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15200 results in ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Page 125 of 760

Reconciling Economic and Environmental Imperatives in Batam
  • Poh Onn Lee
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    06 March 2018
  • Batam's economic transformation has been accompanied by a marked degradation of its natural environment. Enforcement to protect the environment has often been inadequate on many fronts, exacerbated by population increases. Though regulations exist for the provision of public amenities like wastewater and sewerage treatment, existing facilities are run-down and ill-equipped to cope with the present demands. The capacity of reservoirs to meet the present demand for water is also strained because of the large population base, with illegal intrusion and squatters further threatening supplies. Economic and environmental imperatives can be reconciled if more emphasis and resources are put into enforcing regulations and protecting the environment.

Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia in Johor
  • New Party, Big Responsibility
  • Wan Saiful Wan Jan
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    16 January 2018
  • Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (PPBM) was officially launched on 14 January 2017, led by prominent personalities including former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, former Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin, and former Kedah Chief Minister Mukhriz Mahathir. Upon establishment, the party immediately announced that they are aiming to win the southern state of Johor in the upcoming general election. Historically, UMNO splinter parties have never been able to threaten UMNO in this state. Since independence, Johor has always been seen as an UMNO bastion. PPBM has moved quickly to establish themselves in all parliamentary and state constituencies in Johor, however, and it has been rather successful in attracting support from those aged below 35. Their key challenge remains the rural and female voters. Identity politics is a major hurdle for PPBM. The presence of the Democratic Action Party (DAP) in the Pakatan Harapan coalition - of which PPBM is a member - is a hurdle in attracting Malay support. Among Malay voters, DAP is perceived as a threat to Malay privileges. At the same time, PPBM leaders in Johor believe that their contribution towards the coalition is not yet fully recognized by their coalition partners who insist that PPBM contests only in constituencies with a large Malay population. Areas with a high percentage of Malay voters are difficult for PPBM to win because UMNO tends to enjoy huge support in such constituencies, and PPBM leaders argue that they deserve more mixed seats to run in as well. Winning Johor, or some other state, is crucial for PPBM. Should the coalition fail to win at the federal level, PPBM will need a base to avoid disintegration.

Malaysia's General Elections 2018
  • Understanding the Rural Vote
  • Serina Rahman
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    24 April 2018
  • This study was carried out in Johor and Kedah through a combination of focus groups, formal and informal interviews and long-term ethnographic participant observation. Johor was selected for this study because it is the birthplace and long-time bastion of UMNO while Kedah was of interest because of the Mahathir family legacy in the state. The study shows that the rural vote is not homogeneous; views and perceptions that could lead to electoral action differs between regions, ages and genders. Daily survival and rising costs of living are the key common issues that were raised across all regions. The importance of Malay rights and the priority of Islam are also important to the rural voter. Another common problem mentioned is that of the middleman who prevents allocated funds or financial assistance from reaching the average rural resident. Malay cultural norms, traditional obligations of loyalty and patronage politics are major factors that affect the decisions of older rural voters. Younger voters might be open to the idea of a new government, but they need to overcome community and family pressure to break away from generational practices of voting for Barisan Nasional. Some rural voters feel that they gain no benefits from having either side of the political divide in power. While these voters generally do not see the point of voting, a last-minute decision to vote may go the way of the party that provides them with immediate gains.

GE14
  • Will Urban Malays Support Pakatan Harapan?
  • Wan Saiful Wan Jan
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    24 April 2018
  • In Malaysia's last general election, urban voters tended to support the opposition coalition - 72 of the 97 urban parliamentary seats were in fact won by it. However, most of these seats have a mixed demography, with a high percentage of ethnic Chinese voters. In the upcoming general election, Pakatan has a good chance of winning the federal government if Malay voters join their Chinese counterparts in supporting the opposition coalition. A subsequent so-called 'Malay tsunami' could lead to a Pakatan victory. This present study, which is based on a series of focus group discussions held in the Malaysian states of Kedah and Johor, finds that urban Malay voters are very unhappy with the economic condition of the country and are also worried about corruption. But despite their grouses, they are still uncertain about supporting the opposition coalition due to the fear of losing the race-based privileges they enjoy as ethnic Malays.

EduCity, Johor
  • A Promising Project with Multiple Challenges to Overcome
  • Chang-Da Wan, Benedict Weerasena
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    14 February 2018
  • EduCity, built as an integrated learning hub, is a constituent part of Malaysia's general programme to enhance its reputation as a regional centre for higher education. Located in Iskandar Malaysia, Johor, on a 305-acre catalyst development housing seven higher education institutions, EduCity aims to become a best-in-class higher education destination and at the same time provide talent to support economic activities in Iskandar Malaysia. With over 3,500 students currently enrolled, EduCity is moving towards its goal of having 16,000 students by 2025. Its proximity to Singapore and Kuala Lumpur provides it with a large population of potential students, although attracting academic staff to work there remains a challenge. Other challenges that EduCity faces revolve around the provision of facilities and support services, coordination of courses on offer, and coordination between the entity that runs the site - EduCity Iskandar Sdn Bhd (EISB) - and the universities.

Chinese Capitalism and Economic Integration in Southeast Asia
  • Yos Santasombat
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    12 April 2018
  • China's rise exerts a powerful pull on ASEAN economies and constitutes an impetus for a resinicization of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. China has become a skilled practitioner of 'commercial diplomacy', and as long as it continues to lead the way in regional integration, China's state-led capitalism will seek to integrate itself into the ASEAN Economic Community. This in effect becomes China's essential strategy of desecuritization for the region. With increasing trade and investment between China and ASEAN countries, the ethnic Chinese economic elites have managed to serve as 'connectors and bridges' between the two sides, and benefited in the process from joint ventures and business investments. The impact of new Chinese Capitalism on SMEs, however, has not been equally positive. As China rises, Southeast Asia has witnessed increased complexity and variations of 'hybrid capitalism', including alliances between state-led capitalism, transnational entrepreneurs emanating from China's 'going out' policy and ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. Three main forms of Chinese Capitalism in Southeast Asia are neoliberal capitalism, flexible capitalism and Confucian capitalism. These intermingle into a range of local varieties under different socio-economic conditions.

  • The Indo-Pacific and Its Strategic Challenges: An Australian Perspective

  • Peter Varghese
  • Book:
    The Indo-Pacific and Its Strategic Challenges
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    31 January 2020
    Print publication:
    11 February 2019, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • • The shift in the framework of Australia's strategic thinking from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific reflects the primary focus on the maritime environment in the coming decades and the expectation that over time India will become more embedded in the strategic dynamics of the Asia-Pacific.

  • • India is in the midst of a major geopolitical repositioning, as it pursues a hard-headed national interests-based policy and builds stronger strategic ties with a wide range of countries including the United States and its allies in the region.

  • • The region is entering a potentially dangerous phase in U.S.–China relations. China's rise needs to be managed not frustrated; balanced not contained. Constructing that balance and anchoring China in a new multi-polar strategic equilibrium in the Indo-Pacific is the big challenge of our time.

  • • More and more individual Southeast Asian countries are being pulled into China's orbit: not with enthusiasm or conviction but because they see that the economic cost of opposing China's agenda is too high. The United States is so far doing little to change this.

  • The Indo-Pacific and Its Strategic Challenges: An Australian Perspective

  • Peter Varghese
  • Book:
    The Indo-Pacific and Its Strategic Challenges
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    31 January 2020
    Print publication:
    11 February 2019, pp 1-13

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    It is not often that a country changes the geographic definition of its primary strategic environment. But that is precisely what Australia has done in recent years by embracing the concept of the Indo-Pacific.

    Below is a personal perspective on what lies behind this change from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific and the key strategic challenge facing the Indo-Pacific: how to reach a new strategic equilibrium in the region as U.S. primacy is challenged by a China with ambitions to become the predominant power in the region.

    The Asia-Pacific, with Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia at its strategic centre, has been the conceptual foundation of Australian strategic thinking for most of the post-World War II period. It was seen as a coherent strategic system bringing in the major powers and also reflecting a long period of trade and investment integration, best captured by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

    Australia saw this economic integration as giving the Asia-Pacific added coherence. The Asia-Pacific construct provided a framework for thinking about the management of major power relationships especially the vital U.S.–China relationship. It was Australia's frame of reference for charting the strategic impact of shifting economic weight, most notably the extraordinary expansion of the Chinese economy.

    In more recent years, however, Australia has moved from Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific to describe the crucible of its strategic environment. And a large part of that shift is driven by how we see India.

    WHAT IS THE INDO-PACIFIC?

    The concept of the Indo-Pacific as a single strategic system is very much a work in progress. It is both an act of imagination and a recognition of an emerging structural shift in our strategic environment.

    At its heart, the Indo-Pacific reflects two propositions. First, that the maritime environment is likely to be the primary focus of strategic planning and strategic competition over the next several decades. Secondly, that India's strategic focus will over this period shift well beyond India's immediate neighbourhood and embed India in the strategic dynamics of the broader region in a way it has not in the post-war period.

    These two propositions do not, in themselves, create a coherent Indo-Pacific strategic system.

  • Foreword

  • Peter Varghese
  • Book:
    The Indo-Pacific and Its Strategic Challenges
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    31 January 2020
    Print publication:
    11 February 2019, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

    THE EDITORS

    Series Chairman:

    Choi Shing Kwok

    Series Editor:

    Ooi Kee Beng

    Editorial Committee:

    Su-Ann Oh

    Daljit Singh

    Francis E. Hutchinson

    Benjamin Loh

  • Exploring the Trade Potential of the DFTZ for Malaysian SMEs

  • Siew Yean Tham, Andrew Kam Jia Yi
  • Book:
    Exploring the Trade Potential of the DFTZ for Malaysian SMEs
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    31 January 2020
    Print publication:
    29 January 2019, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • • Malaysia established the Digital Free Trade Zone (DFTZ) to facilitate the development of e-commerce and the country's small and medium enterprises’ (SMEs’) exports. The data revealed thus far indicates an increasing number of SMEs coming on board the DFTZ e-commerce platforms.

  • • The publicly disclosed data focus on the value of exports achieved but do not show whether these are from new or existing exporters or whether they are re-exports. They also do not highlight Malaysia's imports through the zone.

  • • The overall trend signals that Malaysia is losing its bilateral revealed comparative advantage in exports to China, as well as an increasing use of imports for exporting to China.

  • • While the DFTZ facilitates both exports and imports, differing standards and customs processes in different export destinations, including China, will require Malaysian SMEs to know and understand the standards and customs processes governing imports in each export destination involved.

  • • Imports are also encouraged by the de minimis rule, which allows duty- and tax-free imports of up to RM800 into Malaysia. Overall, imports can help enhance the competitiveness of Malaysian SMEs, expand choices for Malaysian consumers, as well as facilitate re-exports.

  • • A clearer understanding of the role of DFTZ in facilitating trade will require more detailed data collection, and a closer investigation of the imports going through the zone, and their uses.

  • Vietnam's Industrialization Ambitions: The Case of Vingroup and the Automotive Industry

  • Hong Hiep Le
  • Book:
    Vietnam's Industrialization Ambitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 February 2020
    Print publication:
    29 January 2019, pp 1-19

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    At its eighth national congress in 1996, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) set the target of turning Vietnam into an industrialized economy by 2020. However, in April 2016, National Assembly Chairwoman Nguyen Thi Kim Ngan acknowledged that Vietnam would not be able to achieve that goal. Documents of the CPV's twelfth national congress in January 2016 also acknowledged this failure. Specifically, the political report of the congress replaced the target of “creating foundations to turn the country into a basically modern and industrialized country by 2020” in the eleventh congress's political report by “creating foundations to turn the country into an effectively modern and industrialized country soon”. The replacement of the deadline “by 2020” with the vague term “soon” reflects the Party's more realistic view of the economy as well as its cautious assessment of the country's industrialization prospects.

    Among the reasons for Vietnam's failure to achieve the goal was its inability to grow a strong local manufacturing base and develop key strategic industries to provide a strong momentum for the country's industrialization. The automotive industry is one of the primary examples. Despite repeated efforts, Vietnam's automotive industry has been based mainly on a handful of assembling facilities, and supporting industries have remained largely undeveloped.

    Recently, Vietnam's hopes for an indigenous automotive industry were rekindled when Vingroup, the country's largest private conglomerate, started in September 2017 the construction of a manufacturing complex in the northern city of Hai Phong and announced plans to develop a national car under the brand of Vinfast. Within a year, Vinfast managed to develop two prototypes, a sedan and a sport utility vehicle (SUV), which debutted with great fanfare at the 2018 Paris Motor Show. The company plans to put its first cars on the market in 2019.

    While it is still too early to tell whether Vinfast will be successful, the way the company is rolling out its strategy, the great potential of the Vietnamese car market, the strong support that the Vietnamese government is lending the company, and the generally positive reception the Vietnamese public has shown for its first models, have all given rise to the hope that Vietnam will eventually be able to develop its own automotive industry. The impetus shown by Vinfast, if sustained, may also become a significant landmark along Vietnam's economic development and industrialization path.

  • Foreword

  • Siew Yean Tham, Andrew Kam Jia Yi
  • Book:
    Exploring the Trade Potential of the DFTZ for Malaysian SMEs
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    31 January 2020
    Print publication:
    29 January 2019, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

    THE EDITORS

    Series Chairman:

    Choi Shing Kwok

    Series Editor:

    Ooi Kee Beng

    Editorial Committee:

    Su-Ann Oh

    Daljit Singh

    Francis E. Hutchinson

    Benjamin Loh

  • Foreword

  • Hong Hiep Le
  • Book:
    Vietnam's Industrialization Ambitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 February 2020
    Print publication:
    29 January 2019, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

    THE EDITORS

    Series Chairman:

    Choi Shing Kwok

    Series Editor:

    Ooi Kee Beng

    Editorial Committee:

    Su-Ann Oh

    Daljit Singh

    Francis E. Hutchinson

    Benjamin Loh

  • Vietnam's Industrialization Ambitions: The Case of Vingroup and the Automotive Industry

  • Hong Hiep Le
  • Book:
    Vietnam's Industrialization Ambitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 February 2020
    Print publication:
    29 January 2019, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • • Vietnam has officially admitted its failure to achieve industrialized economy status by 2020. This failure is partly due to its inability to grow a strong local manufacturing base and develop key strategic industries.

  • • The participation of Vingroup, the country's largest private conglomerate, in the automotive industry has sparked new hopes for Vietnam's industrialization drive. The company, through its subsidiary Vinfast, aims to become a leading automaker in Southeast Asia with an annual capacity of 500,000 units and a localization ratio of 60 per cent by 2025.

  • • Challenges that Vinfast faces include its unproven track record in the industry; the limited size of the national car market; the lack of infrastructure to support car usage in Vietnam; the intense competition from foreign brands; and its initial reliance on imported technologies and know-hows.

  • • However, Vinfast enjoys certain advantages in the domestic market, including the large potential of the Vietnamese automotive market; its freedom as a new automaker to define its business strategies without having to deal with legacy issues; Vingroup's sound business and financial performance and its ecosystem; strong support from the Vietnamese government; and nationalist sentiments that will encourage certain Vietnamese customers to choose its products.

  • • If Vinfast is successful, it will boost Vietnam's GDP growth and reinvent the country's automotive industry. Its success will also contribute significantly to the realization of Vietnam's industrialization ambitions and bring private actors into the centre stage of the economy. If the company fails, however, it will cause considerable problems for both Vingroup and the Vietnamese economy.

  • Exploring the Trade Potential of the DFTZ for Malaysian SMEs

  • Siew Yean Tham, Andrew Kam Jia Yi
  • Book:
    Exploring the Trade Potential of the DFTZ for Malaysian SMEs
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    31 January 2020
    Print publication:
    29 January 2019, pp 1-23

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    In traditional international trade, geographical distance can affect trade negatively with trade declining as the distance between two markets increases. The concept of distance was later extended to cover subjective concepts, such as “cultural distance” as well common history, language, legal systems or even institutional dimensions such as trade agreements between trade partners. E-commerce on the other hand, differs from traditional trade in the distance dimension because the Internet is touted to have made the world flatter by reducing the time and transaction costs associated with distance. This has led to claims on the death of distance in international trade, while others deem that the role of distance has merely been reduced.

    Measuring the impact of e-commerce on exports requires a working definition of e-commerce that is quantifiable, and different proxies have been used in different studies and over time. The earlier literature focused mainly on the impact of Internet usage on international trade at the aggregate level. Clarke's cross-country study4 indicates that enterprises that are connected to the Internet, export more than similar enterprises that are not connected. Similarly, at the aggregate level, Freund and Weinhold found that increases in company's websites in a country help to explain export growth in the following year for the fifty-six developed and developing countries that were pooled together in their study. In another study, ICT infrastructure is found to be relevant for the export performance of developing countries, and its impact on exports seems to be more important as a country becomes wealthier.

    At the firm level, the relationship between the Internet and exports may not be so straightforward as it may be conditional. Lu and Julian, in a study covering a sample of 133 Australian firms found that using the Internet can help firms reduce the cost of doing international business besides giving them a competitive advantage over firms without Internet usage. The international experience of a firm is a significant factor in discriminating between high and low export-marketing performance.

    Firm-level studies focusing specifically on SMEs in developed countries indicate that the eBay platform has opened up export markets to SMEs at lower costs for some EU countries. A study of SMEs in the United Kingdom shows that ICT users are 15 per cent more likely to export, ceteris paribus.

  • 1 - Introduction: Thai Realities and Possibilities after the 22 May Coup

    • By Michael J. Montesano, Coordinator, Thailand Studies Programme, and Co-Coordinator, Myanmar Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute
  • Edited by Michael J. Montesano, Terence Chong, Mark Shu Xun Heng
  • Book:
    After the Coup
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    23 May 2019
    Print publication:
    07 January 2019, pp 1-23

  • Summary

    The coup d’état staged by Thailand's military under the leadership of army commander General Prayut Chanocha on 22 May 2014 inaugurated the country's longest period of naked dictatorship in half a century.

    Even before the duration of this spell of authoritarian rule in Bangkok became clear, other factors had already distinguished the 22 May putsch and its aftermath. For one, the campaign of political repression and ideological transformation launched by the self-proclaimed National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO, Khana raksa khwamsangop haeng chat) junta that seized power in the coup represented a notable break with what had followed Thai coups of the recent past. Above all, that campaign made this coup very different from the coup of 19 September 2006, which had ousted Thaksin Shinawatra from the premiership, and it left many observers of Thai affairs concerned that the junta was determined to entrench long-term military domination of the country and its politics.

    A second factor shaped observers’ understandings of the NCPO, of its project and of the prospects for the success of that project from early on. Even at the time of the junta's seizure of power, it was evident that the end of the long life and long reign of King Bhumibol Adulyadej was near. In the event, the king passed away, at the age of eighty-eight, on 13 October 2016, after seventy years as Thailand's sovereign. His son Vajiralongkorn succeeded him, fully four and a half decades after being designated crown prince (Handley 2006, p. 249).

    In social, political, cultural, economic, institutional, demographic and other terms, the Thailand that the new king inherited was a different country from that of 1946, from that of the decades of counter-insurgency in which his father had redefined the role of the Thai monarchy, from that of the heyday of Bhumibol's reign in the 1980s and 1990s, and even from that which had first elected Thaksin to the premiership in January 2001. The events of the decade and half since that election had left the NCPO, a segment of the Thai military, more broadly and a number of civilian interests that backed the junta and its seizure of power determined to pursue a certain vision of Thailand's political and social orders.

  • 7 - Thailand's Zigzag Road to Democracy: Continuity and Change in Military Intervention

  • Edited by Michael J. Montesano, Terence Chong, Mark Shu Xun Heng
  • Book:
    After the Coup
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    23 May 2019
    Print publication:
    07 January 2019, pp 170-193

  • Summary

    Instead of asking why the military engage in politics,

    We ought surely ask why they ever do otherwise.

    — Samuel E. Finer The Man on Horseback (1962, p. 5)

    As society changes, so does the role of the military.

    In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical;

    in the middle-class world, he is a participant and arbiter;

    as the mass society looms on the horizon,

    he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order.

    — Samuel Huntington Political Order in Changing Societies (1968, p. 221)

    Will the military launch a coup? Will the army overthrow the elected government? Such questions continue to arise regardless of the stage of development in which Thai society finds itself. From 1932 to the present, military intervention in Thai national politics has been a recurring theme, making it necessary for those who want to understand Thai politics to understand the Thai military. Indeed, the role of the military in the country's politics has been a crucial point of contention since the Siamese Revolution of 1932. It remains so because the Thai officer corps remains unreformed and unchanged. From 1932 to the Second World War, to the Cold War and through the post–Cold War era, the military has remained a main actor in Thai politics regardless of changing international circumstances.

    Thai politics remains subject to the significant influence of military leaders. Since its break with the palace in 1932 and through its extended record of political intervention in subsequent decades, the Thai officer corps has held an undisputed role as a leading political actor in the country. The military has never proved its professionalism in large-scale warfare; rather, it has engaged only in limited counter-insurgency operations in rural areas. The absence of external security challenges has left the army free to involve itself in political affairs and to become more skilled in political manipulation. Furthermore, the political strength of the army has owed much to the weakness of civil society and of other potential civilian challengers.

    This reality suggests that the political preferences of military elites determine whether a democratic transition is possible or not. More fundamentally, the country cannot sustain such a democratic transition unless military elites decide to commit to democratic rule and to abide by government by elected civilians. In other words, the Thai military's support is a basic prerequisite for the emergence of democratic rule.

Page 125 of 760