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Concept revision is sensitive to changes in category structure, causal history

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2011

Joanna Korman
Joanna Korman
Affiliation:
Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912. Joanna_Korman@brown.edu
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Abstract

Carey argues that the aspects of categorization that are diagnostic of deep conceptual structure and, by extension, narrow conceptual content, must be distinguished from those aspects that are incidental to categorization tasks. For natural kind concepts, discriminating between these two types of processes is complicated by the role of explanatory stance and the causal history of features in determining category structure.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 3 , June 2011 , pp. 135 - 136
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

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