficult questions, such as whether the court should have regard to the underlying evidence base when interpreting a policy. The courts should rely upon, and express their reasoning by reference to, the least expert reader principle, in order to increase the transparency of judgments in the field of policy interpretation.

Austerity measures and the cost-of-living crisis have led to rising poverty rates and violations of socioeconomic rights in the UK and Europe. However, there are limited routes of redress for these violations in many European countries. Claims using Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to address violations of socioeconomic rights are suggested but not fully described in the academic literature. The European Court of Human Rights has found violations of the Convention in very limited circumstances caused by poverty and destitution. These circumstances include violations of the ECHR in cases of insufficient food being provided to those detained by the state. This paper considers possible violations of Article 3 ECHR in relation to food poverty. It argues that hunger is a violation of human dignity and provides tangible evidence of degrading treatment. It identifies benefit caps, the two-child limit, and benefit sanctions as policies that can lead to food poverty and, as a result, could amount to degrading treatment. For some living in food poverty due to these policies, Article 3 ECHR may provide a route of redress.

This paper examines how English courts have responded to the contract problems generated by the Covid-19 pandemic and considers what this tells us about future contract law development. In relation to consumers, the case law on pandemic-affected contracts, though limited, indicates that traditional contract doctrine does not necessarily produce beneficial outcomes for consumers. This further diminishes the importance of the common law in the consumer contracting context. In the commercial sector, contracting parties were encouraged by government and other organisations to co-operate with one another and act in good faith during the crisis, but this has not influenced the courts applying contract law in the pandemic aftermath. The emerging case law suggests that contract law has retained its commitment to certainty, freedom of contract and sanctity of contract, notwithstanding the extraordinary circumstances around the outbreak and its unpredictable effects on contracts. The unalloyed application of formal contract law in the post-pandemic case law augments the position of relational norms as extra-contractual in English law, putting the further judicial development of relational contract principles in doubt. The paper concludes that despite the considerable social and economic upheaval caused by the pandemic, its impact on contract law development is likely to be minimal.