ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Summary

INTRODUCTION

A closer Johor-Singapore economic integration via the Iskandar Malaysia (IM) project has been of high concern to policymakers on both sides of the Causeway. The economic ties between Johor and Singapore date back to the Sultanate of Johor and the colonial era when the former was a key hinterland region with its Singapore-controlled pepper, gambier, rubber and then oil palm plantations (Luraschi and Wruck 2013). Singapore was, along with Johor, part of a group of entities colonized by the British in the Malayan Peninsula. In 1946, while still under colonial rule, Singapore and Malaya — which included Johor — were separated. They were briefly united in the independent Malaysian Federation from 1963 to 1965. In 1965, Singapore separated from Malaysia, thus ending its directly shared history with Johor. An international border plus a twenty-year frosty relationship of the Mahathir-Lee Kuan Yew core period slowed cross-border supply-chain developments and other investments between the two countries. However, during Malaysia's industrialization phase in the 1970s, Singaporean FDI was an important source of funds, with Johor hosting a series of infrastructure works and industrial clusters (Yeung 1998). Thus, economic linkages between Johor and Singapore continued but until recently, there has been a lack of high-key, big transboundary investments by large Malaysia and Singapore private sector companies, including their market-dominating government-linked corporations.

Up until the recent 2007–08 Global Financial Crisis, Malaysia implemented somewhat competitive policies in relation to Singapore. In Johor, projects aiming to steal traffic from Singapore's port include: Tanjung Pelepas, competing over container terminals with the Port of Singapore Authority; and long-hoped-for competition over oil storage and petrochemicals. This includes the on-hold Asian Petroleum Hub which is now on firmer footing via the new Petronas Refinery and Petrochemical Integrated Development (RAPID) project inclusive of the Dialog oil storage terminals and deep-water berthing in Pengerang at the southeastern tip of Johor. However, after nearly twenty years of stop-start projects, punctuated by two major financial crises, the latest Johor policies take on a new cooperative stance with Singapore. This seems to be taking root, engendering confidence among private sector investors from the two countries and beyond. The Iskandar economic corridor story has caught their attention, and the region is abuzz with big property projects and investments in the healthcare, education and tourism sectors.

Summary

This collection is the first in a book series emanating from a broad research venture titled “Floating Frontiers”, supported by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute Director Tan Chin Tiong in 2012.

The attitude this project adopts is to consider Southeast Asia as a maritime phenomenon in the crucial period when regionalism has become a necessary strategy used by governments in the region to counteract and negotiate strong global forces bearing upon them. Applying a cross-border and generally sub-national approach allows our researchers to gather facts that are not immediately shaped by national borders and budgets, and to analyse their findings in ways that do not deny the sub-regional and extra-national nature of present-day economics and culture.

Three areas for research were identified by ISEAS in 2012. All of them involve parts of Indonesia and Malaysia, while Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines are respectively included in each of these sub-projects. The first — and the handsome book you hold in your hand is the product of this focus — is on Singapore-Johor- Riau. This so-called SIJORI Cross-Border Region studies interactions between Singapore, the Malaysian state of Johor, and the new Indonesian Province of the Riau Islands. Second is the Sulu/Celebes Seas region where the coastlines of Sabah, the Southern Philippines and Sulawesi are the object of study and analysis. Third is the Andaman Sea and its coastlines. Other studies of maritime Southeast Asia are being planned.

We proudly present this first volume for your reading pleasure. Much dedicated work was put into it by all involved, especially the editors, Francis Hutchinson and Terence Chong, and important trends and patterns are captured here within, in text and in maps.

Since the 1980s, a key segment in Singapore's economic development strategy has been to promote the relocation of land- and labour-intensive activities to offshore locations. The two nearby territories of Johor and the Riau Islands have been the recipients of much of this investment. But that is only a small part of the story.

Facilitated by common cultural references, a distant shared history, and intricate cross-border business networks, the interactions between the three have multiplied and grown deeper. On the economic front, localized production chains link firms based in Singapore with these neighbouring territories and people move across the borders frequently to consume or provide goods and services.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

According to Cooke (2001, p. 953), Cross-Border Regions (CBRs) are economic-cumpolitical units that may exhibit cultural or historical similarities. They span across various political jurisdictions, such as the nation-state, and federal or local levels of government. This chapter focuses on the Singapore Malay nuclear family as an entity that operates within one particular CBR: that linking Singapore to the neighbouring southern Malaysian state of Johor, which has ties to other parts of Malaysia. It is argued that in the era of transnational flows, citizenship and the accompanying national identities are not always as state leaders envision them to be, especially within CBRs. The stretching of the nuclear family across borders can position the family as a serious competitor to nation-states over the matters of first, citizenship, and second, national identity, exemplifying the idea that state borders are social constructs (van Houtum 2000, p. 67) that can be challenged and transcended.

This chapter offers two case studies of Malay families straddling borders. In the first, members of the family business illustrate that Singapore citizenship is not necessarily a stable political identity. These Singaporeans veer between retaining their Singapore citizenship and adopting a new citizenship status, that is, a Malaysian one. Thus, where the Singapore Malay family acts as a corporate entity, family members can exercise what anthropologist Aihwa Ong (1999, p. 112) calls “flexible citizenship” — professionals choosing from among different nation-state sites for working and anchoring family based on economic and political advantages that can be gained. These Malays mirror similar processes involving other ethnic groups (see Ong 1999 for an exposition on overseas Chinese) and in other cross-border zones, such as that linking Dubai and neighbouring states (see Kanna 2010). Amongst the Malays considered here, possibilities for such veering arise primarily because of a genealogically anchored shared Malayness spanning Singapore and Johor, discussed below.

A clarification of key concepts employed in this chapter is useful here. “Nationstate” refers to the convergence of the political unit of “state” — a form of organizing political power (Poggi 2006, p. 607) characterized by the presence of physical territory, sources of revenue and bureaucracies (Weber [1921] 1958) — with the cohesive cultural unit of the nation that carries shared identities.

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In September 2013, President Xi Jinping proposed the building of the New Silk Road Economic Belt during his visit to Kazakhstan, and in the same year in Indonesia, he proposed the building of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road — now they are collectively called One Belt One Road (OBOR for short). After further discussion and planning, Chinese domestic bodies of various levels gradually reached consensus on this initiative. At the Boao Forum on 28 March 2015, China released the “Vision and Action on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road” (Vision and Actions for short) which was jointly issued by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce with State Council authorization, indicating that the OBOR initiative has officially become one of China's national strategies.

OBOR has evoked widespread discussion within China as well as a range of interpretations internationally. Some observers view it as a grand strategy for extending China's economic and geopolitical influence into Eurasia and beyond, while others are concerned that OBOR might reshape global economic governance and lead to the rebirth of a China-dominant Asia.

Details are still scarce, however, and a concrete top-level design is still lacking. This has led scholars and the mass media to inject more information than can be found in officially published sources. This paper seeks to provide an analysis of the issues from the point of view of scholars in China.

OBOR AS A CONCEPT, A NATIONAL STRATEGY

OBOR as communicated by the Chinese government aims to increase connectivity between the Asian, European and African continents. The intention is to enhance trade flows and spur long-term economic growth and development, benefiting all countries involved.

Be that as it may, OBOR is very much a national strategy for China, and is expected to be a critical driver for the country's long-term ambitions and a key pillar of its “going out” strategy. This overarching strategy is reflected in Vision and Actions, which sets out a vision in which China-led infrastructure construction, reduced tariffs, and simplified customs administration would allow trade to flow seamlessly between China and countries along OBOR by both rail and ship.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

Summary

The Trends in Southeast Asiaseries acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

Summary

The Trends in Southeast Asiaseries acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

Summary

“I shall reign by dharma for the benefit and happiness of all Siamese people”.

— King Bhumibol's First Pronouncement at his coronation on 5 May 1950

Thailand's political crisis which began in the mid-2000s has involved every important institution in the country including the monarchy. But it is not simply the crisis of royal succession as some have argued (Marshall 2014). The succession problem itself might not have become an explosive issue had the real stake not involved the entire political establishment.

Fundamental to the conflict is tension between two structural forces. On the one hand, rural villagers and the urban lower middle class have, as a consequence of rural societal changes and the enhancement of electoral politics since the late 1980s, emerged as a political force favouring electoral democracy. On the other hand, not only has the current political system been unable to accommodate this emerging force, it resisted its demands. The obstinate regime is the “royalist-guided democracy” (or royal democracy for short), an ostensibly democratic polity but one which the electorate and elected authority do not have substantive power since true power remains in the hands of the monarchy. Its formal name, “the Democratic Regime with the Monarchy as the Head of the State”, is a revealing euphemism for a political system in which the formal parliamentary system is subsumed under the unelected and undemocratic power of the monarchy. But since royal democracy relies heavily on the charisma of the monarch, the coming succession is the trigger of the abovementioned fundamental conflict.

By “monarchy”, I mean a social institution and entity that is active in cultural, social, economic, and political life. Duncan McCargo (2005) shows that the monarchy “institution”, as it is often called, is a network of non-monolithic groups and people whose varying interests rely on, and who derive legitimacy from their association with the king and members of the royal family. It is a “network-monarchy”. The network is not harmonious, as the material and intangible interests of its members, and their ideas and visions for the future of the monarchy may be different. As a matter of fact, factional competition has spilled out into open politics. Yet the groups and people in the network share a common interest in sustaining the royal democracy political system and in the royal hegemony under King Bhumibol. The monarchy, in this sense, is a larger entity than the king.

Summary

Since the implementation of decentralization laws in 2001, local governments have maintained a crucial role in advancing social welfare in Indonesia. Indonesian districts, cities and provinces currently enjoy substantial autonomy in several fields, ranging from development policy to public works, environmental protection, and the provision of social services such as education and healthcare. Understanding how local politics works is therefore of primary importance in appreciating the state of democracy in Indonesia.

For several years after the breakdown of the New Order regime, a critical view of Indonesian politics prevailed in the literature. From this perspective, democracy in Indonesia is systematically prone to oligarchic domination and elite capture, with meaningful democratic advancement being thwarted by powerful local interests (Hadiz 2010; Hadiz and Robison 2005; Winters 2011). More recently, however, scholars have studied the emergence of new actors in Indonesian politics, showing that democratization has provided unprecedented opportunities for civil society mobilization and political change (Aspinall 2013; Mietzner 2013a ; Rosser 2015; Pepinsky 2013).

Against this mixed picture of the democratization process, the introduction of local direct elections for district heads and governors in 2005 has received particular attention. While local direct elections, known in Indonesia as pilkada, are overwhelmingly supported by Indonesians (Gabrillin 2014), scholarly work has highlighted their limitations, casting doubts on their ability to enhance accountability (Erb and Sulistiyanto 2009).

New research has provided valuable insights into pilkada elections, but this is almost exclusively based on case-study analysis and qualitative work, and the findings have not been triangulated with the help of alternative approaches. This bias in the literature has had an important, unfortunate consequence for our understanding of Indonesian local politics: while we know a great deal about political elites, we know very little about voters. We have a fairly clear picture of interactions among key political actors, of the role of political parties, of the importance of political finance, and of how local leaders mobilize ethnic and religious identities to their own advantage. We know little about how common people acquire information on local politics, use this information to orient their voting choices, evaluate candidates, participate in political campaigns, and assess the performance of elected politicians, local government and local institutions.

ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

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7 - Political Contestation in Iskandar Malaysia: Views on Economic Integration during Malaysia's 13th General Election

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Conclusion

Section IV - Formal and Informal Economies

Foreword

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Section III - Cross-Border Social and Cultural Communities

List of Tables

11 - Singapore Malay Family Businesses: Negotiating Malaysian and Singapore Citizenship and National Identities

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China's One Belt One Road: An Overview of the Debate

China's One Belt One Road: An Overview of the Debate

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The State of Local Politics in Indonesia: Survey Evidence from Three Cities

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Thailand's Hyper-royalism: Its Past Success and Present Predicament

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Foreword

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Thailand's Hyper-royalism: Its Past Success and Present Predicament

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Frontmatter

The State of Local Politics in Indonesia: Survey Evidence from Three Cities

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