Southeast Asia lies at the junction of South Asia and East Asia, and is traditionally seen by the United States, China, Japan, India, and other big powers as their respective spheres of influence. China has been a keen player in this region for historical reasons in view of the existence of a large diaspora, energy resource supply, trade and investment linkages and protection of its maritime interests. Energy resource cooperation is an important part of China–ASEAN relations. It has been driven under the background of China's energy diversification strategy, the development of China–ASEAN FTA (Free Trade Agreement) and regional economic integration. As China expanded its foreign direct investment (FDI) to Southeast Asia after the global financial crisis in 2008, cooperation in this field developed to a new level, extending from energy trade to energy resource exploration and related infrastructure-building.

CHINA'S ENERGY DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY

China imports much of its oil from the Persian Gulf region through the Strait of Hormuz, where security is dependent on the U.S. Navy. The most prominent issues in the Middle East include the threat posed by Iran's nuclear programme, the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as a destabilizing force in Syria and Iraq, continued instability in North Africa, and the acceleration of Israeli–Palestinian conflicts. These are conflicts involving a great percentage of the world's major energy suppliers. Beijing is concerned about the implications of a potential reduction of U.S. presence in this region. Therefore Chinese leaders are facing questions about what they can and should do to protect the security of energy supply.

China's Approaches to Energy Resource Security

“Mercantilist” or “Liberalist” Approaches?

In a globalized economy, securing the supply of energy resources is a pressing issue for many states. All countries rely on energy to power their electricity and transportation systems, and the emerging economies require mineral resources for their rising industrial sectors. But energy resource production and consumption centres are often located in different national spaces. For emerging economies like China and India that lack local reserves of energy resources, this poses a particular challenge for their energy security. The need to import natural resources exposes these economies to high levels of resource insecurity, and many governments adopt energy resource security strategies to mitigate these risks.

Although Myanmar is a natural resource-rich country, from a global perspective, it does not have particularly notable hydrocarbon reserves. For China, however, from a regional perspective, Myanmar's gas reserves and strategic position are significant in terms of energy security and regional cooperation. However, although China has planned to stake a longterm strategic energy investment in Myanmar and its capital has largely poured into resources and energy-related infrastructural sectors, some factors are pushing the two countries’ energy ties toward competition and conflicts. Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Myanmar no doubt ties the two countries closer together, but also reminds politicians of “new colonialism”, creating concerns and resource nationalism in the local society. Moreover, as Myanmar opens up, the entry or resurgence of more global players like Japan and India provides Myanmar with more options, facilitating its attempts at loosing itself from the Chinese grip. Hence, the questions that require examination are as follows: What direction is the China–Myanmar energy tie going in, cooperation or conflict? How will China adjust its approaches and better embrace the new environment and dynamic changes in the country?

GLOBAL ENERGY RESOURCE NATIONALISM

Over the past two decades, there has been a growing recognition that natural resources play an important and complex role in international and regional peace and security. Natural resources can be a source of cooperation and stability, it can as well be a source of hostility or grievances, which may be related to the loss of sovereignty, the inequitable distribution of benefits from natural resources, the lack of opportunities for local people, or environmental and social harm caused by unsustainable extraction of resources. While such hostility or grievances may not be the sole causes of conflicts, they may lead to the rise of resource nationalism which has real potential to spark armed conflicts especially in disputed areas.

The term “resource nationalism” is often defined as a national government's assertion of ownership rights over oil and natural resource reserves within their territorial boundaries, usually in ways that contradict liberal paradigms for encouraging foreign investment, and work against the international energy companies.

China and most ASEAN countries are characterized by high economic growth and rapid increase in energy resource consumption. Although these countries are trying hard to find appropriate energy alternatives, increase energy efficiency, and diversify energy resources, they are becoming increasingly dependent on imported oil and gas, and the unstable Middle East and Africa are set to remain their predominant sources of oil and gas. Thus high dependence on fossil fuels poses several security concerns and challenges, including a widening gap between supply and demand, transportation of oil and gas resources on vulnerable sea routes, and energy-related CO2 emissions. This chapter mainly analyses these three dimensions in the context of regional and global perspectives.

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ENERGY DEMAND

Energy Demand Drivers

The demand for energy resources in Asia is predominately driven by two factors. The first is “industrial-led” demand related to economic growth, a structural shift from non-mechanized forms of manufacturing and production to more energy-intensive ones, especially for commodities such as iron and steel, cement and glass, paper and pulp, basic chemicals, and non-ferrous metals. The second is “consumption-led” demand as population grows and living standard rises (urbanization), bringing more energy-intensive lifestyles that revolve around automobiles, air conditioning, and disposable goods.

Economic Growth

Over the past decades, China and ASEAN have undergone a profound economic and social transformation. This has largely been attributed to their openness to international trade and foreign investment. Although this region has been affected by the recent global financial crisis, it is assumed that if energy supplies are abundant enough, this region, especially some of its emerging economies, will continue to enjoy economic growth and progress over the long term. China and Vietnam are expected to continue to grow faster than other economies in the region, followed by Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. China now, as the world's second largest economy, will gradually shift from an investment/exportoriented economy to an import/consumption-oriented economy over the medium to long term and see a gradual productive population fall amid the ageing of its population.

Indonesia is another case example of China's energy relations with ASEAN countries. As the biggest country in Southeast Asia, Indonesia illustrates the diplomatic complexities in its relations with China. Although China has planned to stake a long-term strategic energy investment in the country, the fact that its major trading partner is also seem as a security uncertainty in the region has complicated the resource policies in Indonesia and encouraged domestic resource nationalism. Rising fears that the increasing unbalanced trade relations might affect its national economic security have stirred debates over how Indonesian mineral industries could remain competitive as the country continues its trade ties with Beijing. For the concern of being pulled into China's orbit in a dependent relationship based on supplying raw materials, Jakarta implemented a new law banning the export of unprocessed ore in January 2014. Although the aim is to increase the value added from mineral resources, the new regulations will certainly affect Sino–Indonesian energy cooperation.

OVERVIEW OF ENERGY SECTORS IN INDONESIA

Indonesia is rich in minerals and is in the top ten countries in the world for proven reserves of coal, copper, nickel, tin, bauxite, and coal. Indonesia produces more than 15 per cent of the global nickel supply and 3 per cent of the global copper supply, and it is the world's largest exporter of thermal coal. The total mineral export value more than tripled from US$3 billion to US$11.2 billion in 2013, driven by historically high commodity prices and increasing production. By value, approximately 40 per cent of total mineral export is currently processed; all tin exports are processed, while most copper, nickel, and bauxite exports are unprocessed.

Energy and mineral resources are important sectors in Indonesia's economy. The role of energy and mineral resources to the economy can be observed by three indicators such as its share to the gross domestic product (GDP) and its contribution to economic growth, export, and state revenue. The energy sector has become a buffer of national export and it has made significant contributions to the state revenue, both from tax and non-tax revenue. As seen from Table 5.1, the share of the three main energy sectors in GDP was about 11.5 per cent between 2010 and 2014, and crude oil, gas, and geothermal has the highest share.

POLITICS IN MALAYA IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-WAR PERIOD

A few weeks after my return from Australia, I already had the feel of politics in Malaya. My analysis of the events, occurring at that time was as follows: there was an awakening among countries under colonial rule after the Second World War. Nationalism, which was suppressed by the colonial powers before World War II, seized the opportunity created by the havoc and dismay of war to rear its head. It did so in Southeast Asia and its manifestations were so clear that those who were keen observers could not fail to see them. Malaya was heading for independence, of this I was certain. What I was not certain of was how long it would be before she finally achieved it. As I saw it, the pace would be dictated by the national leaders while the British would try their best to thwart them.

There was not a doubt that the man of the moment then was Dato Onn. He had mobilized Malay nationalism and directed it against the British. The question was how far he was prepared to go against the British — would he be prepared to lead the country to full independence or would he stop once Malay rights were restored? As a Malay leader, he was brilliant, and would have been eminently successful if the Malays formed an absolute majority in this country. He was not, however, big enough to face the realities of Malayan politics. Although towards the peak of his career he tried a Malayan solution rather than a Malay solution to the political situation in Malaya, he was not successful because he did not believe in what he was doing.

At this time, there were about half a dozen returned students living in and near Johor Bahru, including myself. We called our group “The Malay Graduates’ Association”. We used to meet fairly regularly to discuss politics. I usually get inspiration and ideas during the course of discussion and it was during such an occasion that this thought passed through my mind: I felt that if intellectuals such as ourselves wanted to play a role in the movement for independence, we had to be active in the right way and not be passive.

Mohamed Tawfik bin Tun Dr Ismail faithfully donated his father's papers to the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in March 2005 after being convinced by his old friend, Ambassador Verghese Mathews, that they would be well taken care of there. The then-director of ISEAS, Mr K. Kesavapany, happily embraced the documents, and since then, two books have been published by the Institute, based on these papers.

Newly arrived at ISEAS, I was lucky enough to be chosen to write the biography of the man, based on these papers and a large number of interviews with people who had known him well. These included Singapore's first Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, and Malaysian billionaire, Robert Kuok. With the able assistance from Tawfik Ismail, the book was done within eighteen months.

The Reluctant Politician: Tun Dr Ismail and His Time (2006) became an instant bestseller when Malaysia's The New Straits Times immediately carried excerpts from it for seven days in a row. Singapore's The Straits Times followed suit soon after, disseminating sections from the book for five days. Malaysian bloggers began discussing the late Deputy Prime Minister's sense of duty and honour following a stimulating book launch on 22 March 2007 at Danga Bay in Johor Bahru. This launch was most ably organized by Karim Raslan Associates, with another former Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Musa Hitam, gracing the event as the keynote speaker.

WITH THE HELP OF REVIEWERS

What, for me, were very gratifying reviews and discussions appeared in most newspapers, online news outlets, and blog sites in Malaysia and Singapore in the following months. To give readers an idea of how the book was discussed, an academic review by Professor John Funston is included in this present volume, with his kind permission and that of the Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, in which it was published.

The Reluctant Politician went on to win in 2008 the Award of Excellence for Best Writing Published in Book Form on Any Aspect of Asia (non-fiction) at that year's Asian Publishing Convention. It was translated into Malay in 2007, and published as Bukan Kerana Pangkat: Tun Dr Ismail dan Masanya (SIRD and ISEAS). A Chinese version is expected to be ready by 2016.

For some of us in the delegation, this was our first trip to London. We arrived in October and were housed in St. James’ Court as guests of Her Majesty's Government. It always amuses me even now as I reminisce, that some people thought we were housed in St. James's Palace instead of a hotel where the British government usually place their overseas guests.

This was also my first trip to London. I had heard so much of London from Suleiman who spent no less than six years there. We lost no time in sampling London: its night life, its shopping centres and, above all, its girls. I always tell my friends that of all my trips abroad — I have travelled no less than six times around the world — I liked this first trip to London the best.

Our delegation was composed of men who got on well together both at official meetings and at social functions. As I said some of us were in London for the first time and were enjoying the big city as children would. The rest, who had been students there, like the Tunku and Razak, were kind enough to guide us throughout our stay.

From the time that we landed at London airport, it was obvious that our mission was going to be a success because a certain high official in the Colonial office told us that what we came for would be handed over to us on a gold platter. The Colonial secretary then was Mr Lennox Boyd (now Lord Boyd) and he and the Tunku hit it off well together.

The meeting was conducted in a typical fashion: there was a main meeting called the plenary meeting and in addition, there were the meetings of the various committees. I remember that in addition to attending the plenary meeting (which all members of the delegation attended), I attended meetings of the Finance Committee and the Civil Service Committee. The chairman of the Finance Committee was Sir Hilton Poynton and he was a hard nut to crack. At the Civil Service Committee, we succeeded in drafting a scheme of compensation for the expatriate civil servants in Malaya; the ease with which the Malayan Civil Service was transferred from the hands of the expatriates is a tribute to the soundness of the scheme.

I entered the medical college in Singapore ill-prepared for it. The only students who were prepared were from schools such as the Penang Free School, the St. John's and Victoria Institutions in Kuala Lumpur, and the Raffles Institution and Anglo-Chinese School of Singapore. These students were taught physics and chemistry in school, two subjects which were and still are essential for first year study in medicine. As for myself, when I first attended lectures in physics and chemistry, I did not even know what friction or oxygen meant. I was very frustrated and became even more so later on when I learnt that the annual examinations were held not only on a competitive basis, but also in such a way that only a certain number of students would be allowed to progress to the next stage. In addition to this restrictive practice on academic life, there were other restrictions which were peculiar only to centres of higher learning in the colonies. Students in medical school in Singapore were not treated as grown-ups but rather as schoolchildren. It was therefore not surprising that the professors adopted the attitude of schoolmasters towards their students who, in turn, were expected to behave like schoolchildren. An example was their having to ask the permission of the professor if they ever needed to perform a simple act. There was one amusing incident I can recall. It was my practice, whenever I could afford it, to go with a few friends to a cabaret where we danced with the hostesses by paying with coupons. Invariably, there was strong competition to dance with the currently popular hostesses. Clients were allowed to approach the hostesses only when the music began to play. Consequently, at the first sound of the band playing, there was a mad rush in the direction of the popular hostesses. One evening, I was in the midst of one of these rushes. To my surprise, I found myself standing directly in front of the most popular hostess. As I was dancing away I happened to look behind and saw a face red with anger. It was the face of one of my professors, who had expected me to step aside and give way to him to dance with the hostess.

Nation building is often assumed. Unless one happens to be intimately involved, the details are not obvious; certainly not to the man in the street, let alone to the young and far-removed generations. The rough-and-tumble of competing visions and political manoeuvrings are conducted mostly behind the scenes and away from the public eye. Much of this is not reported by the media or even recorded for posterity. Thus, nation building may seem mysterious to some and non-existent to many others.

It is only when one reads the writings of those in the thick of things that one begins to understand the dilemmas, complexities, and uncertainties. It is then that one starts to appreciate the dimensions of the problems and the qualities of the people involved. Intelligence, knowledge, and skill are commonly not enough to arrive at the desired outcomes. Values, beliefs, and principles are equally critical, as are the conviction and firmness in holding onto them.

If the nation-building process is not always apparent, their results most definitely are. The difference between national unity and disunity, administrative effectiveness and dysfunction, and prosperity and poverty are not so much driven by policy pronouncements as the strength of the consensus that led them to be crafted in the first place. Force, coercion, and threats are rarely effective in sustained nation building.

In Drifting into Politics: The Unfinished Memoirs of Tun Dr Ismail Abdul Rahman, readers are taken on a first-hand journey into the behind-the-scenes tumult that preceded Independence, the formation of the Federation of Malaya and Malaysia, and post- May 1969. One sees how, at each stage, things could have so easily gone down a different path and gone badly wrong were it not for a handful of men who thought nothing of putting their careers, families, and ultimately even their lives on the line.

Tun Dr Ismail Abdul Rahman was such a man. He worked hard to achieve his personal ambition of being a medical doctor, but just when he was in a position to reap the rewards, he yielded to the call of a cause bigger than himself: first, independence, and then nation building. This may seem quaint and old-fashioned by the values of today but nothing could be further from the truth.

This book has been a Malaysian publishing sensation. It was an instant bestseller. In launching its Malay language edition, the Raja Muda of Perak, Raja Dr Nazrin Shah, was moved to tears by remembrance of how much Tun [Dr] Ismail had contributed to the nation, and how much more still needed to be done.

Tun Dr Ismail bin Dato Haji Abdul Rahman is a worthy subject for a political biography. After completing a medical degree in Australia, he became a Johor state councillor in 1948, joined the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) in 1951, and then in 1953 became party representative in the Federal Legislative Council with portfolio responsibilities for Lands, Mines, and Communications. He continued to hold ministerial responsibilities thereafter through to [his] retirement in 1967. At the same time, he helped shape the UMNO independence struggle, was returned in the first national election in 1955, then became the first ambassador to the United States and the United Nations for over twelve months after independence in 1957. Returning to Malaya, he took on the External Affairs portfolio; then in November 1960 he began a long association with security issues, first as minister of a new internal security ministry, then from February 1962, in home affairs. Forced to retire by ill health, he joined the boards of several multinationals, and gave speeches on the neutralization of Southeast Asia.

Recalled to government after the tragic racial riots of May 13, 1969, he held leading positions during emergency rule in both the National Operations Council and the Cabinet, and became Deputy Prime Minister in September 1970. Seemingly destined for Malaysia's highest political office, he was struck down by a heart attack in August 1973. It helps the biographer's cause that apart from being a statesman, Tun [Dr] Ismail led a colourful and adventurous life. He was born into politics as a member of the Johor aristocracy. His father was the state treasurer of Johor, then first president of the Malayan Senate, and three brothers all had important political roles. He was brought up in a multiracial environment, establishing close friendships with the Kuok and Puthucheary families, which lasted a lifetime. A grandmother was half-Chinese, and his family adopted nine Chinese girls (a common practice in well-off Malay families in those days).

The election of 1959 was a test of whether the Alliance would survive as a coalition party of the three races in the country — the Malays, Chinese and Indians. The MCA was, at that time, led by Dr Lim Chong Eu, a doctor from Penang, who had shown up to that time, a degree of brilliance in politics. Unfortunately, during his stewardship of the MCA, he tried to get away from the foundations which had hitherto held the Alliance together: citizenship for the Chinese in return for their acceptance of Malay as the national language. On the eve of the elections, he tried to demand more seats for the MCA rather than agree to the accepted method of allocation of seats used by the Alliance in previous elections. I tried my best to effectuate a compromise, but failed. As is often the case in times of crisis, the Tunku was firm and refused to yield: he said that he would not give in to threats and that he would stick by the old formula even if only a handful of MCA members remained in the party. The Alliance fought the elections without the support of Dr Lim and his followers and won by a handsome majority.

When the Alliance formed the Government after the 1959 elections, I was again allotted the Ministry of External Affairs. I pursued the same policy as before the elections with instructions to the Ministry and our missions abroad to consolidate rather than enlarge our activities.

After the election, Tunku went to England and later to Europe. In Europe, he had a long talk with Charles de Gaulle who was embarking on his own independent policy. De Gaulle convinced the Tunku that communist China should be recognized and admitted to the United Nations. Without consulting me and the Cabinet, Tunku, on his arrival in Kuala Lumpur, announced a sudden change in our policy towards communist China. At that time, we had refused to recognize either China or Russia. When the Cabinet met, I told them that I could not accept the new policy towards communist China and that I proposed to resign.

Shortly before Merdeka was declared, the Tunku spoke to me about going to Washington, D.C., as our country's first ambassador to the United States of America and at the same time, accredit myself to the United Nations as Malaya's first permanent representative. He said the choice was between Razak and me and honestly, he said, he could not spare Razak as he wanted him in Malaya to assist him. When I accepted the offer, relatives and friends speculated that I had been banished. This thought never occurred to me. It satisfied me to be offered a position which would enable our newly independent country to be known abroad.

As is usual with me, when I took on the assignment I threw my heart and soul into the job. It was a tough assignment and not made any easier by the lack of prior government preparation. In fact, I had to set up the two missions from scratch. The Tunku sent me about two weeks before independence to the United States to look for suitable buildings in Washington and New York for our mission. In doing so, I felt we must not seem bigger than we actually were. Our Embassy had to conform to our status noticeable without ostentation. I managed to buy three buildings in Washington for the Embassy and secured a lease for our office in New York. It was fortunate that I went as a Minister of the Cabinet, with authority to negotiate on the spot, otherwise the whole negotiation would not have been completed as quickly as it had been. (There was a sidelight to this episode: when I arrived back in Kuala Lumpur, I was told at the airport that the Cabinet had sanctioned the purchase of two, instead of three, buildings in Washington. As Cabinet was sitting in the afternoon of the day of my arrival, I attended the sitting and managed to persuade the Cabinet to sanction the purchase of the third building.)

Our journey to Washington was partly nerve-racking, partly humorous, but never dull. Our party consisted of four women, nine children and thirty-one pieces of luggage, and only two men: Ismail bin Mohamed Ali (now a Tan Sri and the Governor of Bank Negara) and myself.