Through an extended critical engagement with John P. McCormick's Machiavellian Democracy, this paper aims to shed light on Machiavelli's account of relations among the many and the few in the Discourses on Livy. While we agree with McCormick that Machiavelli should not be too quickly subsumed within the republican tradition, as interpreted by the “Cambridge School,” we reject the idea that Machiavelli's central thrust is prodemocratic. By focusing on the structure and logic of Machiavelli's arguments, we show that Machiavelli was critical of the capacities of ordinary citizens to govern themselves. As a result, Machiavelli emphasized and endorsed continuous elite intervention in the political life of the mixed regime, even as he paid due attention to the people's participation in a political regime with appropriate laws and institutions. Machiavelli's political theory, as embodied in the Discourses on Livy, challenges the transparency and equality that contemporary egalitarians and democrats embrace.

Although Castiglione's The Courtier was one of the most popular products of the Italian Renaissance, it has largely escaped the attention of modern political theorists. Many dismiss The Courtier as an apolitical work characterized by nostalgia and escapism, but it should not be so dismissed: on the contrary, Castiglione's book expresses a definite political program. This essay explores that program as a “politics of the second best”—as a pragmatic response to unfortunately diminished political opportunities. Put simply, given the choice between trying to make one's master a better person, on the one hand, and not having a master at all, on the other, surely one would not opt for the former unless the latter was not available. Reflection on this point informs the debate between proponents of “negative liberty” and those of “republican liberty.”

Locke stresses the power of custom in shaping opinion and behavior, though this aspect of his thought has been underappreciated. Recognizing its importance raises critical issues, particularly the relation between custom and reason and the role of authoritative custom in supporting political and social power. Locke explains in detail the various psychological and sociological mechanisms by which the power of custom is manifested; but he nonetheless consistently and emphatically rejects its authority. Instead, Locke is a champion of the authority of reason. Because custom is powerful, but reason is authoritative, Locke attempts to enlist the power of custom in the service of reason and of reasonable politics, and because custom is powerful and its impact unavoidable, individual intellectual independence cannot mean being without cultural prejudices. At best, it means the ability to gain some critical distance from them. These observations place Locke's relation to the Enlightenment in a new perspective.

In the summer of 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville visited Ireland. Within the travelogue that he kept while on his journey, there exists an incomplete manuscript in which Tocqueville uses the literary device of the tableau to attempt a general explanation of Ireland's political and religious problems. The present essay explains why this manuscript, whose uniqueness has not previously been recognized fully, must be separated from the rest of the Irish journals, studied in relation to other Tocquevillian tableaux, and scrutinized carefully for its teaching on religion and politics. The essay then attempts an interpretation of the manuscript, which Tocqueville titled A Catholic Priest and a Protestant Minister in Ireland, especially as it bears on the question of Christianity and politics in Democracy in America. It concludes by considering whether Tocqueville once considered revising A Catholic Priest for possible inclusion in Democracy in America and why Tocqueville eventually abandoned the manuscript.

Tocqueville can easily be seen as the symbol of the French liberal thought whereas Schmitt is considered as the brightest opponent of the liberal doctrine. Trying to reconcile their theories might thus seem counterintuitive. However, delving into Schmitt's work reveals that the German thinker admired his French counterpart. As the question of their potential intellectual proximity becomes relevant, this article offers a first glance into what appears as a somehow connected interpretation of the democratic phenomenon in relation to their fear of possible depoliticizations. While they elaborate on distinct and almost contradictory questions which develop along diverging architectonics, the historian and the jurist show a deep problématique convergence. Furthermore, their reservations concerning the enlargement of national borders, individualism, and popular sovereignty reinforce this intuition with one notable exception: Schmitt keeps on ousting the variable “liberty” from Tocqueville's democratic equation.