The crucial question for many legal disputes is “what happened,”? and there is often no easy answer. Fact-finding is an uncertain endeavor and risk of inaccuracy is inevitable. As such, I ask, on what basis can we accept the legitimacy of judicial fact-findings. I conclude that acceptable factual determinations depend on adherence to a legitimate process of fact-finding. Adopting Jürgen Habermas’s insights, I offer a theoretical grounding for the acceptability of judicial fact-finding. The theory holds that legal processes must embody respect for legal subjects as equal and autonomous agents. This necessitates two procedural features. First, fact-finding processes must be factually reliable. This requires: (a) relevant evidence is admissible and exclusions are justified based on respecting human autonomy; (b) error-risk management is internally coherent and consistent; (c) the standard of proof is, at minimum, a balance of probabilities; (d) evidence is used rationally. Second, fact-finding processes must ensure fulsome participation rights. This project is justificatory—civil justice systems are imperfect, but there are attainable conditions that make them good, which must never be compromised.

Mistaken payment is the ‘core case’ of unjust enrichment, and it has had a powerful effect on the development of this area of private law. For Peter Birks, unjust enrichment was simply ‘the law of all events materially identical to mistaken payment’—to be shaped through a process of abstraction from that core case. But this begs the question: how do we work out what counts as ‘materially identical’ to mistaken payment? The most obvious starting point, and that which Birks chose, is the central characteristic of money: money is valuable. Thus, ‘the law of all events materially identical to mistaken payments’ is ‘the law of all events that unjustly enrich one party at another’s expense’.

In this article, I argue that this starting point is incorrect. Rather than looking for some factual similarity between mistaken payment and other events, we should identify the role that money plays in justifying restitution. And what justifies restitution in the core case is not the ‘value’ or ‘benefit’ that money confers; rather, it is a defect in the legal transaction that links payor with payee. The payee is not liable because she has been ‘enriched’, but because she is the counterparty to a legal transaction which exhibits traits that there are institutional reasons to disavow. Just like contract and torts, the role of value is secondary: where correcting the injustice in specie is impossible or undesirable, the defendant must pay whichever sum will most nearly achieve that goal.

Legal and political thinkers have always battled with the question of justice and, especially within a society, about the fair and just distribution of rights and responsibilities. This question is, however, not only relevant for the organization of municipal or domestic society; it has become increasingly relevant within the international legal system. An area where this has been most rife in the last three decades is the international law on climate change.

In debates over rights, as much as, or perhaps more than, in any philosophical debate, it is important to see the wood from the trees. A little while ago, new life was breathed into debates over rights, as a new candidate theory emerged to rival the extant options. More specifically, Gopal Sreenivasan’s hybrid theory of (claim-) rights emerged to rival both will theory and interest theory. This new hybrid theory underwent a series of skirmishes with the interest theory. Moving from the wood, one principal ground over which battle ensued is the so-called third party beneficiary issue. And, more specifically still, descending into the trees, a particular problem within the foregoing third party beneficiary debate centred on what I shall dub Gopal’s Granny, a case wielded by Gopal Sreenivasan, particularly against one of the foremost defenders of the interest theory, Matthew Kramer.

Barbara Fried takes the view that uniform taxation—that is, a single rate applicable to all income levels—cannot be defended on any grounds of justice. She goes further by saying that, of all possible rate structures, it might be “the hardest one”? to ground in “a”? theory of fairness. Using the contractarian-constitutional perspective advanced by John Rawls and James Buchanan, this article argues that tax uniformity can be seen as a requirement of justice. After modelling how the political world realistically decides to distribute tax shares (self-interested parties act under a majority constraint), I show how the uniformity principle could emerge from the constitutional contract. In other words, rational individuals would choose uniformity as a procedural constraint under a “veil of uncertainty”?; that is, with limited knowledge regarding their positions under the future application of the rule. Moreover, I elucidate how the uniformity requirement integrates generalized criteria of fairness and efficiency into fiscal politics as it precludes fiscal exploitation and constrains majorities, and their most influential subgroups, to opt for policies in the direction of the Pareto frontier, and as such promotes outcomes acceptable to all participants.

The contemporary international tax regime has been increasingly criticized over the years from varied perspectives, particularly as to the unfairness it produces for developing countries. Some commentators argue it is unjust due to the lack of participation of developing countries in the policymaking process on an equal footing. Others suggest the international tax regime was designed by affluent countries to respond to self-interested goals. Some note that its current institutional design creates opportunities for tax competition and avoidance, which more seriously affect developing economies due to their relative dependence on corporate income tax and their greater vulnerability to capital mobility. Others specifically criticize how taxing rights, that is, the entitlement of countries to tax cross-border transactions, are currently allocated between home and host countries and how they disfavour capital-importing, developing countries.

Legal philosophers make a number of bold, contentious claims about the nature of law. For instance, some claim that law necessarily involves coercion, while others disagree. Some claim that all law enjoys presumptive moral validity, while others disagree. We can see these claims in at least three, mutually exclusive ways: (1) We can see them as descriptions of law’s nature (descriptivism), (2) we can see them as expressing non-descriptive attitudes of the legal philosophers in question (expressivism), or (3) we can see them as practical claims about how we should view law or order our society (pragmatism). This paper argues that we should understand these claims in the pragmatist way, as claims about how we should view law or order society.

When I was asked to serve as Governor General of Canada, I discovered I had much to relearn. Despite my background as a law student, professor, and dean, I had to revisit the legal principles and conventions of our constitution, especially as they relate to the authority and function of the Crown in Canada. My re-education enabled me to develop an even deeper admiration for how precious the rule of law is in our country, how thin and vulnerable its veneer can be, and how vital it is in moving closer to justice. Even more, my re-education revealed for me anew that the study and practice of law is a hollow pursuit if we do not use it to strive toward justice.

Many religious associations exhibit internal norms that differ from liberal norms and rules. Such norms often directly contradict the non-discrimination norms and rules that are part and parcel of the liberal democracies in which these associations operate. Religious associations often are considered, in both legal and scholarly writings, exempt from at least some of these norms and rules. This tension between broad societal non-discrimination1 rules and the norms of specific religious associations has won the attention of scholars and courts.2 In many such debates, the background assumption is that these religious groups are voluntary associations functioning within a model of separation between religion and state; that is, such associations operate through the free choices of their members and individuals are as free to leave the associations as they were to form them.3 While theorizing about non-discrimination rules and whether they apply to religious associations that are funded via the contributions of their members is of obvious importance, this article examines a distinct problem: that of discrimination within religious associations that are directly supported by democratic governments. Recent research on religion-state relations4 has pointed out that, in many democratic countries, religious associations are funded by the government to a considerable extent. The tension between non-discrimination norms and the presumed rights of the state-funded religious associations to be exempted from such rules, however, is neglected in the literature. Perhaps this is because the most prominent legal cases of this kind were tried at the European Court of Human Rights5 and the U.K. Supreme Court,6 rather than the more conspicuous U.S. Supreme Court. This article asks the following question: in what way, if at all, does receiving governmental funding change the presumed right of religious associations to be exempted from non-discrimination rules? The ‘immunity thesis’—the idea that religious associations enjoy the right to be exempted from non-discrimination rules—is not challenged here: this article argues that if there is such a right to immunity, receiving governmental funding does not necessarily eliminate it. Much depends on how each case maintains the balance between the autonomy of religious associations7 and the protection of individual citizens from discrimination that impacts important civil interests such as access to jobs or high-quality education. Of the suggested variables identified to test this balance, three are internal to the associations’ structure: the centrality of the potentially illiberal norm to the funded religious association; the kind of violation of non-discrimination rules (either internal or external discrimination, see below); and the willingness of the religious association to internalize the cost of the discrimination. Two additional variables that can be used to test the balance of competing social values are external to the association and depend on the political-legal environment in which the association functions: the quantity of funding that the government makes available to the association, and the process by which potentially competing religious associations can become eligible for recognized and funded status. A multivariable ‘test’ is required in order to determine whether and how governmental funded religious associations can still claim immunity when practicing discriminatory norms.

Ensuring equal liberties requires neutral, i.e. impartial, settings where nobody would be deprived of freedom because of their personal characteristics. Religion and disability appear as characteristics which may clash with the existing social and physical environments. Therefore, the necessity of adjusting the existing environment, i.e., reasonable accommodation, is mostly discussed in reference to religion and disability. I aim to discuss reasonable accommodation from a different perspective and ask whether reasonable accommodation should be extended to age issues. I propose that age can lead to differences in conscience or culture like religion. Age can also be a source of dis/ability so it can be compared to accustomed disabilities. Eventually, age may also clash with the existing social and physical environments. I further propose that age is not only similar to but also different from religion and disability when it comes to reasonable accommodation. Therefore, I defend, reasonable accommodation should be extended to age in a special way. The next question then is how age could be accommodated under the European Union (EU) law, especially when we consider that reasonable accommodation law does not have a wide scope in the EU, unlike in Canada.

The topic of ‘judicial discretion’ has been at the center of the debate on legal interpretation in the philosophy of law.1 In a general sense, ‘discretion’ here refers to the exercise of a judgment by a decision-maker due to the lack of legal constraints affecting one’s ability to decide a case. The most fundamental question on this topic is ‘do judges have discretion when interpreting the law?’ There are three kinds of answers to this query. One kind of answer states that judges never have discretion.2 Another kind of answer states that judges always have discretion in interpretation.3 The third kind of answer states that judges sometimes have discretion when interpreting the law, and sometimes they do not.4

We love our children. We really do. Yet we also find ourselves happy when they finally fall asleep, or when they go back to school at the end of their summer vacation. We wish we could spend more time with our children, we really do. Yet we also wish to pursue our own projects, both professionally and personally. This ambivalence hints at a basic characteristic of caring for one’s own child, which is known to every person who ever had a child: it involves both a burden and a benefit.1

Atrocities are often unprecedented and identifying them therefore may require moral and political judgement, not only the application of legal rules. Consequently, potential defendants charged for perpetrating them may be genuinely unable to recognize the law that prohibits their criminal activity. Starting from its classical treatment in Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem, this problem has perplexed scholars who have noted the seemingly normal character of defendants in mass atrocity cases. In disagreement with other scholars in the area, I argue for a recognition of a “mistake of law”? defense in international criminal law. The Article demonstrates the stakes of the claim through three hypothetical international criminal cases with different political underpinnings, all pertaining to burning contemporary concerns: cases against individuals responsible for the enormous risks of climate change; against abusers of migrants in the context of border enforcement; and against individuals responsible for the termination of pregnancies in abortion clinics. I argue for a dual approach: on the one hand, prosecutors and judges must constantly leave open the possibility of a radical departure from extant doctrine and precedent in charging individuals. On the other, they must recognize that defendants may reasonably not be able to recognize the law qua law, especially when such departures occur. The internal tension between these two imperatives sheds light on the predicament of international criminal adjudication. A recognition of the proposed mistake of law defense is but a modest doctrinal solution for a much more fundamental perplexity of the discipline. Yet it is especially crucial today, with an ever-clearer normative divergence among actors in the “international community.”?

This paper explores the possibility that Hobbesian jurisprudence is best understood as a “third way”? in legal theory, irreducible to classical natural law or legal positivism. I sketch two potential “third theories”? of law—legal pragmatism and legal dualism—and argue that, when considered in its broadest sense, Leviathan is best viewed as an example of legal pragmatism. I consider whether this legal pragmatist interpretation can be sustained in the examination of Leviathan’s treatment of civil law, and argue that the pragmatic interpretation can only be successful if we can resolve two textual issues in that chapter. First, while Hobbes argues that law entails the existence of public (sharable) reasons, he does not adequately defend the view that the sovereign is the unique authority over such reasons in all cases, especially as far as they concern known collective emergencies. Second, Hobbes both affirms and denies that a sovereign can fail to do justice, which is paradoxical. Both problems are best resolved by legal pragmatism, though the second problem resists a fully satisfying resolution. The upshot is that, although Leviathan ought to be regarded as an episode of legal pragmatism, there are trade-offs on every reading.

Freedom of expression has been often described as a necessary precondition for democracy and for the implementation of an effective system of human rights. A deliberative democracy cannot function if citizens are not granted the fundamental right to express their views and to criticize the government without being censored.1 The rule of law becomes an empty notion if legal orders do not protect the impartial, autonomous judgments of the judiciary.2

This article explores the emerging use of the proportionality concept in the contract law of the Anglo-common law world, first to understand its internal logic, and secondly, to situate its invocation within private law theory. What are judges doing when they appeal to “proportionality”?, and what does this say about the ideology of adjudication? I draw insights from the use of proportionality in other domains, in particular public law, to uncover its internal rationality as a means-ends rationality review coupled with a process of balancing competing considerations, which I illustrate with reference to the illegality, penalty, and cost of cure doctrines. I argue that proportionality reflects a method of pragmatic justification, expressing an aspiration towards a structured and transparent mode of argumentation that is anti-formal and anti-ideological, focusing from the bottom-up on contextual considerations, and occupying a distinct space against existing theories in private law driven, for instance, by “top-down”? rights-based ideologies or critical and communitarian perspectives.

I argue that homelessness calls for equitable intervention. The motivation for such intervention involves the state’s provision of the system of property rights. This will be one that is responsible for but can also solve homelessness. The nature of the equitable interest responds to this motivation. There is a negative equitable right for the state not to exercise its right to exclude people from state-owned property against homeless people. There is also a positive equitable right for the state to provide housing to the homeless, or at least take steps towards doing so.