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15200 results in ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Page 217 of 760

  • 14 - The Pacific Alliance: A Bridge between Latin America and the Asia-Pacific?

  • from IV - Old and Emerging Approaches to Asia-Pacific Regional Integration
  • Edited by Basu Das Sanchita, Masahiro Kawai
  • Book:
    Trade Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2016
    Print publication:
    11 April 2016, pp 273-294

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    In April 2011, the Presidents of Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru gathered in Lima, Peru to establish a new regional integration initiative, the Pacific Alliance (PA). It had two stated goals. Firstly, to move progressively towards the free circulation of goods, services, capitals, and people among its members. Secondly, to become a platform from which these countries can project themselves towards the world and particularly the Asia-Pacific.

    In its short lifetime, the PA has attracted great attention, both in Latin America and abroad. This chapter attempts to answer some of the most frequent questions surrounding it, such as:

    1. • What is the strategic and economic rationale for the PA?

    2. • What are the criteria for membership and observer status?

    3. • Does the PA adopt any specific integration model, and (if so) why?

    4. • Can the PA be considered a “high standard” Free Trade Agreement (FTA)?

    5. • Is the PA linked to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?

    6. • Can the PA contribute to enhancing economic links between Latin America and the Asia-Pacific?

    The answers to several of these questions are necessarily speculative at this point since the PA project is still in its early stages. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the PA member economies and their trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) links. Section 3 reviews the main milestones in the PA's history. Section 4 discusses the PA's possible role in strengthening trans-Pacific economic links. Section 5 concludes.

    THE PACIFIC ALLIANCE: AN ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

    PA members are generally regarded as Latin America's most dynamic economies, characterized by high growth (by Latin American standards), solid macroeconomic policies, improved social indicators, and a strong commitment to open markets (see, for example, George 2014). While much of this is true, the group's growth performance over the last decade is not remarkable. Mexico, by far the PA's largest economy, has grown well below the regional average, while Colombia and Chile have grown moderately above it. Only Peru has been among the region's fastest growing economies during that period (see Table 14.1).

  • 4 - China and the TPP: Reflections and Responses

  • from I - The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement
    • By Wang Yuzhu, National Institute of International Strategy (NIIS)
  • Edited by Basu Das Sanchita, Masahiro Kawai
  • Book:
    Trade Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2016
    Print publication:
    11 April 2016, pp 71-84

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    During the post-Cold War era, China engaged the Asia-Pacific economies through regional cooperation arrangements. These arrangements include the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Plus Three (APT) forum, and other bilateral or plurilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). APEC — one of East Asia';s few regional arrangements when the Cold War ended — was the first one China joined. After the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the regional architecture of East Asia was reshaped, with the APT emerging as East Asia's main economic framework (this included ten ASEAN countries plus China, Japan, and South Korea). Later, the APT evolved into a parallel framework in East Asia with APEC as a trans-pacific platform. This dual-framework architecture in the Asia-Pacific worked well for China until Japan proposed the “10+6” (Australia, New Zealand, and India were included) in 2006.

    Since the 1997 crisis, China became active in regional cooperation and subsequently launched bilateral FTAs with ASEAN nations. By insisting on using APT as the main channel of East Asian cooperation, China has shown its preference for the smaller framework for economic cooperation. To some observers, this was because China was trying to maintain its dominant position in East Asian cooperation. Since then, China and Japan had been locked in competition for leadership of regional cooperation (Wang 2010) until the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was launched in 2008. Some have argued that an FTA strategy was formed in China during this period (Zhu 2009).

    During this period, China experienced persistently high GDP growth rate, partly because of its successful cooperation with its regional economies. As a result, economic interdependence was acknowledged. However, this economic rise unfortunately led to “strategic tension” (Zhu 2013) between China and the United States, especially when the former was seen as a potential challenger of the latter.

    When the United States launched the TPP with other APEC members, China was wary of the new initiative that focused on making “next generation trading rules”. Known as a latecomer in regional cooperation, China currently faces many challenges to further liberalization. Research interests generated among research institutes over these issues include the TPP's impact on China and recommendations on how China should respond to the agreement.

  • 12 - APEC at 25: Political Realities Realized

  • from IV - Old and Emerging Approaches to Asia-Pacific Regional Integration
  • Edited by Basu Das Sanchita, Masahiro Kawai
  • Book:
    Trade Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2016
    Print publication:
    11 April 2016, pp 239-255

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    In 2013, Indonesia hosted the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders’ Meeting for the second time, on the grouping's twentyfifth anniversary and twenty years on from the Bogor APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting. The differences in atmospherics between these two meetings were stark and telling.

    In 1994, Indonesia hosted APEC's second leaders’ meeting that: (1) cemented this central institutional feature; and (2) announced its central and very ambitious institutional commitment — the “Bogor Goals” of free trade and investment by developed member economies by 2010 and by 2020 for developing ones. In this same year, U.S. economist C. Fred Bergsten (1994, p. 20), who later was appointed as the chairperson of APEC's Eminent Persons Group, proclaimed that: “Contrary to most expectations about regional economic organizations, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum is poised to become a driving force for worldwide trade liberalization.” At this time there was great hope that APEC would deepen regional economic integration among the Pacific Rim economies and through this buttress, the global trading system and the nascent World Trade Organization (WTO).

    APEC's silver anniversary summit in Bali in 2013 lacked the sense of excitement and regional and international media interest of its Bogor predecessor and was much lighter on the deliverables side as well. While the Bali Declaration (with twelve pages of annexes) was ten times longer than the Bogor Declaration, it provided much less guidance for the future direction of APEC as a regional economic grouping, established no central new commitments, and recognized that the Bogor Goals were still that — goals.

    The stark differences between Indonesia's two APEC years is reflective of APEC's path of restricting relevance, a path APEC has been propelled along by enduring international relations realities. Rather than countering sceptical expectations about what regional economic organizations can, and cannot, accomplish, APEC's experience has reinforced them as has the concurrent stalling of the WTO process. ASEAN's bold commitment to the establishment of an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015 and the early days of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) seem to be following along similar, reaffirming paths as well. India';s inclusion in RCEP adds significantly to its future potential just as Japan';s late inclusion in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) did.

  • 10 - AEC and ASEAN+1 FTAs: Progress, Challenges and Future

  • from III - Regional Economic Integration: A Multi-stage Approach
  • Edited by Basu Das Sanchita, Masahiro Kawai
  • Book:
    Trade Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2016
    Print publication:
    11 April 2016, pp 185-212

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    The Asia-Pacific region is seeing growing economic integration through market-driven production networks, and through plurilateral and bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and the emerging mega-trade blocs of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Both economic and political factors are driving the proliferation of FTAs in East Asia. The former is the push for economic growth and employment through improved economic competitiveness, access to markets and investments, and the strengthening of regional production networks and supply chains. The latter is to promote regional resilience and traditional and non-traditional security through closer cooperation.

    Bilateral FTAs are proliferating among East Asian and non-East Asian countries. Plurilateral FTAs have also mushroomed, such as the ASEAN+1 FTAs. This proliferation is driven by the following developments: the stalled World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round and need for alternative paths to trade and investment liberalization; the shock of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in the late 1990s impelling countries in the region to work more closely together; the desire to partially imitate North American and European regional economic integration; the fear of being left out of preferential deals and its resulting domino effect; and the desire to have a stronger East Asian voice and presence in the international fora. Questions that arise from such proliferation include: Will they be effective in liberalizing trade and investment flows? Will they undermine the WTO and the multilateral trading system? Will the various stakeholders, particularly the business community, find them useful and helpful? Will they create a “noodle bowl” phenomenon that actually fragments markets and add to business costs?

    ASEAN has been playing a central role in FTA formation in the region. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) entered into force in 1993, ASEAN Framework Agreement of Services (AFAS) in 1995, and ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) in 1997 and was succeeded by the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2007, ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) in 2010, and ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) in 2012. The development of FTA networks with ASEAN';s Dialogue Partners has been an integral part of the AEC.

  • 13 - The TTIP, Mega-regionalism and Asia

  • from IV - Old and Emerging Approaches to Asia-Pacific Regional Integration
  • Edited by Basu Das Sanchita, Masahiro Kawai
  • Book:
    Trade Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2016
    Print publication:
    11 April 2016, pp 256-272

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    The United States and the European Union (EU) launched negotiations for a possible Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) in July 2013. The goal of the TTIP is to create a modern, comprehensive free-trade area that would unite the two largest economic areas in the world. Thus far, the TTIP has undergone eleven negotiating rounds, the seventh having been held from 19–23 October 2015. As the United States and the EU are among the most open economies in the world, the negotiations are focusing on what might be characterized as “high-hanging” fruit, that is, politically difficult issues such as sensitive agricultural products, the financial sector, product standards, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS — included issues related to animal welfare), the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), and government procurement. Coupled with the usual political baggage associated with transatlantic relations and election-year politics in the United States, the scope and depth of the arrangement has generated extensive debates particularly in Europe. When the TTIP was launched, United States Trade Representative (USTR) Michael Froman expressed hope that it would be completed “on one tank of gas”. The long and winding road of trade negotiations has already required quite a bit of refuelling. Will it reach its destination?

    There are reasons to be optimistic about the accord. The United States and European countries have been key leaders in post-World War II economic governance and in promoting liberalization of global trade and investment. They have been active in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO) in trying to bring down tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) globally, and their respective political and economic institutions related to trade are among the most advanced in the world. There is good reason to believe that the ultimate benefits of the accord could be relatively large, despite the fact that their economies are already relatively open. Moreover, rapid growth in Asia and the “mega-regionalism” in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly the recently concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), have created strong incentives for the EU to avoid being isolated from Asia- Pacific markets and regional rule-making that may well emerge as global rules.

  • 16 - The Implications of Mega-regional Trade Agreements on the World Trade Organization

  • from V - Asia-Pacific Regional Integration: Towards Convergence?
  • Edited by Basu Das Sanchita, Masahiro Kawai
  • Book:
    Trade Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2016
    Print publication:
    11 April 2016, pp 323-340

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    Mega-regional trade agreements are the most recent manifestation of regionalism since its revival in the 1980s. In the past five years, there has been much discussion about the effects of these so-called mega-regionals on the global economy, the most important of which are: the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). An additional preferential initiative currently under consideration, although not yet under negotiation, is the Free Trade Agreement of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), encompassing the full membership of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). According to the World Economic Forum, megaregional trade agreements are defined as:

    … deep integration partnerships in the form of RTAs [regional trade agreements] between countries or regions with a major share of world trade and FDI [foreign direct investment] and in which two or more of the parties are in a paramount driver position, or serve as hubs, in global value chains (i.e. the US, the EU, Japan, China) (Meléndez-Ortiz 2014, p. 13).

    Thus, their size is what differentiates the RCEP, TPP, and TTIP from other Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) and makes their study unique and pertinent. As detailed in Table 16.1, the successful negotiation of the RCEP, TPP, or TTIP would create a vast integrated market across several countries, commanding a substantial portion of the world's trade and gross domestic product (GDP). Moreover, their officially proposed completion date of 2015 indicates the high level of priority that their members have accorded these prospective agreements. As we have seen with the TPP, however, a 2015 completion date may well prove elusive. The purpose of such integration in these mega-regionals is to provide increased market access, regulatory compatibility, and a “rules basket” to iron out variations in business and investment climates (Meléndez-Ortiz 2014, p. 13). Simply put, mega-regionals are large PTAs designed to facilitate trade liberalization among its members.

    Yet, PTAs — including mega-regionals — are problematic “two-faced” arrangements because they offer free trade only to members and protection against non-members, as Jagdish Bhagwati reminds us (Bhagwati 2008, pp. 16–17).

  • 9 - RCEP: An Indian Perspective

  • from II - The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement
  • Edited by Basu Das Sanchita, Masahiro Kawai
  • Book:
    Trade Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2016
    Print publication:
    11 April 2016, pp 167-182

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    Nearly two decades after announcing its Look East Policy (LEP), India is poised to play a much greater role in the Asia-Pacific than it had probably envisaged at that point in time. After several years of lukewarm ties with most countries of the region since the beginning of the Cold War, India's strategic economic links with the region have increased sharply. This is reflected in its presence in regional institutional mechanisms like the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and several other bilateral trade and economic cooperation agreements in the region. Notwithstanding these, it is still not as deeply entrenched in the economic domain of the Asia-Pacific as it could possibly be. A major factor behind the relatively low integration is India's hesitation to decisively abandon a defensive and inward-looking trade agenda. The hesitation has been a compelling determinant of its relatively lesser interface with a region that has long taken a more liberal approach to trade and investment than India and followed strongly outward-oriented policies.

    The reputation of being a hesitant economic liberalizer and difficult trade negotiator is firmly affixed on India as it negotiates the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) — its largest trade and economic deal with the Asia-Pacific region so far. The gradual maturing of negotiations at the RCEP has been accompanied by significant domestic changes in India, the most notable being a change in government with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) having a pronounced right-of-centre political and economic ideology replacing the more left-of-centre Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA). There are wide expectations from the new government in pursuing a more aggressive course of market-based economic reforms than its predecessor. Such expectations extend to India adopting a forward-looking and constructive approach in its external trade negotiations, including the RCEP.

    This chapter examines the context of India's participation at the RCEP, including its active Free Trade Agreement (FTA) policy and the questions about the benefits of these FTAs. It illustrates the economic and strategic significance of the RCEP for India, particularly the gains accruable from its greater presence in global value chains and a larger strategic role in the region.

  • 6 - RCEP Prospect and Challenges: Political Economy of East Asian Integration

  • from II - The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement
  • Edited by Basu Das Sanchita, Masahiro Kawai
  • Book:
    Trade Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2016
    Print publication:
    11 April 2016, pp 105-121

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    Over the last twenty years, regional integration initiatives have been significantly developed: not only in terms of number, which has tripled since early 1990s, but also in terms of integration topics discussed and the number of countries involved in the agreements. Significant development can be observed in East Asia and the Pacific, where countries have been actively forming trade agreements within and outside the region. Recently, the process of integration in East Asia has been conducted under the ASEAN-initiated Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). At the same time, there is also another regional initiative involving some East Asian countries together with countries across the Pacific, called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement which is led by the United States.

    These two proposals are expected to advance the regional trade architecture through the consolidation of various existing agreements among countries in the region. Many questions, however, have been raised in the wake of these recent initiatives: What drives countries in the region to pursue greater integration? How effective are current proposals to tackle the various issues related to international trade and investment? How do those initiatives affect each other and what is the likelihood that they would be compatible with each other? What are some possible directions for these mega-integrations?

    This chapter is an attempt to address these questions. It draws upon lessons from the current state of the RCEP negotiations, taking into account other initiatives in the region such as the TPP and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). In order to put these discussions into context, we will briefly take a look at the evolution of economic integration in the region and discuss the drivers behind its current progress. We will then talk about challenges surrounding region-wide integration, as well as some suggestions to move the process forward.

    A GLANCE AT THE INTEGRATION PROCESS IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

    Formal regional integration, in the form of trade agreements, is relatively new among East Asian countries. A similar situation can also be observed, to some extent, across the Pacific Ocean. The ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Free Trade Area (AFTA) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) were the only visible trade arrangements in the region in the early 1990s.

  • Foreword

  • Robert H. Taylor
  • Book:
    Can Myanmar's NLD Government Undo the Gordian Knot of Federalism and Ethnicity?
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    08 April 2016, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

  • Can Myanmar's NLD Government Undo the Gordian Knot of Federalism and Ethnicity?

  • Robert H. Taylor
  • Book:
    Can Myanmar's NLD Government Undo the Gordian Knot of Federalism and Ethnicity?
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    08 April 2016, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • • Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has said that peace is the first priority of the National League for Democracy (NLD) when it comes to power in April 2016. Both her remarks at the Union Peace Conference in January and the NLD election manifesto point to ethnicity and federalism being linked.

  • • This is a position similar to that taken by the outgoing Thein Sein government and the army. Now that the word “federalism” is accepted as useful in the debate over how to establish an end to Myanmar's persistent civil wars with ethnically designated armed groups, it was hoped that some meeting of minds might take place.

  • • But as revealed at the Union Peace Conference, that is yet to have happened. Rather, spokespersons for the ethnic armed groups continue to speak the language of ethnic rights and a federal army, while the government talks about reaching material and administrative agreements and the army insists that there can only be one army. These debates echo the past, going back to the formation of Myanmar in the late 1940s.

  • • In order to break the apparently endless debate about federalism, ethnicity, states and divisions in the Union of Myanmar, perhaps a new approach might be considered — taking federalism a step further to the seventy-four district levels of administration. As the ethnically designated armed groups operate in relatively small and localized areas, a solution that squares the circle between ethnicity and territory might have appeal.

  • Can Myanmar's NLD Government Undo the Gordian Knot of Federalism and Ethnicity?

  • Robert H. Taylor
  • Book:
    Can Myanmar's NLD Government Undo the Gordian Knot of Federalism and Ethnicity?
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    08 April 2016, pp 1-30

  • Summary

    Introduction

    Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the victorious National League for Democracy (NLD) in the November 2015 general elections in Myanmar, announced in her Independence Day address, her first major post-election speech, that “the peace process is the first thing the new government will work on” when it takes office on 1 April 2016. She added, “We can do nothing without peace in our country.”

    The NLD leader, having not attended the ceremonial signing of a “Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement” between the government of President Thein Sein, the Myanmar army, and eight ethnically designated armed insurgent groups in October, rather disparaged the Union Peace Conference convened on 12 January, saying in an interview two days into the conference that it was merely a meeting acknowledging the ceasefire agreement, and that the real peace conference would be convened by the next government.3 However, having initially said she would not attend the Peace Conference, she did, showing up and becoming one of the opening ceremony speakers, which prompted President Thein Sein to depart after making his initial remarks.4 The five-day conference was agreed upon at the signing of the ceasefire agreement as the first step in a long political dialogue to resolve the country's persistent civil war. The fact that only a minority of Myanmar's myriad ethnically designated armed groups signed the ceasefire agreement and attended the Union Peace Conference underscored the huge challenge the new government faces in trying to achieve an enduring cessation of armed conflict in Myanmar.

    In her remarks at the Peace Conference, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is reported to have said the following:

    Now is the time we are poised to make an effort to bring about eternal peace based on the authority granted by the citizens, including ethnic minorities, to the NLD.

    Negotiations will bring about fruitful results, and the peace dream the ethnic minority groups long for will come true. Our country gained the independence through the united efforts of all ethnic groups. We reached the destination we longed for. The participation of all ethnic communities proved an effective symbol. Inclusiveness of ethnicities is of great importance in reaching our destination.

  • 6 - Electricity and the Environment

  • Maxensius Tri Sambodo
  • Book:
    From Darkness to Light
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2016
    Print publication:
    28 March 2016, pp 112-135

  • Summary

    TRAPPED CARBON IN THE POWER SECTOR

    The electricity sector is not only important for economic development but it also has a strong impact on the environment. One of the major contributors of carbon dioxide emissions comes from the energy sector, particularly from electricity generation. According to IEA (2011), direct carbon dioxide emissions from fossil-fired power generation amounted to 27 Percent of the global greenhouse gas emissions in 2005. Furthermore, about 73 Percent of the total greenhouse gas emissions from power generation in 2007 originated from coal-fired power generation. Almost half of the 2020 energy-related carbon dioxide emissions are expected to be emitted by the major emerging economies, where the power sector and industries play an even larger role (IEA 2009).

    As can be seen in Table 6.1, in 2010, the carbon dioxide emissions in Indonesia amounted to 434 million tons (about 5 Percent and 22 Percent of the total carbon dioxide emissions from China and India respectively). Although Indonesia was higher than India in terms of carbon dioxide emissions per capita, Indonesia had a lower ratio intensity for carbon dioxide emissions with respect to GDP and energy use compared to China and India. This indicates that Indonesia's economy is less carbon intensive compared to China and India. For a single unit of energy use, Indonesia also emitted less carbon dioxide than the other two countries. However, it does not imply that Indonesia has the “right” to emit more carbon dioxide from energy production. In fact, the Indonesian energy sector needs to emit less carbon dioxide in the future.

    In 2011, the total carbon dioxide emissions in Indonesia amounted to approximately 447.18 MtCO2 and excluding LUCF (Forestry and Land Use Changes), the energy sector contributed 435 MtCO2 of that amount. Most of the carbon dioxide emissions in the energy sector consisted of emissions from the electricity generation, manufacturing and transportation sectors (see Figure 6.1). In Indonesia, electricity and heat made up the highest contributions to carbon dioxide emissions from the energy sector; their proportions of the total will increase in the future if the planned energy systems continue to be dependent on carbon intensive sources such as steam coal.

Page 217 of 760