The story of the Myanmar ICT for Development Organisation (MIDO) is closely related to the rise of blogging, which became popular in the country in the mid 2000s. Despite poor internet connections — which were mainly accessed at cyber cafes — and high levels of state surveillance, blogging offered individuals a platform to own their content and for expression, whether to discuss politics, social development or other personal interests like food and fashion. One of the well-known bloggers was Nay Phone Latt — now an elected member of the Yangon regional parliament for the National League for Democracy (NLD) — who was keen on creative writing as well as political commentary. Together, we formed the Myanmar Bloggers Society in 2007 and conducted basic training and workshops for start-ups and the blogging community.

Our first major public event in August 2007 was themed “We Blog, We Unite”, and we were able to attract about three hundred participants and private sponsors. A month later, the Saffron Revolution unfolded, and some of the bloggers and citizen journalists in the country, including Nay Phone Latt, wrote about the political situation and uploaded videos and footage of eyewitness accounts to the internet. These were shared by other media outlets and by individuals with their community members (OpenNet Initiative 2012). Because of this, the bloggers and citizen journalists became targets of the government, and some were eventually arrested. So, in the span of a month, the bloggers went from being popular to being avoided by everyone, as people were afraid and would not talk to us. In January 2008 Nay Phone Latt was arrested and charged under three different laws, including the 2004 Electronic Transactions Law, and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. We had to stop our public activities because we thought it would be dangerous for us. We channelled our work to quietly supporting activists and journalists to develop their technological capabilities.

In 2011 the quasi-civilian government of President Thein Sein announced the political opening of Myanmar, and in January 2012 Nay Phone Latt was released as part of an amnesty for political prisoners (CPJ 2012). We came together again, but this time we shifted our focus from merely promoting blogs to advocating for wider digital rights.

There are two views in our country on how to develop the media. One is that we need to prioritize proper media legislation. The other is that we need to change our mindsets.

In Myanmar there are times when the military respects the law, and there are other times when it uses the law to protect itself. Take, for instance, my arrest on 26 June 2017 in northern Shan State while I was doing my job — reporting on the war.

Before this incident I had often travelled to northern Shan State for the same purpose — to cover armed conflict — but I had never before faced arrest. In November 2016 there were clashes between the Northern Alliance of ethnic armed groups and the military. This happened in the northern Shan State townships of Mong Ko, Muse and Kutkai. When I travelled to Muse there were several army checkpoints between Kutkai and Namkham. At each checkpoint, soldiers checked my phone and my wallet. On my phone they looked to see whether I had taken photos with the rebels. In my wallet they checked if I had contact information for the rebels. If I had had those things, I would have been detained. But each time they let me go, because I did not have anything incriminating. At one checkpoint an army officer asked me whether I was a conflict reporter. I told him that I was and he said that I could accompany his troops to the front line. But once he understood that I would take him up on the offer, he told me that it would be a long process to inform the top officials and to get permission. It did not happen.

According to the law, I have the right to travel to the conflict areas. But when I was arrested in 2017 the army accused me of not having permission to be there. We have laws, but these laws are not always respected. Those who focus on improving media legislation in Myanmar need to remember that laws are not always followed here. Laws should not favour one side. They should protect everyone in the country, and be applied equally.

With the installation of a semi-civilian parliamentary system in 2011, Myanmar cast off its long-standing international “pariah-state” status and created conditions conducive to economic expansion. As the country increasingly gears its economy towards large-scale, landand resource-intensive development, there are serious, negative consequences for the majority rural population, long subject to land confiscations and other abuses under the military state.

At the same time, political liberalizations since 2011 have expanded the space for civil society and media, creating opportunities for forms of public contestation and political engagement that would have been impossible in previous eras. All over Myanmar, smallholder farmers in alliance with urban-based activists, volunteer lawyers’ groups, media workers and others have been mobilizing against land grabs, forced displacements and other threats. High-profile campaigns have emerged to challenge large investment projects. These movements are not without risk: violent crackdowns, threats of violence, and imprisonment of protesters continue in Myanmar, where the state is intertwined with powerful business interests, and authoritarian mentalities and practices persist. Still, the rollback of the most overt forms of state repression — together with new discourses of state accountability, democracy and rule of law — have encouraged diverse actors to test the possibilities for protest and political activity.

My focus in this chapter is on civil society mobilization in Tanintharyi Region in southern Myanmar, and particularly in Kanbauk, a village of about 1,500 households in the Tanintharyi Hills, eighty kilometres north of the regional capital, Dawei. In recent years, Kanbauk villagers have contended with Delco Ltd, a Yangon-based company that runs a tin and tungsten mine in their area in a production-sharing agreement with the government-owned Mining Enterprise No. 2. Villagers have been seeking to assert some influence over company practices, especially regarding the release of wastewater into local streams. Tensions intensified after an accident in September 2015 in which a tailing pond embankment collapsed causing a flash flood that led to the death of a child and the destruction of many villagers’ houses. I discuss the resistance effort that emerged in the village and the company's strategies to suppress and dismiss it. Specifically, I focus on the work of a Kanbauk writer and activist, Aung Lwin, and an evocative essay he wrote, published in May 2016 in Tanintharyi Weekly, a small regional publication.

In 2012, Yangon was abuzz with meetings and conferences on media development — something unheard of during the military regime. These meetings followed public announcements by the quasi-civilian Thein Sein government installed in March 2011 of a reform agenda that would include improvements to the media laws. According to the former information minister Ye Htut, these planned reforms date back to 2007, under the former military dictator Than Shwe, when the junta studied options for legal reform (Mclaughlin 2014), while Kean (2018) places the start of the change in 2004 after a high-profile purge of military intelligence. When the National League for Democracy (NLD) formed the government in 2016, expectations were high that technical and procedural problems with the laws and their enforcement would be reviewed and addressed (Htet Naing Zaw 2016). Yet civil society has been disappointed by the lack of political will to bring the laws in line with international norms and standards. Instead, the NLD-led government has continued to use criminal laws to silence journalists and critics. Globally, the media development sector has adopted a rather formulaic approach regarding reform, placing faith in problematic legislative and judicial systems as the arbiters of the practices and regulation of speech and expression. The emphasis that national and international actors in Myanmar place on laws as fundamental to the transition is thus not uncommon, yet it is questionable, especially in a country where the judicial process has been used to imprison critics and censor the media.

This chapter provides an overview of the laws related to media and free expression introduced or changed in Myanmar since 2011. We begin with a review of the literature on media legal reforms during transitions, followed by a mapping of the media laws in Myanmar and issues related to the reform process. We argue that the legal framework, while attempting to undo the controls of the past, has not been radically transformed. The paradigm of control has prevailed during this transition period, and the use of criminal laws has rendered some of the legal changes inadequate to support freedom, public interest, diversity and pluralism in relation to media and expression.

Media have immense power to shape the stories we hear and see and, by extension, how we understand the world. Through new technologies we contribute to the ongoing construction of these stories. It is no surprise that media are one of the first targets of authoritarian leaders who seize control, repressing or assimilating them somehow into the power structure. Forms of control in democratic societies are more subtle, and the threats less severe for those who challenge power holders, but media are nonetheless sites of struggle over who defines the public agenda as well as the discourse used to discuss it. Media play multiple, shifting and highly contextual roles, perpetuating the status quo as agents of stability; holding officials and official institutions to account as agents of restraint; and challenging the status quo and holding the powerful to account as agents of change (McCargo 2003). We have seen throughout this volume how a single media outlet can play all of these roles at various times. As media have become more pervasive in our lives, it is vital that we understand as much as possible about the people and organizations that produce the stories we see, what effects these representations are having, and how these phenomena function for or against the interests of the various key stakeholders, especially the public, at local, national and global levels.

The field of media studies in Myanmar is just beginning to develop. This short summary addresses only the research published in English, but we encourage a similar assessment of the research available in Myanmar language. The majority of research in English is comprised of reports written by advocacy organizations or journalists, and is mainly descriptive, although some reports do analyse new or reformed media laws, or assess the changing state of freedom of expression. This body of work is also largely focused on journalism and on events in the major cities of Yangon and Mandalay. While media studies include the study of journalism, the field is much broader in scope, incorporating all types of media platforms and content and moving beyond the “how-to” to focus critical and analytical attention on three primary areas: media texts, media audiences and media industries. In Myanmar, media-related educational opportunities focus on practical journalism skills training, and to some extent filmmaking.

Eventually it would help her understand comments on her Facebook feed, like “Kalars should get out of our country” and “Kalars are setting our country on fire”. A gift to her from her father when she passed her school matriculation exam, her vintage radio played the BBC, Voice of America, and Radio Free Asia for three hours every morning and night. She listened to it faithfully, earning her the nickname “grandmom”. Then, in 2012, when Khin Oo was 28, her radio reported that violence had broken out between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State.

Khin Oo is Muslim. She has a small frame and speaks in whispers. “I love getting and sharing information”, she told me. After the 2012 Rakhine riots, and what she learned from the news, she said, “I knew I needed to work for peace and educate my people and those who hate us.” She set her sights on working in Mandalay, a town a few hours away from her home in Shan State, with an organization working to promote peace and education.

Khin Oo finally made it to Mandalay in 2014, where she began working with a peace organization, and also enrolled in law school. The deadly beating of a young Buddhist man that same year, publicized on Facebook, led to an unexpected beginning. “Muslims are responsible for the beating” and “Muslims should leave the country” someone behind her said when he thought she could not hear. No one would sit near her in class after the beating. One day, in her second year of school, she saw several posts on her Facebook newsfeed about a monk who had fallen in the market. The posts said a woman, said to be Muslim, tripped him. Users threatened revenge against the Muslim responsible, and others weighed in with slurs against the Muslim faith. The next day, mobs burned several shops and homes in retaliation. The truth, she later learned, was that a young Muslim girl had accidentally run into a monk, causing him to fall. A minor incident had escalated into an aggressive act, leading people to blame a religious community, wrongly, and to commit acts of violence for revenge. She saw what could happen when people take action based on incomplete or incorrect information.

The publication in 2013 of Myanmar's first private daily newspapers in half a century was one of the most important and exciting moments for journalists and editors since the country's political opening. Thiha Saw launched one of those first private newspapers — the Englishlanguage Myanmar Freedom Daily. He has been part of the country's print media sector since 1979, most recently as executive editor at Myanmar Consolidated Media (MCM), where he oversaw the country's only English-language daily, Myanmar Times, a Myanmarlanguage weekly, and MCM's online team. Myanmar Media in Transition contributing editors Jane Madlyn McElhone and Gayathry Venkiteswaran interviewed veteran publisher, journalist and editor Thiha Saw in 2017 and 2018 to talk about his experiences and his expectations of the political opening.

Q: You are one of Myanmar's print media veterans and a vocal champion of the private media sector. You got your start, though, during the military regime working for state-controlled print media until an unexpected chance came along to do independent journalism.

TS: Yes, I started at one of the two English-language state papers, Working People's Daily, in the late 70s, and then moved to the statecontrolled Myanmar News Agency in the early 80s. Then, in August 1988 [during the student-initiated uprising], we got our chance. A group of young and mid-career editors, including me, took over six Burmese- and English-language newspapers and ran a free press for about three weeks. We told the chief editors to go away and had a brief, amazing, period of press freedom. Then a new military government took over and they sent me a letter saying I was allowed to “retire” prematurely.

Despite the new military regime and your own so-called retirement, that's when you started witnessing slow change in the print media sector.

Well, there was strict pre-publication censorship, so there was no possibility of having a private daily newspaper, but there were dozens of private monthlies run by journalists and writers. So in 1990 I launched my first private publication — a monthly business journal called Myanmar Dana. To publish on time, we had to send our content to the censors at least one week before deadline. We also had to find someone who would lease us a licence. In those days licences were issued to government departments or officially recognized groups, like writers’ groups or associations for retired police officers.

Before the long-awaited 2015 general election, a cyber-group operating under the name Union of Hacktivists1 became infamous for launching several DDoS (distributed denial of service)2 attacks on Burmese media sites, including The Irrawaddy and Eleven Media. Unleashed Research Labs, a cybersecurity firm, traced the origins of these attacks to a military-operated network run by the Defense Services Computer Directorate, attributing the attacks on independent media outlets to the work of government — namely military — employees (Hindstrom 2016). Although the intention was simply platform and content defacement, these attacks emphasize the risks individuals, institutions and corporations face in storing and sharing information online. As more content is exchanged online and more information, particularly personal information, is stored by mobile providers, such risks are likely to shift from defacement attacks to identity theft and privacy violations. Given Myanmar's weak central regulations and the government's ability to access consumer and provider information under the 2013 Telecommunications Law, individuals and organizations are increasingly at risk of privacy violations.

Myanmar's transition is unique. Not only is the country emerging from the longest modern-day military government but the political transition also parallels the introduction of affordable smartphones and mobile technologies available for public consumption across the country. This availability and affordability of information and communications technologies (ICTs) is certainly exciting for the Myanmar public; however, security and privacy risks are high due to a patchwork regulatory framework and rapid growth in mobile penetration. During military rule, modern ICT infrastructure and services were largely unavailable to the public because of high prices. Alongside high economic barriers to entry, punitive regulations emphasized the government's ability to restrict an individual's usage of ICTs while failing to provide a coherent strategy for addressing macro-level issues in the sector. These issues range from cyber-attacks to data collection standards imposed on industry stakeholders. Today, the ICT regulatory framework remains largely unrestricted by laws or institutions, with the exception of the 2013 Telecommunications Law, which allows the government to seize information on ICT users and disable communications services based on broad legal language that is highly unspecific (MCRB, IHRB and DIHR 2015). While the government did enact the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens in 2017, the law's ambiguous language provides little clarity or assurance to individuals. This existing legal environment protects the government while putting the public at risk of unwanted surveillance.

At Myanmar's first national media development conference in early 2012, keynote speaker Ye Naing Moe talked about meeting his wife's family. When asked about his job, he responded: “I'm a journalist.” And it was this answer that inspired a follow-up question from his future father-in-law: “I know you're a journalist, but what's your job?”

Ye Naing Moe is a veteran journalist, columnist, mentor and trainer. He started training Myanmar journalists underground in 2000, and then founded the Yangon Journalism School in 2009, followed by the Mandalay Journalism School in 2015. The schools have since trained more than eight hundred journalists and editors. In 2016 the Yangon Journalism School published Myanmar's first editors’ manual. To encourage local journalists to do investigative reporting, it is also helping to initiate the Myanmar Centre for Investigative Journalists.

Nai Nai and Myanmar Media in Transition contributing editor Jane Madlyn McElhone conducted a series of interviews with Ye Naing Moe between 2016 and 2018.

Q: You've trained and mentored hundreds of editors and journalists. What were the first big changes you noticed post-2010?

YNM: There were actually tectonic changes for the media industry before 2010. We need to start there. Although we had heavy censorship at that time, in 2007 the local media tried to cover the Saffron Revolution. But it was painful for journalists. They knew they couldn't publish their stories in their media outlets, but they still did the coverage. And if they wanted to try to publish their stories, first they had to give them to the government officers. But photographers still went out on the streets and they got the pictures. So did videographers and reporters. Youths across the nation were inspired by these local watchdogs. So it was a tectonic change. It was a revolution. And then there was Cyclone Nargis in early 2008. It shocked the whole nation. Once again, even though they knew they couldn't publish in-depth stories about the cyclone, the journalists went to the Delta region and tried to cover it. When their stories couldn't be published inside the country, they sent them to exiled media. So, even before 2010, there was a lot of tension between local media — editors and reporters — and government officials from the Ministry of Information. Even before the censorship board was abolished in 2012, local media were pushing the limits of journalism.

I remember vividly why a veteran Myanmar reporter said he had not hired women journalists. This was in 2008–9, when the junta was in a foul mood. There was sharp criticism of its slow response to the devastation caused by Cyclone Nargis in 2008 and its brutal crackdown of a popular protest led by monks in 2007. Local journalists were hunted down and jailed for informing both the public and the outside world of the situation inside the country.

The reporter could have used any number of excuses related to safety and security to justify having no women in his team. But no, he said he would not hire them because they “won't be able to climb up the steep stairs to the office”. Besides, the office was full of “boys”, so the presence of a woman could prove awkward for everyone. A decade on, despite tremendous changes taking place in the country, this perception persists, as does the view that women journalists are somehow less competent and/or better at covering less important topics.

Pre-publication censorship has been abolished, private journals and papers abound (although the issue of consolidation caused by financial strains is another matter) and, depending on your calculations, there are between 2,000 and 5,000 accredited journalists in Myanmar, at least half of whom are women. Yet you could count on one hand the number of women in leadership positions in the local media landscape.

Studies by Sweden's FOJO Media Institute (2015, 2016) and the free-speech advocacy group ARTICLE 19 (2015) provide insight into this problem: while more than fifty per cent of the staff in newsrooms are women, they tend to cover “soft” sections, they are “protected” rather than empowered, there are few, if any, mechanisms for complaints or redress if women feel they have been discriminated against, and their careers end with marriage or childbirth. Even though Myanmar had a history of strong women's voices in literature in the 1960s and 70s, today there are very few women commentators and columnists. And despite the proliferation of journalist networks and unions, they tend to focus on political challenges such as threats, arrests and assaults on journalists, rather than policy and issues concerning gender.

In the wake of the November 2010 elections, one important signal of the Burmese government's commitment to change was the cessation of the censorship of music recordings in October 2012. Prior to that, the country's Press Scrutiny Board conducted rather rigorous censoring of so-called stereo series (albums), in cassette and later in compact disc formats. Producers wishing to sell their series in retail shops were required to submit a copy of the recording and ten copies of the song lyrics to the censors at the Press Scrutiny Board (MacLachlan 2011, p. 148). Although the censoring was supposed to be provided for free — as a government service to recording artists — producers in fact incurred regular and sometimes hefty costs in the form of “fees” and “fines” (MacLachlan 2011, p. 149). Ending the censorship requirement, then, represented the lifting of a financial burden borne by musicians and producers. Even more importantly, it was a powerful symbol of the transition government's commitment to freedom of artistic expression.

I began conducting fieldwork in Myanmar in 2007, researching the country's popular music industry. I subsequently published a book (Maclachlan 2011) that describes the norms that prevailed in the music industry during the era of military dictatorship. In one section of that book I examined how musicians and censors interacted, contesting the assertion found in other scholarly accounts that, at that time, censorship of music was total and that the military government controlled all artistic expression in Burma. In fact, musicians and censors engaged in a complex negotiation of power, and musicians exercised a considerable degree of agency in the creation and dissemination of their recordings. Nevertheless, I acknowledged that censorship was an important, although not defining, element of professional pop musicians’ lives under military rule. In retrospect, I characterize that research as an analysis of the pre-transition popular music scene. This chapter constitutes the next step in a now decadelong inquiry into the Burmese popular music industry, and describes the situation during the current transition period. My findings are based on fieldwork conducted in Yangon, the centre of the popular music industry, in May and June 2013, and in April and May 2018.

Introduction

Laos has maintained relatively high economic growth rates for about two decades. However, the country's future long-term economic growth faces risks arising from the country's dependence on resource sectors such as mining and hydropower sectors. Empirical studies have showed that resource-rich countries tend to experience slower growth compared to resource-poor countries. Laos might face the “Dutch disease” or “resources curse” problem (Kyophilavong 2016; Kyophilavong and Toyoda 2008; Corden 1981; Corden 1984; and Corden and Neary 1982). Even though the Lao economy has been growing at about 7 per cent per year in recent years, several challenges remain. Lao firms have low productivity and lack competitiveness. Lao firms also face various obstacles such as high tax rate, access to finance, increasing costs of doing business, and regulatory changes (Kyophilavong 2008; GIZ 2014; World Bank 2013). To overcome these problems, the Lao government has established several enterprises development plans and strategies such as SMEs Development Strategy and Industrial Development Plan. However, due to the lack of qualified human capital and funds, it appears that these plans and strategies have not achieved their targets.

Therefore, it is difficult for Lao enterprises to rival other enterprises in the region due to a lack of competitiveness. As such, in order to promote economic development in the long run, it is important to increase competitiveness of the enterprises. There are many ways to do this. One of the most important ways is to promote enterprise participation in production networks by improving access to external business resources and knowledge, technology, and finance sources. Getting SMEs to participate in production networks and regional economic integration could provide a short cut to enhancing firm competitiveness. However, participation in regional economic integration is affected by various factors, such as government policies, firm-specific advantages, and other barriers. According to our knowledge, there are very few studies on Lao SMEs’ participation in regional economic integration.

This chapter aims to investigate the current situation of Lao SMEs with regards to their participation in the regional economy.

Introduction

During the course of development, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are seen as the cornerstone of a national economy and significant contributors to the prosperity of a country. SMEs play an important role in a wide spectrum of industries in a country. The number of SMEs dominates that of large and very large enterprises. They contribute significantly to a country's economic growth and employment creation of most countries. Most governments view the SME sector as a key engine of the economy and a source of employment creation (Harvie 2010).

The role of SMEs, however, was not recognized until the mid-1970s. Before that concentration and centralization of economic activities were seen as the main evidence of a firm's competitiveness and large firms received much attention. SMEs’ contributions to economic activity only began to be a priority after the Bolton Report in the UK (1971) and the Wiltshire Report in Australia (1971) on the role of SMEs in the economies of the UK and Australia, respectively were published (Al-Qirim 2004).

In Europe, two-thirds of all new jobs are created by SMEs and more than 99 per cent of all enterprises are SMEs. In the United States, more than 99 per cent of all independent enterprises employ fewer than 500 employees, which is the definition of an SME in the United States. These SMEs employ 52 per cent of all U.S. workers (Devos et al. 2014).

In Australia, SMEs is a substantial sector, making up 95 per cent of all enterprises (Chau and Turner 2004). These enterprises contribute A$530 billion to the economy in 2010–11, more than half of private sector economic activities, and employed over 7 million people, generating more than two thirds of private sector employment (Deloitte 2013).

In East Asia, SMEs account for about 98 per cent of all enterprises, equivalent to between 20 and 30 million businesses. In the three largest economies of East Asia — Japan, China and Korea — SMEs account for 70 per cent of enterprises in the region (China: 8 million; Japan: 5 million; and Korea: 2.6 million). The intensity ratio of SMEs is only 20 people per SME in developed countries.

Introduction

Recently, multinational enterprises (MNEs) actively use regional trade agreements (RTAs) all over the world. In particular, there is a growing number of MNEs of which the overseas affiliates trade with third countries (i.e., neither home country nor host country) under RTA preferential schemes. For example, the White Paper on International Economy and Trade 2014 by the Japanese government introduces several case studies on Japanese affiliates in Southeast Asia using preferential schemes when trading with China, India, or Korea. Their use in trading with China or Korea is especially important since Japan has not yet concluded any RTA schemes with China and Korea. Namely, through trading via their overseas affiliates, MNEs enjoy preferential trade with countries with which their home country does not have preferential access.

In the academic literature, such export to third countries by MNEs is called the export platform foreign direct investment (FDI). This branch of research is motivated by the growing importance of platform-FDI activities. For instance, export sales accounted for over 40 per cent of total sales by foreign affiliates of Japanese MNEs in 2009, and export sales to third markets represented over 30 per cent of the export sales. Despite its empirical importance, there have been only a few studies on export platform FDI. Ekholm et al. (2007) is one of the pioneering studies and considers various types of export platform FDI according to the destination market of the overseas plant. The above-mentioned feature indicates that overseas affiliates by such export platform FDI enjoy preferential trade in their export.

In this study, we empirically identify significant firm characteristics in the use of preferences in export platform FDI. Specifically, we investigate the correlation of preference use with the share of “originating inputs”, intensity of exports to the third country, and experience of preference use in exporting to other third countries. For example, if the export intensity is highly and positively correlated with preference use, the absolute magnitude of preferential exports will play a significant role in that use. We can also decompose “originating inputs” into labour inputs, originating material inputs, and other originating inputs. As a result, in order to directly find the bottleneck in preference use in export platform FDI, we just examine the correlation of preference use with firm performance indicators rather than its determinants, such as more fundamental firm characteristics including firm productivity.

Introduction

The economic rise of China has generated substantial impact on the globe. Its economic influence following market reforms has had wide ranging ramifications as Chinese firms have become integrated into global production networks as suppliers initially, and since the beginning of 2000, Chinese multi-national corporations (MNCs) have gradually expanded to initiate regional and global production networks (Zhang and Rasiah 2015; Rasiah, Zhang and Kong 2013). While China's miraculous growth has been largely stimulated by economic reforms since 1978 and its insertion into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, economic slowdown from the global financial crisis (that was triggered by the implosion of the United States economy) drove the government not only to invest domestically on infrastructure but also to encourage national firms to invest abroad. Following the launch of the “Going-out” policy, Chinese MNCs started to strategize by seeking market opportunities abroad. While the acquisition of the computer division of International Business Machines (IBM) preceded the global financial crisis of 2007–8, acquisitions accelerated after the crisis. The previously Swedish-owned Volvo was among the acquisitions that took place since the crisis. Also, China's outward investment has shown an evolving pathway shifting from capital and resource-intensive industries (including resource-seeking and infrastructure), to market-seeking and technologyintensive industries (especially in transport and telecommunication equipment manufacturing).

Despite forays into Africa and Central Asia, China's FDI has expanded most in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Home to around 600 million people in 2015, ASEAN has attracted global attention as an important frontier for growth. ASEAN's US$2,460 billion economy, coupled with its fairly good infrastructure, stability and business-friendly environment, has attracted global MNCs to locate in the region. The implementation of ASEAN–China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015 has further added to prospects of cross-border flows of investment between China and ASEAN.

While China–ASEAN economic relations is becoming increasingly integrated, a major focus of researchers and policymakers has been on understanding the motives for Chinese investment in Malaysia, and how such investment is impacting on host-site economies. While the extant literature has extensively discussed the bilateral trade and investment activities (including the importance of MNCs as a mechanism to organize cross-border economic exchanges and activities), little analytical work exists on the specific motives of Chinese investment and its impact abroad.