This paper is an effort to assess ASEAN's efforts at reform and their implications. Can these measures achieve the goal of rejuvenating the organization or are they aspirations that transcend ASEAN's structural and political capabilities? If the latter point, then what are the long-term prospects for ASEAN's regional relevance? This paper draws on Mohammed Ayoob's (1998) theory of ‘subaltern realism’ to examine ASEAN's development as a regional actor. Subaltern realism argues that concerns with nation-building are the most significant factors shaping the foreign policies of developing world states. This theory offers some key insights into ASEAN's evolution and limitations.

Drawing on subaltern realism (SR), the paper examines the content of the ASEAN Charter and ASEAN's goal of creating an ‘ASEAN Community’. Subaltern realism suggests that both of these efforts are at odds with the political realities of most ASEAN members. The analysis bears this out. The ASEAN Charter embodies norms and values that, in practice, are in contradiction. It juxtaposes a traditional ASEAN emphasis on non-intervention with commitments to human rights and democracy. There is little reason to think that most ASEAN states will respect these commitments. Similarly, creating an ASEAN Community is, at best, a long-term project and one that faces many practical limitations. From this argument, it may seem that ASEAN's days as a functional institution are limited. However, such a conclusion is premature. The second prong of the argument shows that while the strength of ASEAN's identity may be at issue, the unique qualities of the East Asian political environment in which ASEAN operates allow it a prominent and meaningful role in the regional architecture. The rivalries between China, Japan and the United States (US) — and, potentially, India and Russia — create a political space within which ASEAN may exercise significant regional influence. Whatever emerges, ASEAN will follow an atypical path of institutional development.

THE LIMITS OF ASEAN: THE PROBLEMS OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

The 1990s were a pivotal decade for ASEAN. The cessation of the Cold War ended ASEAN's confrontation with Vietnam over the latter's 1978 invasion and subsequent occupation of Cambodia — an event that gave ASEAN focus for more than a decade. ASEAN needed new purposes.

It was Tuesday, 20 November 2007. As I stood together with my fellow ASEAN High Level Task Force (HLTF) colleagues in the imposing Banyan Ballroom of Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore to witness the signing ceremony of the ASEAN Charter, I could not help feeling a deep sense of satisfaction.

There was every justification to rejoice at a job well done. We have managed to complete our work within the stipulated 11-month time frame. We have proven what a dedicated collective effort could achieve within ASEAN by acting together.

The event itself was epochal for ASEAN. It marked a significant stage in the evolution of the 40-year-old regional organisation.

CRITICISMS OF THE CHARTER

Critics of ASEAN however, were quick to highlight the inadequacies of the Charter. It was belittled as merely a “compendium of ASEAN's existing principles and agreements already developed and in force in the last four decades”. It was criticised as not being “bold and visionary” enough and “a huge let-down”. The Charter, it was asserted; contained “no single big idea or single overarching policy to revitalise ASEAN's appeal to its 500 million people”. Particular criticisms were directed at the absence of specific provisions in the Charter on the mobilisation of resources including the setting up of a “Special Fund” to narrow the development gap within ASEAN as recommended by the Eminent Persons Group (EPG). The retention of the principle of consensus in decision-making and non-interference was also criticised as being not progressive or forward-looking. There was no provision for suspension or expulsion of members for non-compliance. Even ASEAN's attempt at defining and developing its own identity was ridiculed. The various “blemishes” it suffers would eventually relegate the Charter to nothing more than “a piece of paper”. In the wider context, comparisons were made between ASEAN and the EU, by looking at what had been achieved by ASEAN on the basis of the Charter, with the EU in Europe.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CHARTER

These criticisms need to be addressed. Some of the critics did not fully appreciate the complexity of ASEAN including how ASEAN works as an evolving regional organisation. ASEAN's institutional building initiatives and improvement of its organisational structure through the Charter process were not fully understood. They also failed to appreciate the totality of the whole exercise.

ASEAN PLUS THREE: ITS ANTECEDENTS AND PROSPECTS

In this section I examine the forces that have encouraged the development of the nascent ASEAN Plus Three grouping, which includes the much larger economies of Japan, China and South Korea in addition to the ten ASEAN members. The picture that emerges is complex, uncertain and rapidly evolving, but one tentative conclusion appears plausible: formerly quiescent strategic considerations, the absence of which allowed a greater degree of autonomy to develop within East Asia, have resurfaced and look set to play an important role in shaping and delimiting the possible trajectory of East Asian regionalism. A further caveat needs to be added to this claim: the impact of strategic considerations is itself potentially contradictory and will ultimately depend on a number of imponderable strategic developments — especially those revolving around American foreign policy — and the region's capacity to develop collective responses to them. At this stage, all we can do is spell out some of the potential contradictory dynamics that are likely to underpin future developments and link them to the region's specific historical circumstances.

Regional Factors

The most important antecedent of ASEAN Plus Three is, of course, ASEAN itself. Although ASEAN has provided an important foundation for the development of a wider East Asian grouping, there are some important differences in the formative dynamics of both groupings that merit brief emphasis. ASEAN, as noted earlier, was very much a product of the aftermath of the decolonization process, the Cold War, and the great power contestation that continues to grip the region. Regionalization — or the private sector-driven economic integration manifest in denser trade and investment flows — was not a decisive force in encouraging closer political co-operation in Southeast Asia. On the contrary, intra-regional trade is still modest between the non-complementary and essentially competitive economies in most of ASEAN. It is important to remember that ASEAN is composed of a number of small economies, the structure and development of which have been profoundly shaped by colonialism and latterly by the activities of more powerful economic and political forces from outside Southeast Asia. In other words, there have been integrative forces encouraging economic regionalization, but these have emanated from countries like Japan, which are outside the smaller ASEAN grouping and are an expression of wider East Asian forces.

INTRODUCTION

ASEAN has maintained close dialogue with Japan ever since 1973. At a special summit held in Tokyo in 2003 to celebrate the 30th anniversary, it was decided that the relationship between the two be elevated into a strategic partnership (Sudo 2015). It was the fast-changing environment in Asia, especially the rise of China, which necessitated the reappraisal of the regional structure and mode of interaction. Specifically, ASEAN-Japan relations have come to be seen in a common strategic perspective ever since the East Asia Summit (EAS) was established in 2005.

FORTIFYING THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

The year 2011 was regarded as a critical juncture by both Japan and ASEAN (Shiraishi 2014). To begin with, the Japan-ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting was held on 26 July 2011 in Bali, Indonesia. Both parties agreed with the planned new joint declaration and plan of action that was to be adopted at the next Japan-ASEAN summit meeting, which was to be held in November 2011. The ASEAN-Japan strategic partnership covers vast areas of cooperation. It is encapsulated in the ASEAN-Japan joint declaration for “enhancing strategic partnership for prospering together” and detailed further in the “Plan of Action 2011–2015”. Both were newly issued at the 14th ASEAN-Japan Summit in Bali. It is also built upon the progress of cooperative activities undertaken to date and in consideration of circumstances prevailing in the region since the preceding declaration was issued in 2003. At this summit, Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko stressed that Japan would provide 2 trillion yen worth of aid for development projects to strengthen regional integration, officials said. Noda also expressed his commitment to boosting cooperation with the region over maritime security and safety amid China's increasing assertiveness at sea.

In a joint declaration issued afterward, Japan and ASEAN mapped out five strategies for promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the region which include deepening political and security ties, cooperation in ASEAN community-building and improving links between ASEAN and Japan. They are: (1) strengthening political-security cooperation in the region; (2) intensifying cooperation towards ASEAN community building; (3) enhancing ASEAN-Japan connectivity; (4) creating together a more disaster-resilient society; and (5) addressing together common regional and global challenges.

The 2003 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II declared “The ASEAN Economic Community shall establish ASEAN as a single market and production base”. The achievement of the declared goal of a single market can be made only if political decision-makers and bureaucrats understand fully the meaning of a single market and the measures required to implement it. The meaning of the term, therefore, requires careful examination.

A SINGLE MARKET = THE LAW OF ONE PRICE

The idea of a single market comes of course from the European Economic Community (EEC)/EU. Initially the EEC created by the 1957 Treaty of Rome was a Common Market. This European concept of a common market was expressed in terms of the “four freedoms”, that is, freedom of trade in goods, services, capital, and labour. A Common Market required the abolition of all border restrictions on the movement of goods, services, capital, and labour. It also required the establishment of “common policies” in four designated areas: external trade, agriculture, transport, and competition. The Single European Act describes the Single Market as “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured”. The central idea of a single market is that there should be no discrimination according to source in the regional markets for goods, services or factors, thus creating a market that should be a single market with no geographic segmentation. It was realized that the cross-border freedoms were not sufficient for foreign suppliers to have access equal to that of domestic suppliers.

The elimination of border controls, important as it is, does not of itself create a genuine common market. Goods and people moving within the Community should not find obstacles inside the different member States as opposed to meeting them at the border. The restriction of imports by measures applying beyond-the-border is usually couched in terms of the principle of National Treatment. National Treatment is the rule that a good or factor that crosses the border should receive the same treatment as a like product produced domestically or a like factor owned by domestic residents with respect to taxes and charges and regulations.

INTRODUCTION

The AEC provides for market access for ASEAN skilled labour. “Free flow of skilled labour” affects the implementation of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) through allowing foreign service suppliers, and the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) through allowing employment of foreign corporate personnel to accompany FDI.

The AEC Blueprint focuses on action to implement Mutual Recognition Arrange-ments (MRAs) for major professional services. It is obvious that recognition of qualifica-tions is not enough to ensure market access in ASEAN. We need to also look at policies and regulatory frameworks affecting skilled labour mobility, and highlight the various policy and regulatory constraints and impediments.

POLICIES AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS ON SKILLED LABOUR MOBILITY IN AND AMONG ASEAN COUNTRIES

ASEAN governments have facilitated in-flows of professional manpower for various reasons, including to: facilitate FDI by permitting entry of foreign business people and professionals to accompany FDI; meet short-term skills shortages; facilitate structural/industrial upgrading; meet com-mitments under GATS and FTAs; and pro-mote health and education services.

Provisions in AFAS

AFAS provides for regulatory convergence and regulatory harmonization including MRAs.

AFAS Article 5 — Domestic Regulation (on qualifications):

With the objective of ensuring that measures relating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services, the Parties shall jointly review the results of the negotiations on disciplines in these measures pursuant to Article VI. of GATS, with a view to their incorporation into the Agreement.

AFAS Article 6 — Recognition (on qualifications):

1. • For the purposes of fulfilment of their respective standards or criteria for the authorization, licensing and certification of service suppliers, each Party may recognize the education or experience obtained, requirements met, or licenses or certification granted in another Party.

2. • Two or more parties may enter into, or encourage their relevant competent bodies to enter into, negotiations or recognition of qualification require-ments, qualification procedures, licens-ing and/or registration procedures for the purposes of fulfilment of their respective standards or criteria for the authorization, licensing or certification of service suppliers…

INTRODUCTION

The institutional structure supporting the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) project remains limited. ASEAN member states are well known for resisting any form of centralized authority to manage and complete the integration process. This chapter explores how best to design regional institutions to enhance AEC implementation.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ASEAN INTEGRATION: UNDERSTANDING ASEAN's PREFERENCE FOR FLEXIBILITY

Three features characterize ASEAN's approach to regional economic liberalization and integration, seen in both the AFTA project initiated in 1992 and the current AEC project. First, ASEAN governments have generally been forthcoming in initiating ambitious plans and programs on economic cooperation and liberalization.

Second, despite ambitious commitments, implementation of these commitments has faced problems, with member governments sometimes failing to meet set targets and/or ignoring them, asking for revisions to original targets and/or seeking exemptions from them. Third, ASEAN governments have always preferred relative limited institutional structures that in the end are unable to impose stronger discipline on member governments to adhere to the commitments, action plans and timelines to which they themselves earlier agreed.

The interplay between external com-petitive pressures and domestic factors in shaping the evolution of AFTA and the AEC provides valuable lessons for this chapter. For instance, both AFTA and the AEC were initiated by ASEAN governments, which saw in these two projects the chance to secure national economic growth by enhancing the competitiveness of the ASEAN region as a whole, particularly as a site for investment.

However, these same governments were also constrained in how far and how fast they could commit to regional integration, because they had to take into account domestic socio-economic and socio-political priorities, including domestic business demands for exemptions from regional liberalization schedules.

INSTITUTIONS FOR INTEGRATION: THEORETICAL INSIGHTS AND THE ASEAN EXPERIENCE

Institutions can very simply be defined as governance arrangements comprising sets of norms, rules, procedures, and organizational structures that aid collective action. Depend-ing on their design, institutions can aid implementation of integration commitments. This can occur through ensuring that clearly defined commitments are agreed upon and effectively monitored, so that instances of noncompliance can be addressed while the propensity for non-compliance reduced either through reputational effects or material costs. The report of ADB's flagship study on Institutions for Regional Integration identifies decision-making rules and a set of various “commitment devices” to be especially helpful aid to implementation.

OVERVIEW

The ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have identified a 2015 deadline to establish an ASEAN Single Aviation Market (ASAM) for the liberalization of air transport services in the region. Also referred to as the “ASEAN Open Skies” policy, the aim is to have the ASAM in place by the time the proposed ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) takes effect in 2015.

Over the years, the concept of progressive liberalization of air transport services has been reaffirmed at successive high-level fora, particularly at the annual ASEAN Transport Ministers’ Meetings (ATMs). In November 2004, building upon earlier discussions, the 10th ATM in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, adopted an Action Plan for ASEAN Air Transport Integration and Liberalization 2005–2015 (ASEAN, 2004). This Action Plan, together with an accompanying document known as the Roadmap for Integration of Air Travel Sector (RIATS), laid down the now-familiar target date of 2015 for achieving an effective “open skies” regime for the region.

At this juncture, it is critical to appreciate what exactly the various “freedoms” entail. To take an example, a Singapore carrier flying between Singapore and Bangkok, Thailand would require the “first freedom” to overfly Malaysian airspace and the “second freedom” to stop in Malaysia for fuel and supplies, if necessary.

The actual commercial opportunities are covered by the subsequent “freedoms”. All these “freedoms” or rights are granted by states to each other through bilateral negotiations, often with flight and capacity limits.

MAAS, MAFLPAS AND MARKET ACCESS LIBERALIZATION

At the 13th ATM held in Singapore in November 2007, the Transport Ministers reaffirmed their commitment toward the RIATS goals and agreed to expand RIATS to implement the ASEAN open skies policy by 2015 as part of the formal ASEAN Single Aviation Market (ASAM).

Since then, the RIATS commitments for passenger services have been successfully incorporated into two formal legal agreements for ASEAN member states’ acceptance. These are the Multilateral Agreement on Air Services (MAAS) and the Multilateral Agreement for Full Liberalization of Passenger Air Services (MAFLPAS), adopted in 2009 and 2010 respectively.

The idea of relaxing market access rights within and between sub-regions demon-strates ASEAN's incrementalist philosophy of starting with modest goals first and pursuing more ambitious relaxations at a later stage.

INTRODUCTION

With the deadline to achieve an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Community by 2015 drawing near, there has been an increased urgency to ensure that ASEAN leaders’ commitment to “promote ASEAN peoples to participate in and benefit fully from the process of ASEAN integration and community building”1 does not go unfulfilled. Unfortunately, there are still gaps in our knowledge that need to be filled if policymakers are to make better-informed decisions about how to improve the quality and impact of dialogue between ASEAN and civil society organisations (CSO).

This chapter's objective is to identify the opportunities and challenges for ASEAN-CSO engagement. This will be done in the context of existing and developing ASEAN processes (such as the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Roadmap).

ASEAN-CSO ENGAGEMENT TO DATE

ASEAN engagement with CSOs is currently at a crossroads as the work by member states laid out in the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Roadmap accelerates. CSOs have also taken strides in developing their own discursive processes, with the three traditional tracks of CSO discussions, namely, the ASEAN-ISIS network's ASEAN People's Assembly (APA), the ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC), and the ASEAN People's Forum (APF), now amalgamated into what is currently known as the ACSC/APF.

Unfortunately, recent events between the ASEAN Secretariat (ASEC) and CSOs have shown that there is still work to be done to improve the relationship between these two actors. At an ASEAN-CSO interface session in February 2009 following the ACSC/APF, one government official protested the inclusion of a particular CSO representative. At the next ACSC/APF in October of the same year, five out of 10 civil society representatives (selected by their peers) were rejected from another official interface session between ASEAN and CSO representatives and their ASEAN heads of government. The actions of ASEAN officials were seen as undermining the democratic efforts of civil society to speak for their constituents.

The difficulties of ASEAN-CSO engage-ment since 2009 could be considered a blessing in disguise, as it spurred both CSOs and ASEC into recognising the potentially damaging consequences if the broken relationship was left to fester, thus galvanising CSOs and ASEC into taking steps to mend and enhance their relationship.

As such, we can observe an openness in ASEAN to improve the existing engagement tracks, and a heightened awareness from the CSOs that they play no small role in the reshaping of their sphere of influence on ASEAN-level policies.

The history of Southeast Asia is a chequered one. Not only are we talking about a region dissected for several hundred years by colonial expediencies, we are also dealing with its bifurcated geography: the southern territories largely configured by coastal ways of life, and the northern territories by riverine and agricultural activities. The political systems and thoughts that flowed out of these were therefore understandably dissimilar. Layer upon layer of external influences placed over centuries are clearly evident, affecting various areas differently. The Indic and Buddhist kingdoms of old, for example, were overwhelmed by latter-day Muslim regimes in the archipelago, but not in continental Southeast Asia. Along the eastern coastline of Indo-China, it was a Sinic influence instead that remained strong for two millennia. In so-called modern times, European powers laid claim to whatever areas other European powers had not yet called their possession — at least until the Japanese expelled them in 1942.

The Europeans could not reclaim these liberated lands in 1945, and in the few places where they persisted — they could not hold them for long. Worse still, they could not reclaim their old authority. Thus, the region went through an essential transformation after the Second World War, and ended up as a jigsaw of nation-states, an alignment that suited some more than others. Since 1968, however, the ambition to construct a regional body — ASEAN — is being gradually fulfilled.

In this section, Wang Gungwu discusses how “Southeast Asia” evolved as a concept, and how — despite the trading routes that passed through the seas in the region — it was never as important as the continental silk route in Central Asia was. ASEAN, as Wang sees it, is also essentially different from the European Union and comparisons between the two should be made with caution. In his piece, Nicholas Tarling deliberates the history of regionalism in Southeast Asia, and the complex conditions under which the attempts at regional cooperation have operated. This is followed by Narongchai Akrasanee's revelation of the diplomatic context for key achievements in ASEAN's development towards economic integration. Finally, Rodolfo Severino — drawing upon his insider's knowledge on the workings of ASEAN as an organization — examines its development from its origins.

Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has been continuously evolving in its efforts at regional cooperation. Over the years, the organization has grown from five to ten member states and has increased both the scope and depth of its cooperation. However, throughout its existence, national sensitivities have been a major factor to consider, and in many cases these have taken priority over the regional agendas.

One major success for ASEAN came in December 1997 with the adoption of ASEAN Vision 2020. This provided a long-term direction for its ambitions to gain benefits from greater integration. Using 2020 as the target year for the achievement of an ASEAN Community, this plan proposed to work through three intertwined pillars — ASEAN Security Community (ASC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and ASEAN Socio-cultural Community (ASCC).

In 2003, ASEAN leaders embraced individual ‘blueprints’ for these pillars., At the 12th ASEAN Summit in January 2007, the organization decided to bring forward the deadline for achieving an ASEAN Community from 2020 to 2015, given the fast changing global conditions. This volume is thus being published on the very year this ambition is being realized.

In the field of political and security cooperation, ASEAN has made significant headway. It has evolved towards being a rules-based organization by introducing instruments such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and perhaps most significantly, the ASEAN Charter. Through mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Plus Three, and more recently, the ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting and the East Asia Summit, the ten member countries have succeeded in keeping the world's major powers engaged in the region.

Progress on the economic front has attracted most attention, as was expected. The AEC is to deliver on an integrated market and production space with free movement of goods, services, capital and skilled labour. While much has been achieved in terms of tariff reduction and trade facilitation, ASEAN is not yet an integrated production space. A significant number of economic measures have yet to be carried out by the member economies. Hence, the AEC is often viewed as a ‘work in progress’.

In its turn, ASCC measures are largely cross-cutting in nature and are mostly derived from the expected impact of economic integration.

We argue that Asian Pentecostalism is characterized by enigmatic attributes in three dimensions that distinguish it from Western Pentecostalism on the one hand and Pentecostalism in the Global South on the other hand. Firstly, Asian Pentecostalism is indigenizing and transnationalizing and this simultaneous movement is spearheaded by prophetic preachers and the crafting of contextual theologies grappling with specific social and cultural conditions. Secondly, organizationally, Asian Pentecostalism tends towards the building of mega-churches and, at the same time, promotes close discipling and disciplining in small groups. Thirdly, while socially and oftentimes politically conservative, Asian Pentecostalism invents new modes of social engagements with developmental states and democratizing public spheres that may have surprisingly progressive outcomes.

A definition of Pentecostalism and Asian Pentecostalism is warranted before we proceed. In taking the conventional definition of ‘Pentecostalism’ to be an emphasis on the religious-spiritual experience, the baptism of the Holy Spirit and the speaking of tongues or glossolalia (see Anderson 2004), we are cognisant of the fact that any attempt at defining an evolving religious movement is going to be fraught with theoretical and political hazards. Indeed, the difficulty is historiographical. It has been shown that the early narrative of Pentecostalism has been infused with the ‘ritualisation of Pentecostal history’ that suffers from the erasure of ‘native missionaries’, ‘white racial bias’, as well as a ‘persistent gender bias’ (Wacker 1986: 95).

By the 1980s and early 1990s, the rapid growth of Pentecostalism had become visible in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea. Against the backdrop of economic growth in much of Asia, the rapid expansion of these Pentecostal congregations, noticeable for their younger upwardly mobile well-educated Chinese members, led to the breakaway of independent churches, from which came the rise of the ‘mega-church’.

The growth of the mega-church in Asia has been one of the most important developments in Pentecostalism in the past two decades. While the worship styles, organizational strategies and use of technologies by mega-churches in the US have shaped the general character of the mega-church, its non-denominational nature has allowed indigenous features to define those found in Asia. The global spread of mega-churches not only attests to the transnationalizing and indigenizing effects of Pentecostalism but also helps us further refine secularization theory to account for religiosity in modernizing societies outside Europe.

INTRODUCTION

The Southeast Asian region's quest for community-building is ambitious in its thoroughness, encapsulating both the traditional realms of political-security relations and economic integration and seeking to further produce a common social and cultural community.

The socio-cultural diversity of ASEAN member-states has not stopped its leaders from conceptualizing a community that will somehow forge unity and solidarity amongst the different peoples in Southeast Asia.

There is a dearth in studies that focuses on the third ASEAN community: the [ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community] ASCC. Because it is the newest among the communities, this is understandable. There have been previous studies on functional cooperation in ASEAN including the problems of putting people at the center in regional community-building.

There is a need however, to see whether community-building in functional areas, which are the main priorities in the ASCC, can be institutionalized.

In order to assess the viability of the ASCC, the following are asked:

1. 1. Who and what social entities are allowed to exist under the ASCC?

2. 2. What regulations are being sought to regulate the everyday activities of the ASCC?

3. 3. What procedures are envisioned to guide the interaction of actors in the ASCC?

4. 4. Would all of these reduce uncertainty and generally constrain the political and social behavior of the actors?

5. 5. In the case of shared regional identity, what are the possible consequences of institutionalization?

INSTITUTIONALISM IN ASEAN: A BRIEF REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Douglass North defined institutions as humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions. The main purpose of institutions is to reduce uncertainty in exchange. This can be understood to mean building confidence in transactions or negotiations allowing contracting parties to dialogue on almost equal terms. Informal rules can be just as binding as formal rules. The concept of the “ASEAN Way”, which means that decisions are made through consensus and that non-interference in the internal affairs cannot be violated, is an example of such an informal rule.

This rule stems from the inception of ASEAN where the founding states sought to stabilize their regional affairs to ensure that they have a free hand in dealing with their internal problems.

INTRODUCTION

On November 18, 2012, heads of state of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (hereinafter “ASEAN”) met in the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh and adopted the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (hereinafter “the Declaration”).

The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, which now represents an important component of that system, consists of three constitutive parts and in the next three sections following ASEAN background, each is examined in turn. First, it consists of politics, or a political context, in which changing political conditions in ASEAN, including its commitment to human rights, provide an enabling environment for the development of the system and its most significant achievement to date: the Declaration. Second, it consists of a process in which different stakeholders compete to exert influence over the system, including the Declaration. Third, it consists of a product: the Declaration itself.

BACKGROUND: ASEAN AND ITS HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM

As in some other multi-lateral organizations, the language of ASEAN diplomacy refers to three distinct “tracks” or institutional layers; Track One covers governmental and intergovernmental bodies; Track Two, non-governmental bodies enjoying official ASEAN recognition; and Track Three, independent bodies, including civil society organizations, which interact with ASEAN organs.

POLITICS: THE POLITICAL CONTEXT TO THE DECLARATION

ASEAN's composition as a disparate group of countries creates distinct political challenges in the development of the ASEAN human rights system — differences that are evident in the subsidiary Declaration of 2012. These political challenges arose particularly from the expansion in membership in the late 1990s, with the accession of poorer and more authoritarian states.

One key cleavage in ASEAN divides the “ASEAN Six” (Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei) from the “CMLV countries” (Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam) or the more economically-prosperous states from their poorer, and historically conflict-ravaged, neighbors. In the case of human rights, therefore, the “ASEAN Six” versus the “CLMV” split, and variations of it, can make it difficult to reach agreement within ASEAN, hindering the development of new initiatives.

Despite these differences between member-states and the cleavages to which they give rise, plans for an ASEAN Community were crystallized in the ASEAN Charter adopted on November 20, 2007. As a core principle, the Charter calls for “respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights and the promotion of social justice”, giving rise to political and legal obligations on the part of member-states.

Over the last decade, ASEAN's role in managing economic, diplomatic and security relations between its member-states and outside major powers has expanded significantly, as has the number and depth of ASEAN-based wider regional groupings. In 2005 — building on the long-standing dialogue partner relations and the early successes of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN+3 process — ASEAN established the East Asia Summit (EAS). In 2010, it established the ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus process. By 2011, both new groupings had the same membership: the ASEAN member-states, the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Russia, Australia and New Zealand. The last decade has also seen ASEAN become the primary platform for its member-states’ external trade diplomacy with the successful negotiation of five ASEAN+1 trade agreements and, in 2013, the commencement of the ASEAN-based Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations between ASEAN and its +1 trade partners.

The Southeast Asian states’ more active use of ASEAN as a platform to engage major extra-regional powers has been reciprocated by these powers and their growing diplomatic and financial commitment to ASEAN. China, Japan and South Korea are members of all these wider ASEAN-led groupings and have successfully completed ASEAN+1 trade agreements with ASEAN. The United States and Russia are members of the ARF, EAS and ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus process.

The first part of this section includes Herman Kraft's article, which looks at the increasing importance of ASEAN centrality over the last decade. The article by Mohamed Jawhar Hassan looks at ASEAN's successful trust-building amongst its members, while Ian Storey's article focuses on the largest and most newsworthy challenge to ASEAN centrality — the maritime boundary disputes between China and ASEAN member-states in the South China Sea.

The next part looks at the growing number of ASEAN-based wider regional bodies and ASEAN's emerging role as a model for other South-South regional bodies. The security-based ARF, the first of these, is facing growing questions about its continued relevance while the finance-oriented ASEAN+3 pro-cess has deepened considerably with the negotiation of the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization. The broader ASEAN-based regional groupings established in the last decade — the EAS and ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus process — are still in the process of finding their proper place, particularly in relation to existing and overlapping regional institutions such as APEC and the Shangri- la Dialogue.