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15200 results in ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Page 221 of 760

  • Laos in 2015: A Pivotal Year in Moving Towards the AEC

  • from LAOS
  • Edited by Malcolm Cook, Daljit Singh
  • Book:
    Southeast Asian Affairs 2016
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    19 May 2017
    Print publication:
    10 March 2016, pp 169-180

  • Summary

    The year 2015 was an intriguing one for Laos. It was a year of taking stock of the country's socio-economic and political developments following Laos’ reform efforts and economic integration. Laos’ accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2013 was the latest in a series of steps towards such integration, and the next milestone is joining the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in January 2016. The AEC presents ample opportunities for Laos, yet the accompanying challenges are not to be underestimated. Laos will also assume ASEAN chairmanship in 2016, a role that is expected to be positive for the country's international reputation and its commitment to further assimilate into the region, although the real impact will only be evident in the medium to longer term.

    The year 2015 was also a time for reflection as Laos observed its fortieth year of state building since its independence in 1975. Even though Laos has sustained relatively high economic growth, the country has faced challenges in managing its fiscal deficit amidst the slow recovery of the global economy. Its exports continue to be skewed towards resource-based products, and in the medium term exports and investment inflows to non-resource sectors are not expected to rise much due to supply-side constraints and a lack of private sector competitiveness. This is largely attributed to a shortage of skilled labour and the high costs of doing business. In terms of politics, Laos will see a power transition in 2016, but that is not expected to significantly change the governance landscape.

    As Laos is a small, rural, landlocked country surrounded by much larger ones, economic and development challenges and ambitions are the most important domestic factors shaping Laos’ future.

    Economy and Emerging Challenges

    The economic growth of Laos was moderate in 2015, with the gross domestic product (GDP) estimated to expand by 6.4 per cent according to the World Bank, and predicted to pick up to 7 per cent in 2016. However, the figures estimated by the Asian Development Bank are somewhat higher, at 7 per cent for 2015 and 7.2 per cent for 2016. These estimates are based on strong investment in the energy sector, particularly the authorization of one segment of the Hongsa lignite power plant, and the higher production output of copper and gold.

  • Japan's “Strategic Coordination” in 2015: ASEAN, Southeast Asia,and Abe's Diplomatic Agenda

  • from THE REGION
    • By Kei Koga, Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore
  • Edited by Malcolm Cook, Daljit Singh
  • Book:
    Southeast Asian Affairs 2016
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    19 May 2017
    Print publication:
    10 March 2016, pp 67-80

  • Summary

    Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has highlighted Japan's commitment to Southeast Asia since his inauguration for his second term as Prime Minister in December 2012. His first year in office, 2013, represented a search for new initiatives to determine his administration's strategic objectives towards Southeast Asia under the fortieth anniversary of the ASEAN–Japan Friendship and Cooperation rubric. Unlike many of his predecessors, Abe visited all ten Southeast Asian states, and this diplomatic approach culminated in the “Vision Statement on ASEAN–Japan Friendship and Cooperation: Shared Vision, Shared Identity, Shared Future” and the Joint Statement, “Hand in Hand, Facing Regional and Global Challenges”, which endorsed comprehensive cooperation between ASEAN and Japan.

    In 2014 Japan's efforts focused on the implementation of the 2013 Vision Statement, promoting cooperation on the four pillars — security, economics, sociocultural ties, and people-to-people interaction. In the face of increasing terrorist threats, Japan emphasized non-traditional security cooperation through the “ASEAN–Japan Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crime”.

    Abe also constantly reassured Southeast Asia about Japan's changing security policy. Indeed, Abe aimed to relax constitutional and political constraints on Japan's security policy under the “Proactive Contribution to Peace” policy — such as its constitutional reinterpretation to enable Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defence — and Japan began to have more domestic political room to strengthen security cooperation with Southeast Asia. At the same time, Japan attempted to reassure ASEAN member states that it would maintain the line of the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine, comprising three principles — never becoming a military power, forging ties with ASEAN based on “heart to heart” understanding, and cooperating with ASEAN member states as equal partners. In this context, Japan's policy towards Southeast Asia in 2015 was characterized by “strategic coordination”, which focused on policy implementation with several new diplomatic initiatives.

    ASEAN Policy

    The objective of strategic coordination is not only to continuously deepen Japan's comprehensive ties of friendship with Southeast Asian states and ASEAN, but also to shape China's behaviour in Southeast Asia and beyond through ASEANled institutions and Japan's bilateral ties with individual Southeast Asian states.

  • Singapore in 2015: SG50

  • from SINGAPORE
    • By Norman Vasu, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Damien D. Cheong, Research Fellow and Coordinator of the Homeland Defence Programme in the same centre
  • Edited by Malcolm Cook, Daljit Singh
  • Book:
    Southeast Asian Affairs 2016
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    19 May 2017
    Print publication:
    10 March 2016, pp 295-314

  • Summary

    How should a review of Singapore in 2015 be best framed? By an acronym and a number: SG50. This was the year Singapore celebrated its fiftieth year of independence, with the ubiquitous SG50 logo embossed on and attached to almost anything. Much like an individual turning middle-aged, the year was one where the nation experienced loss, made decisions about its future, reflected on and celebrated its past with pride, and tried to become comfortable with its own skin.

    Domestic Political Developments

    National Loss: The Passing of Lee Kuan Yew

    Loss in 2015 for the nation came in the form of the death of former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew on 23 March at the age of ninety-one — just under five months before the city-state was to celebrate fifty years of independence. Lee passed away after being hospitalized for severe pneumonia on 5 February. Lee's elder son, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, declared a week-long period of national mourning and all national flags were flown at half mast during that period. After a private wake, his body was moved to the Parliament House of Singapore on 25 March where he lay in state for four days before his cremation on 29 March.

    Lee's death has undoubtedly closed a chapter in Singapore's history, as he is widely regarded as the key founding father of modern Singapore. Co-founder of the People's Action Party (PAP), the political party that has governed Singapore uninterrupted since home rule in 1959, Lee was Singapore's first and longest-serving Prime Minister. He oversaw the rapid development of the nation in one generation from underdeveloped to developed status. In a televised address to the nation on the day of his father's death, Prime Minister Lee maintained “[t]o many Singaporeans, and indeed others too, Lee Kuan Yew was Singapore”. The immense measure of the man and the intimacy of the ties between him and the nation may be found in the tributes paid from abroad, the number of people who queued for hours to pay their respects when he lay in state and the numbers who lined the roads to see the cortege travel to the funeral service and the crematorium.

  • Introduction

  • Edited by Malcolm Cook, Daljit Singh
  • Book:
    Southeast Asian Affairs 2016
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    19 May 2017
    Print publication:
    10 March 2016, pp ix-xviii

  • Summary

    The twenty-three chapters in Southeast Asian Affairs 2016 address a vast range of pressures and opportunities for the peoples of the region, from the political impact of spreading social media, to economic and political models showing signs of atrophy, to the large and turbulent regional ripples of economic transformations and policy adjustments around the world. States of Southeast Asia in 2015 faced bottom-up pressures for political and economic change, a tough global economic environment, and more major-power involvement, and even contestation, in the region. Times were very interesting. All of these pressures are likely to persist and potentially intensify in 2016 and beyond. Political and policy changes to address these structural continuities will be paramount.

    External Forces

    Global and wider regional forces — most, negative — had greater impact in Southeast Asia in 2015. Cassey Lee's regional economic outlook chapter analyses how the fall in commodity prices, slowing growth in China and tightening U.S. monetary policy affected Southeast Asian economies. None were spared, but the effects were very varied. Brunei was the hardest hit and remained in recession given its undiversified economy heavily dependent on oil export revenue. The most open economies in the region as measured by trade flows — Singapore and Malaysia — also suffered from these external headwinds. The headwinds are expected to continue throughout 2016, suggesting politically difficult reforms will be necessary across the region to maintain growth and development.

    Carlyle Thayer's regional security outlook chapter focuses on challenges to ASEAN's goals of regional autonomy, centrality and community building. China's rapid construction of artificial islands on seven disputed land features in the South China Sea stoked the strongest ASEAN language on the disputes and more intense U.S.–China rivalry. Movement on the long-discussed ASEAN–China Code of Conduct in the South China Sea progressed at a much slower pace. In 2015 the threat of regional spillover from the Islamic State's rise in Syria and Iraq and the growing number of Southeast Asians joining those conflicts and returning home became imminent and then, in January 2016 in Jakarta, realized.

    The Major Powers

    While the domestic political developments of Southeast Asian countries in 2015 strongly reflected the diversity and fluidity of the region as a whole, the strategic policy settings with relation to Southeast Asia of the four most important extraregional major powers — the United States, China, Japan and India — had two powerful commonalities.

  • India's Act East Policy and Implications for Southeast Asia

  • from THE REGION
  • Edited by Malcolm Cook, Daljit Singh
  • Book:
    Southeast Asian Affairs 2016
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    19 May 2017
    Print publication:
    10 March 2016, pp 81-92

  • Summary

    The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the upgrading of India's erstwhile “Look East Policy” (LEP) to a more action-oriented “Act East” strategy at the India–ASEAN summit in Myanmar in November 2014. Since then, much debate and discussion has taken place on the nature and content of the strategy. A large part of the debate has been speculative, since India is yet to come out with an official vision statement for it. However, various pronouncements by India, as well as the shifting pattern of its engagement with countries to its East, are beginning to throw greater light on the strategy. This chapter discusses the features of the strategy as discernible till now and emphasizes its geographic scope and strategic depth. It discusses the specific relevance and implications of the Act East strategy for Southeast Asia. While India's engagement with ASEAN is likely to become more comprehensive and strategic over time, the region would need to be prepared for the implications of India playing a more active role in regional affairs.

    Act East: What it Means

    One of the noticeable aspects of the Act East strategy has been the lack of any specific articulation about it from the Indian establishment. This could well be due to the strategy being an evolving one. Apart from its own evolution through the Indian strategic prism, Act East, clearly, is trying to take note of the rapid and complex developments in the region, particularly changes in the economic and security dynamics.

    An analytical understanding of Act East, since its announcement a year ago, has been largely gleaned from a number of official statements emphasizing India's eagerness to play a proactive role to its East. Most of these statements are attributable to Prime Minister Modi, who has contextually alluded to Act East on several occasions. As mentioned earlier, the first of these was at the ASEAN Summit in November 2014 in Myanmar, when he announced the upgrading of the LEP to the action-oriented Act East policy. He mentioned Act East again during his visit to South Korea in May 2014, emphasizing the country's importance as a partner in the policy. Soon after, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj underlined India's efforts to engage more deeply with Southeast Asia through the Act East policy and described Thailand as a significant partner in this respect during her visit to Bangkok in June 2015.

  • Thailand in 2015: The Waiting Game

  • from THAILAND
  • Edited by Malcolm Cook, Daljit Singh
  • Book:
    Southeast Asian Affairs 2016
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    19 May 2017
    Print publication:
    10 March 2016, pp 317-330

  • Summary

    In Thailand, 2015 was a tough year for the impatient. Politics and economic development came to a near standstill in the expectation of the imminent death of King Bhumibol. Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-o-cha and his men want to be in charge when the life of the world's richest and longest-reigning monarch comes to an end. But the King kept breathing on the sixteenth floor of Siriraj Hospital on the banks of the ever-winding Chao Phraya River, while unaccountable elites positioned themselves for the post-Bhumibol era. The generals continued to play the waiting game and held the country hostage. A process to write a new constitution, the twentieth since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932, was exposed as a sham when an admittedly flawed draft was rejected, only to set in motion another cycle of consultations, writing and, presumably, rejection to keep the junta in power indefinitely.

    Meanwhile, the features of the next reign began to take shape. As Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn reached for the crown, some of his former confidants dropped like flies, allegedly aided by Thailand's generals. If the purge and death of would-be allies is anything to go by, the rule of Rama X will be marked by insecurity and instability. King Bhumibol had allowed people to use his royal charisma to legitimize their own agendas as long as these did not threaten the monarchy's interests and exalted position. While Thais were “working towards the monarchy” in that way, the stability of the crown seemed fairly secure. The recent alleged murders of individuals who attached themselves to the Crown Prince, such as Major General Phisitsak Seniwong Na Ayutthaya, the Prince's main bodyguard, however, intensified fears that anyone who got close to Vajiralongkorn would get burned like Icarus, who sought proximity to the sun, only to fall to his death. Hence, the generals might find it difficult to keep a lid on the country's boiling pot.

    But even without a vengeful royal hothead, the country's simmering tensions brought about by grave structural changes in the social makeup of Thailand over the past decades are bound to transform the country sooner or later. The suppression of democracy that continued in 2015 with the arrests of academics, students, journalists and critics of the junta and the monarchy has to be seen in this light.

  • Middle Eastern Influences on Islamist Organizations in Malaysia: The Cases of ISMA, IRF and HTM

  • Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Che Hamdan Che Mohd Razali
  • Book:
    Middle Eastern Influences on Islamist Organizations in Malaysia
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    29 February 2016, pp 1-28

  • Summary

    Introduction

    Islamist activism in the politics of the Malayan peninsula began during the early post-Second World War years, and was dominated until the early 1970s by the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP). PMIP was the chosen outfit for political Islamists previously associated with such fiercely anti-colonial movements as the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP, or Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya), Party of Muslims (Hizbul Muslimin [HM]) and Defenders of the Motherland (Pembela Tanahair [PETA]) (Ahmad Fauzi 2007a, pp. 387–91; Liow 2009, p. 21). By the time the National Front (Barisan Nasional [BN]) was founded in 1974 to succeed the Alliance (Perikatan) coalition, PMIP had morphed into the Islamic Party of Malaysia (Parti Islam SeMalaysia [PAS]), which is still a major actor in Malaysia's Islamist scene today.

    Following the May 1969 racial troubles that engulfed the capital city of Kuala Lumpur, the Malaysian state embarked on a series of reconstruction policies, chief of which was the New Economic Policy (NEP, 1971–90). The affirmative action policies of the NEP laid the first seeds of a new wave of Islamic revival in Malaysia, as state-provided educational opportunities exposed new cohorts of Malay-Muslim youths to political socialization in university campuses both at home and abroad. A significant portion of these new experiences, taking place far away from their traditional village ambience, took on religious colouring as they mixed with international Muslim students and academics through whom they were introduced to the writings of Islamic resurgence ideologues such as Hassan al-Banna (1906–49), Sayyid Qutb (1906–66), Abul A'la Maududi (1903–79), Fathi Yakan (1933–2009), Sa'id Hawwa (1935–89), Said Ramadan (1926–95), Abdul Karim Zaidan (1917–2014), Said Ramadan al-Bouti (1929–2013) and Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1926–). Except for Maududi who was Indo-Pakistani, all the other major influences on post-1969 Islamic revivalist thought in Malaysia were Middle Eastern thinkers, whose original works were written in Arabic. This meant that their books and treatises reached their Malaysian audience mainly through translations, either into Malay or English. Apart from the Middle Eastern figures, two other scholars whose writings made a discursive impact on Malaysia's Islamist scene, although to a lesser extent than the others listed earlier, were the Indian Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi (1914–99), and Said Nursi (1877–1960), a Turk of Kurdish descent (Kamal Hassan 2003, pp. 430–40; Lemiere 2009, pp. 66–67, 71, 78, 83; Zulkifli Hassan 2013).

  • Middle Eastern Influences on Islamist Organizations in Malaysia: The Cases of ISMA, IRF and HTM

  • Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Che Hamdan Che Mohd Razali
  • Book:
    Middle Eastern Influences on Islamist Organizations in Malaysia
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    29 February 2016, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • • Interaction between Muslims in Malaysia and their Middle Eastern brethren has consistently been a source of apprehension to the powers-that-be from colonial times till today. Such interaction was historically made possible by the haj pilgrimage, inter-continental sufi networks, returning Malay-Muslim students from the Middle East and indigenized Arab communities who maintain links with their motherland.

  • • Islamist activism in Malaysia has indeed undergone changes, and these did indeed arise from contemporary Middle Eastern influences. The religious thought, practices and lifestyles of Muslims in Malaysia have traditionally been regarded as moderate. Of particular importance in the present context is the transmission of puritanical interpretations of Islam.

  • • Furthermore, the Malaysian version of Islamist puritanism has always been pragmatic rather than dogmatic, moderated by its multi-cultural and multi-religious setting. But newer strands of Islamism influenced by developments in the Middle East have alarmed authorities.

  • • The impact of this Middle East-driven wave of Islamism is not restricted to Malaysian chapters of transnational extremist groups such as the Islamic State (IS) and Al Qaeda. However, in Malaysia, the influence is more varied in its organizational impact. Newly formed Muslim organizations such as Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia (ISMA, or Muslim Solidarity Front), the Islamic Renaissance Front IRF) and Hizb at-Tahrir Malaysia (HTM) are all found to have maintained strong Middle Eastern links, both at the discursive or organizational levels.

  • • All three movements in question have so far not displayed violent tendencies although their versions of Islamism exhibit varying degrees of ideological absolutism, distinguishing them markedly from the wave of Islamism that engulfed Malaysia in the 1980s.

  • Foreword

  • Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Che Hamdan Che Mohd Razali
  • Book:
    Middle Eastern Influences on Islamist Organizations in Malaysia
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    29 February 2016, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

  • Making Sense of the Election Results in Myanmar's Rakhine and Shan States

  • Su-Ann Oh
  • Book:
    Making Sense of the Election Results in Myanmar's Rakhine and Shan States
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    04 February 2016, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • • This paper examines why ethnic parties did well in Rakhine and Shan States despite the fact that the National League for Democracy (NLD) was given a manifest mandate by the Myanmar electorate to represent its interests nationwide.

  • • In Rakhine State, the electorate chose the Arakan National Party (ANP) over the other parties because of the fear that their cultural identity and right to govern themselves are threatened by Bamar political and cultural hegemony and Muslim/South Asian encroachment from the western border. Moreover, they believe that the ANP are more likely than the NLD or the USDP to look out for their economic and social interests. Most importantly, the inter-religious violence in 2012 afforded Rakhine nationalist politicians the opportunity to present themselves as the legitimate representatives of the Buddhist Rakhine population.

  • • The diversity of political representation (ethnic and otherwise) in the Shan State election results needs to be understood in the light of subnational administrative systems and competing regulatory authorities (many of which are not sanctioned by law or by the Constitution). The former includes Shan State and self-administered areas while the latter is composed of non-state armed groups and militias.

  • • In Shan State, excluding the self-administered areas, the vote was split between the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) and the NLD. This was the only state/region where the USDP won the most number of seats.

  • • Given the lack of available data, the best explanation that can be offered at present is that the combination of non-state armed ethnic group fighting, recent ceasefire agreements, and economic development of places such as the self-administered areas and urban centres influenced Shan State voters to choose the USDP.

  • • The results of the election for ethnic affairs ministers approximate those of the nationwide results. Like the national and regional election results, the Rakhine as well as ethnic groups in Shan State voted for candidates from ethnic parties, indicating that the agenda of these ethnic parties is particularly important for those populations.

  • • The nature of electoral politics in Myanmar is shaped by ethnic conflict, armed and otherwise. This has a bearing on the peace process, particularly since the plan for peace involves armed groups joining the political process as political parties and winning seats in elections to govern the administrative structure set out by the 2008 Constitution.

  • Foreword

  • Su-Ann Oh
  • Book:
    Making Sense of the Election Results in Myanmar's Rakhine and Shan States
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    04 February 2016, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

  • Making Sense of the Election Results in Myanmar's Rakhine and Shan States

  • Su-Ann Oh
  • Book:
    Making Sense of the Election Results in Myanmar's Rakhine and Shan States
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    04 February 2016, pp 1-28

  • Summary

    Introduction

    The general election held on 8 November 2015 saw the National League for Democracy (NLD), headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, sweeping the board and taking 77 per cent of all available seats. Trailing behind in second place, the military-created Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won 10.2 per cent of the seats available. In third and fourth place were two ethnic parties, the Arakan National Party (ANP) with 3.9 per cent of the total seats available and the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) with 3.5 per cent (see Table 1). Out of the twenty-three parties that won seats, seventeen were ethnic political parties (parties in bold in Table 1) but they only gleaned 12 per cent of the available seats.

    Given that Myanmar's citizens overwhelmingly chose the NLD rather than ethnic parties to represent their interests in both the central and regional parliaments, this paper looks specifically at why the ethnic parties did well in Rakhine and Shan States.2 A closer study of the results shows that:

  • • Both the ANP and the SNLD were able to win substantially more seats in the national assembly than other ethnic parties (see Table 1).

  • • The Rakhine and Shan State assemblies were the only ones where the NLD did not dominate (see Tables 2 and 3).

  • • Only one ethnic party — the ANP — was voted in from Rakhine State and it won the most number of seats in the State parliament (see Table 2) whereas many different parties (ethnic and otherwise) secured seats in the Shan State regional election, with the USDP, the SNLD and the NLD winning the most seats (see Table 3).

  • • Shan State is the only region where the USDP won the most number of seats (see Table 3).

  • • The results of the election for ethnic affairs ministers mirror those of the nationwide results (see Table 6).

    • These results are considered in the light of ethnic politics, administrative systems and governance actors in these two states, taking into account recent inter-religious violence in Rakhine State, the nationwide ceasefire accord and the government's peace negotiations with non-state armed groups.

  • 17 - Is APEC's Relevance Fading?

  • from II - BEYOND THE ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
  • Sanchita Basu Das
  • Book:
    The ASEAN Economic Community and Beyond
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    19 May 2017
    Print publication:
    19 November 2015, pp 176-184

  • Summary

    APEC faces both internal and external challenges to its relevance in the Asia-Pacific regional architecture. Its internal challenges arise from conditions such as slow progress in regional integration; diverse membership; soft institutional structure and lack of focused and concrete agendas. Externally, it faces competition from other vehicles for regional economic cooperation like the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the ASEAN+1 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Since APEC and TPP are both trans-pacific arrangements, it is important to consider whether or not TPP is a consequence of APEC's limited integration progress. TPP certainly exhibits almost the reverse of APEC's weaknesses. However, APEC's relevance is not expected to fade. There are several political economy reasons for this. APEC has several achievements such as the lowering of tariff in multiple sectors and its work on trade and investment facilitation. While TPP can address the next generation of trade issues, APEC will continue with its more accommodating approach of trade and investment liberalization. From the United States’ perspective, APEC will continue to be a key economic forum where the leaders of the United States and China can meet on an annual basis. What APEC needs to address are the challenges arising out of diverse membership. It has to minimize conflicts among member economies, work on its soft institutional structure, and redefine its relevance for the future regional economic architecture. It should identify its “niche” and continue with business, trade and investment facilitation to generate concrete “deliverables”.

    INTRODUCTION

    The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has been a useful platform for bilateral and multilateral meetings of regional leaders since 1989. But with a growing number of regional integration measures in the Asia-Pacific like the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the ASEAN+1 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), there are concerns about APEC's relevance as a way towards deeper economic integration in the region. This is more so, as with developments in TPP, it is increasingly felt that the TPP has replaced the APEC as a trans-Pacific arrangements, and the former is a consequence of latter's limited progress in integration.

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