Despite significant economic achievements, Vietnam continues to see a rising number of illegal Vietnamese immigrants to Europe. In October 2019, for example, British police found thirty-nine illegal Vietnamese immigrants dead inside a lorry trailer in Essex (BBC 2020). The trailer arrived by sea from Zeebrugge in Belgium. The story has drawn worldwide attention to the plight of illegal Vietnamese immigrants in Europe and the criminal networks of human smuggling from Vietnam. While the story reveals a tragic aspect of Vietnam’s integration into the global economy, it is important to note that thousands of Vietnamese workers travel to foreign countries every year to work legally under government-sponsored programmes. In fact, the Vietnamese government has long promoted labour export as part of its strategy to reduce poverty while earning remittances from overseas workers. In spite of such programmes, to cope with persistent poverty and insufficient opportunities for training and higher-paid jobs, young Vietnamese in poor areas, such as those ill-fated immigrants above, have sought work opportunities abroad by relying on networks of human smugglers.

This chapter addresses the related phenomena of labour export and human smuggling from Vietnam to Europe. Both groups of workers, including those exported legally and illegally smuggled workers, have contributed significantly to the Vietnamese economy through remittances. But both forms of labour migration have encountered problems. On the one hand, the legal labour export programmes operated by state-owned agencies engage in the exploitative practice of charging excessive labour service fees. Another problem is visa overstaying as workers refuse to return after the end of their contracts. On the other hand, associated with smuggled workers are problems of human trafficking, money laundering, labour exploitation and risks of death.

The plight of both groups of workers points to a larger issue—namely, that Vietnam has achieved rapid economic growth but this growth has created rising inequality, and workers especially are exploited through low wages. Vietnam has a large workforce of 55.5 million, which remains one of its advantages in attracting foreign investment. While non-skilled labour is abundant, skilled workers are in great shortage, and training opportunities for workers are insufficient.

As of 2020, Vietnam’s per capita income was estimated to be US$2,400, which is at the middle position of countries in the category of “lower middle income” set by the World Bank (between US$1,036 and US$4,045). While Vietnam’s economy has been widely viewed as a success story, comparatively it is not so successful, and many key features of the country’s economic expansion may not be fully understood. As Table 2.1 indicates, Vietnam achieved much lower growth rates (4.3, 7.4 and 6.6 per cent, respectively) for the three decades between 1980 and 2000 when compared with the growth rates over the three decades of 1960–80 for South Korea (9.5, 10.5 and 8.8 per cent) and 1980–2000 for China (9.7, 10 and 10.4 per cent).

As I will argue in this chapter, there are two main reasons for Vietnam’s lower performance even after its economic reforms. First is the strategy of industrialization that assigns too powerful a “leading role” to the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at the expense of the private sector. The SOEs have generated corruption and driven up public debt (both for the government and the SOEs) to an extremely high level that almost bankrupted the economy in the early 2000s. Second is the strategy of growth that courts foreign direct investment (FDI) simply for the employment of low-skilled labour instead of focusing on FDI projects that stimulate the development of human capital resources and the transfers and exchanges of knowledge, technologies and skills. As shown in Table 2.12, the foreign invested sector made up a significant share of GDP (22.5 per cent) in 2018, clearly at the expense of the private domestic corporations (10.1 per cent of GDP), although its productivity was even lower than that of the state-owned sector.

This chapter develops a statistical analysis that attends to the following four tasks: (1) to comparatively assess Vietnam’s development through a closer look at Vietnam’s GDP; (2) to examine the views of the ruling Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) about industrialization; (3) to explore the role of FDI in Vietnam’s economy and the country’s development strategy for it; and (4) to provide a cross-country comparison of Vietnam’s labour productivity in industry.

In November 2018, when general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party (CCP) Nguyen Phu Trong became the first leader of post-war Vietnam to hold simultaneous control of both party and state leadership positions, many could not resist the comparison between him and his counterpart Xi Jinping in China. Yet, years before opinion pieces started debating whether Trong is the new Xi, parallels between them had already existed. They go back to the start of their anti-corruption campaigns—China’s in 2012 and Vietnam’s in 2016. In these campaigns, both leaders promised an unprecedented war against corruption that would leave no stone unturned. While Xi vowed to target “both the tigers and the flies” (laohu cang ying yiqida), Trong also declared that his campaign would leave “no restricted zone and no exception” (khong co ngoai le, khong co vung cam).

Fast forward to 2020. Four years after the start of Trong’s campaign and eight years after the start of Xi’s, to what extent have the two leaders delivered on their promises? Besides the unsurprising ovation in both countries’ state media, the two campaigns have attracted as much praise as criticism from outside observers and experts. On one hand, the campaigns have been criticized as veiled excuses for political infighting—a popular sentiment among scholars and even within the party ranks (Thayer 2017; Zhu and Zhang 2017; Hutt 2020). More broadly, the criticisms echo a political science literature that casts doubt on the willingness and ability of authoritarian regimes to mount effective anti-corruption efforts. To this research body, the unwillingness of autocrats comes from the fact that not only can they use corruption rents to attract supporters (Geddes 1999; Bueno De Mesquita 2003), but they can also easily respond to corruption-related discontent with censorship or repression (Wintrobe 1998). The lack of capacity, on the other hand, is rooted in the absence of the democratic checks and balances that enable deterrence, detection and disciplining of corrupt acts such as free media, electoral accountability or civil society (Rose-Ackerman 1996, 1999; Johnston 2005).

From another perspective, a sizable strand of the literature has pointed to the role of authoritarian accountability institutions.

INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTUALIZING POLITICAL FANDOM

On 24 August 2022, the day after Malaysia’s former Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak failed in his final appeal to the Federal Court to overturn his graft conviction, a group of 200 Najib loyalists from Pertubuhan Jalinan Perpaduan Negara Malaysia launched a petition calling for a royal pardon for Najib (Leong 2022). That petition was also uploaded to the website change.org. Within a brief span of time, a counter-petition by Bersih was launched with a list of reasons as to why such an extrajudicial action should not be countenanced by the ruling King (Gabungan Pilihanraya Bersih dan Adil Bersih 2022).

As of this writing, the anti-pardon petition garnered 126,363 supporters (Gabungan Pilihanraya Bersih dan Adil Bersih 2022), significantly outnumbering the pro-Najib petition which garnered 11,259 supporters (Ibrahim Ismail 2022). Are these numbers representative of the final and complete downfall of Najib Razak? Is this just the beginning of further extrajudicial intrigue? More importantly, why does UMNO still insist on supporting Najib instead of paving a new future free of his political baggage? In this article, we will unpack the reasons behind the seemingly “unreasonable” and inexplicable popularity of Najib Razak through the perspectives of fandom and parasocial engagements. At the same time, we wish to emphasize that the size of his detractors does not represent his waning relevance since the fact that he still garners attention means that even his detractors still consider him politically relevant and a potential threat.

Fandoms, political or otherwise, operate on social media through meme-driven battles, personal textual postings, parodies, and pop culture-infused discourses—these are part of “fan fiction” activities involving the building of a (possibly illusory) world around a celebrity. The (im)personality of a celebrity derives from how these celebrities are defined; whether through the manner they engage with their target audiences and how their audiences respond to them; or by how social media content is configured around said celebrities (Marwick and boyd 2011). Fandom activities do not involve monetary compensation but are dependent on dedication based on the amount of affection and/or interest the fan has; some indulge on a more casual basis while others would work hard at raising the status and popularity of the celebrity.

• • The concept of fandom, which contributes to the construction of fan fiction, provides fresh insights into the seemingly inexplicable and irrational popularity of disgraced political celebrities. Political fandom provides the critical framework for contextualizing the continuing popularity of political social media influencers such as Najib Razak within an environment of populist politics.

• • Political fandom comprises fans and anti-fans, each of whom is capable of critical reasoning regardless of conclusions drawn. The presence of anti-fans of an influential figure speaks not to the waning of popularity, but rather, the continuing relevance of that figure within socio-political spaces.

• • Malaysia’s political fandom does not subscribe to well-defined morality when it comes to celebrity politicians. The fans appear more tolerant of the amorality of said politicians than they would be of themselves, their circle, and their peers. Among the Malay-speaking and especially the more rural constituents, the way politicians portray their stance on Islam and address the bread-and-butter issues of their constituents appear to be more important than the politicians’ personal ethics.

• • Najib Razak’s various sources of social capital, derived from his political lineage, his contributions during his time as Malaysia’s Prime Minister, and his ability to brand himself as a social media influencer, made him appear a potent political force despite being the first former Prime Minister to be convicted of corruption.

• • Najib Razak has been adept at spinning social media trends to his advantage and in connecting with the mundane lives and hardships of ordinary citizens. Through his social media postings, he was able to inspire both fans and anti-fans to produce fan fiction around him in the form of images and texts which he could selectively interact with, and even use as content for his “crusade” on behalf of his supporters as an opposition MP, or as distractions from controversies associated with him.

• • Although Najib Razak is the main focus here, a comparative analysis of Anwar Ibrahim, as a rival politician, is provided to demonstrate how Najib constructed his social media persona in ways savvier than his political opponents.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

The issue of New Chinese Migrants (xin yimin, 新移民) has been prolifically discussed globally since Deng Xiaoping introduced market-based economic reforms and greater engagement by China with the global community. Some scholars argue that this migration mainly went to Western developed countries rather than to Southeast Asia, with the exception of Singapore. Understandably, English language scholarly work on xin yimin has tended to focus on this phenomenon in developed countries, and less attention on the topic has been paid to Southeast Asia, at least until recently.

According to the International Organization for Migration of the United Nations (UN), ‘migrant’ is “[a]n umbrella term, not defined under international law, reflecting the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons”.

Xin yimin, or new Chinese migrants, are further defined as migrants from mainland China (and to a much lesser extent from Taiwan) who stay in another country for more than one year, some with the intention to stay longer or permanently.

According to a rough estimate, there were 10.3 million xin yimin across the world in 2008, of which about 8 million came from mainland China. Of those from China, only twenty per cent went to Southeast Asia. It is difficult to get accurate figures on this since almost no country in Southeast Asia has released any relevant figures. According to Indonesia’s Labour Minister, Hanif Dhakiri, there were 24,800 Chinese workers in Indonesia in 2017, the majority of whom were classified as skilled workers. However, many argue that the real number may be double that.

This chapter will focus on the xin yimin in Indonesia, an undertaking that forms part of my larger project on Chinese migration in Southeast Asia. There have been copious descriptions of the diverse nature of Chinese migration into the region, but statistics have been less forthcoming, both as a result of the sensitive nature of the subject and the uneven data collection of country-level surveys.

Much effort has been made to account for the new waves of Chinese migration. And globalization, transnationalism and the changing economic and political context have often been used as potential explanations. For example, Kuhn (2008) suggests that Chinese overseas emigration has important connections to domestic migration trends, and that new Chinese migration has been shaped by historic events. Similarly, Rallu (2002, p. 6) believes that the recent trend in the flow of Chinese migrants is rooted in domestic pressures—including high unemployment, rural underemployment and the rapid increase of the “floating population” within Chinese society. In addition, the close nexus between the rise of China’s economic role and Chinese new migration has also received attention in both academic and policy circles.

This chapter, based on fieldwork conducted in Vietnam, explores the flow of Chinese migration in relation to China’s regional economic integration. In the past, waves of Chinese migration abroad were mainly the result of social conflicts and poverty. Nowadays, the interconnectivity between migration and other economic flows such as trade, investment and economic aid, as well as development policies, are among the main actors (Xenogiani 2006, p. 39). Recent studies by Zhuang and Wang (2010), Chong (2013) and Nyiri (2013) also support this research lead.

In this chapter, new Chinese migrants are categorized into two sub-groups for analysis, though it should be noted that these categorisations may not always be clear-cut. The first group is contracted labourers who are brought to Vietnam by Chinese contractors and companies; the second group is independent migrants who assume all risks in making their way to Vietnam and engage in business in various economic sectors.

The Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam

The term ‘ethnic Chinese’ is referred to as người Hoa in Vietnam, which is derived from the Chinese word Huaren. While this term generally refers to Chinese migrants who live overseas and their descendants, it may not convey whether or not they are Chinese nationals. In the context of Vietnam, ‘ethnic Chinese’ means the descendants of Chinese, including the Hán and other sub groups that originated from China such as Hakka, Xạ Phang and Ngái who settled in the country before it gained national independence in 1945.

In 1974, during the height of the Cold War, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, visited Beijing, long considered a suspect country as a result of the two countries’ opposing ideological inclination, and thus belonging to different camps in the contestation for influence of the opposing blocs of countries. Little could Razak imagine that the bilateral relationship between the two countries would grow to a stage of closeness and interdependency that manifested over the past decade. During the past decade, China has grown to be Malaysia’s largest trading partner, and one of the principal contributors of direct foreign investment. These developments had inevitably started a new development in the bilateral relationship; namely, the influx of Chinese nationals to Malaysia. This development is interesting considering the historical background of the relations—from that of massive immigration of Chinese into the territories that formed present-day Malaysia. Chinese migration then came to a standstill with the taking over of China by the Chinese Communist Party as Malaya—and later, Malaysia—was fighting an armed insurgency led by the Malayan Communist Party, which was supported by the Chinese. This resumption of Chinese nationals moving to Malaysia has created some ripples, not least among the authorities but also among the public at large.

The rise of the People’s Republic of China that was precipitated by the introduction of the Open Door and Reformation policies since 1978 saw China transform itself from a backward, ideologically dominated country to a modern and economically powerful nation. This transformation process has also undergone changes from a gradual and experimental stage in the 1980s and 1990s to full-blown economic development that saw the country rising to be the fastest growing economy in the world. This transformation also brought massive changes to Chinese business enterprises from the state-owned enterprises that were not performing in line with the changing times to be the multinational corporate bodies that helped to spearhead stronger economic performance for China. In 2010, the country overtook Japan as the second-largest economy in the world. The introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 further strengthened the development of the Chinese economy and provided impetus for stronger economic performance.

Some people ask the question, “Why does Singapore need two Chinese cultural agencies?” Those who are aware of the chronology may ask, “Why is there a need to establish the Singapore Chinese Cultural Centre (SCCC) when there is already a China Cultural Centre (CCC)?” Associate Professor Eugene K.B. Tan posed a similar question on SCCC’s opening day: “Is there one Chinese culture or a variety of Chinese cultures? One might be confused, as there are now two Chinese cultural centres in Singapore in close proximity to each other.” This chapter seeks to answer these queries through a comparative study of these two models and attempts to define their roles more clearly in the hope that they can complement each other more effectively and benefit the local cultural scene.

Establishment

The CCC in Singapore, which was established and fully funded by the Chinese government, is one of thirty-five such centres worldwide. It is the thirteenth of the series, and third to be established out of the six currently in Southeast Asia. In 2009, former Chinese President Hu Jintao and Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong witnessed the signing of the memorandum of cooperation in setting up the CCC by both parties. The ground-breaking ceremony in the following year was officiated by then Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping and then Singapore Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong. That year also marked the twentieth anniversary of diplomatic ties between Singapore and China. Five years later, in 2015, Chinese President Xi and Singapore Emeritus Senior Minister Goh co-officiated the launch.

Unlike the CCC, the SCCC is unique as it was established by the non-government organization Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations (SFCCA). The idea was mooted by the SFCCA Council and presented by then Chairman Chua Thian Poh to Prime Minister Lee in 2012, who then announced government support. The SCCC was then incorporated by SFCCA the following year, and the ground-breaking ceremony officiated by PM Lee took place another year later, in 2014. In 2016, the cultural exhibition “Blossoms of Vitality, Colours of Life” premiered. In 2017, the Opening Ceremony was officiated by PM Lee, with the government partially funding the centre through the Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth (MCCY).

Locked in a tense geopolitical tussle, China and the United States have expanded their bitter rivalry into the soft power arena. In Malaysia, China’s increased presence is felt across the board: from trade investment and manufacturing to e-commerce and the digital economy. One of China’s recent initiatives to stand out has been the establishment of Xiamen University in Malaysia (XMUM), marking a milestone in education cooperation between the two countries. This chapter is a study of the XMUM project. It will look at the effect of China’s education outreach and examine the potential role of the overseas Chinese in shaping XMUM’s imprint on Malaysia and the wider region.

To set the context, the chapter begins with an overview of the soft power competition between China and the United States. Next is a review of the Sino-Malaysia relationship and the Chinese soft power projection in Malaysia. This is followed by a descriptive report on two key Chinese education projects in Malaysia; namely, the Confucius Institute (CI) at the University of Malaysia and the Xiamen University branch campus at Sepang.

The third part of the chapter will then develop three sets of evaluative arguments highlighting the XMUM’s importance and potential. The first will draw attention to XMUM’s broader significance beyond Malaysia; namely, China’s foray into the critical soft power arena—international higher education. The Xiamen move, I argue, signifies Beijing’s wider ambition to exert sway in this strategically vital sphere of influence that is still largely dominated by the West.

The chapter then makes the case that XMUM may also be transformed by its relocation to Malaysia. By moving out of the mainland, it could acquire features enabling the university to assume a wider role. One of these agents of change is the overseas Chinese factor. With a campus in Malaysia, Xiamen University is in fact returning to its Southeast Asia roots. Over time, XMUM is likely to re-embrace Malaysia’s multiculturalism and recapture the overseas Chinese traditional intermediary role. Transforming itself from a mere conduit of China soft power into a go-between institution, a two-way bridge linking China and Malaysia.

In the last two decades, the relationship between Indonesia and China has undergone a significant change. While in the past, particularly in the first two decades of the period of New Order Indonesia, the two countries had a tumultuous relationship, today their relations have been significantly enhanced. Such a good relationship began to develop in the year 2000, after President Abdurrahman Wahid entered his presidential term. President Wahid even made China the first country that he officially visited as the president. Since then, cultural exchanges between China and Indonesia have intensified, while their economic relations have increased unprecedentedly. Indonesia’s subsequent presidents have continued President Wahid’s friendly attitude towards China. In 2005, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (popularly known as SBY) signed a strategic partnership agreement with President Hu Jintao, an agreement that was followed by an influx of Chinese investments into Indonesia. Less than a decade later, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Jakarta in 2013, Indonesia and China signed another agreement that made both countries comprehensive strategic partners.

The above phenomenon has opened the way for much more frequent encounters between the Chinese and Indonesian people. Such encounters have not only occurred due to the increased visits by Indonesians to mainland China, but also as a result of the coming of Chinese people to this Southeast Asian country. In the last few years, people from mainland China have become among the largest groups of foreign visitors to Indonesia. While the majority of these people come for tourism, and hence only stay for a short period, a number of them arrive in the country for other purposes, including work, study and business. This latter group constitutes a group of ‘new Chinese migrants’ (xin yimin) in Indonesia.

These new Chinese migrants have a number of differences from the so called ‘lao yimin’ (old migrants), particularly in terms of levels of education, proficiency in the local language, values, and adaptability to the local situation. While the descendants of the Chinese old migrants have transformed into a major ethnic group—popularly known as the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia (Chinese Indonesians)—and have also had a high degree of interactions with other ethnic groups in the country, these new Chinese migrants are relatively alien to the majority of the Indonesian people, who are usually called the ‘pribumi’ (indigenous) Indonesians.

Ever since Hun Sen’s state visit to Beijing in 1996, ties between Cambodia and China—or more accurately, between Hun Sen’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—have only grown stronger. The state visit was a watershed moment. The Chinese had supported the Khmer Rouge regime (1975–78), while Hun Sen came to power under the auspices of China’s rival, the Vietnamese, who had pushed the Khmer Rouge forces towards the Thai border, and founded the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) (1979–89). The 1996 state visit not only signalled a rapprochement between China and Cambodia, but also China’s confidence that Hun Sen was Cambodia’s strongman in the making. The Chinese had invited Hun Sen but not Prince Rannaridh, whose Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif (FUNCINPEC) had formed an unstable coalition government with the CPP after the 1993 elections organized by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Perhaps encouraged by China’s backing, Hun Sen ousted Rannaridh in a coup de force in 1997. In June 2016, roughly two decades after Hun Sen’s state visit and around US$3 billion in Chinese loans and grants later (Veasna 2016), warm ties were once again reaffirmed. Reportedly, as it had done in 2012, Cambodia demanded that ASEAN tone down its statement on China’s disputed claim over the South China Sea, and a few days later China pledged another US$600 million in loans and grants (Hutt 2016a).

Political interdependencies have emerged alongside the influx of Chinese investments, businesses and economic migrants since the 1990s. Cambodia’s infrastructural development, including the construction of bridges, roads and hydropower dams, is largely undertaken by Chinese state-owned companies and financed by Chinese banks (Sullivan 2011). The majority of Cambodia’s garment factories, which account for over three quarters of total exports, are owned and managed by Chinese from ‘Greater China’ (i.e., mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau) (Ear 2016). China is the biggest investor in Cambodia, adding nearly US$5.3 billion between 2013 and 2017 (Hin 2019), and Chinese firms currently hold over forty Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) allocated for tourism development or the cultivation of crops such as rubber, sugar and cassava (LICADHO 2019).

Since Deng Xiaoping introduced his four modernization programmes in 1978, China has risen, and its impact on Southeast Asia has also been strongly felt. This chapter briefly examines the impact of the programmes on the nation-building process in Southeast Asia. It will begin with a general observation of the ethnic Chinese position in Southeast Asian multi-ethnic nations, followed by a discussion about xin yimin or new Chinese migrants in the region and beyond, and finally an explication of Beijing’s new approach towards Chinese living in five Southeast Asian countries and its impact. These countries were chosen based on the availability of information on xin yimin to the author.

Southeast Asian countries with majority indigenous populations regard their ethnic Chinese as ‘migrants’ or ‘descendants of migrants’. Therefore, they are expected to be integrated, even assimilated, into the indigenous population. However, some are more integrated into their host society than others. In other words, all have adopted different degrees of local elements—which have made them different from mainland Chinese. The factors that have contributed to the intensive localization of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia are complex. Apart from Southeast Asian government policies, Beijing’s initial policy of encouraging localization was undoubtedly relevant.

Shift in Beijing’s Policy on Chinese Overseas

The policy of the People’s Republic of China initially followed the Kuomintang (KMT) position, treating all overseas Chinese as Chinese nationals. But at the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung (also known as the Bandung Conference), Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai introduced a new policy later known as luodi shenggen (settle down and take local roots) to ease cooperation with the newly independent states in Southeast Asia and beyond. He encouraged overseas Chinese to take up local citizenship and integrate into local society. The majority of these ethnic Chinese have since become localized. In 1980, Deng Xiaoping issued the first nationality law based on single citizenship, which further encouraged Chinese overseas to localize and adopt local citizenship.

The rise of the Chinese following the success of Deng Xiaoping’s reform programme saw a new wave of migrants leaving China. Consequently, Beijing began adjusting its overseas Chinese policy.