Compensation hypothesis, which has established a link between trade openness of countries and levels of government spending, has been widely accepted in the literature on trade policy and international globalization. However, the nature of the distribution effects produced by trade is likely to determine the existence of more or less redistribution demands from the median voter, and therefore government growth. In this paper I hypothesize that the effects of trade openness on redistribution demands are not homogeneous between countries, and I argue that they depend both on the type-of-factor endowment of the economy and the size of the sectors more likely to be affected by trade. I test this hypothesis with ISSP data for 23 countries, both with a country level and an individual level analysis. The results show that redistribution demands issued from trade openness of the median voter of a country are largely conditional on GDP per capita and size of potential loser sectors such as manufacturing: while trade has a negative effect on pro-redistribution preferences in “poor” and/or in “low manufacturing” countries; it positively affects pro-redistribution preferences in “rich” and/or in “high manufacturing” countries. Additionally, I empirically observe that the size of the loser sector plays a more important mediating role than the type-of-factor endowment of the economy.

This study examines the relationships between deregulation, business strategy (low cost, differentiation, and scope), size, and firm performance in the U.S. airline industry based on archival data for the Major, National, and Large Regional air carriers in the U.S. from 1972 to 1995. Cross-sectional time series regression analysis shows that deregulation had a significant impact on the strategic choices made by airlines. Results also support a significant relationship between business strategy and firm performance. Further, the study found that firm size moderates the environment-business strategy relationship and the business strategy-firm performance relationship, thereby supporting the salience of firm size as a contingency variable in strategy studies.

This paper explores the East-West dichotomy of outsourcing in the European Union in the context of its 2004 eastward enlargement. The purpose of the study is to shed light on the connection between outsourcing and the causal logic of regional integration. The conventional view is that the transfer of business operations from Western Europe to low-cost locations to the east represents a process of outsourcing West-European jobs which deprives the EU core of growth opportunities to the exclusive benefit of the new members from Eastern Europe. This analysis posits the systemic functions of EU outsourcing as a mechanism of economic homogenization in the regional market along its three principal dimensions: investment, commodity trade, and labor mobility. At the macro-level, outsourcing complements capital movements and trade, and acts as a substitute for labor mobility. Keeping labor mobility “down” is the main value added of EU outsourcing. Empirically, its relevance to the regional market is established in an input-output framework of relationships with indicators of economic convergence (homogenization effects) and labor mobility (substitution effects) in the EU. Positive correlations with indices of business synchronization and weak negative correlations with measures of labor supply and wages suggest that outsourcing fits well both with strategies fostering market integration and those counterbalancing the politically sensitive labor mobility in the EU. There is no significant evidence to suggest that, at the aggregate level, outsourcing has independent substitution effects with regard to unemployment rates and wages in Western Europe. The geographic expansion of EU integration, therefore, is not a proxy for losses of social welfare in the West. The paper concludes that as the cost efficiency and resource allocation functions of outsourcing facilitate the homogenizing dynamics of regional integration, it is likely to become increasingly subsumed under EU-level regulation and monitoring in a trade-off between the regional interest and domestic sectoral concerns.

In the study of corporate political activity in the United States, scholars have consistently relied on samples comprised entirely or principally of large firms. While scholars have raised the issue of bias in these samples, there have been no systematic examinations of the consequences for causal inference. We address this issue directly by comparing the results of comprehensive models that examine corporate lobbying using both large-firm and randomly-generated samples. We find that while there are some notable differences, they are certainly not so large as to lead us to question fundamentally the results of decades of scholarship. In short, the results generated using a random sample lead to causal inferences largely consistent with those in the theoretical and empirical literature. In particular, firms' resources and interactions with government condition both their decisions to lobby and the level of their activity.