A growing body of research connects Christian nationalism—a preference for a religiously conservative political regime—to social and political beliefs. This paper raises questions about the validity of a popular scale used to measure those attitudes. I begin by exploring the factor structure of the six-item Christian nationalism index. I then show how semi-supervised machine learning can be used to illustrate classification problems within that scale. Finally, I demonstrate that this index performs poorly at the interval level, a combination of measurement error and the sorting out of religious and political preferences. These attitudes have become so bound up in conventional politics that they often exhibit a threshold rather than a linear relationship to political preferences. I conclude with an appeal for care in matching theory to empirics: Christian nationalism is a prominent political theology, but research must grapple with the limitations of prevailing measurement tools when operationalizing it.

A number of controversial aspects of the relationship between religion and the state are located in public space. Although burqa bans, the Swiss minaret ban, and duties to display crucifixes on public buildings are different in various ways, it is significant that they all take place in this particular type of location. However, when normative political theorists have addressed these issues, they have rarely paid sufficient attention to their spatial location, and, as a result, their analyses are lacking a vital dimension. This article shows what can go wrong when these normative analyses do not refer to an account of public space. It then indicates what part of a suitable account would look like by sketching four of its essential elements, referred to as the definition, distinctiveness, differentiation, and dynamism of public space. It is argued that normative political theorists should draw on aspects of such an account in order to achieve a more sophisticated understanding of issues concerning religion in public spaces, as well as to reach more securely grounded normative conclusions about them.

Pakistan has strived though unsuccessfully to introduce reforms into thousands of religious seminaries. Among the different sects of seminaries, Deobandi madaris which are mostly led by Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F) have posed the greatest challenge. This paper seeks to analyze why and how JUI-F obstructs the state's attempts of convincing madaris for reforms. Based on the findings of elite group interviews and constructs of “elite instrumentalism” and “political survival theory,” this study argues that JUI-F has political interests, both strategic-cum-existential and tactical, at stake in resisting these reforms. This study of Fazlur Rehman's behavior vis-à-vis state's madrassah reform initiatives allows one to bring home the theoretical premises set by “political survival theory” and “elite instrumentalism.” Accordingly, JUI-F opposes madrassah reforms because the instrumental use of religion (madaris) has long been vital for retaining its political power which in turn has ensured party's political survival.

Recent political science literature notes that the relationship between religion and politics is not a one-way interaction: religion influences political beliefs and political beliefs influence religious practices. Most of these studies, however, have relied on aggregate or indirect methods of assessing individual-level religious decisions of where to attend worship services. This paper utilizes an original, nationally representative survey conducted through YouGov to directly ask about respondents' views on politics in church and how it influences their religious behaviors. We find that many respondents admit church shopping, both inside and outside of their denomination, and that politics influences their choice of congregation to attend. After examining the demographics of those who church shops for political reasons, we conclude by discussing the implications of religiopolitical sorting for tolerance and partisan reinforcement.

Understanding the social dynamics of public opposition to religious symbols is a pressing issue. This research finds that stereotypes of how committed group members are to the national community shape support for the right to wear religious symbols in various settings. These social perceptions are particularly influential in determining support for the rights of Muslims to wear religious symbols. Drawing on data from a national survey experiment (N = 974) conducted in Canada, the results show Christians benefit from a particularly strong perceived commitment to the nation, while religious minorities are stereotyped as less committed and identified to the country than the average Canadian. As the perceived national commitment of religious minorities increases, however, the gap in support shown for the rights of Christians over religious minorities disappears and may lead to particularly strong support for the rights of Muslims to wear religious symbols in public when perceptions of national commitment are high.

After five decades of research, there is still little consensus about the relation of religious variables to environmental attitudes. Even putting aside variations in sampling and measurement, we still have doubts about where modest consensus exists—the role of religious beliefs. Religious beliefs, such as mastery over nature, are more unstable than previously considered. Moreover, more importantly, these studies have generally failed to consider the role of secular beliefs about environmental problems and the interaction they may have with religion. Using data from a 2012 Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) survey, we find religious variables have effects conditional on secular beliefs. Moreover, we draw upon an embedded experiment that shows instability in religious dominionism—the dominant religious effect in previous work. The results suggest previous reports of religious effects are not wrong, but overstated, and eliding secular beliefs is a serious sin of omission.

What are the consequences of state support for, and official recognition of, one religion or religious institution over all others in the state? Previous studies have focused on the impact of a state's religion policies on overall religiosity in that state. In contrast, I argue that state support will have markedly different consequences for (1) the favored religious firm and (2) all other religious institutions. Similar to religious market theory, I expect that dependence on state support creates disincentives for the favored religious organization to attract adherents. However, I theorize that the weaknesses that state-backed favoritism engenders in the favored religion should create opportunities for other religious firms to compete and thrive. I conduct a multivariate quantitative analysis of changes in religious affiliation in 174 states between 1990 and 2010, controlling for factors like existential security, regime type, net migration, post-Communist background, and major religious traditions. My findings suggest that, consistent with my expectations, religious institutions that receive favorable treatment from the state lose ground relative to those that do not.

This article examines the relationship between senators' personal religious affiliations and their roll-call voting record on organized labor's policy agenda. While an impressive body of literature now demonstrates clear connections between religion and representation in the U.S. Congress, fewer studies have linked religion to issues outside of the realm of cultural and moral policy. Based on a data set spanning 1980 through 2020, our findings show that evangelical Protestants are significantly the most opposed to organized labor's legislative agenda, while Jewish senators are the most supportive. Other religions fall in between, depending on the decade. The findings imply that the reach of religion in Congress may run even deeper than is commonly understood. It extends beyond the culture wars to one of the most salient issue cleavages in the modern history of the American politics.

In this paper, I tackle a difficult question about “enemy love,” with C.S. Lewis as a primary guide. In the Christian political tradition, can the command to “love thy enemy” be reconciled with the military task of killing one's opponent in war? After defining love, enemy, and enemy love, I move on to violence, particularly lethal violence. I disagree with perceptive contemporary Christian political ethicists Nigel Biggar and Marc LiVecche insofar as they argue that the killing of one's enemy can be “an expression of love” towards them. Such language obscures its moral ambiguity and is strictly speaking false. One may perhaps love one's enemy despite killing them, not by killing them. Lewis's conceptual distinction between “absolute” and “relative” love helps to untangle the knotty nature and limits of enemy love.