The maps presented in this book are based on site-specific field studies, official datasets and online resources compiled by Karoline Kostka and Hans Hortig between October 2018 and April 2019. They are uniquely produced for this publication.

The authors gathered additional insights into the Singapore-Johor-Riau region during their work at the Chair of Architecture of Territory at the Singapore ETHCentre, Future Cities Laboratory (FCL), from 2013 to 2015. Further discussions and feedback from the editors Francis Hutchinson and Serina Rahman helped to shape the final version of the map sections.

The most significant sources for creating the base map that was used in the various sections are:

• • Open Street Map (OSM), Open source geo-referenced information, data retrieved in the period of October 2018 to April 2019.

• • Natural Earth, free vector and raster map data, https://www.naturalearthdata. com/downloads/ (accessed December 2018).

• • Johor State Structural Plan 2030 (Draft), Draf Gambarajah Utama Rancangan Struktur Negeri Johor 2030, http://geoportal.johor.gov.my/petaawam/rsnj2030 (accessed February 2019).

• • University of California San Diego, Institute of Oceanography, “Measured and Estimated Seafloor Topography”, https://topex.ucsd.edu/WWW_html/ mar_topo.html (accessed November 2018). The maps in each section are based on these sources, and then respectively adapted by data from the following sources.

Introduction

Malaysia and Johor

Global Administrative Areas. “GADM dataset of Global Administrative Areas”. https:// gadm.org/index.html (accessed November 2018).

Marineregions. “Maritime Boundaries—Exclusive Economic Zones”. http://www. marineregions.org/eezmapper.php (accessed January 2019).

Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency. “Malaysia Maritime Zone”. https://www. mmea.gov.my/eng/index.php/en/citizens-and-public/36-malaysian-maritime-zone (accessed November 2018).

Section 1: Economics

Mobility and Transport

Open Sea Maps. “Ferry Connections”. http://www.openseamap.org/index.php?id=openseamap&no_cache=1 (accessed November 2018).

Industries and Trade Regimes

Malaysian Investment Development Authority. “Infrastructure Support”. http://www. mida.gov.my/home/infrastructure-support/posts/?lg=EN (accessed November 2018).

Royal Malaysian Customs Department, “Zon Bebas”. http://www.customs.gov.my/ms/ pg/Pages/pg_fz.aspx (accessed November 2018).

Kostka, K., and H. Hortig. Mapping via Google Maps, Wikimapia, Bing Maps, October 2018 to April 2019.

Healthcare Facilities

Peta Kemudahan Kesihatan. Map of Health Facilities, GeoJohor Land Use Portal, http:// geoportal.johor.gov.my/en/petaawam/kesihatan (accessed November 2018).

Ormond, M., and C. Lim, C. 2018. The Private Healthcare Sector in Johor: Trends and Prospects. Trends in Southeast Asia, no. 17/2018. Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

INTRODUCTION

Housing development in Johor has undergone profound transformation over the last few decades. High-rise apartments are now a common sight in downtown Johor Bahru. Luxury enclaves, complete with gated security and leisure facilities, encroach on waterfront land along the Tebrau Strait. Foreign developers have built new townships on reclaimed land, exhorting international buyers to invest their future in the project as well as the rest of Johor. This chapter will examine housing policies and development strategies in Johor, especially those related to the establishment of Iskandar Malaysia (IM). The history of Johor's housing trends and its prospects in the near and medium term will also be analysed. This chapter argues that the launch of IM had a far-reaching impact not only on housing stock, but also on property ownership practices in Johor.

There are three main sections in the chapter. The first section focuses on housing provision and policy in Johor with an analysis of statistical data such as housing stock and distribution of income. The section will ascertain the manner in which the state government manages Johor's housing blueprint. It also discusses associated opportunities and challenges faced by the state government and housing developers, both private and government-linked corporations (GLCs).

The following section illustrates overall practices of housing development in Malaysia since independence. This section considers how housing is managed under national development plans, by-laws, and policies. We examine the major agendas and aspirations for housing in Malaysia and how housing provisions is carried out at both federal and state levels. We also look at the roles of the different layers of government and private developers in housing provision and how these roles evolved in tandem with global trends of economic liberalization. We then take a closer look at housing trends in southern Johor over the last decade, especially those related to the implementation of Iskandar Malaysia.

Acknowledging the rise of Iskandar Malaysia as a regional business hub and its profound impact on Johor, the third section adopts a grounded approach in presenting two case studies to make sense of the housing situation in the state. These projects are Medini Iskandar Malaysia (Medini) and Forest City, two of the largest housing projects within Iskandar Malaysia. It will also reflect on the rather different business models, architectural concepts, and development strategies of both projects.

INTRODUCTION

This volume has evaluated myriad aspects of Johor's current reality, setting out many of the key issues facing Peninsular Malaysia's southernmost state. It has illustrated in maps and words the workings of different sectors of Johor's economy, its unique political context, and the myriad social and environmental challenges it is facing.

This publication is the second in a series that focuses on the Singapore-Johor- Riau Islands or SIJORI Cross-Border Region (CBR). Unlike the first of the series, The SIJORI Cross-Border Region: Transnational Politics, Economics, and Culture, which takes Singapore as the anchor-point for the geo-economic entity, this volume on Johor and the third volume on the Riau Islands focus on the other two territories in the Cross-Border Region. They explore how these territories are influenced by their belonging to a larger political entity—Malaysia and Indonesia, respectively—yet are also shaped by their connections to their neighbouring territories.

While analysis on the SIJORI CBR may tend to be overly shaped by Singapore's influence, so, too, work on Malaysia and Indonesia can focus overmuch on the Klang Valley and Java, respectively. Consequently, these two tomes also seek to redress the geographic imbalance in the study of these two countries by deepening our knowledge of two economically vital but physically non-central territories.

One key date that both Johor and the Riau Islands share is 1990, when both territories sought to market their economies through the Growth Triangle, comprised of these two entities plus Singapore. The benefits of this partnership have been deep and far-reaching, as the economies of both the Malaysian and Indonesian territories underwent structural change on the back of heightened investment flows and the construction of cross-border production networks (Hutchinson 2015).

INTRODUCTION

Private higher education in Malaysia has seen robust growth since the introduction of the Private Higher Education Institutions Act (1996) (Act 555), which legalized these institutions. To transform Malaysia into a global higher education hub, as first outlined by the National Higher Education Strategic Plan (2007–20), the government has sought to offer a wide range of courses and programmes through private universities and colleges as well as international branch campuses with competitive tuition fees.

This chapter examines the development of EduCity, an integrated learning hub situated in Iskandar Malaysia in the state of Johor. The idea for an integrated learning hub built around multiple universities was first hatched in 2007, and in 2011 the first institution moved in. In exploring the challenges and underlying issues involved, this chapter aims to shed light on the private higher education sector in the country in general.

Several site visits were made to the EduCity campus and to the temporary city campus. On 17–23 August 2017, we conducted interviews with academics and administrators in the various universities and with policymakers. In addition, policy documents from the Malaysian government, Johor State government, Iskandar Regional Development Authority, and the respective universities were consulted.

The chapter first outlines how EduCity was conceptualized and discusses the role of EduCity Iskandar Sdn Bhd (EISB) as the “driver” and “owner” of EduCity. It then studies the huge challenges that the creation of an integrated learning hub involves.

JOHOR AND ISKANDAR MALAYSIA

Over the past five decades, the economic structure of Johor has evolved substantially. The state started off as an agriculture-based economy, as its flat and fertile land was well suited for the production of primary products for export such as palm oil, rubber, pineapple and coffee. But faced with volatile commodity prices in the 1980s, Johor sought to develop its manufacturing sector (Hutchinson 2012).

The Economic Plan for Johor (1990–2005) advocated greater commercialization of agriculture and encouraged more knowledge- and capital-intensive industries (UPEN Johor 1989). In the subsequent Johor Operational Master Plan (1996–2010), the service sector was added as a target growth area. This highlighted strategic investment in infrastructure and skill provision to foster high-value services (RMA Perunding Bersatu 1996).

This book has been three eventful years in the making. As we began to gather the stories, data and information that make up the pages of this publication, Malaysia was still under Barisan Nasional (BN) rule and under the leadership of Najib Razak. As our chapters began to take shape, the 14th General Elections captured everyone's attention, and some research findings were released to the public to share our perspectives. Then, the unthinkable at the time happened—BN was voted out and Pakatan Harapan (PH) took over the reins in Putrajaya, with Mahathir Mohamad once again Prime Minister at the age of ninety-two.

As Malaysia's people and myriad observers ran the gamut of emotions, expectations and critical reflection, we worked to amend our content to meet the changes of the day. Where possible, the writers tweaked content to include the unprecedented changes that were afoot and include projections of where the new regime might take the nation. The book was then sent to publication in 2019.

Just as the manuscript was going through the necessary processes of copyediting, proofreading and typesetting, however, political commotion erupted once again in Malaysia's halls of power. In what still remains a somewhat confusing turn of events, an attempted coup took place, Mahathir Mohamad resigned as Prime Minister, his own party, Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (PPBM or BERSATU) split into two, and the faction led by Muhyiddin Yassin pulled out of the PH coalition. The country was effectively without a government for eight days as various individuals sought an audience with the King for approval to regain or retain power. On 1 March 2020, Muhyiddin Yassin was sworn in as Malaysia's 8th Prime Minister, leading a loose coalition of previously ousted parties under the banner of Perikatan Nasional.

Following this, the COVID-19 pandemic effectively ground the world to a halt. At the time of writing this prologue, Malaysian borders are closed, barring selected export of goods to Singapore and highly controlled returns of Malaysians working, studying or living overseas. The nation is on its 64th day of various permutations and phases of Movement Control Orders (MCO), and many in Singapore (where this book is being published) are also working from home.

PLANES, TRAINS AND AUTOMOBILES

Malaysia is a monarchy—albeit one that is sui generis. Rather than following a single line of succession, the kingship rotates among a group of traditional rulers—or sultans—who head nine of the country's thirteen states. Although some of the sultanates predate the arrival of Islam in the region, they are now closely associated with the religion and have been a part of the Malayan peninsula's political context for 600 years.

During the precolonial and colonial eras, the rulers had a wide scope of prerogatives but many of these were relinquished during Malaysia's transition to independence. At present, the sultans are ceremonial rulers, and executive power rests with the prime minister at the national level, and chief ministers and menteris besar at the state level. That said, they are responsible for religion and Malay culture within their respective states, while their historic and symbolic importance as well as a number of constitutional provisions allow their influence to extend significantly further.

Over the past few years, these rulers have begun to assume a more visible role in the country's political life. In some states, they have chosen to withhold their consent for the appointment of menteris besar and, in Perak in 2009, the sultan played a decisive role in toppling the coalition in power (Faruqi 2010, p. 145). Collectively, the sultans have also weighed in on national-level issues such as the quality of governance and rule of law (Borneo Post Online, 7 October 2015).

Of the traditional rulers, the Sultan of Johor, Ibrahim Ismail, has been arguably the most notable. Part of his public persona revolves around his extensive collection of vehicles. He recently purchased a blue and gold 737 Boeing, which will be used to “promote Johor” and allow him to travel the world like his ancestors “who once travelled around in ships” (Star Online, 1 March 2016). He has also given another plane to the Johor soccer team, which is owned by his eldest son, the Crown Prince (Rakyat Post, 2 August 2016).

INTRODUCTION

In 1916, Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah, an Islamic religious scholar (ulama) from Sumatra, made a sneering remark about the Mufti of Johor.

Muftis are religious scholars whose role is to provide guidance to the Muslim community and issue fatwa (religious rulings). In Malaysia, Muftis are appointed by the Malay Rulers. Ideally, an alim (singular for ulama) must not blindly serve the interest of ruling elites; instead, they must be pious individuals who protect the interests of the religious community. Haji Abdul Karim's harsh words showed that he must have felt strongly that the Johor Mufti of his time had been falling far short of those ideals.

To be sure, Haji Abdul Karim and the then Johor Mufti came from rival schools of thought. Haji Abdul Karim was a key player in the reformist/modernist movement in Sumatra, which called for Indonesian Muslims to return to the fundamentals of the Quran and the hadith (sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad). The movement appealed for “pure” Islam in Indonesia, one that was erased of local beliefs coloured with mysticism and irrationalism.

The reformists’ position on theology, rituals and cultural practices was in fact quite similar to that held by Salafi-Wahhabi scholars. Salafism is a Sunni orientation that can be traced back to the theologian Ibn Taimiyyah (b.1263–d.1328). It urges Muslims to return to Islam's pristine past, and considers the first three generations after Prophet Muhammad's death as the ideal period for Islamic societies to copy. Salafis believe that ideas and scholarship generated by savants of these three generations should therefore be applied in contemporary social and political life. One of the main tenets of Salafism is its rejection of Islamic innovations. Its followers can however be either progressive or regressive in their religious outlook. For progressive Salafis, reliving the system of the first three generations after the Prophet means the upholding of its values and principles.

INTRODUCTION

The Iskandar Malaysia (IM) special economic zone (SEZ) was established in Malaysia's southernmost state, Johor, in 2006 and is now beginning its third and final phase of development, with a targeted completion in 2025. IM is jointly operated and regulated by the Malaysian federal government and Johor state government under the statutory body called Iskandar Regional Development Authority (IRDA), which is charged with the development of IM as a “strong and sustainable metropolis of international standing” (IRDA 2016a).

To do this, IRDA focuses on economic sector and infrastructural planning, the promotion of IM to the general public and potential investors, and coordinating and facilitating investment in the SEZ. It promotes nine economic sectors within IM: healthcare, financial and business services, tourism, education, logistics and creative services make up the service sector; while electrical and electronics, petrochemical and oil and gas, as well as food and agro-processing comprise the manufacturing sector.

From IM's inception in 2006 to mid-2016, the manufacturing sector (27 per cent), retail/mixed-development (26 per cent) and residential property segments (20 per cent) comprised the bulk of investment in IM, with the services sector accounting for only 8 per cent during that period (IRDA 2016a, p. 64). Healthcare made up only 1 per cent of total investment, or RM3.16 billion, in the same period (IRDA 2016a, p. 65).

Despite its relative insignificance in the SEZ's broader investment portfolio, healthcare—a driver for other health-related industries (e.g., biotechnology, medical devices and equipment, pharmaceuticals and education)—has been thought to be a steadier source of growth over the last decade than others that IRDA initially saw as significant growth catalysts (Whang and Lim 2016). This is due in part to healthcare functioning, like schools and transport, as a key infrastructural anchor and “enabler” to render retail/mixed-development and residential property development more attractive to investors and consumers.

In the following pages, we provide a contemporary snapshot of the key policies and players shaping the development of private healthcare in Johor in order to inform policymakers, current commercial stakeholders and potential investors, and residents and civil society actors in the region about the latest trends, concerns and opportunities linked to the private healthcare sector in Johor.

INTRODUCTION

In the southwestern corner of Johor, Malaysia's southernmost state—a new administrative capital has shot up. Nestled amid African oil palms and pockets of red earth where the trees have been peeled away, lies Kota Iskandar. Comprising the state parliament, the offices of the Chief Minister, as well as state and federal government agencies, these buildings bring together elements of Moorish-Andalusian and traditional Malay architecture. Close by and connected via large, but rather empty, boulevards are facilities—many partly owned by Malaysia's sovereign wealth fund Khazanah—such as private hospital complexes, high-tech industrial parks, and university campuses, all expectantly open for business.

A little further south, four islands are being reclaimed in the Johor Strait, the body of water which separates Peninsular Malaysia from Singapore. Backed by a large private Chinese real estate developer and the Sultan of Johor, the Forest City project is slated to house high-end apartments and a hotel, as well as a private hospital and international school catering to an estimated 700,000 residents. The marketing centre on the first completed island receives busloads of prospective buyers from China that are attended to by Mandarin-speaking sales staff. Barges carrying sand and gravel for the reclamation work constantly ply the Strait—encroaching on traditional fishing grounds and disrupting the livelihoods of nearby coastal communities.

Further east along Johor's coastline lies Johor Bahru, the state's economic capital, which is being extensively remodelled. Led by the state government, the revitalization encompasses restoring the historic centre, uncovering and beautifying a formerly submerged river, and building ambitious mixed-use developments. Work is also underway to connect down-town Johor Bahru to Singapore via a rapid transit system, in order to ease the daily commute of the estimated 300,000 people crossing to the city-state to work. When completed, Johor Bahru's urban core will be transformed, sparking interest in potential opportunities as well as unease about rising costs among residents.

Even further along Johor's coast towards the South China Sea, a 20,000 acre project, the Pengerang Integrated Petroleum Complex (PIPC), is being developed. Led by Malaysia's state-owned oil giant, Petronas, this sprawling compound will house an oil refinery, petrochemical plants, liquefied natural gas import and regasification facilities, as well as a deep-water port. Substantial stretches of coastline were cleared and five villages relocated to make this possible. The incoming labour force for the project has increased demand for local services in the area but also driven up rental prices.

INTRODUCTION

Until the shocking results in the 14th General Elections (GE-14) that saw the longruling Barisan Nasional (BN) being defeated in parliament and most states by the opposition coalition, Pakatan Harapan (PH) Johor was always regarded as BN's electoral bastion. Historically, Johor has the highest number of parliamentary seats contested and won by the two largest BN parties, namely the ethnic Malay-Muslimbased United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and its Chinese partner, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA). With a mixed racial make-up (60 per cent bumiputra, 33 per cent Chinese, and 7 per cent Indian), clear urban-rural divides, an influential royal house, and a growing and relatively industrialized economy (Hutchinson 2018, p. 2; van Grunsven and Hutchinson 2016), Johor is often deemed to be the bell-wether of BN's support, or rather, its “jewel in the political crown” (Reme Ahmad and Cheong 2017).

UMNO's strength in and dependence on Johor as its point of origin, a forging ground for leaders, and base of support has been convincingly documented (Hutchinson 2015b, 2018; Funston 1980). Yet, the same cannot be said for the MCA. The party's relative resilience in Johor, despite its notable decline from 2008 to 2018, remains unexplored. Its resilience can be seen from the fact that Johor MCA managed to hold onto most of its seats in the 2008 elections despite BN as a whole suffered massive losses nationwide. The importance of Johor can also be intimated from the fact that most MCA presidents are in some way connected to Johor—some for the fact that they are Johor-born (Neo Yee Pan, Chua Soi Lek); some for standing for office in the state (Lee San Choon, Ling Liong Sik); and almost all—with the exception of Tan Siew Sin, Tan Koon Swan, and Liow Tiong Lai, for having at some point of time been appointed chairman of the MCA Johor State Liaison Committee.

This chapter examines the MCA's electoral performance in Johor in relation to its history, Malaysia's national politics in general, the state's changing socio-economic landscape, and most importantly, the unique ethnic-pooling formula that worked in the MCA's favour. It argues that the MCA's fate in Johor, while at first secured by its local Chinese networks and affiliations, was soon undermined by the party's changing membership structure and the party's progressive loss of influence within BN, especially vis-à-vis UMNO.