Background: In April 2009, King County, Washington, experienced a sustained outbreak of 2009 H1N1 influenza A. This report describes the epidemiology of that outbreak in King County, home to a diverse population of 1.9 million people.

Methods: The 2 primary sources of data are case investigations of reported laboratory-confirmed 2009 H1N1 influenza A and a population-based syndromic surveillance system that captures data from emergency departments (EDs). A syndromic category for influenza-like illness was defined based on chief complaint and diagnosis.

Results: ED visits for influenza-like illness peaked quickly in the first week of the outbreak and remained high for approximately 6 weeks, with school-age children accounting for the greater number of ED visits, followed by young adults. Children ages 0 to 4 years had the highest rate of hospitalization. Among reported cases, blacks, Asians, and Hispanics were more likely to be hospitalized. Predisposing factors associated with admission were immune compromise, chronic lung disease, chronic heart disease, pregnancy, diabetes, and asthma. Of people receiving antiviral treatment, 34% started their medication more than 2 calendar days after the onset of illness. Mean days between illness onset and antiviral treatment were greater for blacks, Hispanics, and foreign language speakers.

Conclusions: The spring 2009 influenza A H1N1 outbreak disproportionately affected children, young adults, and racial and ethnic minorities. Opportunities exist to improve the timeliness of antiviral treatment. Potential barriers to care for racial and ethnic minorities should be proactively addressed to ensure prompt evaluation and treatment. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 2):S109–S116)

Background and Methods: Fleet Week New York 2009 was the latest installment of an annual celebration to honor US service personnel. It takes place during Memorial Day and this year’s celebration coincided with the peak of novel influenza A (H1N1) virus (S-OIV) activity in New York City. Four service members from the USS Iwo Jima and USS Roosevelt contracted influenza while in New York City and were hospitalized in the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)-New York Harbor Healthcare System to minimize the risk of widespread outbreak on board the naval vessels. No additional cases were identified on the USS Roosevelt. However, 135 service personnel on the USS Iwo Jima contracted influenza.

Results: Shipwide infection control measures including strict isolation and active case finding were instituted immediately with affected crew members and medical staff receiving oseltamivir. The new case rates remained high for 14 days, but the USS Iwo Jima was able to continue deployment. The secondary infectivity rate was 12.0%. The absolute end of the outbreak correlated with arrival at home port and the ability to move patients off board.

Conclusions: This outbreak not only reinforces the risk for rapid spread of novel strains of influenza A in confined populations but also demonstrates useful strategies to mitigate the severity of an outbreak, including isolation, infection control measures, and off board sick leave when feasible. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 2):S117–S120)

Background: The public health response to an influenza pandemic or other large-scale health emergency may include mass prophylaxis using multiple points of dispensing (PODs) to deliver countermeasures rapidly to affected populations. Computer models created to date to determine “optimal” staffing levels at PODs typically assume stable patient demand for service. The authors investigated POD function under dynamic and uncertain operational environments.

Methods: The authors constructed a Monte Carlo simulation model of mass prophylaxis (the Dynamic POD Simulator, or D-PODS) to assess the consequences of nonstationary patient arrival patterns on POD function under a variety of POD layouts and staffing plans. Compared are the performance of a standard POD layout under steady-state and variable patient arrival rates that may mimic real-life variation in patient demand.

Results: To achieve similar performance, PODs functioning under nonstationary patient arrival rates require higher staffing levels than would be predicted using the assumption of stationary arrival rates. Furthermore, PODs may develop severe bottlenecks unless staffing levels vary over time to meet changing patient arrival patterns. Efficient POD networks therefore require command and control systems capable of dynamically adjusting intra- and inter-POD staff levels to meet demand. In addition, under real-world operating conditions of heightened uncertainty, fewer large PODs will require a smaller total staff than many small PODs to achieve comparable performance.

Conclusions: Modeling environments that capture the effects of fundamental uncertainties in public health disasters are essential for the realistic evaluation of response mechanisms and policies. D-PODS quantifies POD operational efficiency under more realistic conditions than have been modeled previously. The authors’ experiments demonstrate that effective POD staffing plans must be responsive to variation and uncertainty in POD arrival patterns. These experiments highlight the need for command and control systems to be created to manage emergency response successfully. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 2):S121–S131)

Although widespread support favors prospective planning for altered standards of care during mass casualty events, the literature includes few, if any, accounts of groups that have formally addressed the overarching policy considerations at the state level. We describe the planning process undertaken by public health officials in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, along with community and academic partners, to explore the issues surrounding altered standards of care in the event of pandemic influenza. Throughout 2006, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health and the Harvard School of Public Health Center for Public Health Preparedness jointly convened a working group comprising ethicists, lawyers, clinicians, and local and state public health officials to consider issues such as allocation of antiviral medications, prioritization of critical care, and state seizure of private assets. Community stakeholders were also engaged in the process through facilitated discussion of case scenarios focused on these and other issues. The objective of this initiative was to establish a framework and some fundamental principles that would subsequently guide the process of establishing specific altered standards of care protocols. The group collectively identified 4 goals and 7 principles to guide the equitable allocation of limited resources and establishment of altered standards of care protocols. Reviewing and analyzing this process to date may serve as a resource for other states. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 2):S132–S140)

Objectives: An influenza pandemic, as with any disaster involving contagion or contamination, has the potential to influence the number of health care employees who will report for duty. Our project assessed the uptake of proposed interventions to mitigate absenteeism in hospital workers during a pandemic.

Methods: Focus groups were followed by an Internet-based survey of a convenience sample frame of 17,000 hospital workers across 5 large urban facilities. Employees were asked to select their top barrier to reporting for duty and to score their willingness to work before and after a series of interventions were offered to mitigate it.

Results: Overall, 2864 responses were analyzed. Safety concerns were the most frequently cited top barrier to reporting for work, followed by issues of dependent care and transportation. Significant increases in employee willingness to work scores were observed from mitigation strategies that included preferential access to antiviral medication or personal protective equipment for the employee as well as their immediate family.

Conclusions: The knowledge base on workforce absenteeism during disasters is growing, although in general this issue is underrepresented in emergency planning efforts. Our data suggest that a mitigation strategy that includes options for preferential access to either antiviral therapy, protective equipment, or both for the employee as well as his or her immediate family will have the greatest impact. These findings likely have import for other disasters involving contamination or contagion, and in critical infrastructure sectors beyond health care. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 2):S141–S147)

Objective: We investigated local media reporting during the emergence of influenza A/Hong Kong/68 in Hong Kong to understand how indolent social awareness contributed to delays in warning of the pandemic.

Methods: Daily output from 1 English-language and 4 local Chinese-language newspapers published in Hong Kong between July 1 and August 31, 1968 were manually reviewed for all references to the presence of respiratory disease or influenza in southern China and Hong Kong. Public announcements from the World Health Organization Weekly Epidemiological Record were used to approximate international awareness.

Results: Influenza A/Hong Kong/68 appeared abruptly in Hong Kong and within 1 week began to affect the functioning of the health care sector as well as civil infrastructure due to worker infection and absenteeism. Substantial delays in communication between Guangzhou, China, and Hong Kong officials contributed to delays in warning globally.

Conclusions: The 1968 experience emphasizes the need to use the news media in the operational setting as a critical component in warning of a pandemic. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 2):S148–S153)

The H1N1 (swine influenza) 2009 outbreak in Victoria, Australia, provided a unique opportunity to review the prehospital response to a public health emergency. As part of Ambulance Victoria’s response to the outbreak, relevant emergency response plans and pandemic plans were instigated, focused efforts were aimed at encouraging the use of personal protective equipment (PPE), and additional questions were included in the call-taking script for telephone triage of emergency calls to identify potential cases of H1N1 from the point of call. As a result, paramedics were alerted to all potential cases of H1N1 influenza or any patient who met the current case definition before their arrival on the scene and were advised to use appropriate PPE. During the period of May 1 to July 2, Ambulance Victoria telephone triaged 1598 calls relating to H1N1 (1228 in metropolitan areas and 243 in rural areas) and managed 127 calls via a referral service that provides specific telephone triage for potential H1N1 influenza cases based on the national call-taking script. The referral service determines whether a patient requires an emergency ambulance or can be diverted to other resources such as flu clinics. Key lessons learned during the H1N1 outbreak include a focused need for continued education and communication regarding infection control and the appropriate use of PPE. Current guidelines regarding PPE use are adequate for use during an outbreak of infectious disease. Compliance with PPE needs to be addressed through the use of intra-agency communications and regular information updates early in the progress of the outbreak. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 2):S154–S159)

Objective: To assess the extent to which the systems in place for prevention and control of routine annual influenza could provide the information and experience needed to manage a pandemic.

Methods: The authors conducted a qualitative assessment based on key informant interviews and the review of relevant documents.

Results: Although there are a number of systems in place that would likely serve the United States well in a pandemic, much of the information and experience needed to manage a pandemic optimally is not available.

Conclusions: Systems in place for routine annual influenza prevention and control are necessary but not sufficient for managing a pandemic, nor are they used to their full potential for pandemic preparedness. Pandemic preparedness can be strengthened by building more explicitly upon routine influenza activities and the public health system’s response to the unique challenges that arise each influenza season (eg, vaccine supply issues, higher than normal rates of influenza-related deaths). (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 2):S160–S165)

This article applies developing concepts of mass critical care (MCC) to children. In public health emergencies (PHEs), MCC would improve population outcomes by providing lifesaving interventions while delaying less urgent care. If needs exceed resources despite MCC, then rationing would allocate interventions to those most likely to survive with care. Gaps between estimated needs and actual hospital resources are worse for children than adults. Clear identification of pediatric hospitals would facilitate distribution of children according to PHE needs, but all hospitals must prepare to treat some children. Keeping children with a family member and identifying unaccompanied children complicate PHE regional triage. Pediatric critical care experts would teach and supervise supplemental providers. Adapting nearly equivalent equipment compensates for shortages, but there is no substitute for age-appropriate resuscitation masks, IV/suction catheters, endotracheal/gastric/chest tubes. Limitations will be encountered using adult ventilators for infants. Temporary manual bag valve ventilation and development of shared ventilators may prolong survival until the arrival of ventilator stockpiles. To ration MCC to children most likely to survive, the Pediatric Index of Mortality 2 score meets the criteria for validated pediatric mortality predictions. Policymakers must define population outcome goals in regard to lives saved versus life-years saved. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 2):S166–S171)

Hospitals throughout the country are using innovative strategies to accommodate the surge of patients brought on by the novel H1N1 virus. One strategy has been to help decompress the amount of patients seeking care within emergency departments by using alternate sites of care, such as tents, parking lots, and community centers as triage, staging, and screening areas. As at any other time an individual presents on hospital property, hospitals and providers must be mindful of the requirements of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act. In this article we review the act and its implications during public health emergencies, with a particular focus on its implications on alternative sites of care. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 2):S172–S175)

Legal preparedness is an essential component of effective public health emergency response, evinced recently by the numerous emergency declarations issued at the federal, state, and local levels to address the 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak. Although the impact of these emergency laws at the federal and state levels has been studied extensively, the scope and role of local emergency laws have not been similarly assessed. In this article, we examine key issues of emergency laws among select US localities in the context of the recent H1N1 outbreak and their application to volunteer health professionals, who are often needed to meet patient surge capacity during local emergencies.

Localities represent the front line of emergency preparedness and must address an array of legal challenges before and during declared emergencies. Local legal preparedness differs based on overarching restrictions such as the degree of home rule provided to localities under state law. Some localities take innovative legal approaches to address emergency preparedness. Although beneficial in many respects, these variations add additional complexity to legal preparedness and intensify the need for predisaster planning, exercises, and coordination. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 2):S176–S184)

Because of the importance of including ethical considerations in planning efforts for pandemic influenza, in February 2005 the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention requested that the Ethics Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee to the Director develop guidance that would serve as a foundation for decision making in preparing for and responding to pandemic influenza. Specifically, the ethics subcommittee was asked to make recommendations regarding ethical considerations relevant to decision making about vaccine and antiviral drug distribution prioritization and development of interventions that would limit individual freedom and create social distancing. The ethics subcommittee identified a number of general ethical considerations including identification of clear goals for pandemic planning, responsibility to maximize preparedness, transparency and public engagement, sound science, commitment to the global community, balancing individual liberty and community interests, diversity in ethical decision making, and commitment to justice. These general ethical considerations are applied to the issues of vaccine and antiviral drug distribution and use of community mitigation interventions. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 2):S185–S192)

New and reemerging infectious diseases, such as pandemic viruses and resistant bacteria, pose a serious threat in the 21st century. Some of these agents represent global security threats. This review provides an overview of diagnostic challenges presented by pandemic influenza and biothreat agents. The article summarizes recent pandemics and disease outbreaks, point-of-care influenza diagnostic tests, biothreat agents, biothreat instrument systems, and technologies in development. It highlights how medical innovation and health care initiatives can help prepare health care professionals and public health personnel to handle future crises. Based on gap analysis for current point-of-care testing deficiencies, it concludes with policy recommendations that will enhance preparedness. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 2):S193–S202)

The respiratory protective equipment necessary to protect health care workers from the novel swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) virus is not known. The knowledge gap created by this unanswered question has caused substantial debate and controversy on a global scale, leading public health organizations to feel pressured into issuing decisive recommendations despite a lack of supportive data. Changes in clinical practice caused by public health guidance during such high-profile events can be expected to establish a new standard of care. Also possible is an unforeseen gradual transition to widespread N95 respirator use, driven by public health pressures instead of science, for all outbreaks of influenza or influenza-like illness. Therefore, public health organizations and other influential institutions should take care to avoid making changes to established practice standards, if possible, unless these changes are bolstered by sound scientific evidence. Until definitive comparative effectiveness clinical trials are conducted, the answer to this question will continue to remain elusive. In the meantime, relying on ethical principles that have been substantiated over time may help guide public health and clinical decisions. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 2):S203–S210)