Origin of This Volume

This volume is the result of a collaborative project that culminated in the conference “Cultural Transfer in Early Monsoon Asia: Austronesian- Indic Encounters”, organized by Andrea Acri and Alexandra Landmann in December 2013 at the Nalanda-Sriwijaya Centre, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. The event brought together fourteen scholars from different disciplinary backgrounds and regional expertise, in the attempt to provide the widest possible framework to synthesize and (re-)assess the broad subject under investigation. Besides providing a venue for dialogue between various disciplines, it has aimed to (re-)focus scholarly attention on cultural phenomena side-by-side with linguistics, archaeology, and genetics.

Conceptually, the conference sought to foreground a “borderless” history and geography of South, Southeast and East Asian littoral zones that would be maritime-focused, and thereby explore the ancient connections and dynamics of interaction that favoured fruitful “encounters” among the cultures found throughout the region stretching from the Indian Ocean littorals to the Western Pacific, from the early historical period to the present. A hallmark of its intellectual framework has been to transcend the artificial spatial demarcations and imagined boundaries of macro-regions and nation-states, as well as to bridge the arbitrary divide between (inherently cosmopolitan) “high” cultures (e.g. Sanskritic, Sinitic, or Islamicate) and “local” or “indigenous” cultures. Indeed, many “local” small-scale societies and cosmopolitan cultures in the region stretching from Eastern India and Southeast Asia to China and Japan were already plural from the earliest times, yet retain some remarkable common features, such as wet-rice monoculture and houses on stilts (Abalahin 2011, p. 661). Religion, too, shows common forms, in terms of dual organization and a focus on an ancestor cult, often vaguely defined as “shamanic” or “animist” (Reuter 2014). Remarkably similar head-hunting and burial practices characterize the religion of Nāga tribes of Eastern India, as well as the past religions of some Tibeto-Burman and Austroasiatic-speaking ethnic groups settled in Myanmar, and might have been once widespread in maritime Southeast Asia, Taiwan, and the whole of Oceania (Brighenti 2009, p. 92; Hutton 1928, pp. 406–7). A shared core of cultural identity or Weltanschauung across Southeast Asia and Melanesia includes narratives of multiple origins, the importance of precedence, clan and social binding systems, small-scale societies, autonomy for women, and a specific close interconnection of spatial, social and religious differentiation marking centre and periphery.

In the post–Cold War era, 2016 could well stand out as a watershed year for the global order, the Southeast Asian region, and many Southeast Asian states. Events in 2016 saw sharp new changes that may create new continuities going forward within Southeast Asian states and changes within long-term structural continuities that will have important ramifications for Southeast Asia.1 As suggested by the title of this volume, the events of 2016 covered in the twenty-four chapters by twenty-eight authors will have a determining influence on the trajectories of Southeast Asia and the countries of the region in 2017 and beyond.

Structural Factors

U.S.–China Rivalry

The first regional chapter, by Alice Ba, focuses on a defining post–Cold War strategic continuity for Southeast Asian security and states’ foreign and security policies: the strategic rivalry between the United States as the declining status quo power and China as the rising revisionist power. As Ba discusses, Donald Trump's victory in the November 2016 U.S. presidential election is a significant change on the U.S. side of this rivalry with unknown but likely profound importance for the U.S. role in Southeast Asia and Southeast Asian states’ relations with the United States. At the same time, the author analyses how 2016 saw China become more assertive in its push to develop an alternate China-centred regional order and against obstacles to the pursuit of its national interests in Southeast Asia. These include the 12 July Arbitral Tribunal ruling invalidating most of China's maritime rights claims in the South China Sea.

The chapter by Andrew Shearer on the future of U.S.–Japan–Australia trilateral security cooperation delves deeper into the strategic ramifications of the U.S.–China rivalry and the common threat of terrorism. Shearer agrees that the Trump victory is a watershed moment for the United States in Asia. Australia and Japan will be under renewed U.S. pressure to contribute more to their respective alliance relationships with the United States. These relationships and the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue process provides Tokyo and Canberra unique communication channels to Washington DC.

In 2015 there were two important events regarding Beijing's policy towards the Chinese overseas. One was the World Overseas Chinese Businessmen and Industrialists Conference in Beijing and the other was the announcement of the Huayi Card, specially designed for foreign citizens of Chinese descent working and residing in China. These events clearly manifest Beijing's “new policy” towards the Chinese overseas. Nevertheless, when examined closely, this policy change can be seen to have taken place much earlier, as reflected in previous events.

This chapter examines both the World Overseas Chinese Businessmen and Industrialists Conference and the Huayi Card, and the new policy's impact on the Chinese overseas, with special reference to Southeast Asia. It also explains when and why Beijing began to change its policy towards the Chinese overseas.

Clear Distinction between Huaqiao and Huaren

Beijing's policy towards Chinese overseas has been changing. During the Deng Xiaoping period, the distinction between huaqiao (华侨 Chinese citizens overseas) and huaren (华人 foreign citizens of Chinese descent) was quite clear.

After the resurgence of Deng Xiaoping, China promulgated the first PRC Citizenship (Nationality) Law in 1980, that stipulates that China only recognizes single citizenship. Once a Chinese overseas becomes the citizen of another country voluntarily, he or she ceases to be a citizen of the People's Republic of China. The clear distinction between Chinese nationals and foreigners resolved the historical problem of dual nationality of the Chinese overseas.

Nevertheless, with the modernization of China and globalization, there have been waves of new Chinese migrations, known as xin yimin. But the destinations of the new migrants have been developed countries (especially in the West) rather than the developing countries of Southeast Asia (except Singapore). These new migrants proposed that China should revive the dual nationality policy for ethnic Chinese, as such was being practised in the West. The proposal was debated by the China's People's Consultative Body, but the 1980 Chinese Nationality Law remained unamended. Apparently the Chinese government felt the present citizenship law served Beijing's national interests well.

The most striking example of the distinction between China's nationals and foreigners can be seen in Beijing's attitude towards the anti–ethnic Chinese riots that took place in Indonesia in May 1998, which affected many Chinese Indonesians.

For Singapore, 2015 was an extraordinary year. Proud of their country's numerous accomplishments, Singaporeans celebrated their fiftieth year of independence and participated in a year-long series of events and projects that were branded SG50. They mourned the death of their founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and wondered what the future would bring in his towering absence. Would there be an SG100 for Singapore and, if so, what would it be like? Also in 2015, the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) surprised many observers by winning 69.9 per cent of votes, and 83 out of 89 seats, in a general election in which all seats were, for the first time, contested. This suggested that opposition parties, which had been making strong inroads since the general election of 2006, were not after all going to have an easy time strengthening their presence in Singapore's government and politics. Liberal democratization was not going to be a straightforward linear process in Singapore.

In the afterglow of its convincing electoral victory, a more confident PAP government concentrated on consolidating its power and protecting Singapore's interests in a post–Lee Kuan Yew world. In his National Day message, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong focused on the theme of political, economic, and social stability in Singapore amidst an increasingly uncertain global and regional environment.

Leadership Succession and Renewal

In August 2016, midway through his National Day Rally speech, an annual address to the nation that can typically go on for more than three hours, PM Lee almost collapsed. Officially explained as a brief loss of consciousness caused by fatigue and dehydration, Lee's highly televised fainting spell was reported widely in both local and foreign news outlets. Earlier in May, Finance Minister Heng Swee Keat had suffered a stroke due to an aneurysm during a cabinet meeting and was only discharged from hospital in late June. These two events, still broadly in the shadow of Lee Kuan Yew's passing, brought focus once again to the longstanding question of top leadership succession and renewal in Singapore.

After a difficult first year in office, President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) showed in 2016 that he has grown increasingly adept at manoeuvring through the maze of political and economic interests in Jakarta. For most of the year he continuously consolidated his power through a range of political manoeuvres that included the broadening of his governing coalition, a cabinet reshuffle, and the appointment of his preferred choice for police chief. Towards the end of the year, however, a new challenge emerged for Jokowi when his political opponents joined forces with Islamist hardliners to mobilize hundreds of thousands of protestors to demonstrate against Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), an ally of Jokowi, who faced politically motivated blasphemy charges. In terms of policy, the President and his reshuffled team focused much of their attention on economic matters, in particular the development of Indonesia's ailing infrastructure and the implementation of a tax amnesty law. Internationally, the need to attract more foreign investment and the rising tensions in the South China Sea prompted Jokowi to pay more attention to foreign policy than in his inaugural year.

All in all, the President tightened his grip on power in 2016, but challenges remain, not least because there is still a lack of coherence and clear direction in Jokowi's policymaking and personnel decisions. This chapter will highlight these seemingly contradictory features of Jokowi's second year in office through an analysis of some of the most significant events in Indonesian politics in 2016. First, it will provide an overview of domestic politics, which were dominated by Jokowi's quest to strengthen his governing coalition on the one hand and an ongoing slide towards religious and political conservatism on the other. Second, it will outline key trends in the Indonesian economy, emphasizing that Indonesia's GDP growth remained relatively flat compared to 2015 despite a number of ambitious economic reform initiatives aimed at stimulating investment and improving fiscal space. Third, the discussion will shift to foreign policy, where Indonesia attempted to be more assertive in its pursuit of tangible benefits yet remained constrained by its lack of military capabilities and effective diplomatic resources.

The turbulent events of the last fifteen years have brought to the fore a number of critical issues in Thailand's political and social structure.

One of these issues concerns the unparalleled attention given to regions in the nation's political make-up, especially the role of the northeast region. It is with this region that the present chapter will be concerned. In the present circumstances of the recent passing of King Bhumibol, it is more important than ever to understand the roots of the regional and political divisions in Thailand.

I will first summarize a few salient points about the northeast, also termed Isan, and sometimes termed the Khorat Plateau. As far as terminology is concerned, I will use the three terms interchangeably, and will generally refer to Siam, rather than Thailand, for events prior to 1939 (when the name Thailand was adopted). It should be noted, though, that the term “Isan”, supposedly meaning “northeast”, is of rather recent origin, used for an administrative unit called a monthon only since 1900.

Most scholars would agree that the vast majority of those living in the northeast are of Lao descent, perhaps eighty per cent. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to enter into the complex issue of ethnic identity, but this question has been discussed informatively by a number of writers.

The northeast region consists of 20 of the country's 77 provinces. Many of these Isan provinces are among the poorest in the nation. The northeast is a significant region in a number of respects, in terms of land area, production, population, and also in terms of the political landscape. The twenty provinces account for approximately a third of the nation's land area and roughly a third of the population. These ratios have remained fairly constant since the beginning of the twentieth century, when Thailand's present-day boundaries were settled and the first population census was taken. In 2014, Thailand's population was estimated at just over 67.9 million, of which 18.9 million lived in the northeast. Although the proportion of the northeast's to Thailand's total population has been falling in recent years, the northeast remains easily the most populous of the major regions.

The resounding victory of Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) in the national elections in November 2015 ushered in what many hailed as a new era for Myanmar, after more than a half-century of military and semi-military rule. While the NLD's ascension has generated overwhelming optimism, a more open environment, a surge of foreign aid, and — after a fourmonth hiatus — investment, the fledgling government's performance in addressing Myanmar's age-old challenges has received mixed reviews. We examine how the rise of the NLD government and its de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, has transformed the political landscape, and highlight key opportunities and challenges confronting the party and Myanmar's overall transition to democracy.

The Aftermath of the NLD Elections

Immediately after taking power on 1 April, the NLD government dropped charges against and/or released approximately 235 political prisoners; filled top-level positions, including the first all-civilian contingent of chief ministers for the 14 states and regions; slashed the number of government ministries from 36 to an initial 21; and vowed to cut bureaucratic red tape. In a clear push for “quick wins”, the new government also broadened anti-corruption rules for officials and lawmakers; stepped up agricultural loans to farmers; accelerated the previous government's move to return confiscated land to individuals; and reached out to migrant Burmese workers, particularly in neighbouring Thailand.

After creating a new role for herself of State Counsellor, equivalent to prime minister in a semi-presidential system, Aung San Suu Kyi — who also took the post of Foreign Minister — set up a series of committees and commissions to address priority areas, from land disputes to environmental and economic reforms, and announced general policies to address an array of economic and political problems. Some initiatives, such as the release of political prisoners and loans to farmers, had immediate and positive impacts; but others — including sweeping promises to create more jobs, reform state enterprises, and return seized land — highlighted the complexity of problems that will require carefully structured, multi-faceted solutions. With this in mind, we first examine how the NLD's accession to power has affected the nature and composition of government and the dynamics within major political parties and institutions.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

This chapter provides an overview of Southeast Asia's demographic situation over the first fifteen years of this century, and highlights variations across countries. It concludes with discussions of major demographic challenges facing each country in the region. Data for this chapter are taken mainly from the United Nations’ World Population Prospects — 2015 Revision database. By focusing on this period, this chapter updates and adds to the findings of an article by Gavin Jones that provides a comprehensive analysis of the population situation for Southeast Asia from 1980 to 2010.

The Socio-economic Context

Demographic changes are closely interrelated with socio-economic development. Hence, a brief overview of the socio-economic conditions in the countries of Southeast Asia will be useful in understanding the variations in demographics across the region. The Human Development Report (HDR) published annually by the United Nations Development Programme provides development indicators for nearly all countries/regions of the world. Some development indicators from the HDR are given in Table 1.

Since 1990 the United Nations has been using the human development index (HDI) to rank countries in terms of human development. HDI is a composite index that combines economic, health, and education indicators. In 2014, Singapore (ranked eleventh in the world) and Brunei Darussalam (at rank thirty-one) were classified as very high HDI countries, Malaysia and Thailand as high HDI countries, Myanmar as a low HDI country, and all the other Southeast Asian nations as medium HDI countries. Between 2000 and 2014, Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Myanmar, and Laos registered the most rapid rise in HDI, each with a gain of between 24 and 32 per cent.

Life expectancy at birth varied within a rather narrow range between 65.9 and 68.9 years in six Southeast Asian countries (Myanmar, Laos, Timor-Leste, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Indonesia), and between 74.4 and 78.8 years in four (Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei). Singapore has one of the world's highest life expectancies at birth, at 83 years. Within each country, women live longer than men, by between 2.7 (Laos) and 9.5 years (Vietnam).

In 2014 the mean number of years of schooling ranged from 4.1 to 4.4 years in Myanmar and Timor-Leste to 10.0 to 10.6 in Malaysia and Singapore. Data from World Development Indicators show that, between 2000 and 2012, the tertiary enrolment ratio rose markedly for all Southeast Asian countries, except for the Philippines.

On 27 January 2016, the 12th Central Committee of Vietnam's ruling Communist Party (VCP) re-elected the seventy-two-year-old Nguyen Phu Trong as its General Secretary, breaking the rule that limits the age of candidates for this position to sixty-five. More strikingly, Trong's rival in the race to this top post was Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, who has been perhaps, as a country expert has noted, “Vietnam's most powerful politician over the past thirty years, since the demise of General Secretary Le Duan.” Unlike any previous contenders to this job, Dung fought until the last minute, reportedly gathering nomination votes from nearly twenty per cent of the delegates of the 12th VCP Congress, which elected the Central Committee on 26 January. However, the fate of this contest was substantially sealed five weeks earlier, at the 13th Plenum of the 11th Central Committee (14–21 December 2015). Following this momentous event, the 14th Plenum, held one week before the 12th Congress, finalized the 11th Central Committee's recommendations for the top posts in the party-state: General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong would stay party chief, Minister of Public Security Tran Dai Quang was named the next state president, Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc the next prime minister, and Vice-chair of the National Assembly Nguyen Thi Kim Ngan the next National Assembly chair. A few months later the National Assembly would formally appoint the three individuals to these posts for the next five years.

The 11th Central Committee also prepared the lists of nominees from which the 12th Congress and the 12th Central Committee respectively would select a two-hundred-strong new Central Committee (which is the 12th CC) and a nineteenstrong new Politburo. In Vietnam's party-state, the VCP Central Committee is the country's highest decision-making body between the Party Congresses, while the Politburo takes on this role when the Central Committee, which meets about twice a year, is not in session. As “the Party leads and the State manages” (Đảng lanh đạo, Nha nước quản ly) in this party-state, the Party General Secretary is the supreme leader of the country and the Commander-in-Chief of the military, even though the titular head of state is the State President, who is empowered by the Constitution to have the highest command (thống lĩnh) over the armed forces.

With the promulgation of a new constitution in 2008 and subsequent elections in 2010 and 2015, Myanmar has undergone a process of political transition which could lead eventually to full-scale democratization. One important aspect of the political transition is the changing pattern of civil–military relations, which started with the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) coming to power in 2011, ending more than two decades of direct military rule by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces). This process of structural adjustment in civil–military relations, from domination to influence, was expected to enter into a new phase when the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, came to power in March 2016, as there were high expectations for further steps towards democratization and democratic consolidation.

What should be an ideal model of civil–military relations in a democratic setting? In conventional literature, the most desirable form of civil–military relations in a democracy is what Samuel Huntington called “objective civilian control” over the military. Huntington's model emphasizes the separation of civilian and military institutions, non-involvement of the military in domestic politics, and the subordination of the military to the civilian authorities. According to Huntington, “objective civilian control” can be achieved by maximizing military professionalism, which involves the recognition of an independent military sphere within government and a clear distribution of power and responsibilities between the military and civilians. The other form of civil–military relations, according to Huntington, is “subjective civilian control”, which is maintained through “maximizing the power of the civilian groups in relation to the military”. Historically, subjective civilian control has been identified with maximizing the power of particular governmental institutions, social classes, or constitutional forms. Subjective civilian control is possible in the absence of a professional officer corps and a lack of democratic principles in governance. In a recent study on civil–military relations, Zoltan Barany claimed that, “democracy cannot be consolidated without military elites who are committed to democratic rule and obedient to a democratically elected political elite”.

On the other side of the equation is the military's supremacy over civilians, where the military holds the monopoly of power to make political decisions. This pattern of civil–military relations is not democratic in nature. Rebecca Schiff has put forward an alternative model of civil–military relations, known as “concordance theory”.