EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • A few ASEAN countries have signed the Global Methane Pledge, but methane should receive a broader and higher priority from the entire region, given its significant contribution to climate change, and the availability of solutions.

• • The agriculture sector contributes the most amount of methane emissions with a steadily rising share over the past decade.

• • Several Southeast Asian countries face similar methane abatement challenges (i.e., agricultural productivity in Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar and the Philippines; gas leakage in Malaysia and Brunei; and waste management in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore), warranting closer collaboration at the subregional level.

• • While it is true that countries have been participating in international initiatives and implementing national policies related to rice cultivation and oil and gas processing, their impacts have not been thoroughly evaluated.

• • Rather than creating new institutional structures, ASEAN could for example ensure that its existing working groups and networks prioritize methane abatement.

• • Missing data on the relative contribution to methane emissions from livestock, rice paddies and informal economies should be collected to help refine problem definition and formulate effective solutions.

Executive Summary

• • Religious extremism among students in major campuses in Indonesia remains a problem for the Indonesian government, campus authorities and moderate Muslims.

• • A substantial number of studies on Islam and religious extremism in Indonesia have focused on security and cultural paradigms. In contrast, this article discusses the factors that cause the rise of religious extremism among university students through an organizational and institutional lens.

• • The dissemination and internalization of religious extremist narratives contribute to the rise of religious extremism among university students in Indonesia.

• • Counter-extremism policies by the government and campus authorities have not been effective due to the absence of an integrative approach. All stakeholders—the government, campus authorities, parents of university students, communities and student organizations—need to establish a concerted and integrative effort to uproot religious extremism from among university students.

Executive Summary

• • Malaysia was initially lauded for its ability to combat the first few waves of COVID-19 but infection spikes since the Sabah state elections in September 2020 and subsequent exponential increases in both infections and deaths in 2021 left the nation reeling. Nationwide vaccination is seen as the only way out of the pandemic.

• • Malaysia’s COVID-19 communication strategy was hampered by political machinations and myriad changes in government. The need to shore up favour among the electorate resulted in inconsistent messaging and regular U-turns whenever there was public outrage at arbitrary restrictions. This resulted in confusion on the ground, preventing successful COVID-19 management and containment.

• • Under the current regime, claims to more accessible data have been disputed and doubts have surfaced over data transparency and accuracy. There is an urgent need to ensure convincingly reliable information, as well as to use more engaging messaging on more suitable media.

• • A holistic and effective COVID-19 communication strategy should adopt principles from several communication approaches, resulting in messages that are clear, simple and accessible as well as consistent and credible. Audiences should be segmented so that messages can be better tailored to their needs, with adequate information on the necessary steps to prevent infection and spread. Fake news, misinformation, and disinformation should be constantly tackled and debunked.

• • The Gerai OA and OA Lindungi Komuniti Facebook pages are outstanding examples of grassroots information dissemination channels that effectively provide fact-checked, coherent and accessible information to local communities in languages and on media best-suited to their audiences.

Singapore’s home affairs and law minister, K. Shanmugam, is generally an unflappable man. Yet, twice in 2021, his composure appeared to be affected by a series of racially inflected incidents that captured the public’s attention. The first was on 6 June when he expressed that he was “not so sure anymore” that Singapore was “moving in the right direction on racial tolerance and harmony”. His remarks were triggered by a viral Facebook video of a Chinese Singaporean man berating a young couple for their interracial relationship. In the clip, the man—later identified as a sixty-year-old local polytechnic lecturer—told them that that it was “racist that an Indian prey on Chinese girl”, while insisting that people should only date within their own race. (Shanmugam sounded more optimistic four days later, however, when he asserted in an interview that Singapore has made “tremendous progress” as a multiracial country.) Just over a month later, the minister conveyed that he was “quite sad” to hear a particular question raised during a forum co-organized by the government’s feedback unit and Lianhe Zaobao, Singapore’s main Chinese language broadsheet. An attendee had asked why the Chinese community—the country’s largest ethnic group—“shouldn’t have the right to decide on Singapore’s direction, such as education, [and] language”, instead of having to defer to ethnic minorities.

These events were not isolated. Accounts circulated in social media through the year about racial incidents. An ethnic Chinese lady was filmed repeatedly hitting a gong in front of her Hindu neighbour’s door while the latter was conducting his “five-minute, twice-a-week” ritual prayers (which involved ringing a small bell). There were two separate racist incidents against ethnic Indians in the first week of May alone: the first involved a man making offensive remarks at an Indian family after confronting one of them for not wearing a mask, while the second involved an assault against a fifty-five-year-old Singaporean Indian lady who had worn her mask below her nose while brisk walking.

These incidents arose despite the country’s heavy emphasis on the ethos of multiculturalism and the numerous laws regulating racial harmony. The Singapore government has certainly not been shy in resorting to legal sanction when necessary to penalize offensive speech, including relying on the colonial-era Sedition Act (originally introduced to safeguard British rule from local anti-imperial resistance) in the 2000s and early 2010s.

Setting the Scene: The Decade of Reforms Ends

By seizing power by force on 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military—or Tatmadaw—effectively put an end to the decade of political and economic liberalization that had been initiated with the establishment of a semi-civilian government following elections in November 2010. Conducted under the 2008 constitution, the 2010 elections were the first since the ones in 1990 that saw the rise of the National League for Democracy (NLD).

The decade from February 2011 to February 2021 were remarkable for Myanmar, a country that had been under some type of military rule and isolated economically since the 1960s. The transition to a hybrid political structure where democratic groups cohabited with the armed forces was accompanied by structural reforms aimed at promoting a market-led economy connected to regional supply chains and the global financial system.

The economic and business reforms were especially impressive under President Thein Sein, the retired general from the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), who led the first government of that decade from February 2011 to February 2016. Notably, his liberalization of the telecommunications sector epitomized the shift away from a state-led economy, while his suspension of the Myitsone hydropower dam project signalled the willingness of Myanmar to break away with its political and economic dependence on China.

The NLD government that took power in February 2016 also pursued economic and business reforms, and intended to expand and accelerate them after its re-election in November 2020. Still, the NLD faced criticisms during its first term, including from some local businesses and foreign investors, that it did not go fast or big enough with its reforms, especially when compared with the Thein Sein administration. It is true that the NLD took months, if not the entire first year of its term, to become acquainted with the bureaucracy; some of its decision-making and its initial economic appointments were indeed disappointing. The Rohingya crisis from 2016 onwards also affected the NLD’s focus as well as the economy. Nevertheless, the NLD government did continue or initiate significant structural reforms aimed notably at promoting transparency in public finances and procurement.

I. Background

• 1. The ASEAN Connectivity Coordinating Committee is established under the ASEAN Coordinating Council pursuant to the decision of the 17th ASEAN Summit on 28 October 2010 and as espoused in the Ha Noi Declaration on the Adoption of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity.

II. Purposes

• 2. The ASEAN Connectivity Coordinating Committee shall work to ensure the effective implementation of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity to:

• • promote economic growth;

• • narrow development gaps;

• • enhance ASEAN integration and community-building process;

• • enhance competitiveness of ASEAN;

• • promote deeper social and cultural understanding and mobility of people; and

• • connect ASEAN Member States within the region and with the rest of the world.

III. Roles and Functions

• 3. The ASEAN Connectivity Coordinating Committee shall:

  • a) Monitor, evaluate and review on a regular basis, or as appropriate, the implementation of the strategies, actions and projects of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity;

  • b) Coordinate with the National Coordinators, the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN, relevant ASEAN sectoral bodies and subregional arrangements to ensure that the implementation of the strategies, actions and projects are in line with the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity;

  • c) Identify issues and challenges, which arise from the implementation of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, and make appropriate recommendations to the ASEAN Summit through the ASEAN Coordinating Council;

  • d) Coordinate with ASEAN Dialogue Partners, multilateral development banks including various international and regional financial institutions. Adopted by the ASEAN Coordinating Council 17 January 2011 two international organizations, private sector and other relevant stakeholders to promote the implementation of Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity and mobilize all possible sources of funding;

  • e) Evaluate and recommend additional strategies, actions and prioritized projects to the ASEAN Summit through the ASEAN Coordinating Council;

  • f) Liaise with the National Coordinators to carry out outreach activities and consultations with stakeholders to raise awareness of ASEAN Connectivity;

  • g) Explore strategies to strengthen connectivity between ASEAN and other regions including East Asia and beyond; and

  • h) Undertake other activities as instructed by the ASEAN Coordinating Council.

IV. Composition of the Committee

• 4. The ASEAN Connectivity Coordinating Committee shall comprise the Permanent Representatives to ASEAN or any other special representatives appointed by ASEAN Member States.

Protocols

After Myanmar’s armed forces crushed a nationwide pro-democracy uprising in September 1988, the country’s official name (in English) was changed from its post-1974 form, the “Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma”, back to the “Union of Burma”, which had been adopted when Myanmar regained its independence from the United Kingdom in January 1948. In July 1989, the new military government changed the country’s name once again, this time to the “Union of Myanmar”, which had long been the vernacular version (in the literary register, at least). In the formal declaration of the country’s independence, for example, it was called the Union of Burma in the English version and the Union of Myanmar (or “Myanma”) in the Burmese version. In 2011, after formal promulgation of the 2008 national constitution, the country’s official name was changed yet again, this time to the “Republic of the Union of Myanmar”.

Also, in July 1989 a number of other place names were changed by the military government to conform more closely to their original pronunciation in the Burmese language. For example, Arakan State became Rakhine State and Tenasserim Division became Tanintharyi Division (later Tanintharyi Region). The Mergui Archipelago became the Myeik Archipelago, the Irrawaddy River became the Ayeyarwady River and the Salween River became the Thanlwin River. The city of Rangoon became Yangon, Moulmein became Mawlamyine, Akyab became Sittwe and Maymyo became Pyin Oo Lwin. The ethnolinguistic groups formerly known as the Burmans and the Karen are now called the Bamar and the Kayin.The people of Kayah State are widely known as Karenni, the state’s name until it was changed by the Burmese government in 1952.

The new names were accepted by most countries, the United Nations and other major international organizations. A few governments, activist groups and news media outlets, however, still clung to “Burma” as the name of the country, apparently as a protest against the former military regime’s refusal to put the question of a change to the people of Myanmar.The old name was also believed to be the preference of then opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who was held under house arrest by the military regime for periods totalling almost fifteen years.

INTRODUCTION

Rising economic inequalities have been a global concern. Global awareness of the problem was bolstered by the United Nations in its 2005 Report on the World Social Situation: The Inequality Predicament (UN 2005). Rising inequality across the globe has also brought the issue to the centre of attention of the world’s two leading multilateral organizations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which were previously reluctant to point to inequality directly and rather focused solely on poverty, but are now openly discussing economic inequality and its social and economic consequences.

Since the advent of neoliberal globalization in the early 1980s, within-country inequality has been rising in most countries: in the advanced economies as well as in the developing world. In advanced economies of the Western world, economic inequality has been seen as a contributing factor to the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) (Rajan 2010; Kumhof, Rancière and Winant 2015), but at the same time the responses to GFC also contributed to the surge in inequality (Klein and Winkler 2019). Rising economic inequality is also fuelling the more recent rise of right-wing populism of white supremacists. With a focus on the West, Piketty (2018) argues that the electoral results of parties with right-wing populist platforms are greater in countries that experienced higher increases in inequality and endured more severe impacts of the GFC—these are well represented by the Trump presidency in the United States and Brexit victory in the United Kingdom. In the developing world too, the rise of right-wing populism as in the case of Hindu-nationalists in India and Islamist-transnationalists in Indonesia, and the consequent polarization of society, can partly be explained by rising economic inequalities.

In the advanced economies, as in the United States and the United Kingdom, the surge in economic inequality has been characterized by the rise of income of the higher income groups while the income of the lower middle class stagnated. Concomitantly, higher income groups’ share of national income expands, while the share of lower income groups diminishes. This is captured by the trend of increasing per capita gross domestic product (GDP) over time while median income stagnates, which reflects how the lower middle-income groups have been particularly excluded from the growth process.

Introduction

The previous chapter considered the role of the military in Indonesia’s foreign policy. It showed that initially the President was passive with respect to foreign policy matters. After the 1982 general election, however, Suharto became more active in foreign policy-making as he was interested in projecting a higher foreign policy profile for Indonesia. This chapter focuses on the assertive role of Suharto after the 1983 presidential election. Some examples will be provided, but the main focus will be on the East Timor issue, including the Dili Affair, in which Suharto has played a decisive role.

Suharto and a Higher Foreign Policy Profile

After the 1982 general election, Suharto became more confident. Golkar had scored a landslide victory in the election and, unlike the previous general election, there had been no violence or student demonstrations prior to the polling, signifying that there was no longer any opposition. During the 1983 presidential election, Suharto was nominated by the three parties (Golkar, PPP and PDI) as the only candidate for the presidency. In the previous presidential election, the PPP had only agreed to nominate Suharto at the last minute. In the 1980s also, the East Timor problem was under control. Suharto might have thought that it was time for Indonesia to play an active role again in foreign affairs. Indeed, a number of events from 1984 onwards demonstrate this trend.

The Thirtieth Anniversary of the Afro-Asian Conference

In 1985, Indonesia decided to host the thirtieth anniversary celebration of the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung. About one hundred Afro-Asian states were invited (including the PRC). At the meeting, however, the participants were not able to agree on any major international issues. As a result, no resolution was issued. Some commentators have argued that it was a non-event. From the Indonesian point of view, this was the first step for Indonesia in becoming active again in the international arena.

Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement and APEC Summit

In 1987, President Suharto sent his Vice-President, Umar Wirahadikusumah, to attend the Non-Aligned conference in Zimbabwe, Africa. Umar was instructed to express Indonesia’s desire to be the chairman of the next Non-Aligned conference. The offer was turned down. Apparently, the Non-Aligned Movement, which was dominated by pro-Soviet states, did not agree to Indonesia’s leadership.

Insistence on ASEAN Centrality an Offshoot of Post-Colonialism and Cold-War Stigma

I believe that there is a historical explanation of why Member States which make up ASEAN have acquired an almost obsessive desire to insist on ASEAN Centrality in their dealings among themselves and their external partners. Wary of their past colonial experience of being dictated on in what they can and cannot do, say or think, and having become the arena on which major powers have flexed their military and political muscles in the not-so-distant past, ASEAN has used the principle of centrality as some kind of a mantra or antidote against repeating this bitter part of their colonial past. However, the awareness of insisting on ASEAN Centrality has not found itself in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration, except for a general reference to the avoidance of “external interference” in a preambular paragraph. It was only much later, after forty years, that it was spelled out and became preeminent in the ASEAN Charter which was adopted in 2007, particularly as a response to ASEAN Member States’ growing self-consciousness of weaning themselves away from foreign influence in the post-Cold War era. I can attribute this to the fact that in 1967 when ASEAN was established, the Cold War was still raging and the original ASEAN 5, although trying hard to remove the vestiges of the Cold War stigma that has divided them in earlier attempts at regionalism, have not yet totally weaned themselves from these predispositions. Still in the infancy of their regional experiment, they had not yet discovered their unique brand of multilateralism which, they would discover later on, could serve as an alternative to the push-and-pull pressure of their former colonial masters and the big powers that are raring to once again use this arena in flexing their political and military muscles. In recent times, with a long queue of external partners desiring to engage it, ASEAN has found its niche and has tried to shake off these vestiges of colonialism and Cold War by insisting on ASEAN Centrality as a foundational principle of its existence and a guaranty of its sustainability and relevance in the web of complex power-play in the region.

Situating Johor Dap within Malaysian Politics

In the 2018 General Election (GE2018), the Democratic Action Party (DAP) made an almost clean sweep in Johor. Except for the Ayer Hitam parliamentary constituency, DAP captured all the other six parliamentary and fourteen state constituencies it contested in the state. Apart from the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the DAP had the second-highest number of state assembly seats in GE2018. After several UMNO Johor state assemblymen defected to Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (PPBM), the DAP and UMNO presently have an equal number of representatives in the state assembly, at fourteen each. Being a key component member of Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition, the DAP was part of the PH state administration which governed Johor from GE2018 until the Sheraton Move in February 2020. The rise of DAP in Johor in 2018 is exceptional, as the party for most part of its history, was not a significant political force in the state.

Demographics of Johor

Johor serves as an interesting case for the DAP as the state has a demographic composition that is similar to Penang’s and Selangor’s in terms of a sizeable Chinese population. Johoreans of Chinese descent constitute 34 per cent of the overall population, compared to Penang (46 per cent) and Kuala Lumpur (43 per cent). With a population of 3.75 million, Johor is the third most populous state in Malaysia, and only a notch below Sabah.2 The share of Johoreans residing in urban areas closely mirrors the national average of 71 per cent.3 However, in contrast to the significant support the DAP had had in Penang, Selangor and Perak since 1969, the party had not been able to replicate that success in Johor (Table 1). Even before the 2008 General Election (GE2008) which denied Barisan Nasional (BN) its customary two-thirds parliamentary majority, the DAP was typically able to gain a commendable number of parliament and state seats in Penang, Selangor and Perak. The same could not be said of Johor.

Johor is politically significant to Malaysia’s national politics for having the second-highest number of parliamentary seats among Malaysian states, behind Sarawak.

Thirty-five years ago, Myanmar (or Burma, as it was called back then) was little known and even less understood. It rarely featured in the international news media and few governments and international organizations devoted significant resources to monitoring its myriad problems. The small number of foreign scholars who studied and wrote about the country could only rely on a select audience for an appreciation of their published product.All that changed in 1988, when a nationwide pro-democracy uprising in Myanmar demanded that the world pay it more attention. Almost overnight, there was a strong demand for articles and books that explained what was happening in the country, and why. A selection of such works was listed in the first edition of this bibliography, compiled in 2012, but since then the number of publications about Myanmar has grown exponentially. There are now hundreds, if not thousands, of foreign officials, scholars, journalists, students, tourists and others, both professionals and amateurs, writing about this fascinating but still deeply troubled Southeast Asian country.

As a result, there have been major changes to the publishing environment as it has related to Myanmar, both outside the country and inside it. Some of these developments were briefly noted in the prefaces written for the second and third editions of this bibliography, which were compiled in 2015 and 2018 respectively. Many of the trends identified in those works have evolved over the past few years as Myanmar has continued to undergo profound political, social and economic changes. The most recent development has been the military coup of 1 February 2021 and creation of a new State Administration Council (SAC) led by the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services. For these and other reasons, not least several serious outbreaks of communal unrest and numerous examples of human rights abuses, Myanmar has remained the focus of international attention. Books, reports and other monographs about it (and of course articles of various kinds, although they are not included in this checklist) have continued to appear, mainly in the English-speaking world but elsewhere as well.

Among the many works published since the third edition of this bibliography was released, three genres in particular have dominated the academic and popular literature.

While asatizah have historically played a significant role in the community in matters of faith and worship, the demands and impact of rapid change which have affected basic social institutions have witnessed their growing influence in society extending beyond these traditional domains. Uncertainties in response to change and the rise of a host of social and economic challenges affecting the community in the process of development have witnessed their growing influence for guidance and remedy. At the same time, strong signs of insecurity have also conditioned the nature of religious experience of Muslims, revealing signs of conservatism and utopian streaks that threatened and impeded the well-being of society. Asatizah, the people responsible for teaching the religion, perpetuating the religious tradition and protecting religious identity are thus seen to be significant in strengthening the potential role and contributions of religion towards improving the condition of life.

Until the last two decades, discourses on the needs and development of asatizah have been largely confined to the community level. The rise of religious revivalism in the region since the 1970s compounded by violence and terrorism in the name of Islam that have emerged in the region shortly after 9/11 and its ramification on Singapore, have ushered greater spotlight on Muslims’ religiosity at the national level. Asatizah, in particular the Islamic studies graduates, who at present formed the core of the asatizah community, have inevitably been the subject of much attention in dominant discourse. Highlighted by Singapore’s leaders as one of the three vital pillars of the Malay/Muslim community, alongside the professionals and entrepreneurs, they have been said to play a highly pertinent role in contributing to harmony and social cohesion of Singapore’s pluralistic society. Not only are they expected to provide guidance to the community in areas as broad as scientific developments, demographic changes and social problems experienced by those who fall between the cracks, their role in safeguarding the nation against extremism and violence in the name of Islam that threatens the security of the nation has also been constantly reiterated. At the same time, asatizah are also constantly urged to contextualize and promote religious teachings conducive to Singapore’s pluralistic society. However, the discourse has not been accompanied by systematic and critical attention to planning for religious education that is progressive and meaningful for change, if at all.

Malaysia first encountered COVID-19 in January 2020 and the crisis has now dragged on for almost two years. Initially lauded for the successful containment of the virus in early 2020, a combination of factors led to a sudden deterioration in conditions. In early 2021, there was a sudden escalation in infections and deaths which peaked in August. Today COVID-19 is being cautiously treated as “endemic” and the economy is slowly reopening given the decline in numbers since August 2021.

For a population of about 32.7 million, positive infection and death rates were relatively high. Total cumulative infections and deaths as at 4 December 2021 stood at 2,643,620 cases and 30,538 deaths respectively. Table 1 indicates the severity of Malaysia’s COVID-19 experience in comparison to several other countries.

The country with the closest population to Malaysia is Peru. However, while infection numbers there seem lower than that of Malaysia, deaths are higher. Within the immediate vicinity of Southeast Asia, Malaysia has the highest numbers in terms of deaths and infections. The other countries were cited for their international interest in the news given their high infections or citizens’ unrest in response to COVID-19 restrictions. Other sources note that Malaysia has the fourth highest death rate in Asia, after three Middle Eastern countries. For all of these countries, infection and death numbers are often underreported for myriad reasons.

The number of deaths in Malaysia in the month with the highest mortality (August 2021) alone stood at 7,640; 25.4 per cent of cumulative deaths throughout the 23-month pandemic period. Of the total cumulative deaths, 6,077 (20.2 per cent) were Brought in Dead (BID), meaning that they died outside of a healthcare facility. These figures and widespread images of army field hospitals set up across the country clearly indicate how overburdened the country’s healthcare system was over the worst of the pandemic period.

It is broadly understood that an “infodemic” accompanied COVID-19 pandemic woes worldwide. An “infodemic” is defined by the World Health Organization as “an over-abundance of information” that makes it difficult for people to discern fact from fake news, resulting in a lack of accurate knowledge of what to do in the coronavirus crisis. Within this spectrum of false information lies the notion of “disinformation” which is “deliberately propagated false information” and “misinformation” or “false information that may have been unintentionally propagated.”