The conventional model of factor demand has firms choosing the technique of production and mix of factor inputs to minimise the cost of producing some given level of output for an exogenously determined set of factor prices and a given set of technical knowhow. In this simple model, firms are free to vary the mix of factors each period. Unemployment then occurs as a feature of labour market failure. For otherwise wage rates would adjust so that supply equalled demand. A vintage model takes account of the fact that some factors are durable, and this means that it is important to take account of two different decisions on factor choice. Firms will make an ex-ante choice of techniques at the time that new capital is installed — e.g. will firms use automated energy intensive or labour intensive production methods? Once that piece of capital is installed, firms may be able subsequently to alter the mix of factors, but their ability to do so is now constrained by the ex-ante choice of technique. This second decision is the ex-post decision.

INTRODUCTION

In his General Theory, Keynes argued that the ratio q of the market value of firms to the replacement costs of their assets is an important determinant of investment demand. As the market value of the firm depends on the yield of stocks and bonds, the ratio q depends itself negatively on the general level of interest. It also depends positively on the corporate income tax parameters such as the tax rate and the capital cost allowance schedule. That is, in this model, both monetary policy and corporation taxation policy affect the level of investment, if at all, through q. Whether monetary policy, or corporate income taxation policy can stabilize investment depends on at least two conditions. First they must alter the procyclical tendency of q due to the procyclicity of expected profits, and secondly, q must act on investment with a very short lag.

INTRODUCTION

Productivity differences between the Canadian and U.S. manufacturing sectors are commonly attributed to smaller Canadian plant scale and levels of product diversity that are too large. However, there are relatively few studies that have actually investigated the extent of suboptimal scale. And those that have done so have either concentrated on a relatively small number of industries (Eastman and Stykolt, 1967; Gorecki, 1976; Scherer et al., 1975), have been beset by missing data observations (Caves et al., 1980) or have focused on Canada without comparing it to some international standard (Gupta, 1979; Dickson, 1979).

I. INTRODUCTION

Les autorités du Fonds monétaire international ont toujours dévoilé une grande préoccupation face au développement de systèmes de taux de change doubles ou multiples. Malgré ces préoccupations et l’avis généralement exprimé par les experts qu’un système de taux de change multiples est discriminatoire et moins efficace qu’un mécanisme de change unifié, de nombreux pays ont eu recours à des sytèmes de taux de change multiples ou doubles pour atténuer leurs problèmes de balance des paiements. Inventorier la nature des régimes de taux de change doubles ou multiples dépasse l’objet de notre étude. Toutefois, un examen attentif des dispositions 1égales prises par les autorités monétaires de pays utilisant de tels régimes fait apparaître qu’ils fonctionnent différemment des schémas théoriques présentés par les économistes. Selon ces derniers, un régime de double marché des changes se caractérise par un cloisonnement complet entre le marché des changes réglementé réservé aux transactions commerciales et le marché des changes libre réservé aux transactions financières. C’est en s’appuyant sur cette hypothèse que les premiers travaux de Baratieri et Ragazzi [1971], Fleming [1971], Abraham et Martin [1970], Kouri et Porter [1974] et Swoboda [1974] évaluèrent l’efficacité des instruments de la politique fiscale et monétaire en régime de double taux de change en la comparant aux régimes de taux de change fixe ou flexible.

The deficit of the general government averaged 1.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the 1960s, 5.0 percent in the 1970’s, and 11.9 percent in the 1981-84 period. This growth occurred depite a sharp rise in the average tax burden, as tax revenues went from 31.7 percent of GDP in the 1960s to 41.3 percent in the 1970s and 46.3 percent in the 1981-84 period. The engine of the budget deficit has been and continues to be the rise in expenditures.

This note raises two questions. First, is the existing structure of expenditures, taxation, growth of output, and real interest rate consistent with a stable (that is, finite) ratio of government debt to GDP. The answer is no. The second question asks what economic conditions will have to emerge to stabilize the bond-to-income ratio of the nation. There is no unique answer to this question; nonetheless, I offer one solution whose «realism» may be beyond the scope of what political economy can yield at the moment.