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15200 results in ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Page 121 of 760

Rowing Against the Tide?
  • Batam's Economic Fortunes in Today's Indonesia
  • Francis E. Hutchinson
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    14 August 2017
  • Despite its good infrastructure and proximity to Singapore, Batam's economic performance has taken a turn for the worse, with declining levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) and exports. Well-known firms in the electronics sector have closed shop, the shipping industry is in the doldrums, and unemployment rates have begun to climb. The environment for business is not as conducive as it used to be, with bureaucratic overlaps, persistent red tape, and shortages of land for investors. And, rather than seeking to attract large-scale investments in manufacturing or services, government campaigns have focussed on traditional economic activities such as fishing and farming. There are three reasons for this state of affairs. First, Indonesia's decentralization reforms have made doing business in Batam much more complicated than it used to be. Rather than dealing with one all-powerful central government agency, investors need to deal with three levels of government -- each with veto power. Second, Batam's economic transformation over the past quarter-century has attracted large numbers of migrants from other parts of the country. This has engendered a cultural sub-nationalist movement, which has sought to protect local interests and identities -- to the detriment of the economy. Third, structural changes in Indonesia's economy and changing corporate strategies have meant that investment into the country seeks to tap its domestic market -- as opposed to producing for export. In this context, Batam is not a viable destination due to its distance from large population centres, bad connectivity, high labour costs, and unattractive tax framework. While recent measures have sought to reduce red tape, fight corruption, and improve the island's infrastructure, it is possible that Batam needs to re-orient its business model away from producing for export and towards enabling firms on the island to also cater to Indonesia's burgeoning domestic consumer base.

The Political Economy of Chinese Investment in Cambodia
  • Vannarith Chheang
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    08 November 2017
  • China suffers from a trust deficit in the region, and Southeast Asian countries have adopted hedging strategies, at varying degrees, aimed at diversifying their economic and strategic interests from Chinese investments and influence. Cambodia considers China as an important strategic and economic partner in providing performance legitimacy and as a countervailing force against its immediate neighbours. Cambodia's economic overdependence and power asymmetry have enabled China to exert significant political leverage over the Kingdom, especially on international issues affecting China's core national interest such as the South China Sea dispute. Local communities are discontented with some Chinese investment projects, especially hydropower plants and land concessions, which have infringed on labour rights and environmental protection. Given the public resentment and dynamic changes and transformations of politico-social environment in Cambodia, China needs to address the concerns and issues raised by local communities in order to sustain and enlarge its political and economic footprint. Promoting good corporate governance, as well as social and environmental responsibility, would help.

Harnessing the Potential of the Indonesian Diaspora
  • Charlotte Setijadi
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    20 November 2017
  • In recent years, the Indonesian government has increased efforts to harness the economic, political, and social potential of its diaspora. A recent high-profile event was the fourth annual Congress of Indonesian Diasporas that took place in Jakarta on 1 July 2017. Opened by former U.S. President Barack Obama, the event was intended to draw the Indonesian public's attention towards the contributions of Indonesian diaspora communities abroad. Current estimates put the number of overseas Indonesians at up to 8 million people worldwide. Members of the Indonesian diaspora are lobbying for legislative amendments, including dual citizenship, parliamentary representation, property ownership rights, and constitutional recognition. There are plans to set up a separate governmental office for diaspora affairs. Presidential Regulation Number 76/2017 also put into law the "Diaspora Card" that will provide Indonesians abroad with special entitlements such as long-term visas and property ownership rights. The Indonesian government needs to take the potential of its diaspora seriously in order to harness their enormous capital and skills contribution.

Old Stereotypes, New Convictions
  • Pribumi Perceptions of Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia Today
  • Johanes Herlijanto
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    14 July 2017
  • Despite improvements in the position of ethnic Chinese in the reformasi era, critical and negative perceptions of them persist among prominent pribumi personalities, particularly in recent years. These include leaders of several Islamic organizations, nationalists who harbour suspicions about foreign powers, and some who were in mid-career and/or were well placed in the last years of the Suharto era. This latter group consists of retired senior military officers, senior scholars, as well as current and former senior government officials. The ethnic Chinese are often portrayed as outsiders who are already dominant economically, and who are trying to be politically dominant as well. Furthermore, it is often claimed that ethnic Chinese tend to be loyal towards China. At the same time, there are others, including politicians affiliated with pro-government political parties, high-ranking officials, leaders of NGOs sympathetic to President Jokowi, as well as advocates of multiculturalism (many of whom are scholars and Muslim leaders), who believe that Chinese Indonesians are first and foremost Indonesians. The evidence they cite to support this belief varies, from past heroic actions by ethnic Chinese to the identity constructs of Chinese Indonesians, which is usually based on Indonesia or some Indonesian region.

The Natunas
  • Territorial Integrity in the Forefront of Indonesia-China Relations
  • Leo Suryadinata, Mustafa Izzuddin
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    11 July 2017
  • In May 2017 the Indonesian military conducted a large-scale exercise in the Natuna Islands. This was in the wake of three incidents in 2016 that involved Chinese fishing boats. Jakarta accused the vessels of "stealing fish" within the Indonesian EEZ but Beijing considered these boats to be carrying out "regular activities in Chinese traditional fishing grounds". Both Beijing and Jakarta acknowledge that the Natuna Islands belong to Indonesia. But while the Chinese avoid mentioning the issue of the islands having an EEZ, Jakarta openly claims that the islands definitely do have an EEZ. The two countries are "strategic partners", and while China needs Indonesia to help realize some of its "One Belt One Road" ambitions, Jakarta eyes funding from Beijing to help its "Maritime Power Dream". Indonesia has adhered to its claim of being an Archipelagic State and has relied on UNCLOS to support its territorial claims. China has also openly stated that the South China Sea issue would be resolved with reference to UNCLOS. However, Indonesians are divided over the issue. There are those who wish to bring the problem to an international tribunal, because they have no faith in bilateral negotiations as a possible path to a solution. The rise of hardline Muslims in recent months and their critical view of Chinese investments in Indonesia may also affect Jakarta-Beijing relations. While the Natunas is likely to remain a perennial issue between Indonesia and China in the short to medium term, it is unlikely to derail the bilateral relationship as economics is likely to continue trumping politics in Sino-Indonesian relations, at least under Indonesian President Jokowi's administration. It is also unlikely to bring about an outright naval confrontation between Indonesia and China.

The Indonesia National Survey Project
  • Economy, Society and Politics
  • Diego Fossati, Yew-Foong Hui, Siwage Dharma Negara
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    05 September 2017
  • The ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute commissioned a nationwide survey in Indonesia, called the Indonesia National Survey Project (INSP) to enhance understanding of economic, social, and political developments in Indonesia. President Joko Widodo's approval rating hovers at around 68 per cent, and respondents generally think that the President has made improvements to the economy, although there are concerns with the price of necessities and job-seeking prospects. The Widodo administration scores well in infrastructure development, which is its signature policy thrust. Roads, education and electricity supply remain the top priorities for respondents, while corruption is still considered the most important problem facing Indonesia today. Some key issues that have emerged during the Jakarta gubernatorial election, such as punishing blasphemy against Islam and voting a Muslim leader into office, receive significantly high support from respondents, suggesting that these issues have currency beyond Jakarta and the election. On the political front, state institutions, especially the Army, are more highly trusted than politicians. Key elements of Indonesia's political infrastructure, such as democracy, Pancasila, and decentralization are supported by an overwhelming majority of respondents. Indonesians identify strongly with Indonesia and consider traditional economic partners such as Malaysia, Japan, Singapore and ASEAN to be most important for Indonesia.

Speculating on World-Class Transportation Infrastructure in Ho Chi Minh City
  • Hun Kee Kim
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    18 September 2017
  • Population, cars and motorbikes have increased at higher than expected rates in Ho Chi Minh City, leading to increased congestion and strain on existing transportation infrastructure. While the city has a transportation infrastructure plan, it lacks adequate funds and is reliant on official development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI) to finance it. Amidst the backdrop of an opaque regulatory environment and intense competition among global ODA institutions, city officials speculate on multiple and contradictory transportation projects simultaneously. Conflicting interests between Bus Rapid Transit and Metro projects in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City exemplify the state's speculative forms of governance in capturing transnational flows of ODA capital to finance infrastructure and call into question dominant framings of infrastructure as rational processes and technologies that work against the so-called irrational and unplanned structure of the city.

The Growing "Strategic Partnership" between Indonesia and China Faces Difficult Challenges
  • Leo Suryadinata
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    08 November 2017
  • Jakarta-Beijing relations have experienced significant progress, especially since the Yudhoyono presidency. Economic links between the two countries have expanded rapidly and tourism and cultural exchanges have also shown improvements. Issues that may affect Indonesia-China relations negatively in the future include: 1. mainland Chinese workers in joint projects; 2. the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Natuna Islands; 3. the rise of pribumi-ism in Indonesia; 4. domestic anti-Chinese sentiments; and 5. changes in China's policy on Chinese overseas.

Parti Amanah Negara in Johor
  • Birth, Challenges and Prospects
  • Wan Saiful Wan Jan
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    24 August 2017
  • In 2015, a new party called Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah) was formed following the departure of progressive Islamists from the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), leaving the latter to be a party dominated by conservative Islamists. Much of the groundwork for the formation of Amanah took place in Malaysia's southern state of Johor. A prominent Johor PAS activist, Mazlan Aliman, was among the first to propagate the idea that a new, progressive platform needed to be formed. This eventually led to the "Bakri Declaration" which forms the basis for the establishment of Amanah. Working in the Pakatan Harapan national opposition coalition, Amanah is eyeing for around a third of the state legislative assembly seats in Johor. It has potential in constituencies with mixed-ethnicity voter demographics, especially those with 30-45 per cent Chinese voters. Johor PAS is badly affected by the crossing over of a sizeable portion of their active members and leaders to Amanah. In the next election, it is likely that PAS will be decimated in the state if it refuses to partner with any other mainstream parties.

Beneath the Veneer
  • The Political Economy of Housing in Iskandar Malaysia, Johor
  • Keng Khoon Ng, Guanie Lim
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    18 September 2017
  • The rise of Iskandar Malaysia as a regional hub has profoundly altered the domestic landscape, generating a knock-on effect on Johor's housing development, both economically and politically. Housing policy and development in Johor, as illustrated in the formation of Iskandar Malaysia, is riddled with conflict along two dimensions — "bumiputra versus non-bumiputra" and "federal government versus state government". The first one is entangled with international real estate development and foreign investment, while the latter has more to do with the rise of sub-national autonomy in Johor. Particularly in southern Johor, housing policy has increasingly been influenced by foreign investment through implementations of mega projects (e.g., Forest City). These mega housing projects not only boost the state's coffers, but also change the way housing is produced, financed and governed. Given the importance of sub-national governments in many large-scale housing projects in Iskandar Malaysia, the changing political conditions urge us to rethink the long-standing practice of national-centric development policy in Malaysia. Taking housing as a point of departure, the timing is ripe to revisit the role of state government in policy-making and urban governance.

The 2017 Johor Survey
  • Selected Findings
  • Terence Chong, Hock Guan Lee, Norshahril Saat, Serina Rahman
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    24 November 2017
  • ISEAS commissioned the 2017 Johor Survey to understand Johor residents' attitudes towards state and federal government, the economy, Islamic identity, the Johor royal family, as well as development projects like Iskandar Malaysia. This is a presentation of selected findings from the survey. A majority of respondents are satisfied with the Johor government's management of the state. There is mild optimism over the economic future of the state across the board, except for Chinese respondents who are generally more pessimistic. Chinese respondents are more likely to report smaller improvements in the financial situation of their households. In terms of identity, there is strong support for Bangsa Johor across all demographic segments. However, religious affiliation is the most important for Malay respondents while Chinese and Indian respondents identify themselves as Malaysian citizens first. The idea of introducing public English-medium schools receives overwhelming support from all ethnic groups. The Johor royal family is viewed as a good steward of Johor's resources and is believed to look after the personal interests of citizens. Many also believe that the Johor Sultan should intervene in politics when necessary. However, a slight majority agree that the Johor royalty should refrain from business ventures. With regard to Islam, the vast majority of Malay respondents see Malaysia as an "Islamic state". This majority also believe that increased Islamic religiosity is a positive development for society. More than half of the Malay respondents would like hudud laws to be applied to non-Muslims as well. The majority of Malay respondents also believe that JAKIM should regulate Muslim behaviour and that Malay culture is not becoming more Arabized.

Islam Nusantara as a Promising Response to Religious Intolerance and Radicalism
  • Ahmad Najib Burhani
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    07 December 2018
  • The Indonesian government has tried to defeat terrorist groups and uproot radicalism, both through military and cultural-ideological approaches. The recent attack at Mako Brimob Depok, West Java, and the bombing in Surabaya, East Java, however, have shown that radical Islam and terrorist groups are not defeated yet. Killing terrorist does not always mean killing terrorism. It could even have the opposite impact, i.e., strengthening and fertilizing the radical ideology. The government, being aware of this, has been supporting Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in promoting Islam Nusantara, widely believed to be the ideological antidote for radicalism and terrorism. Proponents of Islam Nusantara believe that radical ideology contradicts the character traits of Islam Nusantara, i.e., peaceful, smiling, tolerant, moderate, and accommodative to culture. Radicalism and intolerance are commonly seen in NU circles as being disseminated by transnational movements such as Hizbut Tahrir and Salafi-Wahhabi groups. Though not terrorist groups, they do teach intolerant and exclusive religiosity which provides a breeding ground for terrorism. Among Indonesian Muslims, including NU, Islam Nusantara has received varied responses and been met by resistance. The emergence of NU Garis Lurus and the concerted efforts to debunk Islam Nusantara by some preachers are among the forms of activities that seek to undermine Islam Nusantara. The introduction of Islam Nusantara is further hampered by the attitude of some of its proponents who emphasize its exclusivity by identifying Islam Nusantara only with NU. Barring its current limits, Islam Nusantara has the potential to become an exceptional form of Islam or a template for tolerant Islam that can be emulated by Muslims in other parts of the world, especially in terms of its ability to accommodate local culture and multiculturalism.

Malaysia's Electoral Process
  • The Methods and Costs of Perpetuating UMNO Rule
  • Kai Ostwald
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    24 November 2017
  • Malaysia will hold its 14th general election before August 2018, bringing renewed focus on the nature of political competition in the country. This paper provides a systematic overview of the electoral process and an assessment of how it shapes the country's political environment. Political competition in Malaysia is extensively manipulated to provide the incumbent government substantial advantages in elections. Most of the manipulations are a result of institutional bias during the pre-election phase. They create a fundamentally uneven playing field that has entrenched the political dominance of the UMNO-led coalition. Electoral manipulations impose numerous costs. These include direct costs like the inefficient allocation of resources, as well as indirect costs like the exacerbating of ethnic divisions. Both channels hinder Malaysia's efforts to reach further developmental milestones. The high degree of electoral manipulation in Malaysia, juxtaposed against its successful developmental record and relative social stability, makes the country an important case for the growing body of research on electoral integrity and malpractice.

The Peace Process and Civil-Military Relations during the NLD Administration's First Year
  • Htet Aung Lin
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    13 October 2017
  • Peace and political considerations are priorities in Myanmar as indicated by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's frequent pronouncements. While 2017 would not easily become the "year of peace", stakeholders including ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) appear willing to engage further at the negotiating table although the Tatmadaw (military) has stuck to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) route reiterated by the National League for Democracy (NLD) government at the 21st Century Panglong Conference. The Tatmadaw has softened its views on federalism, and although military operations drew criticisms, inter-elite relations especially between the NLD and the Tatmadaw appear to be improving. Economic development is not high on the government's agenda as yet, and civil servant responses to the government-led reforms remain unchanged.

Electoral Politics and the Malaysian Chinese Association in Johor
  • Hock Guan Lee, Nicholas Chan
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    07 December 2018
  • Like the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) was known for having its bastion in Johor, with the state containing the highest number of parliamentary seats contested and won by the party. Two features of the MCA stand out: (1) its relative resilience in that its near elimination in other states since 2008 did not occur in Johor until the recent 14th General Elections, and (2) that most MCA presidents had some connections to Johor, either as having been born in Johor, contested in a Johor constituency, been chairman of the Johor state liaison committee, or a combination of three. Although historical institutional linkages such as the New Villages and the Chinese guilds and associations (CGAs) gave the MCA a strong footing in Johor initially, changing political and socioeconomic circumstances gradually eroded the part's support among the Johorean Chinese. As it began to lose appeal as an individual party, the MCA Johor had to depend on a strategy of mixed voter pooling so that the significant loss of support from the Chinese could be compensated for by the Malay electorate that was until recently highly supportive of the Barisan Nasional (BN). The strategic dependence of the MCA on the UMNO was rendered void when the latter was defeated in the state. As it stands, the revival of the part's standing both within Johor and nationally is far from certain.

The Perak Sultanate
  • Transitioning into the 21st Century
  • Barbara Watson Andaya
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    15 December 2018
  • Although Dr. Mahathir Mohamad's earlier government (1981–2003) limited the powers and privileges of Malaysia's nine hereditary rulers, the political influence that they could exercise was still evident in the "Perak Crisis" of 2009, which also generated public debate about royal rights. In recent years, public wariness in Malaysia about politicians has helped the rulers present themselves as alternative sources of authority. "Monarchical activism" has been especially evident in the state of Perak, dating from 1984 when Sultan Azlan Muhibbuddin Shah, who was until then Malaysia's Lord President, was installed as the thirty-fourth ruler. In 2014, he was succeeded by his eldest son, Sultan Nazrin Muizzuddin Shah. Sultan Nazrin Shah has presented himself as a modern, educated and approachable ruler who consistently endorses the rule of law and is aware that public support for the monarch is highly dependent on meeting expectations in regard to ethical conduct and good governance. This paper argues that although Sultan Azlan Shah and Sultan Nazrin Shah have embraced the idea of a "new" Malaysian monarchy that actively responds to changing political and social contexts, two issues with especial relevance to the situation today can be tracked through the history of Perak's royal line since its inception in the sixteenth century. The first, arguably now of lesser importance, concerns royal succession. The second issue, still highly important, involves the ruler's relationships with non-royal officials and with elected representatives and the public at large.

The Central Role of Thailand's Internal Security Operations Command in the Post-Counter-insurgency Period
  • Puangthong R. Pawakapan
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    20 November 2017
  • The Thai military's Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) was in charge of a wide range of civil affairs projects during the country's struggle with the communist insurgency between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s. These projects — including rural development programmes, mass organizations and mobilization campaigns, and psychological operations — provided justification for the military to routinely penetrate the socio-political sphere. Since the Cold War drew to a close, little attention has been paid to ISOC's role and power within the state apparatus. Since the coups of September 2006 and May 2014 that toppled the elected governments, ISOC has been dangerously empowered and increasingly employed by the military regimes to dictate the country's political direction. The power of the Thai military is exerted not only through its use of force but also by means of its socio-political arms. ISOC represents a potent tool with which conservative elites can undermine and control electoral democracy and through which the military can maintain its power.

The Rising Politics of Indigeneity in Southeast Asia
  • Micah F. Morton
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    25 October 2017
  • Amidst rising trends of "nativism" and "xenophobia" throughout Southeast Asia, a related yet distinct movement framed around altogether different notions of "Indigeneity" is occurring among various long-oppressed ethnic minorities. These groups and their distinct claims of Indigeneity and linkages with the regional and global Indigenous movements are all arising in response to the heightened incorporation of their communities and territories into expanding nation states. The Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP) Foundation based in Chiang Mai, Thailand, is playing a key role in promoting solidarity, networking and capacity-building among Indigenous Peoples in Asia as well as linking local communities with international funders and advocates. As highly marginalized communities residing predominantly in the region's natural-resource-rich areas, Indigenous Peoples are bearing the brunt of the downside of ASEAN's "ambitious investment plan" and "resource-extractive model of development". Regardless of ASEAN's overall stance of non-recognition of Indigenous Peoples as a distinct community, Indigenous Peoples in the region are increasingly identifying in solidarity with a larger, distinctive collectivity of Indigenous Peoples within the framework of ASEAN.

Making Sense of the Election Results in Myanmar's Rakhine and Shan States
  • Su-Ann Oh
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    04 February 2016
  • This paper examines why ethnic parties did well in Rakhine and Shan States despite the fact that the National League for Democracy (NLD) was given a manifest mandate by the Myanmar electorate to represent its interests nationwide. In Rakhine State, the electorate chose the Arakan National Party (ANP) over the other parties because of the fear that their cultural identity and right to govern themselves are threatened by Bamar political and cultural hegemony and Muslim/South Asian encroachment from the western border. In Shan State, excluding the self-administered areas, the vote was split between the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) and the NLD. This was the only state/region where the USDP won the most number of seats. Given the lack of available data, the best explanation that can be offered at present is that the combination of non-state armed ethnic group fighting, recent ceasefire agreements, and economic development of places such as the self-administered areas and urban centres influenced Shan State voters to choose the USDP. The results of the election for ethnic affairs ministers approximate those of the nationwide results. Like the national and regional election results, the Rakhine as well as ethnic groups in Shan State voted for candidates from ethnic parties, indicating that the agenda of these ethnic parties is particularly important for those populations.

Learning Diplomacy
  • Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam Diplomats in ASEAN
  • Deepak Nair
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    14 October 2016
  • For nearly two decades, ASEAN has served as a vehicle for the postsocialist states of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV) to seek diplomatic recognition and enmesh their economies with the dominant discourses, structures, and visions of post-Cold War capitalist modernity. In scholarly and lay understandings of how CLMV states "integrate" through ASEAN, attention has been firmly on the political, security, and economic outcomes of ASEAN-CLMV interactions, with diplomacy viewed as a passive instrument to pursue such outcomes. Such a static view of diplomacy, I argue, obscures a vital mechanism in and through which these broader macro-social changes are being sought and accomplished. As they pursue modernist state projects, diplomats too must yield to experiences of learning and redefinition to express (and enable) the project of international "integration". This paper examines such processes of learning and redefinition by studying the effects and consequences of immersion in English-based ASEAN multilateral work for the diplomats of CLMV states. It delves into the Attachment Officers Programme for CLMV diplomats at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta as an illustrative case to tease out the skills CLMV diplomats gain from their stints in ASEAN work. These skills — the ability to draft quasi-diplomatic documents in English, facility with speaking English, and an embodied ease in interacting with foreigners (both Asian and Euro-American) — are generic but also transposable as these junior diplomats embark on representational and negotiating roles for their countries. The paper demonstrates how stints in ASEAN multilateral diplomacy have emerged as a channel for exposure and grooming for CLMV diplomats as they themselves "integrate" with an English-based global (yet Eurocentric) diplomacy.

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