A persistent question in the literature on policy adoption and diffusion focuses on the ways in which jurisdictions gather policy information. Decades of research have offered numerous conclusions regarding knowledge transfer mechanisms assumed to drive diffusion. While important, we suggest that the characteristics of existing work may have limited what we know about the exchange of policy information among peers. Most studies infer learning indirectly, and as a result, the literature has tended to focus on exchange between geographic and ideological peers, to the exclusion of other channels. As an alternative, this study takes a more direct approach and draws on a survey of 112 U.S. expert informants in the area of energy policy. We use the information exchange channels revealed by these informants to predict the diffusion of state renewable portfolio standards and electricity deregulation among the American states to determine whether they offer explanatory leverage beyond the “traditional” channels.

Recent demonstrations of growing economic inequality in the United States raise normative concerns about the political representation of all but the very wealthiest citizens. Building on existing cross-national work on the roles of unions in welfare states, I provide evidence that organized labor, as a political institution, limits unequal income distributions in the U.S. states. The states are useful to our understanding of labor's influence on inequality as states differ in their acceptance of labor unions, base levels of inequality, political preferences, industries, and levels of development but are all nested within a single overarching national framework. Over the 39-year period examined, states where unions maintain more members remain more equal within the labor market and after redistribution via government transfer. These effects persist after accounting for state-level policy, demography, and economic conditions. However, states where union membership has the largest influence on inequality have also seen growing attempts to reduce unionization rates. Overall, I find that unions are still able to limit the growth of economic inequality in spite of declining levels of union membership.

The judicial selection classification problem is widely recognized but poorly understood. In this note, I identify the classification problem's three interrelated sources: ambiguous theoretical arguments, varying decision rules for categorizing merit selection states, and not accounting for interim selections in mixed systems. To demonstrate threats to inference posed by the classification problem, I replicate a study on opinion writing productivity in state supreme courts. I also offer straightforward suggestions for resolving the classification problem. Eliminating the classification problem will help ensure that inferences are comparable across studies with respect to the consequences of institutional design choices concerning state judicial selection mechanisms.

Extant findings show that voter fraud is extremely rare and difficult to prove in the United States. Voter's knowledge about voter fraud allegations likely comes through the media, who tend to sensationalize the issue. In this study, we argue that the more voters are exposed to media coverage of voter fraud allegations, the more likely that they will perceive that voter fraud is a frequent problem. We merge the 2012 Survey of Performance of American Elections with state-level media coverage of voter fraud leading up to the 2012 election. Our results show that media coverage of voter fraud is associated with public beliefs about voter fraud. In states where fraud was more frequently featured in local media outlets, public concerns about voter fraud were heightened. In particular, we find that press attention to voter fraud has a larger influence on Republicans than Democrats and Independents. We further find that media coverage of voter fraud does not further polarize partisan perceptions of voter fraud. Rather, political interest moderates state media coverage on voter fraud beliefs only among Republicans. Last, our results provide no support that demographic changes, approval of election administration, or information concerning actual reported voting irregularities have any discernable effects on partisan perceptions.