The potential benefits of effective medium-term budgeting have been extensively documented. A well-designed and well-managed framework for medium-term budgeting contributes to better fiscal discipline and control, increased efficiency in resource allocation, and improved cost-effectiveness of service delivery by enhancing clarity in policy objectives, predictability in budget allocation, and accountability and transparency in the use of resources. For Cambodia, it starts with preparing the fiscal framework, now called the Medium-Term Macroeconomic and Public Finance Framework (MMPFF) that is aligned with global macroeconomic outlooks, RGC’s policy priorities, and revenue and expenditure trends.

The Budget System Reform Strategy (BSRS) describes three elements for forming the budget planning framework:

• 1. Medium-Term Macroeconomic and Public Finance Framework;

• 2. Medium-Term Budget Framework (MTBF); and

• 3. Budget Strategic Plans at ministries, institutions and provincial levels.

The MMPFF is currently used for the preparation of the budget law but is to be phased out and replaced by the Medium-Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF) between 2025 and 2027, starting at the commencement of the 2023 budget law preparation. The introduction of the MTFF and MTBF will strengthen medium-term budgeting in the annual budget process. These two tools will be critical for developing economic policy in Cambodia. The budget process operates on a three-year rolling basis, covering the budget for the immediate year and two years after, to ensure a truly medium-term outlook for budget planning.

3.1 MEDIUM-TERM FISCAL FRAMEWORK

The MTFF is a macroeconomic model that provides the basis to forecast growth by economic sector, inflation, interest rates, exchange rates and potential revenues and expenditures. These forecasts are based on assumptions of the sectoral interaction in the economy as well as the potential impact of shocks in the world economy. The reliability of the forecast is dependent upon the accuracy of the economic model and its assumptions, which attempt to reflect the actual status of the economy.

The MTFF will be part of a transparent planning and budget formulation process that will attempt to link government policies and priorities to resource allocation. It is designed to ensure overall fiscal discipline by setting fiscal targets and allocating the resultant resources to strategic priorities within these targets. The Rectangular Strategy (RS) and National Strategy Development Plan (NSDP) are the primary strategic policy inputs to the MTFF.

The MTFF sets out a fiscal strategy and fiscal policy stance by determining the total revenue and expenditure for the medium term.

Introduction

Muslim identity has become a discursive battleground in contemporary Indonesia. With over 229 million Muslims—that is, approximately 87 per cent of its total population, Indonesia is home to the world’s largest Muslim population. One of the most prevalent practices among Indonesian Muslims today, particularly those from urban areas, is to display their religious activities and traits on social media (Slama 2018; Weng 2018; Nisa 2018). In her study on the role of commercial television in mainstreaming Islam in Indonesia, Rakhmani (2017) posits that urban Muslims are experiencing a “spiritual anxiety”—that is, the desire to adopt a more Islamic way of life and behaviour, and seeking moral guidance through media content such as television shows. Notably, in today’s digital era, urban Muslims rely on social media for religious content such as watching YouTube sermons, following Instagram religious study groups, and streaming movies with Islamic values as they are easily accessible and offer audio-visual message delivery. Furthermore, more Muslims are utilizing social media as the technological and interactive capabilities of social media enable personal expressions and discussions of Islam, fostering a more individualized form of piety. To explain this new phenomenon, Bunt (2018, p. 1), in his book #Hashtag Islam, notes that contemporary expressions of Islam are increasingly relying heavily on digital media in which “faith, command, and control are manifest across complex systems of Muslim beliefs”.

According to Hefner (2010), the Islamic resurgence in Indonesia is part of a much larger religious resurgence in contemporary Asia. This spans from Catholic Filipinos converting to Pentecostal Christianity, the proliferation of meditation movements in Vietnam, to the increasing number of Buddhists in China despite the country’s secular Marxist- Leninist ideology. Interestingly, in all three cases, social media plays a crucial role, serving as a platform for individuals to display their piety, interact and exert influence on one another. A similar trend can also be observed in the Arab world where a group of young, middle-class, pious urban Muslims known as GUMmies (Global Urban Muslims) demonstrate how to live a modern, global lifestyle in an Islamic manner on Instagram (Zaid et al. 2022).

With the rise of digital Islam in the post-Suharto era, van Bruinessen (2013) speculates a conservative turn transpiring in Indonesia’s mainstream Islam. In this context, “conservative” refers to religious views that conform to existing dogmas and societal structures.

Introduction

The puritan form of Islamic ideology, salafi-jihadism, sanctions the use of violence to accomplish its objective of erecting an Islamic state that enforces the ideals of Salafism, which calls for a return to the Prophet’s puritanical teachings as exemplified in his hadith (oral and practical traditions), sunna (trodden path), and the lives of his companions and al-salaf al-salih (pious predecessors), i.e. early generations of Muslims who survived Muhammad (peace be upon him) until three-hundred years of his death. Underlying the violence approved by terrorist network Al-Qaeda’s jihadist ideology was its indiscriminate call to kill both civilian and military enemies anywhere in the world, thus catapulting armed jihad to the global stage (Amin 2014, pp. 118–19). Salafi-jihadism became the driving doctrine behind the active recruitment of jihadist fighters into Al-Qaeda franchises all over the world and large-scale movements of transnational jihadist funds (Hegghammer 2009, pp. 251–57, Zulkarnain and Nordin 2013, pp. 22–25).

The rise since mid-2014 of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a terrorist group otherwise known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Islamic State (IS) or Daesh (after its Arabic acronym), at one point seemed to have eclipsed other manifestations of global Islamist violence. ISIS’s notoriety was attributable to, among other things, its spectacular brutality, territorial gains, and apocalyptic ideology. ISIS intentionally employed violence as a political weapon and showcased grisly online images to cow populations under its control and convince the large viewing public of its invincibility. What many did not realize was that ISIS tapped into sentiments that had been fostered by extremist policies of many Muslim governments and leaders themselves as an outgrowth of decades of authoritarian rule following post-colonial upheavals in many Muslim societies. The lack of a civic culture and human rights regime in Muslim polities is legitimized by the identification of such forms of governance with secular, liberal, and hence ungodly values, driven as it is by a bipolar view of the world pitting the umma against belligerent forces. In ISIS, Muslims were lulled into believing that a promised utopia was in the offing, underlined by its territorial control and imposition of a political order ostensibly based on Islam, and fuelled by eschatological convictions founded upon a misreading of Prophetic traditions dealing with events near the end of time.

ISIS’s violent ideology drew support from a handful of Muslims in Southeast Asia.

Introduction

Following its democratic transition in 1998 which saw the lifting of the state’s grip on religious affairs, there is a broad scholarly agreement that liberal and progressive Islam in Indonesia is on a decline (Fealy 2019; van Bruinessen 2013). Taking advantage of this political opening in the post-Suharto era, Islamist actors have expanded their influence with their majoritarian agenda to normalize religious conservatism at the expense of the country’s pluralist fabric (Hefner 2021; Jones 2021) and challenge liberal Islamic intellectuals’ “power to define the terms of [religious] debate” (van Bruinessen 2013, p. 4). However, under the Joko Widodo presidency whose political platform embraces religious pluralism, the government has pushed back on Islamism, albeit accompanied by repressive measures, relying on heightened government authority (Mietzner 2018; Fealy 2020; Setijadi 2021). This development is closely associated with the broader trend of “democratic backsliding” or “illiberal turn” under the Widodo government (Power and Warburton 2020; Diprose et al. 2019). Scholars argue that the political elites today are creatively implementing “authoritarian innovations” (Curato and Fossati 2020) to assist such developments, among which increasingly prominent is the use of social media campaigns to stifle opponents and critics as well as to justify controversial government policies (Wijayanto and Berenschot 2021; Sastramidjaja and Wijayanto 2022).

Under such conditions, I argue in this chapter that proponents and sympathizers of liberal Islamic activism have found a new life by incorporating new forms of online media and adapting to the political opportunities, evolving into frontline critics in the war against religious conservatism on cyberspace. In the process, these “digital anti-Islamist activists” as I frame them which include members of the renowned but now-inactive Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islamic Network, JIL) community, have managed to amass substantial online followings as opinion leaders, spreading their views through highly polemical rhetoric by attracting mainstream media coverage and rattling the Islamist communities and grassroots. In an era characterized by political polarization and democratic regression, however, the use of polarizing rhetoric and prioritizing the defence of the Widodo government’s controversial policies have invited scrutiny from the other end of the spectrum of civil society, which emphasizes the preservation of democratic principles.

Based on digital ethnography and original data obtained through interviews, the following sections will shed light on the current wave of resistance by liberal Islamic activists against Islamism, which has unfolded in the digital realm.

Over the years, two broad groups have shaped Islam in Indonesia: (1) the pluralists and (2) the conservative Islamists. Contestations between the two groups have coloured Islam throughout the country’s history. Scholars normally associate the pluralists with the leaders of secular nationalist parties, Muslim intellectuals in the New Order regime, and members of the two largest Muslim mass organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. These actors imagine Indonesia to be an inclusive nation embracing ethnic and religious diversity, and promoting equal standing among Indonesian citizens. By contrast, the Islamists include leaders of Muslim mass organizations or parties influenced by transnational Islamic movements aiming to Islamize the state and Indonesian society.

I argue that in Indonesia, the pluralists have been the more dominant actors in the public sphere, though their Islamist rivals somewhat challenge their authority in this digital age. The pluralists have made Indonesia a religiously neutral state and an inclusive society. Scholars argue that the pluralists’ dominance results not only from their intellectual capacity to harmonize Islam and civic pluralism, but they are also well-funded and receive support from the state. Robert Hefner’s (2000) study on Civil Islam is correct. During the New Order period, the role of Muslim intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid (Cak Nur) and Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) in promoting moderate Islam was crucial in the pluralists’ triumph.

This trend continues during the post-New Order era. Here, I refer to the people’s moral opposition towards religious intolerance and sectarianism. This component, I believe, has been more visible in recent years, and it is a positive development in Indonesian Islam. It has helped Indonesia’s civic pluralism thrive amidst heated religious tension in Indonesia’s recent political history.

The thoughts of Abdurrahman Wahid, Nurcholish Madjid, and Syafi’i Maarif (Buya Syafii) remain essential and relevant to the current state of Indonesian Islam, defying some arguments that Indonesia is experiencing a “conservative turn”. Many have admitted that there was not much difference in the three figures’ thoughts despite coming from different cultural and organizational backgrounds. They grew up and emerged out of three mainstream Muslim communities in the country.

Like a locomotive, the three pulled the large traditional Muslim carriage into the modern era that cherishes inclusivity and diversity, and thus placed Islam as an important source in building modern Indonesia. They prioritized Islam in substance rather than form, especially in the context of building the nation and state.

Due to its strategic location, maritime Southeast Asia serves as an economic hub that connects the East and the West, with the Straits of Malacca serving as an important route for business access. Maritime Southeast Asia remains essential today, if not more significant, as the economies within the region continue to grow faster than many other regions in the world. Its strategic location and the advancement of its combined economy make the region a premiere meeting point, offline and online, for many people worldwide as more people look for investment opportunities and leisure activities in more prosperous Southeast Asia.

Apart from its economic and strategic positioning, maritime Southeast Asia is a significant area for analysis as the region also serves as a hub for the cross-pollination of ideas. During the Cold war period (1945–91), Southeast Asia became the battleground for the forces of neo-liberal capitalism and communism. But an equally interesting scope of scholarly interest is the development and exchange of religious ideas, particularly concerning Islam. Azra’s (2004) study The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia, among others, remain one of the most important contributions capturing the network of Malay-Indonesian and Middle Eastern ideas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Maritime Southeast Asia is home to the largest Muslim society in the world, namely Indonesia. Eighty-nine per cent of its 281 million people are Muslims. However, the community is not homogenous, depending on where they live, and the extent to which they immerse cultural and ethnic influences into their religious life. Some would reckon that the country is also changing, from one that was referred to as the smiling face of Islam to one that is currently experiencing a conservative turn (Van Bruinessen 2013; Feillard and Madinier 2011); or a hotbed of political Islam and radicalism (Ayoob 2008).

Maritime Southeast Asia is also home to the relatively homogenous and traditional Islamic polity of Brunei Darussalam, which ties the concept of the monarchy to Islam and Malay culture. Based on its 2021 census, Brunei has a population of 333,600 citizens, 89 per cent of which are Malays (Department of Economic Planning and Statistics, Brunei 2023).

Internet-based schisms within the most prominent Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), have been a subject of interest among scholars, particularly between two factions: NU Garis Lurus (NU Straight Brigade) (Iqbal 2020) and NU Garis Lucu (NU Funny Brigade) (Hoesterey 2021). In the 2015 NU congress held in Jombang, East Java province, these social groups competed for power. NU activists who felt that NU was more liberal, established the NU Garis Lurus and campaigned through conservative social media outlets. Their sympathizers ran for NU’s top post, challenging chairman Said Agil Siradj, an NU veteran activist seen to be promoting liberal ideas. Running in the election provided NU Garis Lurus with a platform to increase its influence within the organization. Through the media, they expressed a barrage of criticism that NU leaders had given in to Western ideas of secularism, pluralism, and liberalism (SEPILIS) (Rohman 2020, pp. 269–71).

Alarmed by NU Garis Lurus’ influence, the NU liberal camp fought back. Young activists at NU established the NU Garis Lucu, a social media community that “used satire and humour to temper the accusations of NU Garis Lurus and to mobilise social media as a uniting force within Nahdlatul Ulama and Indonesia more broadly” (Hoesterey 2021, p. 85). These youth activists demonstrated that the anti-NU Garis Lurus movement did not represent NU’s structure. Hence, the dispute between NU Garis Lurus and NU Garis Lucu is not a social dispute that pits “structural NU” against “cultural NU”; rather, the dispute is an internal schism among the different factions within NU. “Structural NU” refers to a group of NU activists whose members assume formal positions in NU’s organizational structure and who are therefore influential among NU members. On the other hand, “cultural NU” refers to a group of NU activists who do not assume formal positions in NU’s organizational structure, but they wield considerable influence among NU members due to their expertise in Islam or their exemplary behaviour.

These kinds of discourse contestations among different camps within NU are old contestations that are translated, emphasized, and amplified through new platforms such as social media, in addition to mainstream media. This internal contestation is not novel in NU. Political schisms are not unusual and are most evident during the NU congress which is held every five years. One notable schism occurred ahead of the 1984 congress.

Introduction

Islam is closely tied to the cultural identity of Singapore Malays. Based on the 2021 census report, the Malays constitute 15.1 per cent of Singapore’s 5.5 million population (“Population in Brief 2021” 2021), of which 98.0 per cent profess Islam. The religious elite—the ulama (Islamic religious scholars), religious teachers, and preachers—wield significant influence on the religious community regarding spiritual matters. However, their authority has been somewhat challenged in the new media and digitization age. What does this mean for their future and the quality of religious discourse in Singapore? This chapter focuses on the movers and shakers of the Singapore Malay/Muslim community’s religious discourse and outlook.

As the religious elite ride on new digital mediums of instruction, they easily migrate from the traditional print, radio, and television platforms to the new digital ones. They utilize the Internet and have become social media savvy. Consequently, the local religious elites must venture beyond conventional ways of preaching and compete with preachers from different parts of the world as religious learning is no longer confined to the mosques and madrasahs. The pressure to apply new forms of preaching does not apply to Islamic elites only. According to Naim (2013), the rise of new Pentecostal and charismatic churches has also redefined religious authority in Christianity. He also argues that while the arrival of these micropowers does not undermine traditional authority, the “big players” can no longer take their power for granted (ibid., pp. 196–97).

However, I contend that the religious elite’s digital ventures are not necessarily accompanied by shifts in their thinking. The dominant religious orientation continues to manifest traditionalism. This orientation is now ushered by capitalism and populism, presented and repackaged with sophistication via the new media, and sustained by the growth of the Muslim middle class. The middle class riding on Islamic symbolic commodities and reaping financial incentives to raise their social positions (Muzakki 2008, p. 205) further complicates any possibility of reform. Significant changes in the discursive arena are further slowed by state policies that accord the asatizah (religious teachers) the sole authority to speak on Islamic matters. Through occupational licensing, this legitimacy given to the theologians resulted from the state’s attempt to tackle radicalism through the religious lens. Yet, moderate Islam discourse ignores attention to other aspects of modernization and development: tackling irrationalism and addressing inequality.

Introduction

In discussions on trending Islamic ideas, focus has been given to the role of charismatic personalities or popular mediums, namely the Internet and social media, but not on the role played by administrators. In Malaysia, the role of public administrators is equally important, especially on matters related to Islam, as religion has become intertwined with public policy. Malaysia’s civil service is estimated to employ a million staff members, and for a country with a population of 32.7 million, the number of civil servants signifies “strength and influence” (Ahmad Faiz Yaakob et al. 2012, p. 133). Majority of the civil servants are Malay by ethnicity and this does not accurately reflect Malaysia’s multiethnic composition. According to Malaysia’s 2020 census, the three major ethnic groups in the country are Malay or Bumiputera (69.4 per cent), Chinese (7.3 per cent), and Indian (0.7 per cent) (Launching of Report on the Key Findings Population and Housing Census of Malaysia 2020).

Prijono Tjiptoherijanto (2012) states that the “indigenous Bumiputeras which are largely ethnic Malays” have “87 per cent of government jobs”. Prijono further adds that “the biggest loser in the current system is Indians, who, according to government statistics make up 9 per cent of the labor force but hold 16 per cent of menial jobs and control just 1.2 per cent of equity in registered company in the country”. In 2022, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) admitted that 89.23 per cent of the top posts in Malaysia’s public service are Malay, and that those from Sabah and Sarawak are also least represented (Malaysiakini 2022).

As most civil servants are Malay-Muslim, scrutinizing their role and impact in society is important, especially since those serving in religious institutions are also considered civil servants. Moreover, religious authorities have been allocated a large amount of funds from Malaysia’s national budget. The previous administration provided a RM1.5 billion budget allocation for the management and development of Islam, and this was heavily criticized especially since the religious authorities are regarded as largely incompetent (Imran Ariff 2021).

This chapter aims to analyse the significance of a Malay-Muslim dominant civil service. Arguably, as Muslims, the Malays are very much influenced by current Islamic trends. The civil servants’ way of thinking about certain issues can be carefully predicted according to contemporary trends.

Introduction

To appreciate contemporary trends, one must appreciate historical origins, for they continue to define and influence the evolution of religious observance. Thus, there is a need to understand the ways in which Islam initially came into what is now Southeast Asia, especially the power of trade and proselytization in precolonial times, the impact of European colonial competition and imperial administration, followed by the impact of postcolonial nation-building.

Although only three countries in Southeast Asia have Muslimmajority populations, the narratives of Muslim-minority communities form a vital part of Southeast Asian Islam. For example, there are the Rohingya in Myanmar, the Chams of Cambodia, the Muslims in the former Sultanates of Pattani or Maguindanao, and the Malays in Singapore.

Proper treatment of this topic also demands a thorough grounding of regional geopolitics and an intimate knowledge of the domestic politics within specific countries. The nexus between religion and politics has grown in intensity all around the world, even in nominally secular countries such as the United States or India. Whether one is referring to evangelical Christianity, resurgent Hindutva, or Islamism allied with ethnic supremacy, we can see how almost every area of public policy has become infused with religious rhetoric: in justifying national budgets, tax policy, education policy, international relations, trade rules, housing and neighbourhood regulations, abortion rights, regulation of Islamic Finance which now includes fintech, and the administration of justice itself.

This edited volume showcases some of the emerging trends in Southeast Asian Islam. There are many ways of reading this book: one may choose to read the chapters to have a deeper understanding of the trends surrounding Islam in specific countries in the region—mainly Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei—or one can compare cases across state boundaries given that all these societies are now confronted with a new mode of religious transmission in the form of social media. The faithful are no longer studying religion solely from the mosque or madrasah, but they are doing so through the Internet and social media platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Tik Tok.

Malaysia

I am rather inspired by Professor Komaruddin Hidayat’s incredibly insightful piece on Indonesia (Chapter 2), so this Foreword will focus on Malaysia.

Malaysia was known for a long time as a tolerant Muslim country, and there were many affirmations of this.

Introduction

According to Fox (2010, p. 355), “Recent years have seen a growing interest, both scholarly and otherwise, in the intersection of religion and media. Much of the commentary has been organised around the idea that, as media have taken on the role of a public religion, contemporary religious life has become suffused with sensibilities that derive from television, popular films, and the Internet”. In maritime Southeast Asia, particularly the Muslim-majority societies, popular culture has become part of everyday lived Islam. Sounds and images about Islam abound in contemporary popular culture in the form of films, music, television, radio, comics, fashion, magazines, and social media. However, along with the development of modern and increasingly accessible modes of communication come broad implications for what gets articulated in the public sphere. Eickelman and Anderson (1999, p. 14), for instance, describe how as the role of the media has increased, the gatekeeper role of nation-states has decreased, and as a result, more people have gained access to redefining Muslim thought.

The most potent entity of this expanded mediascape is the Internet and social media. Bunt (2009, p. 1) states that many Muslims, in both majority and minority contexts, are relying on the Internet as the primary source of news, information, and communication about Islam. He uses the term “cyber-Islamic environment” (CIE) to describe this digital space that represents the diversity of “varied Muslim worldviews within the House of Islam”. He also notes that the new media culture that emerged recently has led to the creation of new concepts such as “e-jihad” (“Electronic Jihad”), which presents itself in myriad forms such as promoting militaristic activities or coordinating peaceful protests.

Similarly, on the role of social media, Ibahrine (2014, p. 37) argues that the impact of social media on “religious behaviours of individuals and communities in environments characterized by conservatism and traditionalism, will be even more profound than in environments characterized by liberalism and openness”. He notes that many Islamic scholars today are highly enthusiastic about using social media to spread their messages as they recognize the power of these platforms to engage with a bigger audience. In fact, proselytization on social media is not limited to religious leaders but is also done by ordinary Muslims who often post Qur’anic verses and hadith (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) on their social media accounts.

Introduction

A religious orientation can be broadly defined as a mode of thinking in relation to religion. According to Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge which stipulates that ideas need to be understood within a given socio-historical context, a religious orientation can be more specifically defined as a socio-historically conditioned mode of thinking of a given community or group of people. Religious orientations do not function in a vacuum and can be affected by the political and economic order which governs a given society or community, or the social positioning, roles, functions, and milieus of the group or community in question. For example, the religious orientation(s) of Muslims in Singapore and Malaysia have been affected by feudalism, colonial capitalism, and neoliberal capitalism.

However, change constantly occurs, and the forces affecting religious orientations today may differ. When Karl Marx expounded his critique of capitalism, he studied the scientific and technological advances of his time—steam engines and machines—which are considered rudimentary by today’s standards. Instead, today, society is moving towards a new form of capitalism whereby technological and scientific advances have necessitated that artificial intelligence, automation, and bio-technological inventions dominate. As such, we are moving towards a form of capitalism that leverages data as a product, tool, and currency to fuel profits and give advantages to organizations and individuals.

This new form of political economy is called surveillance capitalism, which can be defined as a “new form of information capitalism which aims to predict and modify human behaviour as a means to produce revenue and market control” (Zuboff 2015). It has been further characterized as “the unilateral claiming of private human experience as free raw material for translation into behavioural data” which are then “computed and packaged as prediction products and sold into behavioural futures markets” (Laidler 2019). Companies like Meta, Google, Twitter, TikTok, and other technological giants and even smaller players are the surveillance capitalists in this new political economy. Governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are also involved in using surveillance capabilities developed in the commercial sector even though they might not reap profits from these capabilities (Faris 2022).