Singapore commemorated the bicentennial of Thomas Stamford Raffles's establishment of a British station on this island with a yearlong series of blockbuster exhibitions and accompanying international conferences and ground-up events involving community and volunteer efforts. In contrast to the centennial of Raffles's arrival in Singapore, which was a celebration of the achievements of the Crown Colony that had grown out of the British station Raffles established, the bicentennial was a commemoration inviting Singaporeans to reflect on the two hundred years of their island's past in the long cycles of the preceding five hundred years of time. For many, this invitation was a challenge, as the prevailing and dominant public narrative of Singapore was that it had only a two-hundred-year history.

This template of Singapore having a two-hundred-year history started by Raffles was laid down by Raffles himself. On 8 January 1819, Raffles reported to Governor-General Hastings that his inquiries at Pinang indicated that Singapore “has been deserted for Centuries and long before the Dutch power existed in these Seas”. British colonial officials from Dr John Crawfurd (1783–1868) have confirmed this. The template was consolidated by generations of historians, from Raffles Professor of History Kennedy G. Tregonning and his colleagues at the History Department of the old University of Singapore in the 1960s through to the 1990s.

Crawfurd, as the second Resident of Singapore after William Farquhar, would be in a position to authoritatively state that “for a period of about five centuries and a half, there is no record of Singapore having been occupied, and it was only the occasional resort of pirates. In that year [1811], it was taken possession of by the party from whom we [the British] first received it, an officer of the government of Johore called the Tumângung. This person told me himself that he came there with about 150 followers, a few months before the British expedition which afterwards captured Java passed the island, and this happened in the summer of 1811.”

L.A. Mills was the first to establish the founding of Singapore as the beginning of a history of British Malaya, 1824–67.

This essay aims to provide a synopsis of the different types of sources that are available for the study of the history of Singapore in the period before circa 1800. The objective is not to provide a reconstruction of Singapore history as such, but rather to provide general comments and analyse the sources at hand. This chapter offers an opportunity to step back and share with you the experience I have gathered in identifying, handling and working with different types of sources over the past two decades. In this chapter I will take a closer look at what those different types of sources are able to inform, what their limitations are, and what they generally do not tell us. As the title suggests, the focus of the present expose is placed on Portuguese and Dutch textual materials broadly defined. This includes manuscript and published sources as well as cartographic specimens that touch on the island of Singapore, its surrounding waters, and the southern stretches of the Malay Peninsula.

Clearly, I am aware that I am not the first to work on these materials, specifically on Portuguese texts. Investigations were already conducted in the 1950s by Ian Alastair Macgregor at the History Department of the University of Singapore. Almost concurrently, Carl Alexander Gibson-Hill, the former director of the Raffles Museum of Singapore, was studying archaeological evidence, published travelogues and historical cartography. These two researchers made important contributions to the study at that point in time when access to primary sources dating from the early modern period (either in printed form or manuscript) was far more cumbersome and limited than it is today. Much later, in the 1990s, Paulo Pinto published a study, first in Portuguese and later in an updated English translation. He has mined the Portuguese sources to explore the relationship of the Portuguese with Aceh and Johor during the second half of the sixteenth and the opening two decades of the seventeenth centuries. This latter work, however, does not substantially touch on Singapore, and has failed to take into consideration certain Dutch and German language documents from the period under review. Its value is therefore somewhat limited.

The Orang Laut played a significant role in the history of the Straits. This area is centred on the Straits of Melaka and the islands, the seas and the straits at the northern and southern entrances of the Straits and at the southernmost end of the South China Sea. This world or Realm of the Straits (Negara Selat) gained prominence because of the vibrant east–west international maritime trade between Europe, the Middle East, India and Sri Lanka in the west and China, Japan, Korea and the Ryukyu Islands in the east. Southeast Asia lay athwart this trading lane, with the Straits of Melaka being the only known passageway for centuries. Even after the Sunda Straits between Java and Sumatra came to be used increasingly after the sixteenth century, the Straits of Melaka continued to be the most travelled maritime route through Southeast Asia. The waters of the Straits were generally calm, and the mountain chains running along both spines of Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula provided all-year protection from the annual northeast and southwest monsoon winds. Before entering and leaving the southern end of the Straits of Melaka, ships had to cross a dangerous stretch of waters from the southeastern coast of Sumatra to Singapore, the Riau-Lingga Archipelagos and the islands and straits of the southern end of the South China Sea. For this reason, the entire area was considered to be a single maritime unit and came to be referred to simply as “the Sea” or “the Straits”.

In the Raffles MS 18 version of the Sulalatus-Salatin, more commonly known as the Sejarah Melayu or Malay Annals, the Malay word “Laut” or sea is the term used for this maritime space. When the Palembang lord Sri Tribuana decided to leave permanently to go abroad, he said to his minister: “I want to go to the Sea (Laut) to look for a good place so I can build a settlement (hendak berankgkat ke Laut, hendak mencari tempat yang baik hendak beta perbuatkan negeri).” Once he left Palembang he crossed over to the Sepat Straits and from the Sepat Straits to the Sambar Straits.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • Agricultural products are one of Vietnam's most important exports, contributing considerably to the overall export turnover of the country.

• • Vietnam's agricultural exports are easily affected by external factors. It is overly dependent on the Chinese market, and its agricultural products do not as yet meet strict global standards.

• • Challenges facing Vietnam's export of fruits and vegetables to the Chinese market include technical barriers, long risk assessment periods, restrictions on products exported through official quotas to the Chinese market, and frequent changes in China's policy on border crossings.

• • The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the importance of market diversification to this sector.

• • To further develop its agricultural export sector, Vietnam needs to gather and consolidate information on import standards and guide its farmers on product quality requirements. Besides, efforts to gradually diversify its markets are essential for it to avoid being dependent on a small number of partners and markets.

• • Vietnam's participation in international organizations such as ASEAN, APEC, WTO, and AEC exemplifies its increasingly active efforts at seeking new development opportunities. The seventeen bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements which have been signed by Vietnam partly demonstrates efforts at achieving market diversification.

OVERVIEW OF VIETNAM's AGRICULTURE EXPORTS

Vietnam's agricultural exports play a particularly important role in the country's development, by generating employment, improving the quality of life for its farmers, and promoting social stability. Leveraging its comparative advantages in this sector, the country has emerged as one of the nineteen largest agricultural producers in the world, and aims to be among the fifteen largest agricultural exporters by 2030.

Its agricultural exports have steadily been increasing since 2009. The country's state-budget export turnover from 2009 to 2019 reached about US$321.5 billion, growing at an average of 10.9 per cent. As shown in Figure 1, Vietnam's export turnover for agriculture, forestry, and fishery products went from US$15.3 billion in 2009 to US$41.3 billion in 2019 (2.7 times larger).

In 2019, Vietnam's total export turnover reached US$264.2 billion, of which 15.6 per cent were from agricultural products. Fishery exports achieved the highest values, followed by fruits and vegetables, cashew, coffee, and rice (Table 1). Agricultural, fishery, and forestry exports in the first 11 months of 2020 reached US$37.42 billion, up 2.4 per cent over the same period in 2019 (US$36.52 billion).

As of 2019, Vietnam's agricultural products have been exported to over 180 countries and territories. The largest among these markets are China, the United States, European Union, ASEAN, and Japan, in descending order. Together these account for 80.6 per cent of Vietnam's total agricultural export turnover.

The United States is currently Vietnam's largest agricultural export market, accounting for 26.2 per cent of Vietnam's total agricultural export revenue in the first 11 months of 2020. It is followed by China at 24.6 per cent. See Figure 2.

VIETNAM's MAJOR AGRICULTURAL EXPORT MARKETS

The European Union

Vietnam's tropical weather provide favourable conditions for agriculture, and the potential to produce and export agricultural products to other continents is enormous.

The EU is the second-largest import market in the world and also a big market for Vietnam. However, exporting to the EU is challenging due to the bloc's high-quality requirements, which can be a big obstacle for Vietnam's exporters. It is thus very important for Vietnam to properly assess its current production model and find the right strategies for agricultural production, to facilitate its exports to the EU market.

Abstract

Food security has long been a contentious issue in Indonesia. As the country has graduated into the upper middle income group it still has to deal with ensuring people's access to food. The self-sufficiency ambition exacerbates this situation, as policies taken are often protectionist in nature, resulting in high domestic prices and thus hurting the poor, whose access to affordable food deteriorates. Now, the COVID-19 pandemic may further amplify food insecurity, leading to chronic hunger and lasting developmental challenges. We discuss the impact of the pandemic on Indonesia's food security by examining the global and regional food trade along with Indonesia's domestic food policies. We argue that the COVID-19 pandemic exposes the vulnerability in Indonesia's food systems, especially in terms of declining production trends, inadequate distribution capacity and trade limitations. Needed reforms include inviting more investment, supporting diversification of food supply, easing food trade flows and working with other countries to ensure regional food security.

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic is directly affecting food supply and demand globally, raising concerns over a potential food crisis on top of the existing health crisis. Mobility restrictions required to contain the spread of the virus disrupt the increasingly complex and interconnected food supply chain, from food production through processing, distribution and consumption, both domestically and globally. The disruption may result in food shortages, price spikes or price volatility that harms the livelihoods of people working in the supply chain and threatens food security, especially for the vulnerable poor. A joint report by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD), United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP) and World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that, in 2019, 690 million people or 9 per cent of the world's population went hungry, and the COVID-19 pandemic may push another 83 million to 132 million people into chronic hunger (FAO et al. 2020).

Food insecurity risks during and after the pandemic will hit hard in Indonesia where, even before the pandemic, 9 per cent of the population or more than 22 million people were undernourished between 2017 and 2019.

Abstract

In an increasingly complex environment of COVID-19, improving Indonesia's targeting system is needed more than ever. Both the poor and the bottom middle class need support during the current crisis. However, improving Indonesia's targeting system is technically and politically challenging. Support is needed from different stakeholders, and we need to ensure the system will improve the accuracy of targeting. Targeting accuracy could be improved by better collecting poor household data and better selecting the beneficiaries from those data. Better collection of data relies on ensuring the right households are surveyed. Accurately identifying the poor and the bottom half of the population from among those surveyed will lead to better selection of beneficiary households. Improving the selection method without improving the data collection will not improve the exclusion error. Improving data collection without improving the selection method will not address the changing environment. There are several choices in improving data collection and selection methods, each with different advantages. Because there is no best method for all situations, a mixed-method approach is recommended.

Introduction

COVID-19 is a double malady that creates not only health shocks but also economic shocks. In Indonesia, with businesses closed and largescale mobility restrictions imposed after the COVID-19 outbreak, the World Bank estimated 24 per cent of households’ breadwinners had stopped working by early May 2020 (Purnamasari and Ali 2020). Among household breadwinners who continued working, 64 per cent experienced reduced income and 32 per cent experienced food shortages. There was a significant improvement from May to August 2020, with only 10 per cent of breadwinners not working. Those experiencing food shortages also decreased, from 32 per cent to 24 per cent. Wealthier and female-headed households experienced faster improvement than others. However, 13 per cent of households are experiencing worsening food shortages, mostly in the poorest 40 per cent of the population and outside Java.

It is not only the poor who need help. Households in the bottom middle class are also experiencing hardship. Indonesia's major household social assistance programs are critical in providing a safety net for affected households. Via Presidential Regulation No. 72/2020, the Indonesian government has allocated Rp 203.9 trillion for various programs (Table 8.1).

Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic has afflicted the Indonesian economy significantly. The first half of 2020 saw a sizeable GDP contraction on the back of disrupted economic activities exacerbated by strict social distancing measures domestically and overseas. Prolonged weaker real sector activities will eventually lead to further distress in the financial sector. Unlike in other episodes of economic downturn that focus on stimulating demand, this unprecedented crisis requires the government to boost resources for pandemic containment measures, health care, and an emergency lifeline for poor and vulnerable families as well as businesses. As a result, the government has to confront unprecedented fiscal pressures from both spending and revenue sides. The fiscal deficit is likely to widen to a historical record in five decades. In this chapter we highlight Indonesia's fiscal policy in responding to the pandemic crisis and managing the economic recovery. More specifically, we underscore three main issues: (1) heightening fiscal pressures on the back of underperformed revenue collection and rising fiscal needs to contain and mitigate the pandemic crisis, (2) government strategies to finance the cost of the pandemic crisis and (3) lessons learned for future reform.

Introduction

Indonesia's economic fundamentals were in relatively good shape at the end of 2019. Higher volatility emerged in the global financial market as the United States – China trade war put pressure on the global economy. At the same time, escalating geopolitical tension created uncertainty over oil prices. Yet global economic conditions stabilised towards the end of 2019, trade tensions eased somewhat, and capital flows started to return to emerging markets, including Indonesia.

Pressures to the financial market eased significantly in the last quarter of 2019. The rupiah appreciated by 5 per cent between 31 May 2019 and 31 January 2020 and the ten-year yield decreased by 138 basis points during the same period. A calmer global financial environment is an important factor for countries such as Indonesia that are highly dependent on foreign flows to push economic growth above its potential.

Several reforms were underway, aimed at higher economic growth to escape the middle income trap by 2045, the anniversary of Indonesia's 100 years of independence.

Abstract

The COVID-19 crisis is one of the most serious challenges in Indonesia's 75-year history. It is testing all aspects of government and society, from health and social security systems to macroeconomic management and administrative capacity. The country's health system has struggled, owing to past underinvestment and inconsistent management during the crisis. Macroeconomic management has been more surefooted, although the fiscal stimulus has been comparatively small and initially slow to reach its intended recipients. The social impacts are still unfolding, reversing the past decades of declining poverty and unemployment. Nevertheless, through a combination of good luck and effective management, the overall economic impact on Indonesia is considerably less than most of its middle income Asian neighbours. The economic decline in 2020 is also much smaller than that experienced during the Asian financial crisis. Predictably, there have been substantial subnational variations in socioeconomic impacts, ranging from the steep decline in tourism-dependent Bali to much smaller impacts in more remote, lightly settled regions. There is so far little evidence that the Widodo administration will change policy directions in any fundamental way as a result of the crisis.

Introduction

The COVID-19 crisis is a defining event for the world. It is the most serious pandemic in a century, and the sharpest peacetime global economic contraction in 90 years. It is truly global, it was unanticipated (at least in the form that it took), and it is everywhere testing all aspects of government and society, from macroeconomic management and health systems to societal resilience and personal wellbeing. It is also occurring at a troubled time for the world, with the rise of populism, authoritarian leaders, democratic regression and a serious dispute between the world's two economic superpowers, and a concomitant weakening of cooperative global institutions and coordinated action to address pressing global economic, political and environmental challenges.

The COVID-19 crisis is also a perfect illustration of the phenomenon of John Kay and Mervyn King's (2020) ‘radical uncertainty’, of ‘unknown unknown’ events that are inherently unpredictable. Writing in the midst of the crisis (October 2020), with no immediate end in prospect, is a perilous exercise.

Abstract

An outbreak the size of the COVID-19 pandemic would surely significantly impact not only the economy but also human capital development. In Indonesia, however, the true size of this pandemic and its human capital impact is unclear since the number of COVID-19 tests has been low. In this chapter we attempt to estimate the true magnitude of the pandemic and outline a conceptual framework to understand channels from which the COVID-19 pandemic will affect human capital development, particularly in health and education, in Indonesia. We find that the number of casualties due to the pandemic could be much larger than those formally announced. The pandemic is expected to increase cases of other morbidities, maternal deaths, and less healthy babies and children. In the long run, there is evidence that a pandemic of this size could increase overall mortality cases.

Introduction

By mid-October 2020, there were around 349,000 formally confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Indonesia and the number of confirmed casualties was approximately 12,000. The pandemic has been spreading to all provinces and the numbers are increasing. Figure 10.1 shows the regional spread of COVID-19 by mid-October 2020. Most confirmed cases are in Java and the Bali Islands. This is understandable since about 58 per cent of Indonesians live in Java and the Bali Islands. Approximately 22 per cent of Indonesians live in Sumatra, but only 15 per cent of cases are on that island. It is predicted, hence, the spread of the pandemic in Sumatra is smaller than the spread of the pandemic in Java and the Bali Islands.

The spread of the pandemic in remote areas of Indonesia, Sulawesi and eastern Indonesia has been relatively equal to the proportion of the population in those areas. However, the number of cases in Sulawesi and eastern Indonesia has increased since July 2020. Hence there are indications that the speed of the pandemic spread in these areas was faster than in other parts of Indonesia between July and October this year. Health facilities and public health programs have been typically weaker outside Java and the Bali Islands, so there is a significant possibility that the pandemic might stay much longer in remote areas of Sulawesi and eastern Indonesia.

Abstract

Like in the Asian financial crisis of 1998, many jobs have been lost during the first year of COVID-19, especially for young people locked out of the labour market. The informal sector seems to have been hit much harder than during the Asian financial crisis, partly because of mobility restrictions and lockdowns. So too have industries heavily dependent on international markets, such as tourism and labour-intensive manufacturing, while non-tradeable transport and construction have also suffered badly. Nonetheless, despite the severity of COVID-19, the Indonesian economy and labour market are doing better than several more globally networked countries in Southeast Asia. Extensive use of the internet has facilitated work from home and skills development, such as through the new Kartu Prakerja (Pre-employment Card). The Unified Database has facilitated government help for the poor, despite delays in disbursals. However, the wide geographic spread of COVID-19 and its effect on labour supply makes support for jobs costly and uneven. Although off to a rocky start in October 2020, reforms seeking to promote investment and employment in the omnibus law Cipta Kerja have the potential to create better jobs during the recovery if managed more wisely.

Introduction

In the first six months of 2020 the spread of COVID-19 was already a severe setback to labour markets in countries across the globe (IMF 2020a). Indonesia has not been spared, with gross domestic product (GDP) growth declining by a huge 5.3 per cent in the second quarter of 2020. Measures to control the spread of COVID-19—social distancing, lockdowns and restrictions on mobility—that were introduced from April to June 2020, had significant effects on economic activity, which have been reflected in job and labour incomes.

In this chapter I explore Indonesia's labour market adjustments in the first eight months of 2020, covering the six-month period from March to August when COVID-19 spread across the country. It is clear that the impact of COVID-19 on jobs and hours of work—and hence on labour earnings—was already severe in the period of large-scale social restrictions (pembatasan sosial berskala besar, PSBB) from March to June 2020, even though the database for evaluating these effects on labour is slim.