Many welfare states have embraced choice and market mechanisms since the 1990s. With respect to welfare users, it has been argued that this led to a change from citizens to consumers. This paper challenges this observation and discusses changes of welfare user roles in the German welfare state. The main argument rests on the assumption that user roles are much more complex and include claimants and co-producers in addition to citizens and consumers. Based on this heuristic model of multiple user roles, empirical evidence for user roles in pension insurance, health care and schools is presented. Indeed, we observe a shift towards consumers in many fields of welfare provision, but German users are still largely addressed as claimants and citizens. Moreover, they are acting as active co-producers, entitled claimants, subversive consumers and needy patients.

Have increasing levels of conditionality fundamentally changed the attitudes of the unemployed towards social security, work obligations and welfare dependency? Both neopaternalist and governmentalist theorising suggests that workfare policies should have shifted this group's conceptions of self-interest over time yet previous evidence has been rather mixed. This article makes a fresh contribution to the literature by drawing upon New Zealand Election Study data (1990–2014) and New Zealand qualitative data (2007–2008; 2014) to analyse the attitudes of “undeserving” unemployed benefit recipients who are subject to work obligations over 21 years and by comparing their attitudes to those of “deserving” benefit recipients not subject to work obligations (the retired and students) and wage/salary earners. It finds a notable hardening of unemployed people's attitudes towards some welfare dependency propositions over time and evidence of “self-governing rationalities” being adopted by some unemployed individuals but, overall, attitudes amongst this group remain nuanced and ambivalent.

We present evidence on the distributive politics of social transfers implemented in the context of a capable bureaucracy and the absence of a clientelistic machine-party system; where the usual distinction between “core” and “swing” voter investments falls short. Using evidence from Chile, the paper illustrates a selective distributive politics scenario in which, at the margins of fair socioeconomic targeting, incumbents might seek to enhance their political returns by implementing a highly diversified investment portfolio that includes the pursuit of both electoral and non-electoral goals. Non-electoral goals might be more effectively accomplished through selective distributive politics. The empirical evidence is based on a series of seemingly unrelated-regression models generated using a database on the allocations of six different social programs in 345 municipalities over a nine-year period. Our findings and theory discourage the mechanical translation of investment rationales across cases, while promoting a broader and more contextualized analysis of distributive politics.

This paper provides an analysis of Chile's 35 year experience with defined contribution, fully funded pensions and argues that this pension approach should not be emulated by countries seeking to reduce the state role in the provision of pensions. The paper shows that 35 years of privatized pensions have led to a massive accumulation and concentration of capital and profits in the hands of the pension fund administrators and insufficient and unequal pensions for the retirees. This legacy of the Pinochet dictatorship has experienced marginal reforms after the transition to democracy. However, those reforms have not altered the system's structure and have augmented the fiscal role as the state attempts to repair some the most damaging outcomes of the private pension scheme.