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Modifications de comportement précédant la défaillance d’entreprise: l’impact des cessions d’actifs sur la relation de crédit

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Régis Blazy
Régis Blazy*
Affiliation:
CERPEM, Université Paris Dauphine, France
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Résumé

Le processus de défaillance d’une entreprise, lorsqu’il résulte d’une dégradation de ses performances économiques, est affecté par les règles de partage qui prendront place en cas de liquidation. Il existe notamment, en cas de dégradation continue des résultats, des incitations conduisant l’entreprise à réduire son potentiel de croissance, par cession prématurée des actifs, afin de préserver la confiance de ses partenaires. Ce type de comportement, en retardant le défaut de paiement, risque d’accroître l’insuffisance d’actif et, par voie de conséquence, réduire le taux de recouvrement des créances. Néanmoins, en cas de difficultés temporaires, la politique de cession prématurée des actifs peut constituer un outil stratégique efficace contre le refus de prèt. Les résultats d’une enquète menée auprès du Tribunal de Commerce de Paris entre 1993 et 1995 (données de 1991) confirment l’existence de telles cessions d’actifs : en retardant le déclenchement de la procédure collective, elles constituent un obstacle au redressement des entreprises.

Summary

Summary

Priority rules, prevailing under liquidation, affect the corporate bankruptcy process, especially when this process is due to a decrease of economic performances. In case of lasting difficulties, there are incentives for the firm to liquidate its own assets in order to preserve creditors’ confidence. This modification of behaviour, which postpones financial distress, may deepen the gap between liabilities and assets, and reduce the recovery rate. Nevertheless, in case of temporary difficulties, this strategy may avoid credit rationing. Results from a survey conducted between 1993 and 1995 (Tribunal de Commerce de Paris, 1991 data), confirm the existence of such liquidations of assets. By postponing the initiation of bankruptcy, they are impediments to firms’ reorganization.

Keywords

G33D82D21G33D82D21
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 65 , Issue 2 , 1999 , pp. 225 - 276
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1999 

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Footnotes

(*)

Je tiens à remercier pour leurs commentaires et leurs conseils Monsieur le Professeur Pierre-Marie Larnac, Madame le Professeur Jacqueline Pradel, Monsieur Jérôme Combier ainsi que les deux rapporteurs anonyrnes de la revue. Mes remerciements s’adressent également, pour son précieux soutien, à la Fondation Jean Bastin de la Namur - Assurances du Crédit. Je tiens enfin à exprimer ma reconnaissance envers Monsieur Jean-Louis Duplat, Président de la Commission Bancaire et Financière, et Messieurs les Professeurs Hubert Ooghe et Charles P. Van Wyrneersch. Je demeure seul responsable des erreurs ou omissions qui pourraient subsister.

References

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