This chapter uncovers new demographic evidence of ethnic diversity in Indonesia. As listed in Chapter 3, the 2010 population census recorded a very large number of ethnic categories and we reclassified them into a New Classification of ethnic groups. With this classification, this chapter presents and discusses the ethnic composition in Indonesia as a whole and within each province. First, it examines the ethnic composition at the national level by limiting itself to the fifteen largest ethnic groups in Indonesia. These fifteen ethnic groups already formed a very large portion of the total citizens in Indonesia, accounting for 84.9 per cent in 2010.

Second, it analyses the ethnic diversity in each of the 33 provinces. This discussion at the provincial level better shows Indonesia's ethnic diversity. It details various degrees of heterogeneity amongst provinces. It then provides an expanded list of ethnic groups to capture a more comprehensive view of Indonesia's ethnic spread as a whole, by combining all large ethnic groups within the provinces. Finally, this chapter reveals the degree of “ubiquity” of the ethnic groups amongst the various provinces in Indonesia.

Amongst other things, this chapter also discusses local ethnic groups versus migrant ethnic groups in each province to provide a glimpse into migration phenomena. Local ethnic groups are defined as the people who originate in a province although nowadays they may live in many other provinces in Indonesia or overseas. On the other hand, migrant ethnic groups are defined as those who did not identify themselves as one of the local ethnic groups in the provinces where they live. They may just have arrived in Province A some years earlier, they may not have been born in this province, but it is also possible that they were born in Province A and have been in Province A for many generations. As long as they identify themselves with an ethnic group originating from outside Province A, these respondents are called migrant ethnic groups.

Furthermore, although the number and percentage of foreigners are still small, the presence of foreigners is likely to increase and hence play an important role in future interaction with the people of Indonesia (Ananta and Arifin 2014). Therefore, this chapter discusses the demography of the foreigners before elaborating on the ethnic composition in each province. This is the first detailed demographic study on foreigners in Indonesia, another first for this book.

It is a great pleasure for me to write this foreword. Firstly because I have known Evi and Aris for many years and regard them as dear friends as well as important and gifted Indonesian scholars. However, the ethnic diversity of Indonesia has always been part of my research in the country. Ever since I found the treasure trove of ethnicity data in the 1930 Dutch-applied Volkstelling, I was hooked on following the important interactions between ethnicity and politics and the threats to it of attempts to rationalize Indonesian “culture”, language etc. As a geographer, too, the spatial complexity of the heartlands of the various ethnolinguistic groups was fascinating. One of my great disappointments with the censuses of 1961, 1971, 1980 and 1990 was that they did not include an ethnicity question because of its sensitivity during a period when governments encouraged national Indonesian identification over ethnic-regional associations. However, this has fortunately changed. The 2000 census data was excellently analysed by Evi, Aris and Leo Suryadinata. As Professor Widjojo Nitisastro, one of Independent Indonesia's greatest economists and social scientists, said in his foreword to the volume, this study will see a flourishing of more ethnicity-based studies in Indonesia, and it certainly has.

Turning to the new study based on the 2010 census, Evi and Aris have been joined by three new co-authors — M. Sairi Hasbullah, Nur Budi Handayani and Agus Pramono — all from the BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik/Statistics – Indonesia). The latter have certainly added a significant understanding of the measurement of ethnicity in Indonesia and the ways in which they have been classified and the methods used to meaningfully aggregate small-sized groups into ethnic and sub-ethnic groups. A distinctive feature of the book is the development a new classification of ethnicity in Indonesia which reclassifies the 1,331 coded separate ethnicities into 600 ethnic groups and two excellent recommendations have been made to BPS to refine this further for the next census. The book contains the most detailed account of concepts, collection methods, data definition and methods of analysis that has yet been written and is to be highly recommended to scholars in this area.

The new classification will excite much discussion among scholars in this area. The choices are justified in Chapter 3. The new classification is tabled alongside the equivalent initial classification group for each province.

This chapter elaborates on the various ethnic group populations, who can be seen as both consumers and producers of development. Specifically, the chapter examines the age-sex and geographical distribution of these ethnic groups. These data are especially useful for marketing and for both commercial and non-commercial purposes. In democratizing Indonesia, this knowledge is also very important for analysing electoral behaviour and understanding geopolitics.

In Chapter 4, we showed how we have classified 145 ethnic groups as belonging either to the ten largest, the fifteen largest or the twenty-five largest ethnic groups in the various provinces. However, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss all of these groups in detail. Instead, we focus here on the age-sex structure (often called the population pyramid) and the geographical distribution of the fifteen largest ethnic groups in Indonesia in 2010.

LIFE-CYCLE APPROACH

Following a life-cycle approach, we disaggregate the population into different stages, each with a different impact on society and the economy. In this book, we classify a population into five age groups: infants and toddlers (0–4), children (5–14), youths (15–24), prime-working-age adults (25–59) and older persons (60 years and above).

Infants and toddlers (0–4) are highly physically and financially dependent and potential recipients of health services in their early years. They need caregivers to support them. Children (5–14) are also potential ‘customers’, as they are financially dependent on adults. At these ages, they cost their parents most in terms of their education. Altogether, the population aged 0–14 potentially burdens the economy with spending on health and education. At the same time, this expenditure can also be seen as investment in human capital for the nation.

Next to the dependent infants, toddlers and children are the youths (15–24). This group can be costly if the parents have higher aspirations to provide their children with tertiary education (until age 24). Therefore, youths may be added to the group of dependants (infants, toddlers and young children). In addition, youths are in transition to adulthood, ranging from entering the labour market, searching for a partner, starting a career and building a family. The youth bulge, often associated with negative things such as crime, is defined when the percentage of youths exceeds 20 per cent.

The top part of the population pyramid is the group of older persons, aged 60 years and above.

Earlier chapters have shown the richness of Indonesia in terms of its ethnic groups: the ethnic composition at the national level, the variation of the ethnic composition at the provincial level and the dynamics of ethnic composition across time. As religion and language are closely intertwined with ethnicity and the data are available from the 2010 population census, this chapter examines the religions and languages of each of the fifteen largest ethnic groups in Indonesia. This is the first detailed statistical information on the religion and language of ethnic groups ever published for the whole of Indonesia and its fifteen largest ethnic groups. However, this chapter does not assume that there is any meaningful relationship between religion and the usual language spoken at home.

This chapter begins by examining the religious composition of Indonesia, including politically inherited problems concerning statistics on religion. Although Indonesia is well known as a Muslim majority country, this chapter examines and shows the spatial distribution of religious followers, that there is a considerable variation of religious compositions across provinces and within each province. Furthermore, this chapter studies the religions of each of the fifteen largest ethnic groups, the first quantitative measurement of religions amongst ethnic groups in Indonesia. It shows the composition of religious followers in each of the ethnic groups. This section provides an interesting answer to whether or not, for example, there is a significant percentage of Sundanese recording themselves as embracing Protestantism. Do the Chinese embrace only Buddhism or Christianity? What percentage of the Chinese Indonesians are Muslims?

This chapter also studies the composition of groups of language speakers in Indonesia, which may be different from that of ethnic groups. It also analyses what languages each of the fifteen largest ethnic groups speak daily at home. It is the first quantitative analysis on the language of ethnic groups in Indonesia. For example, it calculates the percentage of Javanese, the largest ethnic group in Indonesia, who speak their own language, who speak Bahasa Indonesia, the national language and/or who speak some other languages. Another example is the language proficiency of the Chinese Indonesians. How many Chinese speak Bahasa Indonesia, how many of them speak their own language (Chinese) and/or how many speak some other local languages, such as Javanese?

CONCEPT OF ETHNICITY

As elaborated by Baumann (2004), it is not easy to define ethnicity. It is a much debated topic, though best defined in cultural anthropology. There is no consensus on how to define ethnicity and how ethnic groups are created. This chapter does not aim to elaborate on the debate. Rather, it focuses on the concept used in the demographic analysis on Indonesia's ethnicity, the theme of this book.

Ethnicity is not “culture”. It is related to a particular kind of identity, imposed or otherwise. It is a result of self and group identity that is created within extrinsic and intrinsic contexts as well as social interaction.

Ethnicity is generally defined as a sense of group belonging, with the core characteristics of common origin, history, culture, language, experience and values (Baumann 2004; Radcliffe 2010). Bulmer (1996) defined an ethnic group as follows:

Ethnicity is different from race. Racial stratification is related to birthascribed status based on physical and cultural characteristics imposed by outsiders. A person cannot change his/her race. On the other hand, although also ascribed at birth, ethnic groups usually can define their own cultural characteristics themselves.

Ethnic identity may be dynamic, not static over time, and dependent upon context, as people inhabit a more complex world in which they interact with more than one ethnic group. An ethnicity of a person is voluntary, meaning that an individual may change his/her ethnic identity if s/he feels that s/he is closer to his/her new ethnic group. Through intermarriage, cultural exchange, political change, migration and assimilation, some individuals may change their ethnic identities and affiliation (Baumann 2004; Radcliffe 2010).

People may change their identities because of political reasons. An example is a Chinese person who was born and grew up in a Javanese community. He does not speak any Chinese, but speaks Javanese fluently. During the Soeharto New Order era, he hid his Chinese identity and identified himself as a Javanese person.

Indonesia, the largest country in Southeast Asia, has as its national motto “Unity in Diversity.” In 2010, Indonesia stood as the world's fourth most populous country after China, India and the United States, with 237.6 million people. This archipelagic country contributed 3.5 per cent to the world's population in the same year. Its relative contribution to the world population will be stable at around 3.4–3.5 per cent until 2050. According to the median variant of the United Nations estimate (2013), Indonesia's population will continue to grow, reaching 300 million in 2033.

The future demographics of Indonesia are likely to be very different from today's pattern, just as the current situation varies markedly from the past. Indonesians are increasingly living longer and having fewer children. Benefiting from the ease and advancement of transportation and information technology, Indonesians are increasingly more mobile, venturing into a wider labour market both within and outside Indonesia.

Indonesia has nearly completed its first demographic transition, from both high fertility and mortality to low fertility and mortality rates. The end of the first demographic transition is marked by the “replacement” level of fertility, which is the number of children a couple has that are needed to replace themselves. Population experts believe that the replacement level is reached when the fertility rate is about 2.1. However, Espenshade, Guzman and Westoff (2003) argue that the replacement rate does not occur at that rate, but relates instead to the mortality rate.

The onset of the replacement level of fertility has further implications for the ethnic composition of a population. If the replacement level can be maintained for about forty years, the population will stabilize with zero growth. However, in many cases, this is not a reality. Some regions can easily fall into below replacement fertility for so long as to threaten the population with extinction. For instance, Japan and Germany are depopulating in this way.

Some provinces in Indonesia such as Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Bali have already completed their first demographic and are now in the second demographic transition, where the fertility rate is below the replacement level. As Lesthaeghe (1991) argues, under the regime of the second demographic transition, marriage is no longer universal, occurs at older ages and can be childless. There are higher-order needs on individualization, self-actualization and a rising awareness of human rights.

Creating a new classification system for ethnic groups in Indonesia is not an easy task. The long list of ethnic categories, with its problems and issues as discussed in Chapter 2, coupled with limited or a complete absence of references (no published literature or local expertise) as well as certain political and social sensitivities, requires a thorough examination of each ethnic category. This is a time-consuming search. The published references used include Melalatoa (1995), Hidayah (1996), Koentjaraningrat (1994), Riwut (1958) and Riwut and Mantikei (2003).

Our New Classification is not an attempt to make a list of official ethnic groups. As discussed in Chapter 2, the peoples of Indonesia are free to determine their own ethnic groups. They may even change their ethnic groups as frequently as they wish, as the change does not have any consequences. This is different from some other countries such as China, whose government officially recognizes fifty-six ethnic groups, and Singapore, who categorizes its population into four major groups.

Therefore, the New Classification is not supposed to be fixed for a long time. Rather, the New Classification should be continuously improved as new data and references are available. Yet, this is the first comprehensive classification of ethnic groups based on the 2010 population census.

This chapter sets out the New Classification of ethnic groups based on the 2010 population census for Indonesia. It is new because our classification is different from the Initial Classification discussed in Chapter 2. To some extent it is also significantly different from the one resulting from the 2000 population census, although it has some similarities with that of 2000. This chapter discusses the significance of the New Classification and examines what new groups are revealed from the New Classification. To provide a better understanding of the New Classification, this chapter also presents three comparative case studies on ethnic composition based on the New and Initial Classifications at the provincial level. The selected case studies are on the provinces of Aceh, West Sulawesi and East Nusa Tenggara.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW CLASSIFICATION

The New Classification of ethnic groups is expected to capture the rich diversity of the ethnic composition of Indonesia as a whole and its provinces, particularly amongst those with many small ethnic groups in the eastern provinces of Indonesia.

As Indonesia collected information on ethnicity for the first time since the colonial era in the 2000 population census, the discussion on the dynamics of Indonesia's ethnic groups is focused on the period of 2000–2010. However, this chapter also provides a brief discussion relating to the period 1930–2000, as the colonial population census in 1930 collected information on ethnicity. Special caution should be exercised when interpreting the statistics from 1930, especially when comparing with those in 2000 and 2010, as the concepts and coverage of the statistics as well as classification of ethnic groups can be different. Because of space and time limitations, we have concentrated on the dynamics of the fifteen largest ethnic groups in Indonesia according to the 2010 population censuses.

To understand the changes in population numbers, we first need to examine changes in the three basic demographic components: fertility, mortality and migration. The fertility rate has a positive impact on the size of a population by adding to the number of people. On the other hand, the mortality rate has a negative impact by reducing the number of people. Migration can increase or reduce the number of people depending on the flows of out-migration and in-migration. The fertility rate affects the age structure through the youngest population aged 0–4 years old. Mortality and migration can have an impact on all age groups. In addition to these three demographic components, we have checked for any possible differences on the coverage of samples and classifications of ethnic groups over time.

In the next section, we discuss the classifications of ethnic groups in 2000 and compare them with those in 2010. We then compare the coverage of the 2000 and 2010 population censuses, especially the underestimation in the 2000 population census. With this background, this chapter discusses the change of the composition of ethnic groups in Indonesia.

ETHNIC CLASSIFICATION IN 2000

The ethnic groups in 2000, presented in the book, Indonesia's Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape (Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta 2003), was based on publications by BPS. BPS published the results of the 2000 population census in a series of thirty-one volumes, one volume for each of the thirty provinces and one volume for Indonesia as a whole.

Amongst many other things, this series contains statistics on ethnicity in Indonesia as a whole and within each province.

The military coup of 2006 that deposed the elected government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra led to an increasing militarization of Thai politics. This latest political intervention unveiled the calculated strategy of the military. Not only did the coup serve to eliminate the traditional elite's enemy, in this case Thaksin, but it also opened the door for the military to reclaim its control over politics, and consequently, foreign policy. The role of the military in foreign affairs was immense during the Cold War period. The threat of communism in this part of the world allowed the military to entrench its position in the name of defending national security, with the support from the United States, both in ideological and financial terms. But this role was challenged when Thaksin became prime minister in 2001. Throughout the Thaksin administration (2001–06), Thaksin intruded in the military's affairs, diminishing its influence in domestic politics and foreign policy making. Daringly, Thaksin attempted to fragment the army so as to prevent a possible coup. But Thaksin eventually failed. For the military, the only way to regain its political power was to stage a coup against Thaksin. The political turmoil that followed in the post-coup years, in turn, legitimized the military's political position. The military firmly took charge of the uncertain political situation, particularly in dealing with security issues, such as endless street protests and occasional violent confrontations with certain political factions.

In 2008, the pro-Thaksin regime of Samak Sundaravej returned to power through the first election after the coup. The election victory of the People's Power Party (PPP), a reincarnation of Thaksin's disbanded Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT), was a slap in the face for the military elite who were certain that the coup was an effective measure in deracinating Thaksin's political legacy. To destabilize the Samak government, the yellow-shirt People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) took to the streets of Bangkok, politicizing the issue of Preah Vihear, known in Thai as Khao Phra Wihan.