Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Publications
  3. Publishing partners
  4. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute
  5. Content Listing

Refine listing

Refine listing

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

15200 results in ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Page 146 of 760

  • Agriculture in Johor: What's Left?

  • Geoffrey Kevin Pakiam
  • Book:
    Agriculture in Johor
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    25 August 2018
    Print publication:
    27 July 2018, pp 1-38

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    For those living in Singapore or Peninsular Malaysia, accustomed to having fresh chicken eggs every other morning, chances are that your breakfast comes from one of 17 million broody hens raised in the Malaysian state of Johor. If this comes as a surprise, you are probably not alone. Most recent commentaries concerning Johor's economic growth give the impression that agriculture is now a historical relic. The Iskandar Malaysia development project — accompanied by glittery real estate, oil and gas refining, complex manufacturing, mass tourism, and sophisticated healthcare offerings — now hogs the limelight. Indeed, even for field-leading scholarship on greater Malaysia's economic development, agriculture has been conspicuous by its relative absence, sidelined by an overwhelming focus on manufacturing and services.

    This essay represents an initial attempt to redress this imbalance. I ask two basic questions: what is left of agriculture in Johor? And why? My argument is similarly direct: although agriculture's share of Malaysian gross domestic product (GDP) and employment has fallen significantly, much remains, particularly in Johor. Amidst rapid urbanization and industrialization, agriculture's economic contribution in Johor has actually held steady and witnessed resurgence over the past decade. Johor's present-day agricultural strengths lie in oil palms, livestock farming, and certain forms of ornamental products. These agricultural activities are underlined both by high output and productivity relative to the rest of Malaysia. The clusters of trade networks and expertise underpinning these developments were already being developed in Johor prior to independence, and were given additional support from the 1960s onwards through policies linking industry with agriculture.

    Johor's unusual situation can be best understood by comparing its present-day context with its past. The following section briefly outlines Southeast Asia's and Malaysia's agricultural transformations since the 1960s. A subsequent section places Johor squarely under the lens, comparing the size and productivity of its farm sector with the rest of Malaysia's. A third section examines the key historical drivers behind Johor's long-standing agricultural prominence. A fourth segment reviews the overarching roles that Malaysia's federal and state governments have played in shaping Johor's resource-heavy economy. I then offer some concluding remarks about Johor's past, present and future agricultural developments, pointing to a number of major uncertainties hanging over Johor's farmscape.

  • Agriculture in Johor: What's Left?

  • Geoffrey Kevin Pakiam
  • Book:
    Agriculture in Johor
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    25 August 2018
    Print publication:
    27 July 2018, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • • Despite decades of industrialization, Johor remains an agricultural powerhouse.

  • • The state is Peninsular Malaysia's largest contributor to agricultural gross domestic product, and its official agricultural productivity is Malaysia's third highest.

  • • Johor's agricultural strengths lie primarily in product specialization, namely the farming of oil palms, various fruits and vegetables, poultry, pigs, cut flowers, and ornamental fish.

  • • Johor's production clusters have taken decades, if not centuries, to build up their regional dominance. Urbanization, often blamed for diminishing agriculture's importance, has actually helped drive Johor's farm growth, even until the present day.

  • • Johor's agricultural sector will persist for at least another decade, but may become even more specialized.

  • Foreword

  • Geoffrey Kevin Pakiam
  • Book:
    Agriculture in Johor
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    25 August 2018
    Print publication:
    27 July 2018, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

  • The Private Healthcare Sector in Johor: Trends and Prospects

  • Meghann Ormond, Chee Han Lim
  • Book:
    The Private Healthcare Sector in Johor
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    25 August 2018
    Print publication:
    23 July 2018, pp 1-40

  • Summary

    Introduction

    The Iskandar Malaysia (IM) special economic zone (SEZ) was established in Malaysia's southernmost state, Johor, in 2006 and is now beginning its third and final phase of development, with a targeted completion in 2025. IM is jointly operated and regulated by the Malaysian federal government and Johor state government under the statutory body called Iskandar Regional Development Authority (IRDA), which is charged with the development of IM as a “strong and sustainable metropolis of international standing” (IRDA 2016a). To do this, IRDA focuses on economic sector and infrastructural planning, the promotion of IM to the general public and potential investors, and coordinating and facilitating investment in the SEZ. It promotes nine economic sectors within IM: healthcare, financial and business services, tourism, education, logistics and creative services make up the service sector, while electrical and electronics, petrochemical and oil and gas, and food and agro-processing comprise the manufacturing sector. From IM's inception in 2006 to mid-2016, the manufacturing sector (27 per cent), retail/mixed-development (26 per cent) and residential property segments (20 per cent) comprised the bulk of investment in IM, with the services sector accounting for only 8 per cent during that period (IRDA 2016a, p. 64). Healthcare made up only 1 per cent of total investment, or RM3.16 billion, in the same period (IRDA 2016a, p. 65).

    Despite its relative insignificance in the SEZ's broader investment portfolio, healthcare — a driver for other health-related industries (e.g., biotechnology, medical devices and equipment, pharmaceuticals and education) — has been thought to be a more solid and steadier growth catalyst over the last decade than other projects that IRDA initially saw as significant growth catalysts (Whang and Lim 2016). This is due in part to healthcare, like schools and transport infrastructure, functioning as a key infrastructural anchor and “enabler” to render retail/mixed-development and residential property development more attractive to investors and consumers.

    In the following pages, we provide a contemporary snapshot of the key policies and players shaping the development of private healthcare in Johor in order to inform policymakers, current commercial stakeholders and potential investors, and residents and civil society actors in the region about the latest trends, concerns and opportunities linked to the private healthcare sector in Johor.

  • The Private Healthcare Sector in Johor: Trends and Prospects

  • Meghann Ormond, Chee Han Lim
  • Book:
    The Private Healthcare Sector in Johor
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    25 August 2018
    Print publication:
    23 July 2018, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    Executive Summary

  • • The future of the private healthcare in Johor and in the Iskandar Malaysia (IM) special economic zone in particular is intimately tied to larger property developments and trends in the region, both because private healthcare developers are increasingly the same as property developers and because IM's future population growth relies heavily on corporate settlement in IM and the jobs that such settlement generates. Volatility in corporate investment and settlement in IM may have significant consequences for the sector's development.

  • • The Federal and Johor State Governments intend to turn IM into a world-class private healthcare destination for local residents and foreign visitors alike. A range of strategies and policies have been launched to develop IM's medical care, aged care, and lifestyle and well-being sectors.

  • • It is essential to track the impact of federal and regional fiscal incentives for private healthcare development and monitor actual demand for private sector capacity in order to assess the value and utility of such incentives, especially given the potential for such incentives policies to promote the generation of excessive private sector hospital and clinical capacity if left unchecked.

  • • Private healthcare providers in the region depend mostly on local residents as their consumer base because Johor and IM are not (yet) significant medical tourism destinations. Given the current rate of expansion of existing hospitals and construction of new ones in Johor and specifically in IM, local demand must be secured via measures that increase the Johor household income base, foster interstate migration, attract higher income talent in larger numbers to live in the region, and improve quality of life in the region.

  • • To strengthen medical tourism, private players — both large and small — require greater coordination and cooperation at the regional level in promoting medical tourism and in setting up centres of excellence and medical tourist-friendly services that cater to the actual needs of international patients.

  • Foreword

  • Meghann Ormond, Chee Han Lim
  • Book:
    The Private Healthcare Sector in Johor
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    25 August 2018
    Print publication:
    23 July 2018, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

  • U.S. Relations with Southeast Asia in 2018: More Continuity than Change

  • David Shambaugh
  • Book:
    U.S. Relations with Southeast Asia in 2018
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    25 August 2018
    Print publication:
    18 July 2018, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • • The United States maintains a comprehensive and robust presence throughout Southeast Asia that has grown dramatically since the 1980s. It includes the commercial, security, education and diplomatic, and other domains. America's strengths and contributions to the region lie particularly in both hard and soft power, but the U.S. economic footprint is both broad and deep.

  • • However, this presence is not very well appreciated or reported by regional media — whereas China's presence and influence is pervasive. Most Southeast Asian governments are often reluctant to recognize or publicize the U.S. presence or contributions to regional security, stability, and growth.

  • • America's diplomatic engagement of ASEAN and the region has rightly been criticized for its episodic engagement, and Washington should substantially elevate Southeast Asia within its broader Asian and Indo-Pacific diplomatic priorities. Southeast Asia was made the highest priority ever for Washington during the Obama administration. While receding somewhat under the Trump administration, the region remains an important priority — but Washington must devote sustained attention to match the region's importance to American national interests.

  • • As U.S.–China competition escalates, Southeast Asia will become an epicentre of this competition. Southeast Asian states and societies may not realize the significance of the escalating U.S.–China competition for them, as most countries are internally preoccupied and buy into ASEAN's rhetoric of inclusive engagement of external powers. Southeast Asian countries are likely to become increasing objects of this competition, and it will be become increasingly difficult for them to ignore it.

  • • Meanwhile, Southeast Asian states and ASEAN must elevate their own emphasis and engagement with the United States. The U.S. brings many more strengths and benefits than does China and is a far more comprehensive actor in the region. In particular, it would be helpful if ASEAN and its member states would more publicly recognize the contributions and importance of the United States.

  • Foreword

  • David Shambaugh
  • Book:
    U.S. Relations with Southeast Asia in 2018
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    25 August 2018
    Print publication:
    18 July 2018, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asiaseries acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

  • U.S. Relations with Southeast Asia in 2018: more Continuity than Change

  • David Shambaugh
  • Book:
    U.S. Relations with Southeast Asia in 2018
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    25 August 2018
    Print publication:
    18 July 2018, pp 1-27

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    A year and a half into the Trump presidency, Southeast Asian countries (like the rest of the world) are wrestling with understanding their region's place in his administration's priorities. If there is a consensus in the region, it is that under Trump the United States is returning to its long-standing approach of benign neglect — or what Joseph Chinyong Liow aptly terms “ambivalent engagement” in his excellent study of American relations with the region.

    While the Trump administration has certainly not prioritized Southeast Asia, neither has it intentionally downgraded the region. It simply seems to be returning to its traditional pattern of episodic diplomacy, whereby multi-month periods of no or little high-level interaction is followed by bursts of “parachute diplomacy” by U.S. officials who fly into the region, give reassuring speeches of America's continuing commitment and resolve, and then fly out. On some occasions the U.S. Government becomes proactive by inviting Southeast Asian heads of state and senior officials to the White House and Washington. But such surges of U.S. diplomacy are normally followed by many consecutive months of relative inattention — before the pattern repeats itself. One can thus understand and forgive Southeast Asian scepticism about the continuity and commitment of the United States to the region. This time around though, the residual doubts and questions about America's attention span and staying power is greater, and it is fuelled by three further factors: Trump's own unpredictability and capriciousness; China's rapidly rising role in the region; and the legacy of the Obama administration.

    The Trump Factor

    Trump has proven himself his administration's own worst enemy. An aggressive early morning tweet or denigrating comments made about a foreign leader, combined with the President's clear disdain for multilateralism, unappreciation of the importance of alliances, barely disguised racial and religious prejudices, and his simplistic mercantilist view of international commerce all have the potential to do real damage to U.S.–Southeast Asian relations. Trump's anti-immigration policies and targeting of Muslim immigrants in particular go down very badly in Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia — and his abrupt withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) sent irreparable shock waves throughout the region.

  • 2 - Southeast Asia: From Trust Deficit to Strategic Trust

  • Marty Natalegawa
  • Book:
    Does ASEAN Matter?
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    16 July 2018, pp 14-69

  • Summary

    Southeast Asia has been a region transformed.

    In 1967 the region was afflicted with wars and conflicts; tensions and instability; poverty and underdevelopment. Five decades since, while tensions and instability still permeate, and the battle against the scourge of poverty is yet to be completely won, the region is largely free from war and has made economic strides that are the envy of much of the world.

    Anchoring these developments has been a fundamental transformation in the nature and dynamics of relations among the countries of the region — the transformation of “trust deficit” to “strategic trust”.

    What have been some of the conditions conducive for such transformation? What has made this transformation possible? Are such conditions likely to persist over the next fifty years? Indeed, even if they do continue to exist, are such conditions still of relevance in the face of possible new types of challenges in the next fifty years? Will ASEAN's current strengths still be of relevance in the world of tomorrow? Of equal interest, has ASEAN simply been the manifestation, the embodiment and beneficiary of the positive transformation of Southeast Asia, or has ASEAN actually facilitated and made such transformation possible? Has ASEAN been a passive bystander or a determinant of the region's dynamics? Or, indeed, has it been both — ASEAN as peace dividend and facilitator for peace? In other words, while the birth of ASEAN itself was made possible due to initial and fragile dynamics towards positive change, ASEAN in turn helped to consolidate, nurture and accelerate these emerging positive dynamics. ASEAN helped turn what was probable to possible, and what was possible into reality.

    There is little doubt, however, that the fifty years of ASEAN's existence coincided with some of the most fundamental transformations in Southeast Asia's milieu — the conversion of trust deficit to strategic trust, and the conversion of a culture of war to a culture of peace.

    Prior to 1967, Southeast Asia had been a region marked by deep tensions, distrust and, indeed, open conflict. Prior to Western colonial rule, relations among the kingdoms and entities then existent in Southeast Asia were not entirely devoid of conflict. Such conditions, the divisions inherent in Southeast Asia and the complex diversities prevalent, provided optimum settings for their exploitation that enabled Western colonial rule to take hold.

  • Appendix 3 - Statement of Asean Foreign Ministers on Asean's Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea

  • Marty Natalegawa
  • Book:
    Does ASEAN Matter?
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    16 July 2018, pp 239-240

  • Summary

    ASEAN Foreign Ministers reiterate and reaffirm the commitment of ASEAN Member States to:

  • the full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (2002);

  • the Guidelines for the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (2011);

  • the early conclusion of a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea;

  • the full respect of the universally recognized principles of International Law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS);

  • the continued exercise of self-restraint and non-use of force by all parties; and

  • the peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with universally recognized principles of International Law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

    • The ASEAN Foreign Ministers resolve to intensify ASEAN consultations in the advancement of the above principles, consistent with the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976) and the ASEAN Charter (2008).

  • 5 - ASEAN: Wither or Prosper?

  • Marty Natalegawa
  • Book:
    Does ASEAN Matter?
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    16 July 2018, pp 228-235

  • Summary

    Has ASEAN mattered? Without hesitation, I can say, absolutely. Without ASEAN the past five decades could have been witness to an entirely different experience for the countries of Southeast Asia.

    It would not have been too far-fetched to imagine the countries of Southeast Asia continuing to be enveloped by a deep sense of distrust and animosity, providing fuel for and sustaining the latent sources of conflict between them. It would not have been improbable for the countries of Southeast Asia to continue to be sharply divided along the interests of the extra-regional major powers — remaining as pawns in the proxy rivalries of non–Southeast Asian states. Indeed, Southeast Asia could have suffered the same fate as other regions afflicted by incessant conflict; namely, of economic regression and malaise, as well as the extensive neglect of human rights, good governance and democracy.

    While ASEAN's record over the past fifty years has not been without blemish, and there have been critical moments in the region's evolution when ASEAN has been felt to be “absent” — divided even — there is little doubt that ASEAN has made a difference; it has mattered. However, to remain of consequence over the next five decades, clearly a business-as-usual approach by ASEAN will not suffice.

    In the preceding chapters I have sought to make the case for ASEAN to recognize some of its likely future challenges and opportunities and, more importantly, to ensure that it is suitably equipped to manage and address these challenges, and to seize such opportunities. In my view — given, on the one hand, ASEAN's significant past achievements and, on the other, the constantly changing national, regional and global milieu — it is critical that ASEAN consolidates and secures aspects of its cooperation that have worked, adapt and adjust where necessary, and create and innovate where new forms of challenge and opportunities beckon.

    In other words, ASEAN must find equilibrium between the need for change and continuity. In a world marked by a dizzying pace of change, an ASEAN that relies simply on its past achievements would run the risk of irrelevance. Conversely, an ASEAN overly driven to change for the sake of change — to reinvent the wheel, so to speak — may find itself not necessarily strengthened as a result.

Page 146 of 760